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The purpose of article is to analyze the prospects for granting the status of the second state language to the English language, taking into account the peculiarities of state policy in the sphere of culture. Research methodology is to disclose main problematic aspects associated with provision to the English language the status of official state lan- guage in Ukraine. The methodology of the research is based on the integrated use of the systemic and structural ap- proach, logical-legal and dialectical methods as well as method of analysis and synthesis. The scientific novelty of the work is that it develops logical and structural evidential base of expediency and necessity of giving the English language the status of the state language in Ukraine. The research proves the need for studying the English language by public officers. It justifies the necessity of spreading English as an instrument of optimization of international political and foreign economic relations. Conclusions. The work has established the importance of the problem of giving to the English language the status of the state language in terms of continuation of Ukraine's integration into the world community, expan- sion of its economic and diplomatic ties and creation of conditions for free exchange of experience in various spheres of social relations. It has made a conclusion about the expediency of introducing the status of the state language into English language because of a number of arguments, concerning the need for studying it by different categories of citizens. ; Целью работы является анализ перспектив предоставления статуса второго государственного языка английскому языку, учитывая особенности государственной политики в сфере культуры. Методология исследования заключается в раскрытии основных проблемных аспектов, связанных с предоставлением английском язы- ку статуса государственного языка в Украине. Методология исследования основана на комплексном использовании системного и структурного подходов, логико-юридического и диалектического метода, а также методов анализа и синтеза. Научная новизна работы заключается в том, что сформирована логико-структурная доказа- тельная база целесообразности и необходимости предоставления английскому языку статуса государственного языка в Украине. Доказана необходимость освоения английского языка государственными служащими. Обоснована необходимость распространения английского языка в качестве инструмента оптимизации международных политических и внешнеэкономических отношений. Выводы. Установлено, что актуальность проблемы предоставления английскому языку статуса государственного является важной с точки зрения продолжения интеграции Украины в мировое сообщество, расширения ее экономических и дипломатических связей, создания условий для свободного обмена опытом в различных сферах общественных отношений. Сделан вывод о целесообразности введения для английского языка статуса государственного благодаря ряду аргументов, касающихся необходимости изучения его различными категориями граждан. ; Метою дослідження є аналіз перспектив надання статусу другої державної мови англійській мові, враховуючи особливості державної політики в сфері культури. Методологія дослідження полягає у розкритті основних проблемних аспектів, пов'язаних із наданням англійській мові статусу державної мови в Україні, та ґрунтується на комплексному використанні системного і структурного підходу, логіко-юридичного та діалектичного методу, а також методів аналізу і синтезу. Наукова новизна полягає в тому, що сформовано логіко-структурну доказову базу щодо доцільності та необ- хідності надання англійській мові статусу державної мови в Україні. Доведена необхідність опанування англійської мови державними службовцями. Обґрунтована необхідність поширення англійської мови в якості інструменту оптимі- зації міжнародних політичних і зовнішньоекономічних відносин. Висновки. Встановлено, що актуальність проблеми надання англійській мові статусу державної є важливою з точки зору продовження інтеграції України у світову спільно- ту, розширення її економічних і дипломатичних зв'язків, створення умов для вільного обміну досвідом у різних сферах суспільних відносин. Зроблено висновок щодо доцільності запровадження для англійської мови статусу державної через низку аргументів, які стосуються необхідності вивчення її різними категоріями громадян.

A U.S. airstrike Thursday in the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad killed Abu Taqwa, a commander of Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba, along with an unranked individual, according to reports .
Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah are two of the Iran-aligned militias that have most frequently targeted U.S. forces in Iraq, both before and notably after the start of the Gaza conflict on Oct. 7. Abu Taqwa also served as the Deputy Commander of Baghdad Belt Operations in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). While formally part of a chain of command led by the prime minister, certain factions within the PMF, particularly Shi'a paramilitary units, operate outside of this structure.
The airstrike targeted a vehicle carrying Taqwa at a logistics center near Iraq's Interior Ministry in Baghdad. Significantly, this strike occurred shortly after a meeting between Akram Al-Kaabi, Secretary-General of the al-Nujaba militia, and the commander of the Iranian Quds Force, Ismail Qaani. Considering the location, timing, and Taqwa's role within the PMF, this event represents a notable escalation and a clear message to both Iran-aligned militias and the Iraqi government.
