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Chan Wai Shun. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 193-216). ; Abstracts in English and Chinese. ; ABSTRACT --- p.III ; 緒論 --- p.IV ; ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.V ; TABLE OF CONTENT --- p.VII ; ABBREVIATIONS / LIST OF TABLES / LISTS OF FIGURES --- p.XII ; Chapter CHAPTER 1: --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 ; Chapter 1.1 --- Policy Background --- p.4 ; Chapter 1.2 --- Research Questions and Hypotheses --- p.6 ; Chapter 1.3 --- Conceptualization of Terms --- p.8 ; Chapter 1.4 --- Thematic Framework of the Whole Dissertation --- p.11 ; Chapter 1.5 --- Methodology and Research Limitations --- p.14 ; Chapter 1.5.1 --- The Selection of Case --- p.16 ; Chapter 1.5.2 --- The Articulation of Narratives and Discourses --- p.17 ; Chapter 1.5.3 --- The Source of Narratives and Discourses --- p.18 ; Chapter 1.5.4 --- The Methodological Limitations --- p.20 ; Chapter 1.6 --- Potential Contributions --- p.21 ; Chapter 1.6.1 --- Contributions to Academic Community --- p.21 ; Chapter 1.6.2 --- Contributions to the Diplomatic Community --- p.23 ; Chapter 1.7 --- Chapter Summary and the Preview of the Dissertation --- p.24 ; Chapter CHAPTER 2: --- A THEORETICAL REVIEW ON EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY --- p.25 ; Chapter 2.1 --- IR Theories and their Application in European Neighbourhood Policy --- p.25 ; Chapter 2.1.1 --- Realism and its Variation --- p.26 ; Chapter 2.1.2 --- Liberal Institutionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism --- p.28 ; Chapter 2.1.3 --- Constructivism and its Application --- p.30 ; Chapter 2.2 --- Problems of the Traditional IR Theories --- p.34 ; Chapter 2.2.1 --- The Maltreatment of Bargaining Game within EU --- p.35 ; Chapter 2.2.2 --- The Maltreatment of EU Polity --- p.37 ; Chapter 2.2.3 --- The Maltreatment of EU Foreign Policy --- p.38 ; Chapter 2.3 --- From IR ThEories to Policy-oriented Analysis --- p.40 ; Chapter 2.3.1 --- The Enlargement Experience of the Usual Reference --- p.41 ; Chapter 2.3.2 --- The Cross-pillar Characteristics of ENP ...

The COVID-19 pandemic brought on the so-called "coronacrisis," a global crisis event enormous in size and force. The crisis questioned the ability of states and instruments of international governance to respond quickly and effectively to the global threats. It is noteworthy that there was no strong correlation between crisis management efficacy and the type of political system of a country. However, the countries with elaborated and well-financed health systems, were able to struggle with the devastating consequences of the coronacrisis better than those with systemic, structural and financial problems of their healthcare sectors. It is obvious that the ability to manage the coronacrisis is not related to the type of political governance or ideology, but to the state administrative resources and competence of the cabinet / leaders. That potentially gave an opportunity for countries with different ideological foundations to neglect their tensions and unite the efforts in the containment of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (e.g. create mutual programmes of vaccination and medicine distribution). The main forces are the Transatlantic alliance, Russia and China. Unfortunately, no visible COVID-19-related agreement between them ever happened so far. Instead, the coronacrisis situation was used by the political rivals to intensify their aggressive rhetoric against each other (e.g., USA and Russia, USA and China) or profit from it in deepening international collaboration not connected with the pandemic itself (e.g., Russia and China). We do not observe any real mutual efforts of liquidating the pandemic consequences even within an ideological block, to say nothing about different blocks. The US–EU relationships worsened during the pandemic, especially at the background of Trump's cool attitude towards international organisations and his decision to leave the World Health Organization in the midst of the pandemic and his threatening words that US may also abandon the NATO. Likewise, John Bolton spoke of the EU as an entity hostile ...

It is generally acknowledged that Europe will not be a super power in the sense of a political-military ensemble on an equal footing with the United States or China. Europeans reject this possibility across the board. Moreover, even if they wanted to go that route, wouldn't it expose them to reproducing on a European scale what they have struggled to combat amongst themselves: the idea of becoming a great power with all the attributes of force and supremacy that such a project implies?So if Europe will not be a super power, how can it be a power at all? Probably by reinforcing what remains its major political resource: its capacity to produce and set up at the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible that can organize the world, discipline the interplay of its actors, introduce predictability in their behavior, develop among them a sense of collective responsibility, and offer those who engage on this path, particularly the weakest, at least the partial possibility to use these norms as an argument/force* against all, including the world's most powerful.The task may seem colossal, even outrageous. It probably is, but does Europe have any other choice but to assume its responsibility as a normative power? Probably not.[publisher's website]

It is generally acknowledged that Europe will not be a super power in the sense of a political-military ensemble on an equal footing with the United States or China. Europeans reject this possibility across the board. Moreover, even if they wanted to go that route, wouldn't it expose them to reproducing on a European scale what they have struggled to combat amongst themselves: the idea of becoming a great power with all the attributes of force and supremacy that such a project implies?So if Europe will not be a super power, how can it be a power at all? Probably by reinforcing what remains its major political resource: its capacity to produce and set up at the global level a system of norms as broad-sweeping as possible that can organize the world, discipline the interplay of its actors, introduce predictability in their behavior, develop among them a sense of collective responsibility, and offer those who engage on this path, particularly the weakest, at least the partial possibility to use these norms as an argument/force* against all, including the world's most powerful.The task may seem colossal, even outrageous. It probably is, but does Europe have any other choice but to assume its responsibility as a normative power? Probably not.[publisher's website]