Search results

AbstractThe outbreak of the COVID‐19 pandemic appears to have inflicted a decisive blow to ordoliberalism's influence on the economic governance of the Eurozone. This contribution shows that the decline of the ordoliberal ideas precedes the pandemic and can be traced in the management of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Drawing on the theoretical approach of sociological institutionalism and using insights from 18 interviews with participants in the Economic and Financial Committee and the ECOFIN, this article analyses the evolution of policy‐makers' economic policy beliefs and their impact on the fiscal reform of 2010–2013. It is argued that the establishment of the European Semester was the institutional reflection of an intellectual shift from rules‐based to institutions‐based discipline. I find that the latter conflicts with core ordoliberal principles of the Freiburg economic school, opening the way for alternative institutional arrangements, such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility.

AbstractEurope 2020 and the European Semester signal a major change of direction in EU social policy with new governance arrangements, policy orientations and politics. This paper analyses 290 Country Specific Recommendations and 29 interviews to answer two questions: 1) What type of social policy is being advanced by the EU at present? 2) How are EU social actors able to advance EU social policy under current conditions? It argues that the degree of progress in EU social policy in the European Semester (2011–15) has been conditional and contingent. EU social policy is more oriented to supporting market development than it is to correcting for market failures. We explain these developments by a combination of factors including the strong agency exerted by some social actors in a context of constraint, the moderation of expectations and the adoption of strategic practices by key actors, and political divisions among the Member States.

Recently, a well-known publisher Routledge from London published a book about to that topic under the title The European Semester and National Employment Policies (European semester and national policies of employment) written by Mario Munta from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb.

In this contribution to the symposium "What's the problem? Multilevel governance and problem‐solving," we discuss possible reasons that make difficult for the European Semester to achieve the goals of developing mutual learning and the acquisition of "ownership" over fiscal restraint, budgetary coordination and structural reforms. We underscore the uneasy coupling of a "soft" multilevel governance mode with "hard" forms of governance associated with power politics and domination. We claim that four major problems undermine the Semester's credibility and effectiveness: (1) a democratic deficit resulting from executive dominance, the relative sidelining of parliaments and the marginalization of the public, which confine learning to governmental and administrative circles; (2) the constitutionalization of budgetary policy choices, which constrains the available policy options and preempts reflection and discussion; (3) the "disciplinary logic" imposed through asymmetric intergovernmentalism, which invites noncompliance or bargaining, and (4) the "tough" treatment of debtor Eurozone members outside the Semester.

This article discusses the impact that the reforms of the European Union's economic governance since 2011 have had on the European Commission's role as a policy entrepreneur. Particular attention is paid to mechanisms that are applied by the Commission to extend its scope beyond its given formal competences to shape national reform agendas. The research interest is based on the assumption that the Commission is a 'competence-maximising rational actor' (Pollack, 1997), whose primary organisational goals are to expand the scope of Community competence and increase the Commission's own standing within the policy process. Accordingly, this research contributes to the scholarly debate by identifying mechanisms applied by the Commission under the European Semester to shape European and national reform agendas in areas of sovereign policymaking competences of the member states.

The European Semester became an essential part of the revised governance architecture of the Europe 2020 reform strategy for the Single European Market under the conditions of the global financial crisis and the emerging eurozone crisis a decade ago. The article examines to what extent the European Semester offers channels to establish <em>throughput legitimacy </em>by granting national parliaments the ability to effectively scrutinise executive decision-making in the annual policy cycle. Poland is chosen as the case study for parliamentary scrutiny of the EU's system of multi-level governance in the East-Central European region. The analysis adopts a liberal intergovernmentalist two-level approach. On the domestic level it concentrates on the involvement of the Sejm, the lower house of parliament, on the drafting of the Polish National Reform Plans for the annual Semester policy cycle between 2015 and 2020. The basis for the analysis are official transcripts from the plenary debates in the relevant committees, the European Affairs Committee and the Public Finance and the Economic Committee. The Polish case study illustrates that the European Semester represents a predominantly elite-driven process of policy coordination, which is strongly geared towards EU-level executive bargaining processes between national governments and the European Commission at the expense of domestic parliamentary scrutiny.

Pensions at the European level have been, since the sovereign debt crisis, affected by several decision-making innovations. Retirement policy has been embedded in the European Semester, which strengthened the hitherto inadequate European socioeconomic policy coordination mechanisms. Given that the additional powers bestowed upon the Commission were qualified, a supranational response followed. With the effect of strengthening its rational-legal authority, in line with neo-functionalist spillover assumptions, evidence-based standards have been progressively applied to EU retirement policy formation. This innovative turn warrants the employment of a policy analysis theoretical framework. In particular, the article applies the concepts underpinning policy evaluation to the study of pensions within the Semester. Using a mixed-methods approach, which combines case study with statistical analysis, and following a novel in-depth coding of country-specific recommendations and Country Reports, this article argues that member states' pensions are now assessed within a structured, formal and polycentric evaluation cycle. This has been gradually constructed by increasing the coherence between the yearly interim ex post evaluations of pension policy output (the Country Reports) and the final ex post evaluations of pension policy outcomes (the Ageing and Pension Adequacy Reports) that are published every 3 years. The result is a streamlined, technocratic, knowledge-based approach to retirement policy at the supranational level. Even though the generation of technical knowledge is no substitute for toothless conditionality, greater reliance on evidence is aimed at socializing national decision-makers and may eventually influence their policy choices. The unconventional pension evaluation cycle that sprung up around the Semester may, hence, serve as a model applicable to other socioeconomic policy domains.