The targeted killing occurred against a backdrop of tense relations between Washington and Baghdad. Widely interpreted as a preliminary warning to the Iraqi state, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin specifically addressed attacks by Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba against U.S. forces when he spoke with Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani on Dec. 8. Furthermore, during a press conference with the Spanish Prime Minister at the end of December, Sudani mentioned that his government was reassessing the presence of the international coalition in Iraq.In the near term, it is unlikely that U.S. troops will receive orders to leave Iraq or that Iran and its affiliated militias will launch a significant retaliation within Iraq. However, with each tit for tat escalation, sometimes without formal claims of responsibility, the risk of a broader regional conflict looms larger. If, especially during an election year, a U.S. soldier were to be killed by an Iran-aligned militia, the pressure on the Biden administration to escalate forcefully would be substantial.
The reality is that the United States has limited capacity to deter attacks by Iran-aligned militias in Iraq without diplomatic efforts or a notable increase in kinetic strikes, which would pose the risk of triggering a broader war.
U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria may contribute to strengthening partner forces against ISIS, but they neither contain Iran nor significantly protect the security of the homeland. They are deeply vulnerable to the aftershocks of other conflicts in the Middle East, raising the question of whether the advantages of their force presence outweigh the risks. Disturbingly, it is a war being conducted in the shadows with little Congressional oversight.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland played an important role in the European integration process from Winston Churchill's idea of creating the "United States of Europe", to becoming the first Member State in history to withdraw from the European Union. Ever since the first attempts of joining the Communities, their membership has met with reservations by the founding countries and mistrust regarding the British objectives towards the future development of the Community. The British relations with the EU have been uniquely marked with constant pursuit of better economic and political conditions of membership. Over the years, as the Government in charge of the British Parliament changed, the United Kingdom has presented with different requirements for their continued permanence and substantial budgetary contributions. These renegotiations have been repeated several times during the fortyseven years of British membership, always requesting for additional concessions. The achieved agreements were twice associated with a national referendum to confirm British membership within reformed Community. However, the two referenda led to opposite effects: the first one validated the recommendation of the Government to stay in the EU; while the second one ended with Britain leaving the European Union, against the official Governments suggestions, leading to many years of uncertainty, damaging the economy, negatively influencing working conditions, British currency, with potential to destroy the integrity of the United Kingdom. The aim of the study is to analyze both referenda results and the renegotiations of the membership conditions that led to them, by selecting the critical issues in the negotiating strategies, that were obstructing the agreements between the United Kingdom and the European Union, and by comparing several political agreements achieved by the United Kingdom in the process of negotiations at the correspondent stages of their membership within the European Union to demonstrate their political and economic implications. The research examined British, French, and American confidential diplomatic documents from the national archives, formal publications produced by Her Britannic Majesty's Government and those published by the European Institutions, as well as journals, letters and newspaper articles, documentaries, reports, and social media announcements made on the official accounts in different languages, including English, Italian, French, and Polish. In conclusion, this study shows how the national interest of the singular EU members does not always comply with the European agenda and how it overcomes any Communitarian interest. Furthermore, the research points out how the use of referenda on the membership cannot be justified as a leverage mean for negotiating the changes to the membership terms determined by the European Treaties.

There is and has long been great debate over the means and motivations necessary for societal organisation, and most particularly in relation to the establishment and maintenance of governance systems in the context of the nation state. One of the key fault-lines in this discourse lies in the role played by the individual against that of the collective. At the centre of the argument lies a disagreement on conceptions of justice and how these relate to acceptance by the society involved as to the legitimacy or acceptability of the state being established. This thesis aims to examine these arguments with respect to a case study which is at once both highly particular and unusually apposite for that analysis. The case is Somaliland, which is undergoing a transition from a kinship-based system that emphasises discursive democracy to the establishment of an increasingly viable system of representative democracy. That this process has occurred in the shadow of Somaliland's southern neighbour, the erstwhile Republic of Somalia, a country of which the international diplomatic community still insists Somaliland is a part, yet one which is unable to establish a viable system of government itself, adds relevance to the analysis. One of the key periods in Somaliland's transition began in 1990, just prior to the fall of the Siyaad Barre regime at the beginning of 1991, and 1997 when an interim constitution was adopted, ending a final period of conflict within Somaliland. While there remain small if vociferous sections of the population wedded to reunification with Somalia, the successful staging of a series of elections and the fact that renewed widespread conflict has failed to materialise attest to the evident fact that the accommodations reached between 1990 and 1997 enjoy the support of the vast majority of the population. In order to understand the 1990-97 period, though, it is also necessary to examine the complex links between Somalis and the political and social changes that have occurred over the years. This thesis therefore examines the changes wrought by shifting patterns of trade and pastoralism, and in particular those of the colonial era, and in that light examines the 1990-97 transition using a framework synthesised from the theories of the deliberative democracy of John Rawls and the Institutional Analysis of Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. It aims both to interrogate the synthesised conceptual framework and to refine it, in the process examining the case study and attempting to gain an understanding of some of the key elements that have permitted the emergence of a viable system of state.

