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Alexander MotylIn this discussion, let us exclude economic issues altogether. While I would not presume to fill an economist's shoes, I would like to rephrase one or two issues from a political scientist's perspective that might then be worthy of discussion. This rephrasing is essential because the discussion of economic reform in the Soviet Union has been noticeably lacking in any kind of context or any appreciation of the genuine political situation in the Soviet Union. What strikes me in the economists' discussions of what should be done in Russia, Ukraine, and Poland is that, by and large, there is very little consideration paid to precisely the issues that have been raised by today's presentations. There is almost no consideration of the constitutional and political confusion referred to by John Hazard; very little talk about the social decompression and the societal problems described by Peter Juviler; complete ignorance of the gender, equality, and age conflicts addressed by Michael Paul Sacks; virtually no appreciation of the ethnic conflicts discussed by Robert Lewis; no understanding whatsoever of the cultural problems pointed out by Edward All worth; and very little appreciation of the security dilemmas referred to by Jack Matlock. In other words, the economic discussion, even if theoretically correct, and reflective of the best textbook version of what should be done in such circumstances, seems to be totally disembodied from any of these other contextual realities, and thus, almost foreordained to fail.

MotylI would like to pursue some of the ideas raised by Mark von Hagen and the other speakers, synthesizing some of the many themes and topics that have been raised. What has been implicit in much of the discussion in the morning and in the afternoon is the most obvious development of the last year—that is that the Soviet Union actually collapsed. This is a phenomenal event, not simply because it happened without the intercession of a major world war, but because the place was so big and powerful. Further, it raises a critical question because, inasmuch as external violence was not involved in the collapse, inasmuch as it is logically unsound to implicate the Estonians, or the Armenians, or the Ukrainians, we are drawn inevitably to conclude that the internal dynamics of this particular kind of political system had something to do with the collapse.

MotylLet me open by making one or two minor remarks and then raising a broader issue which, I believe, is relevant to all the papers and may lead to further discussion if the panelists are so inclined. The minor points speak to methodological and ideological concerns, and are addressed to Paul Goble's comments about the theorizing and the break-up scenarios of the 1970's and the 1980's. For what it is worth, that really is not the issue. From the 1970's through today, the central issue in interpreting the nationality question has been the stability of the system, whether one interprets this from a conflict model perspective or consensus model perspective, to put it simplistically. The conflict perspective has so far been validated. It has also been suggested that, if one removes the coercive apparatus—the influence of the police—and liberalizes society, conflict will become manifest. That should not happen according to the consensus perspective. Consensus is, as it were, a permanent feature.

In his admirable analysis of the juristic theory of the state, Dr. Willoughby has said that "analytical political philosophy" views the state "simply as an instrumentality for the creation and enforcement of law." The point of view from which this philosophy proceeds is thus fixed. It is professedly the legal point of view.It is, however, precisely by peculiar and distinctive points of view from which phenomena are observed, that sciences or philosophies are differentiated one from another. Two philosophies cannot occupy the same standpoint. If there is to be discussion of a philosophy of politics which asserts its viewpoint to be that of a philosophy of law, then it is necessary to define very clearly the relationship between politics and law.As these concepts have been defined by the analytical school, it is obvious that they are intimately connected. By the opponents of this school it may be objected that, when correctly conceived, politics and law are perfectly distinct. It may perhaps be held that what is known as law in modern society is not essentially political at all; but that it has merely happened as an accident of modern political development that a part of the law has received the additional and nonessential sanction of political authority.