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Cover -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Review Of Existing Datasets -- III. Methodological Considerations -- IV. Overview of the Global Debt Database -- V. Global Debt Trends -- VI. Conclusion And Way Forward -- BOXES -- 1. A Multidimensional Approach to Debt Statistics: The Example of Mexico -- A.1.1. Compilation of the Global Debt Database -- FIGURES -- 1. Private Debt Coverage in Approach 2 vs. IIP Approach -- 2. Country Coverage in the Global Debt Database -- 3. Country Coverage in the Global Debt Database -- 4. Private Debt: Country Coverage in Global Debt Database vs. Existing Datasets -- 5. Public Debt: Country Coverage in the Global Debt Database vs. Existing Datasets -- 6. Largest Debtors by Income Group, 2016 -- 7. Total Debt -- 8. Change in Public and Private Debt -- 9. Total Debt: World and G20 -- 10. Contribution to Total Debt by Income Group -- 11. Private Debt by Income Group -- 12. Public Debt by Income Group -- 13. Total Debt by Region -- 14. Private Debt by Region -- 15. Public Debt by Region -- A.1.1. Global Debt Database: Country Coverage -- TABLES -- 1. Comparison of Existing Debt Datasets -- 2. Selected Countries and Income Group: Total Debt -- A.1.1. Global Debt Database: Characteristics of Private Debt Data -- A.2.1. Classification by Income Group -- A.2.2. Classification by Region -- ANNEXES -- I. The Global Debt Database: Definitions, Methodology and Sources -- II. Country Classification

A comprehensive survey of a new generation of independent fiscal institutions, established to promote transparency in public finances. The chapters, written by heads of the institutions, as well as distinguished policy analysts and academics, explore the rationale and experience of these fiscal watchdogs.

Economists commit a category mistake when they treat democratic governments as indebted. Monarchs can be indebted, as can individuals. In contrast, democracies can't truly be indebted. They are financial intermediaries that form a bridge between what are often willing borrowers and forced lenders. The language of public debt is an ideological language that promotes politically expressed desires and is not a scientific language that clarifies the practice of public finance. Economists have gone astray by assuming that a government is just another person whose impulses toward prudent action will restrict recourse to public debt and induce rational political action.

This paper studies the effect of sovereign debt restructurings with external private creditors on growth during the period 1970-2010. We find that there are bad and good (or not so bad) debt restructurings for growth. While growth generally declines in the aftermath of a sovereign debt restructuring, agreements that allow countries to exit a default spell (final restructurings) are associated with improving growth. The impact can be significant. In general, three years after restructuring, growth is about 5 percent lower compared to countries that did not face restructuring over the same period. The exception is for final restructurings, which result in positive growth in the years immediately after the restructuring. Final restructurings tend to be better for growth because they reduce countries' debt, with the strongest effect for countries that exit restructurings with relatively low debt levels

We use a controlled laboratory experiment with and without overlapping generations to study the emergence of public debt. Public debt is chosen by popular vote, pays for public goods, and is repaid with general taxes. With a single generation, public debt is accumulated prudently, never leading to over-indebtedness. With multiple generations, public debt is accumulated rapidly as soon as the burden of debt and the risk of over-indebtedness can be shifted to future generations. Debt ceiling mechanisms do not mitigate the debt problem. With overlapping generations, political debt cycles emerge, oscillating with the age of the majority of voters.

With decentralization and urbanization, the debts of state and local governments and of quasi-public agencies have grown in importance. Rapid urbanization in developing countries requires large-scale infrastructure financing to help absorb influxes of rural populations. Borrowing enables state and local governments to capture the benefits of major capital investments immediately and to finance infrastructure more equitably across multiple generations of service users.With debt comes the risk of insolvency. Subnational debt crises have reoccurred in both developed and developing countries. Restructuring debt and ensuring its sustainability confront moral hazard and fiscal incentives in a multilevel government system; individual subnational governments might free-ride common resources, and public officials at all levels might shift the cost of excessive borrowing to future generations. This book brings together the reform experiences of emerging economies and developed countries. Written by leading practitioners and experts in public finance in the context of multilevel government systems, the book examines the interaction of markets, regulators, subnational borrowers, creditors, national governments, taxpayers, ex-ante rules, and ex-post insolvency systems in the quest for subnational fiscal discipline. Such a quest is intertwined with a country's historical, political, and economic context. The formal legal framework interacts with political reality to influence the dynamics of and incentives for reform. Often, the resolution of a subnational debt crisis unfolds in the context of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms. The book includes reforms that have not been covered by previous literature, such as those of China, Colombia, France, Hungary, Mexico, and South Africa. The book also presents a comprehensive review of how the United

Assessing both the macro- and micro-economic levels of the contemporary African Debt Crisis, this book, first published in 1989, begins by looking at the origins of the world debt crisis, and then looks closely at the problem as it affects Sub-Saharan Africa. The effects of debt on Africa's position in international relations are considered, and the roles played by organisations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are assessed. The authors also examine the local effects in a series of case studies of various states including Nigeria, Ghana and Sierra Leone, the Francopho