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Adapted from the source document.

Den norske klimapolitikken blir stadig tettere knyttet til EUs klimaregelverk. Denne artikkelen analyserer hvordan og hvorfor Norge har koblet klimapolitikken opp mot EU og hvilket handlingsrom samarbeidet med EU gir norske myndigheter. Gjennom EØS-avtalen har det europeiske kvotesystemet (EU ETS) siden 2008 dekket omtrent halvparten av de norske utslippene, i hovedsak fra industri og petroleumsvirksomhet. Siden 2021 er også de ikke-kvotepliktige utslippene fra transport, landbruk, bygg og avfall omfattet av en egen tidsavgrenset avtale med EU, som et tillegg til EØS-avtalen. Dette samarbeidet forplikter Norge til å kutte utslipp hvert år fram til 2030. Avtalen binder også Norge til å følge EUs regelverk for opptak av klimagasser knyttet til skog og annen arealbruk. I praksis er Norge fullt medlem av EUs klimapolitiske samarbeid fram til 2030. Analysen viser at denne tette tilknytningen har økt det politiske presset for å kutte klimagassutslipp innenlands. Samtidig har Norge valgt å holde alle fleksibilitetsmuligheter åpne for å gjennomføre kuttene i EU i stedet. Hvorvidt disse mulighetene vil bli benyttet er i stor grad et politisk spørsmål som trolig vil prege klimadebatten frem mot 2030. Den endelige utformingen og innretningen på EUs grønne giv og Norges tilknytning til denne vil også påvirke handlingsrommet for klimakutt hjemme versus ute.
Abstract in English:Ever Closer Union? Norway's Climate Collaboration with the EUNorwegian climate policy has increasingly become closely linked to EU climate regulations. This article analyzes how and why Norway has linked its climate policy to the EU's and what room for maneuvering the cooperation with the EU gives Norwegian authorities. Through the EEA agreement, the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has covered about half of Norway's emissions, mainly from industry and the petroleum sector, since 2008. Since 2021, non-ETS emissions from transport, agriculture, construction and waste have also been covered by a separate time-limited agreement with the EU, as a supplement to the EEA agreement. This cooperation obliges Norway to cut emissions every year until 2030. The agreement also binds Norway to comply with EU regulations for the emissions and uptake of greenhouse gases related to forests and other land use. In practice, Norway is fully obliged to comply with the EU's climate policy regulations until 2030. The analysis shows that this close connection has increased the political pressure to cut greenhouse gas emissions domestically. At the same time, Norway has chosen to keep all flexibility options open to implement the cuts in the EU instead. Whether these opportunities will be used is largely a political question that probably will shape the climate debate until 2030. The final design and structure of the EU's Green Deal and Norway's connection to it will also affect the maneuvering room for climate cuts at home versus abroad.

Negotiation for the next EU budget was one of the most important & complex issues for Lithuania & other EU member states during the first three years after the EU enlargement of 2004. During the negotiation Lithuania could rely on some experience acquired at the time of EU accession. However, the crucial difference between these two negotiations was that the acceding countries did not have voice (veto power) when discussing the terms of their future EU membership. This article describes the dynamics of the negotiation in 2004-2005 over the next EU budget & tries to address the paradox that, despite the microphone & a place at the negotiating table, negotiation for Lithuania (and most of other EU new member states) by & large ended according to the accession scenario. The article also discusses the likely directions of the EU budget review & options of its modification, as well as implications for Lithuania. Adapted from the source document.

