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Text of Resolution A3-0400/92 adopted by the European Parliament on Apr. 21, 1993.

IN SEVERAL WAYS THE DANISH EP ELECTION DEVIATED FROM THE ELECTIONS IN THE OTHER MEMBER COUNTRIES. THE DANISH ELECTION TOOK ITS OWN COURSE MAINLY BECAUSE, LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR IN 1979, IT WAS KEPT APART FROM NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE EYES OF MOST VOTERS. SINCE THE CAMPAIGN DID NOT INVOLVE DOMESTIC ISSUES TO ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE, THE VOTERS TENDED TO FALL BACK ON THE OLD CLEAVAGE LINE OF SUPPORT FOR THE EC VERSUS OPPOSITION AGAINST THE EC. THE ATTEMPTS TO SET UP A THIRD SET OF ISSUES, DEALING SPECIFICALLY WITH THE GOALS AND POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, WERE NOT SUCCESSFUL.

One of the most important decision making bodies in the EC is the Council of Ministers. In that voting body the member states have different voting weights roughly in proportion to the size of their populations. This article focuses on the voting power of current and prospective member states (Finland, Norway and Sweden) utililizing the Shapley‐Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power. As the decision rules play a crucial role in the computation of these indices, the a priori voting power distribution is considered under various decision rules ranging from simple majority to near unanimity. We also discuss the a priori voting power distribution of various political groupings in the current European Parliament and in the hypothetical parliament which would have Finland, Norway and Sweden as new members. Although thus far the real power base in the EC is the Commission, the analysis of voting power distributions in the Council of Ministers and in the parliament sheds some light upon the relative influence that various actors might have in EC decision‐making processes.