It is more likely than not that the Cyprus question will continue to keep, at least, a certain number of diplomats busy for some time to come. What is this dispute about? And what lessons can be drawn from the failure of so many previous third-party attempts at a settlement of it? Curiously enough, after the Turco-Greek war of 1920-1922, and the Treaty of Lausanne which ended it (1923) the two countries drew close together, owing to their coincident political and security interests in the Balkans. Together, they formed and led the Balkan Entente of the 1930s. During and after the Second World War this trend continued: both countries were slotted into the Western world; both struggled against communist expansionism and set up the Balkan Pact in the 1950s as part of the Containment policy. Their simultaneous admission to NATO in 1952 gave this strategic partnership a new impetus and many observers on both shores of the Aegean felt that Ankara and Athens were acting so closely together that a serious clash over some regional development was unthinkable. The Cyprus conflict, which erupted in the mid-1950's, abruptly ended this rosy diplomatic and security atmosphere of those days. The conflict in Cyprus has persisted and poisoned the relations between the two NATO partners. Many official attempts at resolution have fizzled out and the conflict has become more and more complicated. It has by now taken its toll of mediators, UN Secretaries General, their Permanent Representatives for Cyprus, US and British Cyprus Coordinators. The dispute now appears to be going through a new phase with Greeks pressing hard for EU membership despite vehement objections by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. At the same, the Greeks in Cyprus have been searching for sophisticated weaponry from a variety of countries. Greece is using all the leverage it has within the EU to accelerate the membership process while Ankara has threatened to set in train moves for the integration of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) with Turkey, should all its warnings against any such EU decision go unheeded. Until mid-1999 just before the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece this was the political situation between the two countries. And although the friendship displayed by both Greek and Turkish public towards each other during and after the earthquakes and the amicable earthquake diplomacy pursued by Ismail Cem and Andreas Papandreou, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and Greece respectively, there has almost been no major movement in the direction of a resolution to the Cyprus question. (SOI : MO: 47)

Over the last two decades, it has become clear that Russia insists on its great power status, even at considerable cost. Chasing Greatness provides an interpretive explanation of the tacit rules that shape Russia's great power identity today. Anatoly Reshetnikov argues that this never-ending chase for greatness is a result of how Russia and its predecessors—including the USSR, Russian Empire, Muscovy, and Kievan Rus'—historically interacted with its neighbors to the east, the south, and particularly the west. By analyzing an extensive amount of original source material, including primary sources that have not been previously translated into English, he is able to reconstruct a millennial history of the Russian concepts that express political greatness. He also traces numerous encounters between Russia and the West, as well as Russia's troubled integration into the European society of states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to show how these concepts have affected Russia's interaction with international society.

Despite its substantive historical depth, Chasing Greatness is not a book of history. Rather, it is a synthesizing social science work inspired by the continental tradition of the critical history of modernity. As such, the book is more about the present than about the past. Its main aim is to expose and explain the rich conceptual baggage behind Russia's unceasing great power rhetoric (domestic and international) and how this rhetoric drives the current international crises involving Russia.

