After the First World War an anti-alcohol movement requiring the prohibition intensified both in Europe and the USA and it also resonated strongly in the Czechoslovakia. The main representative of this movement was the Czechoslovak Teetotal Union. It struggled for eradication of alcoholism as a serious social and health problem. The activities of the movement were in conflict with the interests of groups of alcoholic drinks producers and distributors, which represented a strong lobby connected to political circles, especially the most powerful political party, the Agrarian Party. Financially strong alcohol lobby with one exception (Holitscher Act of 1922 restricting access to alcohol for the youth) quite successfully neutralized the attempts of the anti-alcohol movement to gain a bigger state support in the fight against alcoholism. Only after the methyl-alcohol scandal in 1935 the government did establish a permanent advisory board for the fight against alcoholism in the Ministry of Public Health and Physical Education. It elaborated a many recommendations (such as blood tests for drivers after car accidents), which, however, were not implemented until the end of the First Republic. An important benefit of the Czechoslovak Teetotal Union was the founding of alcohol treatment counselling.
In this contribution, we compare the correlation of supply & demand shocks for the countries of the euro zone & the acceding countries in Central Europe. Demand & supply shocks are recovered from estimated structural VAR models of output growth & inflation in individual countries. We find that Poland & Hungary face already a comparably high similarity with the countries of the current euro zone. However, the remaining countries show still significant differences in business cycles as compared to the euro zone. This is likely to indicate that the loss of monetary sovereignty may be costly. In turn, the integration is expected to align the business cycles of these countries in the medium run. We document a similar development for the countries of the European Union in the 1990s. 4 Figures, 22 References. Adapted from the source document.
As a consequence of the new regionalism a marked increase in the number of regional groupings can be observed which makes the preferential relations between states even more complicated & complex. One of such complex relationships, which did not come to being during the third wave of regionalism but was strongly supported by it, is subregionalism -- simply said, overlapping of regional integrations. The aim of this comparative study is to analyze a current state & development of subregionalism within two region-wide integrations -- the European Union (EU) & the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) -- & on the basis of this analysis to compare the effects of this phenomenon in both regions. Some general conclusions enabling an assessment of future development of subregionalism & its impact on regionalism in Europe & Asia are the main outcomes of the comparison. References. Adapted from the source document.
This analysis focuses on the role of the federal Europe model in the present stage of the European integration. The European Union' appropriate constitutional form primarily depends on a political decision. Such a decision must be based on democratic legitimacy conferred by political nations of the member states, & not on a delusionary conception of the European demos. If the politicians decide to continue European integration, a federal structure for European decision making must be established, with its typical features: subsidiarity & a clear division of competences. Contrary to the traditional federative models, both German & American, the European federal model cannot be based on the concept of a federal nation. The individual political nations will remain the source of its sovereignty. As a result we can talk of federal elements without a federation, or of a consociative federation without a federal state concept. Adapted from the source document.
The referendum on the accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union was the first -- & thus far the only -- national referendum in the history of both the Czech Republic & Czechoslovakia. Although it was obvious that the majority of the Czech population was in favor of joining the European Union, sociologists could not predict the turnout. The polls had shown that at least 70 percent of the population would vote "Yes." However, as there had been no referendum in the country's history before, there were fears of voter apathy. There was no experience concerning the difference between public opinion polls & the actual results. Regardless of these factors, TNS Factum offered a very accurate prediction of voter turnout & of support for accession. The voting pattern in the actual referendum was firmly correlated with & similar to the voting behavior in the 2002 parliamentary elections. A study on electoral data showed a strong correlation between the support for Koalice (Coalition of liberals & Christian democrats) in the 2002 general election & the pro-EU voles in the 2003 referendum. The Czech referendum was not an exception compared to developments in other post-communist states. Nevertheless, there is a clear difference between east European referenda & past EU referenda in Western Europe. The latter were characterized by higher voter turnout & by relatively less enthusiasm concerning EU accession. In this respect, the post-communist referenda were the inverse. They displayed low voter turnout & high support for accession; hence, they demonstrate the differing perceptions of the east European populations & their western counterparts. 8 Tables, 7 Graphs, 14 References. Adapted from the source document.