It is a common perception that 20 years after the fall of communism, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CCEE), even though they have joined the EU, belong to the group of post-communist countries. This article analyses whether a clear distinction in the quality of democracy between the CCEE, which are new member states of the EU, and the old member states still could be made. The analysis has been performed by comparison of the democracy indicators of the countries of Southern Europe, Nordic countries and the CCEE. The research has revealed that the scores of democracy indicators of the countries of Southern Europe and the CCEE do not differ significantly, and in some cases, the scores of the group of the CCEE correspond to a better quality of democracy. The scores of democracy indicators of the individual countries of the two groups overlap in most cases. However, the analysis has exhibited a considerable difference of the democracy indicators between the countries of Southern Europe and Nordic countries, although these countries belong to the group of the old member states of the EU. Thus, the difference in the scores of democracy indicators inside the group of the old member states of the EU is bigger than the difference between the CCEE and the countries of Southern Europe. This means that the requirements for the quality of democracy, which are applied to mature Western democracies, have to be applied to the CCEE. Adapted from the source document.

The dynamics of the attitudes towards Lithuania's membership in the EU could be divided into three periods: decreasing number of membership supporters till the beginning of 2000 (distrust in state institutions, lack of information, economical fears), increasing support till referendum (informational campaign, beliefs in positive impact on economy) and stable support of membership after referendum & accession. The main positive changes according to public opinion are possibilities to work abroad & reduced unemployment. The main negative change is rise of prices. Rise of prices was the main reason of skeptical attitudes towards euro introduction. On the other hand, according to Eurobarometer Lithuania, is one of the most euro-optimistic countries. Public opinion polls in EU show that attitudes towards Lithuania are positive. Adapted from the source document.

The article deals with the main preconditions for the application of the EU conditionality. It argues that the experience of the Western Balkan & the ENP countries could be used to assess the preconditions of the success of the Europeanization in Central & Eastern Europe. It also provides arguments for the critical assessment of the role of the EU membership perspective in the success of the domestic reforms. Three main conditions are identified & suggestions for further research are made. Adapted from the source document.

The EU energy policy has always been governed by a sort of go-it-alone principles. There has been a lack of common approach to energy problems and no real determination to create a common energy market. As a result, the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine left certain Central and South European countries without gas and showed how vulnerable the EU is when it does not have real instruments to react unanimously. In that context the effects of Lisbon Treaty in energy security sector are very important to assess by looking what contribution the Treaty makes in that field. Moreover, it could be argued that The Lisbon Treaty established the main priorities of the European energy policy and has envisaged the possibility for the EU to play a more active role in that sector. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this article is to review & evaluate the condition & the development perspectives of the relations between the EU & its Eastern neighbors. The problem is analyzed in the context of the recent discussion on the "Broader Europe" concept. The current dominant model of the relations between the EU & Eastern Europe countries is described in the article using the "circular discourse" & "circular interaction" terms. This article is aimed to reveal the initial theoretical & geo/political preconditions that helped this model to become the dominant theoretical & practical approach in the field of EU -- East Europe relations, to uncover the logics of its functioning & the implications of its realization to Lithuania & the other new EU member states. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of this article is to explore the bargaining process of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013 & to provide the conceptual explanation of the particular result of this bargaining. Although quite a number of drafts have been discussed among member states, three of them characterize the most important turns of the bargaining: Commission's Proposal, the Luxemburg's Compromise & the Decision of the European Council. Andrew Moravcsik's Liberal Intergovernmental Approach has been applied as the methodological tool for the analysis of the EU Financial Perspective 2007-2013. Moravcsik assumes that European bargaining is a two level game. A two level game is a metaphoric concept describing how the interaction between the domestic pressure groups & decision makers formulates national preferences & how political leaders on the European level represent those national preferences. On both levels pragmatic economic interests are the driving factors of different actors. It should be emphasized that states are the main players in EU arena, whereas supranational institutions play a supporting part. Five different groups or informal coalitions could be found in the recent bargaining for the Financial Perspective. The key interest of rich member states (UK, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, & France) was to decrease EU spending -- to cut the contributions to the EU budget. Phasing out states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) as former major beneficiaries of EU structural policy strived to diminish financial losses in the new Financial Perspective. Poorer Central European countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic & Hungary) fought for the structural funds. Finally, the UK was alone against the rest of member states which called for the radical review of the British rebate. The comparative statistical & qualitative analysis of those proposals revealed two important trends in the bargaining. First, the EU spending was cut in every turn. Second, the funds for the rich member states were redistributed at the expense of the poorer member states. Certainly, such redistribution did not change the fact that the older member states remained the net contributors & the poor Central European countries gained more benefits compared to the previous Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Besides these two main tendencies the phasing out states succeed to increase the funds for their undeveloped regions & the final Decision of the European Council offered for the UK the most favorable mechanism counting the British rebate. The article reveals the weaknesses of the popular geopolitical interpretations which were proposed in order to explain the strong clashes between member states. The geopolitical & ideological discourse was aimed at neutralizing the domestic pressure. The economic logic to pay less & get more was the dominant thinking in the bargaining for the European financial pie. The asymmetrical interdependence which was the main source of bargaining power during the previous intergovernmental negotiations on Common Market is obsolete in explaining the modalities of redistributional policies. The effect of relative power was limited to the bargaining strategy, however it did not make a remarkable impact to the final agreement. On the contrary, the typical net recipient is a small & poor member state. The author has to come to the conclusion that the poor Central European countries states were forced to support the cuts of the budget & suffered a relative defeat in the bargaining, since they were the main beneficiaries of the common EU budget. It means that the poor Central European countries were the most interested to reach an agreement as soon as possible in order to avoid the risk of facing the EU financial turbulences. For this reason their bargaining power was very weak. Adapted from the source document.