The increasing frequency of arbitration and the pressure for a regular court of international justice composed of permanent judges, have given new emphasis to the demand for what is called the codification of international law.The process and the result intended to be described when the term codification is applied to international law involves something very different from the codification of municipal law. The codifier of any part of the law of a nation finds the law with which he is to deal already in existence and authenticated. It may be confused in form and apparently unrelated in its parts: it may be scattered through the statutory enactments of many years and the declarations of a multitude of judicial decisions; the codifier may have to struggle with difficult questions of apparent inconsistency, of doubtful repeal, of obscurities in expression calling for interpretation and construction, and with conflicts of judicial opinion; but the expressions which he considers all come from the same law-making power. Somewhere in the mass of material is to be found the final expression of legislative will, the controlling decision of the courts, and when these are found everything inconsistent with them may be rejected as repealed or overruled. The codifier's task is to find what the rules really are; to put them in due relations to each other under appropriate heads in accordance with some systematic scheme of arrangement; to bring order out of confusion; to furnish a methodical statement of the results of his researches which may make the law plain to the people who live under it and may relieve countless lawyers from the necessity of going through the same wearisome process of inquiry in each separate case. When the work is complete, if it is acceptable, the legislative power of the state puts its stamp of approval upon it and resolves any doubts or uncertainties by its acceptance of the codifier's conclusions. It may indeed be that the research of the codifier and the clearer view presented by a systematic arrangement will have revealed inadequacies of expression, incongruities, and omissions in the existing law, but, as to these, the suggestions of the codifier for remedying the defects discovered will be accepted or rejected by the single fiat of the legislative body which enacts the code.

President Joe Biden told the nation on Thursday night that he was planning to submit a request to Congress for an aid package that will include funding for Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and border security. "It's a smart investment that's going to pay dividends for American security for generations," Biden said.According to the Associated Press' Seung Min Kim, "the supplemental request will include $60 billion for Ukraine, $14 billion for Israel, $10 billion for humanitarian efforts, $14 billion for managing U.S.-Mexico border and fighting fentanyl trafficking and $7 billion for Indo-Pacific." The request is expected to be submitted on Friday. National security adviser Jake Sullivan had confirmed these plans over the weekend."The President has made clear that he is going to go to Congress with a package of funding for Ukraine as well as continued support for Israel," Sullivan said during an appearance on CBS's Face the Nation. "You can expect intensive engagement with Congress this very week, as we work on such a package and seek to secure bipartisan support for it."The idea of such a proposal — which reports have indicated will also include aid for Taiwan and funding for border security — has been floating around in the weeks since House Republicans decided to strip $300 million in security assistance for Kyiv in the Defense Department appropriations bill, in the latest sign that the GOP is growing increasingly skeptical about funding Ukraine's war effort.Some Republicans on Capitol Hill have been critical of the idea, but earlier reporting said that the administration was looking to "jam" these members, anticipating that Republicans would ultimately not oppose a package that included funding for three of the party's policy priorities. Hesitant Republicans in Washington are not the only reason that Biden and his administration may feel like they have to pass the next tranche of aid quickly. As the Times reported earlier this week, some in Washington and European capitals fear that support for Ukraine may have peaked. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has expressed concern that the war in the Middle East may divert attention away from his country's effort. "But even before the war in the Mideast began last week, there was a strong sense in Europe, watching Washington, that the world had reached 'peak Ukraine,'"reports the Times, adding, "that support for Kyiv's fight against Russia's invasion would never again be as high as it was a few months ago.""Even in Europe, Ukraine is an increasingly divisive issue," he continues. "Voters in Slovakia handed a victory to Robert Fico, a former prime minister sympathetic to Russia. A vicious election campaign in Poland, one of Ukraine's staunchest allies, has emphasized strains with Kyiv." Another constituency that is showing signs of fatigue is the American public. A poll from the Eurasia Group Foundation showed that 58% of Americans think the U.S. should push for a negotiated end to the war.Katrina vanden Heuvel, publisher of The Nation, and columnist James Carden wrote in Responsible Statecraft this week that Biden might react to these shifting domestic and global dynamics, arguing that the president would be wise to take his cue from the public and begin the "the long, arduous journey" towards a diplomatic solution. "While the seeming shift in public opinion is an important one and should signal to the administration that the time has come to pursue negotiations," they write, "it is clear that those whose opinions matter most — in Kiev, Moscow, and Washington — aren't terribly interested in doing so."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:—Vladimir Putin met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, in what was the Russian president's first trip outside of the former Soviet Union this year. The meeting took place against the backdrop of war raging in the Middle East, with both leaders calling for an end to hostilities. During his speech, Putin talked up his relationship with Xi and touted the Belt and Road initiative, saying that it was a plan "aimed at creating more equitable, multipolar world relations."