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This study dwells on the fact that, on one hand, men draw by themselves their historic trajectories and that, on the other, they develop as a result, a critical discourse which aims to be performative. It is the heterogeneous set of texts – novels, university researches, films, political speeches… – which embody this discourse that it labels as "writings of responsibility". Taking Africa as a case in point, the study intends to grapple with the modalities along which these writings address the question of responsibility. The study shows that this question is intimately linked to that of identity, which brings about some consequences. Besides, the needs of Realpolik which are not always connected with identity issues, also intend to inform the modalities whereby these writings are shaped. So, the question is how the writings of responsibility will react.Generally, whether these writings are about genocide, memory, reconciliation policies, about Africa or other places; they betray the coexistence of multiple positions and they contradict one another as well. For an example, the negationist texts cohabit with reconciliation discourses. The study concludes that, among the heterogeneous writings, some are capable of bringing constructive responses to the question of responsibility. To identify them and apply what they offer is just a question of will. It also concludes that Africa is not that unique as it seems: the writings that deal with this continent appear to behave like any other. ; Cette étude revient sur le fait que, d'une part, les hommes dessinent eux-mêmes leurs trajectoires historiques et que, d'autre part, ils tiennent là-dessus un discours critique et qui se veut performatif. C'est l'ensemble hétéroclite des textes – romans, travaux universitaires, œuvres cinématographiques, discours politiques. – qui délivrent ce discours qu'elle désigne par « écritures de la responsabilité ». A partir du cas de l'Afrique, elle se propose de saisir de manière globale les modalités selon lesquelles ces écritures posent la question de la responsabilité.L'étude montre que cette question est intimement liée à celle de l'identité, ce qui n'est pas sans conséquence. D'autre part, les besoins de la Realpolik qui ne se confondent pas toujours avec les enjeux identitaires veulent également informer les modalités selon lesquelles ces écritures se réalisent. Toute la question est alors de savoir comment elles vont réagir.D'une manière générale, que ces écritures portent sur le génocide, la mémoire, les politiques de réconciliation, sur l'Afrique ou d'autres lieux, elles trahissent la coexistence de positions multiples et qui se contredisent les unes les autres. Pour exemple, les textes négationnistes côtoient les discours de la réconciliation. L'étude en conclut que parmi la masse hétéroclite de ces écritures, il en existe qui sont capables d'apporter des réponses constructives à la question de la responsabilité. Les identifier et appliquer ce qu'elles proposent n'est finalement qu'une question de volonté. Elle conclut également que l'Afrique n'est pas aussi singulière qu'elle ne paraît : les écritures qui s'intéressent à ce continent se comportent finalement comme toutes les autres.

This study dwells on the fact that, on one hand, men draw by themselves their historic trajectories and that, on the other, they develop as a result, a critical discourse which aims to be performative. It is the heterogeneous set of texts – novels, university researches, films, political speeches… – which embody this discourse that it labels as "writings of responsibility". Taking Africa as a case in point, the study intends to grapple with the modalities along which these writings address the question of responsibility. The study shows that this question is intimately linked to that of identity, which brings about some consequences. Besides, the needs of Realpolik which are not always connected with identity issues, also intend to inform the modalities whereby these writings are shaped. So, the question is how the writings of responsibility will react.Generally, whether these writings are about genocide, memory, reconciliation policies, about Africa or other places; they betray the coexistence of multiple positions and they contradict one another as well. For an example, the negationist texts cohabit with reconciliation discourses. The study concludes that, among the heterogeneous writings, some are capable of bringing constructive responses to the question of responsibility. To identify them and apply what they offer is just a question of will. It also concludes that Africa is not that unique as it seems: the writings that deal with this continent appear to behave like any other. ; Cette étude revient sur le fait que, d'une part, les hommes dessinent eux-mêmes leurs trajectoires historiques et que, d'autre part, ils tiennent là-dessus un discours critique et qui se veut performatif. C'est l'ensemble hétéroclite des textes – romans, travaux universitaires, œuvres cinématographiques, discours politiques. – qui délivrent ce discours qu'elle désigne par « écritures de la responsabilité ». A partir du cas de l'Afrique, elle se propose de saisir de manière globale les modalités selon lesquelles ces écritures posent ...

