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Turkey first applied for EU membership in 1987 and started negotiations for full membership in October 2005 after lengthy and challenging negotiations between EU member states. This master's thesis attempts to examine the relationship between the negotiations for EU membership that are going on between Turkey and the EU Commission and the public discussion on the subject. The research material consists of selected posts on the Financial Times discussion forum and the Acquis communautaire and Copenhagen criteria. By comparing the research material this thesis attempts to investigate if the public deliberation and official negotiations focus on the same issues and requirements for membership. The theoretical background for this analysis is deliberative democracy, according to which public debate should be a prerequisite for agenda setting and decision making. The findings of the thesis reveal that the public discussion does touch on the acquis communautaire and Copenhagen criteria to some degree, but the public is also concerned with non-acquis issues such as the culture and history. A unique feature of the accession negotiations is also the amount of commentary from heads of state regarding the negotiations, which was also noted in the research material. In the light of deliberative democratic theory it can be noted that the public may take part in the discussion over Turkey's membership, but it has little or no chances of setting the agenda for the negotiations.

This work, prepared and published during the author's stay at the RSCAS, EUI, is a "compilation thesis" (in Finnish "artikkeliväitöskirja"), Department of Political Sciences, University of Helsinki, and contains the major part of the author's PhD thesis (forthcoming print monograph, 2012). ; The future is uncertain, and the financial system of the European Union has to take into account this uncertainty. This book looks at the different means it has at its disposal to do so, and analyses how these means have evolved since the creation of the general budget of the European Communities in 1968. The analysis is extended to a broader study of the development of the European Union through several case studies: negotiations on the Financial Regulation of 25 June 2002,on its first modifi cation, adopted on 13 December 2006, and on the Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) of 17 May 2006 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound fi nancial management and on the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2007-2013. The question of the uncertainty of the future is addressed using the so-called "Theory of Budgetary Flexibility". This theory, developed originally to analyse national budgetary systems, establishes an essential distinction between External Flexibility and Internal Flexibility, on the one hand, and Annual Flexibility and Multiannual Flexibility on the other hand. It is particularly useful here as it enables us to examine under a common framework processes that are often considered separate (and treated in the literature as such), and to draw conclusions at systems' level. The book is divided into three Parts: - Part One (Chapters 1 to 3), which forms the theoretical part of this book, includes an analysis of the specificities and of the functioning of the budgetary and financial systems of the European Union, while presenting an "état des lieux" of studies carried out in these fields; - Part Two (Chapters 4 to 13) deals with changes that have been made to various forms of flexibility since 1968. Special attention is paid not only to the consequences these changes have had for the various actors involved – namely the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and Member States – but also for the financial system of the European Union as a whole; - Part Three (Chapters 14 to 18) addresses the question of how the changes examined in Part Two affect the general development of the European Union.

Vol. 1: Belgique. - 653 S. - ISBN 92-829-0315-X; Vol. 2: Belgique. - S. 654-1334. - ISBN 92-829-0300-1; Vol. 3: Danmark. - 725 S. - ISBN 92-829-0301-X; Vol. 4: Deutschland. - 534 S. - ISBN 92-829-0302-8; Vol. 5: Ellas. - 580 S. - ISBN 92-829-0303-6; Vol. 6: Espana. - 635 S. - ISBN 92-829-0304-4; Vol. 7: France I. - 560 S. - ISBN 92-829-0316-8; Vol. 8: France II. - S. 565-1019. - ISBN 92-829-0305-2; Vol. 9: Ireland. - 201 S. - ISBN 92-829-0306-0.; Vol. 10: Italia I. - 435 S. - ISBN 92-829-0317-6; Vol. 11: Italia II. - S. 439-1199. - ISBN 92-829-0307-9; Vol. 12: Luxembourg. - 517 S. - ISBN 92-829-0308-7; Vol. 13: Nederland. - 605 S. - ISBN 92-829-0309-5; Vol. 14: Portugal. - 288 S. - ISBN 92-829-0310-9; Vol. 15: United Kingdom. - 636 S. - ISBN 92-829-0311-7

Euroopan komissio luotiin jotta se voisi ajaa yhteisöjen intressiä. Sen vuoksi siitä päätettiin tehdä itsenäinen. Mutta koska Euroopan Unionin vaikutus jäsenmaissaan on hyvin vahvaa, myös talouden kannalta, haluavat jäsenmaat vaikuttaa komissioon mahdollisimman paljon. Tämän vuoksi komission itsenäisyys vaarantuu. Perustamissopimukset koettavat hoitaa ongelman luomalla komissiolle joita-kin suojamekanismeja. Mutta ovatko ne riittäviä? Vaikuttaa siltä, että komissioon pystytään vaikuttamaan liikaa sen jokapäiväisessä työssä. Tämä vaikuttaminen alkaa jo komission nimittämisvaiheessa ja jatkuu koko ajan komission pohtiessa uuden lainsäädännön tarvetta ja komission valmistellessa uutta lainsäädäntöä. Komission lakiehdotelman sisältöön vaikuttavat usein paljonkin muut instituutiot, jäsenvaltiot sekä intressiryhmät. Tämä johtaa siihen, että komissio ei täysin pysty toteuttamaan yhteisöjen in-tressiä. Monin eri tavoin komission päätöksiin voivat vaikuttaa yksittäisten tai use-ampien jäsenmaiden edut, vaikka tarkoitus olisi ajaa yhteisöjen etua. The European Commission was created so that it could work to fulfil the Community Interest. Therefore it was decided to be an independent institution. But because the European Union affects its Member States very deeply, not least in budgetary ways, the Member States seem to want to influence the Commission as much as possible. Therefore the independence of the Commission is at stake. The Treaties try to deal with the problem by setting some protective mecha-nisms on the Commission. But is it enough? It seems that the Commission gets in-fluenced too much in its everyday work. This influencing starts already at the nomi-nation of the Commissioners, continues all the while when the Commission is decid-ing if new Community legislation is needed and while it drafts new legislation. The substance of the drafts are often influenced very much by the other institutions, Member States and interest groups. What this means is that the Commission can't fulfil its task at seeking the best of the Communities. In many different ways the decisions of the Commission may further the good of one or some interested parties instead of the Community In-terest.