—The West's reaction to the violence in Israel and Gaza has underscored the Global South's reluctance to back the Western effort in Ukraine, according to the Financial Times."Western support for Israel's assault on Gaza has poisoned efforts to build consensus with significant developing countries on condemning Russia's war against Ukraine, officials and diplomats have warned," the FT reports. "We have definitely lost the battle in the Global South," an unnamed senior G7 diplomat told FT. "All the work we have done with the Global South [over Ukraine] has been lost . . . Forget about rules, forget about world order. They won't ever listen to us again." The diplomat went on to say that the West will lose all "credibility" because of its hypocritical reaction to the two wars. The report cited, for example, the West pressuring the Global South to condemn Russia's violations of international law while not reacting in the same way to Israel restricting Gazans access to water, gas, and electricity.—The war in the Middle East is an opportunity for Washington to work with Russia and China to avoid escalation, say the Quincy Institute's George Beebe and Anatol Lieven. Given the hostility between the nations, this will be no easy task, but the circumstances dictate that the Biden administration must pursue diplomatic channels. "It will require opening a high-level channel of communication between senior Biden administration officials and the Kremlin to discuss the crisis, coupled with an implicit signal that Washington is willing to address some concrete Russian concerns about the U.S. military's role in Syria and about the need for rekindling Israel-Palestine diplomacy," Beebe and Lieven write in RS. "By contrast, stiff-arming Chinese and Russian involvement would only incentivize their opposition to U.S. policies. And if there's one thing Washington does not need in this crisis, it is yet more parties intent on exploiting instability."U.S. State Department news:State Department spokesman Matthew Miller spoke about how the lack of the House Speaker might affect the administration's plans for more funding. "We have made clear that we stand by Israel, just as we stand by Ukraine. They are two democracies defending themselves from attacks from outside," he said. "And so as we do everything we can as an Executive Branch, there is a time when we're going to need to go to Congress for more assistance, and it would be nice to have a functioning partner in that regard."

Of all the foreign policy challenges President Joe Biden faces, most difficult is the war in Gaza. That is not because of the apparent geopolitical stakes; as Biden often says, China poses the most important long-term challenge and Russia is next. But while important, what happens between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as elsewhere in the Middle East, has not been in the same league.Yet because of the war in Gaza, with its linkage to overall Israeli-Palestinian relations and risks of escalation to other parts of the region, there may soon be an explosion dwarfing all other concerns facing Biden and his team. There is also another important reason that the war in Gaza now occupies center stage for the Biden administration: America's attitudes towards and relations with Israel. Since Israel's creation in the wake of World War II, most Americans have considered U.S. ties with the Jewish state as special, both because of its founding as a democracy committed to values similar to America's and a shared perspective of "never again" stemming from the Holocaust. Even when Israel has fallen short, as for many years in its treatment of Palestinians, most Americans have given Israel the benefit of the doubt. Except on a handful of occasions, Washington consistently "has had Israel's back" in Middle East crises and conflicts. For both interests and values reasons, therefore, it was natural that immediately following the horrendous October 7 Hamas assault on southern Israel, in which some 1,200 people were killed and 240 more taken hostage, Biden declared total support for Israel's military retaliation. His position was initially supported by most Americans, largely on a bipartisan basis. But then the toll of destruction in Gaza mounted — as of this past week, more than 16,000 Palestinians have been killed, at least 40,000 more wounded, and more than 85 percent of the Strip's population of more than two million has been rendered homeless with no safe place to go. All of this has been vividly displayed on U.S. television and cable media. Thus, the Biden administration began to rethink its hands-off support for Israel's military campaign — but only with respect to its tactics, not its overall policy of destroying Hamas.Washington worked through intermediaries, principally Qatar, to obtain a "pause" in the Gaza fighting in order to get Hamas to release some hostages and increase the flow of humanitarian assistance from Egypt into Gaza. Following the end of the pause, however, U.S. appeals to Israel have been limited to try to minimize civilian casualties in Gaza, or, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken put it, "taking more effective steps to protect the lives of civilians." But so long as Israel continues to pursue the extirpation of Hamas, significantly limiting civilian casualties is impossible, as the Biden team must recognize. Notably, the world sees that Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has essentially rebuffed Biden, which impacts on U.S. credibility elsewhere, especially since the United States is universally seen as Israel's sole patron. Certainly, America's reputation for promoting humanitarian concerns has been severely damaged. Both factors argue for the president to press Israel immediately to declare a cease-fire, not just a temporary "pause," but one designed to end the war. Indeed, if we are to believe Israel's own estimates, Hamas's military capacities have already been heavily degraded, and the possibility of it again being able to mount a serious attack on Israel is low.The gravity of risks in the Levant and potentially throughout the region means that the United States (and others) cannot once again return to indifference when this war ends. Biden has shown he is aware of this, and has recommitted himself to pursuing the so-called "two-state solution." For years, however, it has been largely a mantra; and while it is the best