At the end of 1906, polemicist Maximilian Harden launches in his review Die Zukunft a campaign against the close circle of Emperor William II, especially Prince Eulenburg & Count Moltke. Begins one of the most serious internal crisis of the imperial regime. Germany, claims Harden, is governed by "unhealthy degenerate homosexuals" that pervert the emperor & lead him to weakness towards France. The strategy of the polemicist consists in sparing the sovereign (avoiding the lese-majesty crime) & focusing its attacks on the "incapable" counsellors. Some slander trials ensue. This paper suggests an interpretation of such an affair as the expression of a growing conflict within the Wilhelmian regime between a court society, based on favours & secrecy, & an information society, based on public argumentation & public production of proofs. The antagonism between the notions of culpability & dishonour, respectively repared by proceedings & duel, clearly reveals this tension, just like the opposition between public discourses (Harden's diatribes or Chancellor Bulow's pleas) & the logics of silence (sovereign silence of the emperor or Eulenburg & Moltke's words of honour). Adapted from the source document.

I. Main articles. La Justice comme guide d'orientation de l'éthique théologique / Heinrich Bedford-Strohm -- La Justice comme guide d'orientation de l'éthique théologique / Jered Kalimba -- "The first theological-ethical doctrine of basic human rights developed by a twentieth-century German Protestant theologian": Dietrich Bonhoeffer and human rights / Christine Schliesser -- Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the struggle for human rights in the context of Africa / Byaruhanga Ruokoo Archangel -- La confession de culpabilité et chemin vers la reconciliation / Pascal Bataringaya -- Culpability confession as a way to reconciliation: it can start, but it can only start with Bonhoeffer / Jannika Haupt -- Peace as a central task for Christians: bringing about peace in the work of Dietrich Bonhoeffer and its importance for current ethics / Clemens Wustmans -- Peace as a central task for Christians in the light of Dietrich Bonhoeffer's peace ethics with a special focus on churches and peacemaking in Tanzania / Abednego Keshomshahara -- Responsabilitéet Courage civil: Fondamentaux de l'éthique de Dietrich Bonhoeffer / Traugott Jähnichen -- Church as "church for others"?: reflections on the role of church in society and the relevance of society for the shape of church / Kai Horstmann -- Ecumenism and the future of the church / Ulrich Möller -- L'Oecumenisme: L'avenir de l'Eglise / Vincent Muderwa Barhatulirwa -- II. Theological impulses, experience reports & mediations. Expériences de réconciliation et responsabilité pour la paix dans le contexte allemand / Albert Henz -- Reflections on commemorative practices in Rwanda and Germany / Katharina Peetz -- The question of guilt and confession of the young generations after the genocides in Rwanda and Germany: an experience report / Christine Jürgens, Maximilian Schell -- Meditations / Samuel Mutabazi, Helmut Keiner, Thérèse Mukamakuza, Jan van Schaardenburgh -- Jörg Zimmermann -- III. Closing word & final statement. Mot de cloture / Elisée Musemakweli -- Final declaration (in English and French)

The democratic transition in South Africa outlines the process of truth and reconciliation as an indispensable condition for a renewed constitutional normativity. Important philosophers like Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty, and militant thinkers like Gramsci, Benjamin e Pato?ka proposed a phenomenology of transition resumed by experience, history and utopia. It is ours to investigate the juridical foundations of pardon as following the relation between responsibility (interpellation) and culpability (confession) throughout the "truth and reconciliation" process. This will allow us to present the experience of the South Africa Commission as a complex model of transitional justice that both recognizes traditional institutes like amnesty and introduces the link confession – pardon, as grounded into the philosophical presupposition of the "people" idea.Key words: transitional justice, South African Commission, truth and reconciliation. ; La transition démocratique en Afrique du Sud démontre que le processus de vérité et réconciliation constitue une condition indispensable à la constitution de la nouvelle normativité constitutionnelle. Les phénoménologues les plus grands du siècle passé – Ricoeur et Merleau-Ponty pour tous – et les philosophes militants comme Gramsci,Benjamin et Pato?ka ont développé une phénoménologie de la transition entre experiénce, histoire et utopie. Il s'agit de dépister les fondements juridiques du pardon `a partir de la relation entre responsabilité (interpellation) et imputabilité (avoue) dans le procès de "vérité et réconciliation". Ce qui nous permettra de comprendre la complexité de l'expérience de la Commission sud-africaine en tant que modèle de justice transitionnelle, entre renouvellement d'instituts traditionnels de la transition démocratique (amnistie) et établissement d'un lien inusité entre avoue et pardon `a partir de la présupposition philosophique de l'idée de "peuple".Mot clés: justice transitionnelle, Commission Sud-Africaine, vérité et réconciliation.