The study of the Bulgarian system of political parties assumed a relatively important position in the context of research in the genesis of party and political arrangements in post-communist countries of Central, South-East and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. It can be said that, in spite of certain delay, Bulgarian multipartism became one of the privileged subjects of that research, similarly to post-communist pluralisms in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (and/or Czechoslovakia). The attention given to Bulgarian party system was not a mere coincidence. The fact is that apart from some endemic peculiarities, Bulgarian multipartism also showed – and still, to a large extent, shows - some distinct features of indisputable interest and importance for the construction of models of formation of pluralist party systems, features linked especially with the complex phenomenon of Bulgarian post-communist party and political (bi)polarisation and its medium and long term system forming consequences. This article is a contribution to the discussion about the remarkable aspects of Bulgarian post-communist multipartism. In this perspective, special attention will be paid to links between the Bulgarian model of major pole dualism (Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, and Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP), the format of its party system and the systemic effect of the "extended" ("protracted") initial social and political polarisation. In this context, also some partial issues related with the evolution of the potential and role of "third parties" in present-day Bulgarian context will be briefly addressed. ; The study of the Bulgarian system of political parties assumed a relatively important position in the context of research in the genesis of party and political arrangements in post-communist countries of Central, South-East and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. It can be said that, in spite of certain delay, Bulgarian multipartism became one of the privileged subjects of that research, similarly to post-communist pluralisms in ...
The main purpose of this article is to show by selected case studies to what extent the euro has already managed to establish itself as one of the key international currencies from the point of view of various aspects, to what extent it fulfills the functions of an important international currency, and what are the prospects of the euro's position in the future. Various signals indicate that the euro already fulfills some conditions which would allow it to become a serious competitor to the dollar in a relatively short period of time. The article is also taking notice of some obstacles and drawbacks that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has to and will have to deal with.First of all, the author deals with the question of whether the eurozone is an optimum currency area. This is one of the principal theoretical problems which has been accompanying the EMU since the very beginning. Then he shifts his attention to the question, concerning what role does the euro play in the world economy at present from the point of view of the share of the eurozone on the world GDP, trade, officialforeign exchange reserves, selected indicators offinancial markets etc. Then he deals with the role of the euro in the world monetary system -- one of the main subsystems of the world economy. Here is presented a survey of countries which have accepted the euro as its single or main currency, and also countries whose currencies are narrowly linked to the euro by means of various exchange rate mechanisms. The next part of the article outlines the potential of the euro in its "conquest" offurther regions of the world. Both those where the euro is becoming or will become the number one currency (e.g. in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe) in a foreseeable future, and those where it will compete with the American dollar (e.g. in Latin America, in the Middle East etc.). In the final part, the author attemptes (use the same tense) to point out some problems which can influence what?missing subject, if and to what extent the euro really will become a strong and stable currency. At the moment, it is not yet possible to answer concisely and clearly the question of whether the euro will become an equivalent competitor to the American dollar. It is important whether the EMU will or will not break up in the course of the coming years or decades. So far, there have not appeared any signals of this kind. It will be substantial how the member countries of the eurozone will be able to handle the first serious crisis, e.g. analogical to that of 1992-1993. At that time, the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) was abandonned temporarily by the 1talian lira and permanently by the British pound. This crisis of the European monetary system has shown the difficulty or even incapacity to set such a monetary policy which would be simultaneously advantageous for all member countries of a certain monetary system. The question is whetlLer it is possible considering there are usually big differences in economical standing between individual countries. A similar or even a more serious crisis could emerge in a longer time horizon. The EMU thus stays a long term project and a long distance run. It is, however, possible to assume that within the next ten years, it could become totally clear whether the EMU project is a great success or a great error. Adapted from the source document.