outcome, its prospects are now even more remote given renewed Israeli fears provoked by the October 7 attack and its attendant atrocities, as well as increased Palestinian bitterness over the massive destruction and loss of life in Gaza. Yet time is not on the side of "orderly diplomacy" that for a half-century has been the usual course. There is already a major risk of a new intifada on the West Bank, as most Palestinians have lost any hope of Israel's willingness to recognize their basic human rights, much less permit a Palestinian state. They also see that Israel will not stop West Bank settlers from displacing and even murdering Palestinian civilians. The Palestinians also cannot count on support from Arab states. No Arab leader really cares for the Palestinians and none has even called into question their existing treaties with Israel or the so-called Abraham Accords. Nor is it conceivable that, to do the necessary diplomatic work, the U.N. or countries other than the U.S. can lead or have any chance of success. Nothing will be possible unless Washington takes charge and makes clear to Israel that, as the occupying power, it must change its policies and practices toward the Palestinians. On December 6 , U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres reiterated his "appeal for a humanitarian ceasefire to be declared." In the U.N. Security Council Friday, the United States vetoed the resolution and was joined only by Britain's abstention. The Biden administration thus tied itself even more to Israel's slaughter in Gaza, carried out in major part with U.S.-supplied bombs. The veto further cheapened U.S. political and moral standing and made it harder for Biden to be seen as credible as a diplomatic leader once the war ends.Until October 7, President Biden and his team gave Israel-Palestinian relations short shrift. So far, everyone has been lucky that the crisis has not spread across the region, with the possibility of wider war. Even so, Israel and Hezbollah have come to blows; Yemen has taken some pot-shots; and while Iran has been careful not to get directly involved, its proxies in Iraq and Syria have been engaged in some incidents.But luck is not a policy. The president must know that the Israeli-Palestinian crisis can't again be pushed aside when this war ends. He needs to rebuild trust in the United States for strategic competence and then as an honest broker. He needs to show that the United States will place its own interests first, not anyone else's. He needs to augment his foreign policy inner circle with outside experts in strategy and regional dynamics, but free from biases. And he needs to be prepared to run risks in American domestic politics.It's a difficult agenda, but nothing less will enable President Biden to protect and promote U.S. strategic, political, and moral interests.

The text analyses the intelligence activity against Poland in the period 1944-1989. The paper also contains a case study, i.e. an analysis of the American intelligence service activity held against Poland. While examining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to best illustrate the point, the author presented a number of cases of persons who spied for the USA, which was possible thanks to the analysis of the training materials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs directed to the officers of the Security Service and the Citizens' Militia. The text tackles the following issues: (1) to what extent did the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination?, (2) what was the level of interest of the foreign intelligence services in Poland before the year 1990?, (3) is it possible to indicate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland? 1) The analysis of data indicates that the period 1946-1956 witnessed a great number of convictions for espionage, which is often associated with the peculiar political situation in Poland of that time. Up to 1953, the countries of the Eastern bloc had reproduced the Stalin's system, which only ceased due to the death of Stalin himself. Since then, the communist systems gradually transformed into the system of nomenklatura. Irrespective of these changes, Poland still witnessed a wave of repressions, which resulted from the threats continuously looming over the communist authorities – combating the anti-communist underground movement, fighting with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the Polish government-in-exile, possible revisionism of borders, social discontent related to the socio-political reforms. Hence, a great number of convictions for espionage at that time could be ascribed to purely political sentences. Moreover, equally significant was the fact that the then judicial practice was preoccupied assessing negatively any contacts and relations with foreigners. This excessive number of convictions could ensue from other criminal-law provisions, which applied with respect to the crimes against the State, including espionage. What is also important is the fact that in the Stalin's period the judiciary personnel acquired their skills and qualifications through intensive courses in law with the predominant spirit of the theory of evidence and law by Andrey Vyshinsky. Additionally, by the decree of 1944 the Penal Code of the Polish Armed Forces was introduced; the code envisaged the increase in the number of offences classified as penalised with death penalty, whereas the high treason was subject to the military jurisdiction (the civilians were prosecuted in military courts till 1955; the espionage, however, still stood under the military jurisdiction). In 1946, there was introduced the Decree on particularly dangerous crimes in the period of the State's recovery, which was later called a Small Penal Code. 2) The interest that foreign intelligence services expressed in relation to Poland was similar to the one they had in all countries of Eastern and Central Europe. In the case of Poland, it should be noted that foreign intelligence services recruited Polish citizens who had previously stayed abroad and after WWII returned to their home country. The services also gathered information from Poles staying in immigrant camps (e.g. in FRG). The activity of the American intelligence service on the territory of FRG and West Berlin played a key role. The documents of the Ministry of Internal Affairs pointed to the global range of this activity, e.g. through the recruitment of Polish sailors in the ports of the Netherlands, Japan, etc. In line with the development in the 1970s, espionage, which had so far concentrated on the defence and strategic sectors, became focused on science and technology of the People's Republic of Poland. The acquisition of collaborators in academic circles was much easier, as PRL opened to academic exchange. Due to the system of visas, the process of candidate selection for intelligence services (e.g. the American) began in embassies. In the 1980s, the activity of the foreign intelligence services concentrated on the specific political situation in Poland, i.e. the growing significance of the "Solidarity" social movement. 