The Presumption of innocence constitutes a procedural principle which organizes the penal lawsuit, by indicating which of the parts will have to support the burden of proof, and by sending back the defendant of the end of the proceedings as soon as there is a doubt. Devoted on the international level, and more recently, on the national level, by the laws of January 4th, 1993, and June 15 th, 2000, this principe, closely related to the problem of the penal proof, went through a slow and difficult emergence. Indeed, the criminal Ordinance as well as the system of the penal proof which is consubstantial with the criminal Ordinance impose on the judge to condemn as soon as the proof is put together. The doubt cannot exist for a defendant who was supposed guilty. The Revolution was going however to register the Presumption of innocence in a Declaration of the Right of and of the Citizen, and who not only intended to release men from the obsolete framework of the Ancient Regime, but also to protect it from its rigours. When they voted the article 9 of this text, the Settiors were not aware of its procedural dimension. The consecration of the jury and of the intimate conviction, as well by the law of September 16-29 1791 as by the directive of the criminal code, maintains this blindness. In spite of the revival of the criminal law which is freed from the weight represented by the power of the civil law, the 19th century stays almost quiet on this principe. We will have innocence. However, its reception remains imperfect. It is criticized in its application and the criminal law created presumptions of culpability. The recent legislative interventions do not enable to stop the erosion of this principle since they bring a confusion between the procedural principle and a principle contributing to the freedom of the defence and the rights of the person. The presumption of innocence then remains fragile in spite of its recognition. ; La Présomption d'innocence constitue un principe procédural qui organise le procès pénal, en ...

The Presumption of innocence constitutes a procedural principle which organizes the penal lawsuit, by indicating which of the parts will have to support the burden of proof, and by sending back the defendant of the end of the proceedings as soon as there is a doubt. Devoted on the international level, and more recently, on the national level, by the laws of January 4th, 1993, and June 15 th, 2000, this principe, closely related to the problem of the penal proof, went through a slow and difficult emergence. Indeed, the criminal Ordinance as well as the system of the penal proof which is consubstantial with the criminal Ordinance impose on the judge to condemn as soon as the proof is put together. The doubt cannot exist for a defendant who was supposed guilty. The Revolution was going however to register the Presumption of innocence in a Declaration of the Right of and of the Citizen, and who not only intended to release men from the obsolete framework of the Ancient Regime, but also to protect it from its rigours. When they voted the article 9 of this text, the Settiors were not aware of its procedural dimension. The consecration of the jury and of the intimate conviction, as well by the law of September 16-29 1791 as by the directive of the criminal code, maintains this blindness. In spite of the revival of the criminal law which is freed from the weight represented by the power of the civil law, the 19th century stays almost quiet on this principe. We will have innocence. However, its reception remains imperfect. It is criticized in its application and the criminal law created presumptions of culpability. The recent legislative interventions do not enable to stop the erosion of this principle since they bring a confusion between the procedural principle and a principle contributing to the freedom of the defence and the rights of the person. The presumption of innocence then remains fragile in spite of its recognition. ; La Présomption d'innocence constitue un principe procédural qui organise le procès pénal, en désignant celle des parties qui aura à supporter la charge de la preuve, et en renvoyant l'accusé des fins de la poursuite dès lors qu'il existe un doute. Consacré sur le plan international, et plus récemment, au plan national, par les lois des 4 janvier 1993 et 15 juin 2000, ce principe, intimement lié au problème de la preuve pénale, connut une émergence lente et laborieuse. En effet, l'Ordonnance criminelle ainsi que le système de la preuve légale qui lui est consubstantiel imposent au juge de condamner dès que la preuve est réunie. Le doute ne peut exister pour un accusé que l'on supposait coupable. La Révolution allait cependant inscrire la présomption d'innocence, dans une Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, et qui entendait libérer les hommes des cadres obsolètes de l'Ancien régime, mais aussi le protéger de ses rigueurs. Quand ils votèrent l'article 9 de ce texte, les Constituants en ignorèrent la dimension procédurale. La consécration du jury et de l'intime conviction, tant par la loi du 16-29 septembre 1791 que par le Code d'instruction criminelle, maintient cette cécité. Malgré le renouveau du droit pénal qui s'affranchit du poids représenté par la toute puissance du seul droit civil, le XIXème reste presque silencieux sur ce principe. Il faudra attendre le XXème pour voir clairement exposé le mécanisme procédural de la présomption d'innocence. Toutefois, sa réception demeure imparfaite. Il est critiqué dans son application et la loi pénale créa des présomptions de culpabilité. Les récentes interventions législatives ne permettent pas d'enrayer l'érosion de ce principe puisqu'elles installent une confusion entre le principe procédural et un principe concourant à la liberté de la défense et des droits de la personne. La présomption d'innocence reste donc d'une fragilité certaine malgré sa pleine reconnaissance.