3) The specificity of the American intelligence activity against Poland was related to the composition of the residency staff, which was the largest in comparison to other Western countries. The wide range of these activities can be proved by the quantitative data of convictions for espionage in the years 1944-1984 (however, one has to bear in mind the factors mentioned earlier in the text, which led to the misinterpretation of these data). Analysing the data and the documents prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, one should treat them with caution, as, frequently, the Polish counter-intelligence service used to classify the ordinary diplomatic practice and any contacts with foreigners as espionage threats. It is clearly visible in the language of the training materials concerned with "secret service methods of the intelligence activity" as well as in the documents on operational activities of the Security Service in relation to foreigners. The level of interest the USA had in Poland was mirrored in the classification of diplomatic posts, according to which Warsaw occupied the second place (the so-called Group "B") on the three-point scale. The CIA experienced spectacular defeats during their activity in Poland: supporting the Polish underground anti-communist organisation Freedom and Independence and the so-called Munich-Berg episode (both cases took place in the 1950s). The text focuses only on selected issues related to the espionage activities against Poland. Similarly, the analysis of the problem has been based on selected sources, which has limited the research scope - however, it was not the aim of the author to present the espionage activity against Poland in a comprehensive way. In order to assess the real threat posed by the espionage activity, one should analyse the case of persons convicted for espionage in the period 1944-1989, as the available quantitative data, mentioned in the text, cannot constitute an explicit benchmark for the scale of espionage activity. The inaccuracies in the interpretation of data and variables, which can affect the evaluation of this phenomenon, have been pointed out in the text. ; The text is treats of the espionage against Poland in the period 1944-1989. The above analysis has been supplemented with the quantitative data from the period 1944-1984 as regards those convicted for participating in, acting for, and passing on information to the foreign intelligence agencies. The espionage issues were presented on the example of the American intelligence activity, which was illustrated by the cases of persons who were convicted for espionage. While examining the research thesis, the author used the documents and analyses prepared by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were in its major part addressed to the Security Service and the Citizens' Militia officers. The author made an attempt at the verification of the following research hypotheses: (1) to what extent did the character of the socio-political system influence the number of persons convicted for espionage against Poland in the period under examination (1944-1989)?, (2) what was the level of foreign intelligence services' interest in Poland before the year 1990?, (3) is it possible to indicate the specificity of the U.S. intelligence activity against Poland?

I ought to point out first that my own practice is primarily corporate practice dealing with international business between Japan and the United States. Contract drafting is probably what I do most of, that and contract negotiations. In my field, many of the negotiations are not polite; they involve role playing on both sides and often extreme misunderstandings on both sides. I think, in addition to a good law background, the most important element in practice, especially in relations between Asia and the United States, is knowledge of an Asian language and a cultural familiarity with the countries where you specialize. To be able to communicate with your own client, and to be able to communicate for your client with the Japanese company across the table, knowledge of the language is absolutely essential. Also, I think my type of practice—that is practice with Asia—illustrates something that has happened in American law practice during the last ten years. The causes are primarily the revolution in transportation and something called the telex machine. Before 1960 it was impossible to get to Tokyo from New York in less than 26 hours. Now I go almost every month; it takes 16 hours. If you are representing Japanese clients in the United States it is necessary, I think, to meet the people in the Tokyo home office. Japanese abide greatly by this type of personal contact. It also helps to eliminate misunderstanding between a lawyer and his client. More and more lawyers, especially out of New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington are traveling around the world with their practices following them. If you have support services in various cities, there is usually no problem. You can travel, especially if your secretary and the people you work with out of the office from which you originate can handle the minor problems that come up. The telex machine has become extremely important. This is partly because of the time lag. Japan is almost exactly twelve hours opposite from the United States. My clients' legal departments can handle minor negotiations and telex questions to me or ask me to draft particular positions. By getting background by telex, I can do this on an overnight basis so that in effect their legal department works 24 hours a day. This has the added benefit that sometimes the Japanese clients are able to disguise from the opposing American side the fact that they are using a large New York law firm.

Political outsider Bassirou Diomaye Faye will officially be declared the next president of Senegal Friday after cruising to victory in this week's elections just 10 days after being released from prison.Faye won 54% of the vote, allowing him to avoid a second round matchup with former Prime Minister Amadou Ba, the Dakar Court of Appeals announced Wednesday. Ba has conceded defeat and congratulated Faye, as has current President Macky Sall.Experts say the peaceful transition of power is a welcome indication of stability in Senegal and a positive sign for West Africa as a whole amid a string of coups that have rocked the region's relations with Western countries.Senegal's democracy, analysts say, came under threat last month after Sall made a controversial decision to postpone elections, citing corruption allegations against the Constitutional Council that decides which candidates are eligible to run in the elections, a fact he said would question the integrity of the results. The decision drew public outrage, as well as concern from the United States, a historically close diplomatic partner with Senegal. The U.S. State Department said last month that it was "deeply concerned" about the postponement in a statement urging Senegal's government to "move forward with its presidential election in accordance with the Constitution and electoral laws."It was the first time an election has been postponed in Senegal's history, and Sall's actions were "a jolt and a shock to the system" due to Senegal's long-held position as a stable democracy in West Africa, said Dr. Joseph Siegle, director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. Senegal has historically promoted democratic norms, free speech, opposition party participation, and security in the region, Siegle said. It's a stark contrast to surrounding states in the region — military coups have destabilized the governments of neighboring Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Guinea in recent years. Siegle said the recent election reiterates Senegal's role as an exemplar of democratic leadership in the region."Senegal provides a very important counterpoint that this is how you realize change. You do it through legal means, through constitutional means, through transparent means," Siegle said. The election was also a significant indication of the strength of Senegal's democratic institutions, as the judiciary promptly interpreted the constitution and rescheduled the elections in response to the postponement, said Adele Ravidà, senior election systems advisor and country director for Senegal at the International Foundation for Electoral Systems. She added that, given that these events were unforeseen, the judiciary's actions created a precedent that increased its capabilities to respond to incidents of instability. "This was the strength of the judiciary in Senegal, the fact that even in a situation in which there is no law, that they can find a solution to the situation," Ravidà said.Faye's presidency could bring about further strengthening of Senegal's democratic institutions. Faye has campaigned on an anti-establishment platform, stating that he plans to reduce corruption in the government and strengthen checks on presidential power. Ravidà says it is still early to say what the potential of this new government is in fulfilling these claims. Siegle said Faye's policies may be cause for cautious optimism that democratic norms will be further bolstered. "That's encouraging, and given the strain to some of these norms we've seen in the last couple of years, that's welcome and would be much valued across Senegal," he said.Ravidà added that the election demonstrates the power of civil society in mobilizing to enact change."[The Senegalese people] are giving the chance now to this new generation of leaders to show if they can really rule the country well. But the population is mature enough to consider that if they are not doing well, in the next five years they give the opportunity to another party or a different leader." President Biden congratulated Faye for his victory in a statement on Wednesday. In a press conference on Monday, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Matthew Miller said "the commitment of the Senegalese people to the democratic process is part of the foundation of our deep friendship and strong bilateral ties."Faye has iterated his intention to continue to maintain Senegal's bilateral partnerships with its diplomatic partners. The U.S. currently maintains close military ties with Senegal, Siegle told RS. The countries' militaries are partners in peacekeeping operations in the region, with the U.S. supplying aid and deploying troops to Senegal to help counter crises in the region.Faye will be officially declared the next president of Senegal on Friday, in the event that no complaint against the electoral process is filed by Thursday night, an event Ravidà says is not anticipated. The official transfer of power will take place on April 2, the day Sall's presidential mandate ends.