In this article the main attention will be devoted for the state and its place in postcommunist society. The state is the main institutional ensemble in political arena that directs our both political and everyday life, yet it itself is usually resilient for any radical changes even if it largely does not suffice the expectations of its citizenry. Firstly, it is considered the phenomenon of transformation of postcommunist state, its internal logic and essential causes that determined clear divergence of developmental paths in the postcommunist space. In other two chapters the attention will be paid for the development of postcommunist states after their accession in to the EU and for evolution of different trajectories. In the second part of the article the attention is paid to the development of postcommunist states after their accession in to the EU and for evolution of different trajectories. The evidence shows that the divide between "semi-core" and "semi-peripheral" countries in Central and Eastern Europe has become quite stable and may have its implications for the future. Adapted from the source document.

Lithuania's referendum on the accession into the European Union was part of the so-called "domino strategy" of the fourth wave of EU enlargement, which aimed to influence the mindset of the inhabitants of the less euro-enthusiastic member states by placing the pressure of the anticipated high positive result from the more enthusiastic member states (Lithuania among them) on them. Typical trend of elites' manipulations can be observed in Lithuania, i.e. changing of the legal basis on the referendum prior to the EU accession referendum in order to facilitate positive outcome. These facilitating rules had been introduced step by step, bringing any discussions on these matters in a parliament during election campaigns of 2000 & 2002 to an end in order to escape escalation of the pro versus the anti-European cleavages within political system. Thus, a double hurdle (both turn-out & voting YES of 50 per cent of all eligible voters) existing since 1989 in referendum legislation was lowered introducing triple hurdle (turnout of 50 per cent & voting YES one third of all eligible voters but more than 50 per cent of participants) in 2002. Then, in 2003 it was facilitated once again introducing new double hurdle (turn-out 50 per cent of all eligible voters & voting YES by 50 per cent of participants). Further attempts to facilitate positive result were limited by two factors: first, a specific factor, an almost parallel initiative of referendum on the constitutional amendments (so-called "Uspaskikh referendum"), is to be taken into consideration. In addition, a general requirement that the citizens themselves decide on the issue of Lithuania's EU integration in a decisive & binding manner, i.e. a referendum, typical for other CEE countries as well as, was also important here. Finally, other settings laying ground for a positive result, though facilitated twice, were further reinforced by a two-day voting procedure. Together with an unexpected apathy of Hungarian voters in their referendum, these risky rules became a reason for dramatization & anxiety expecting proclaiming referendum as invalid due to insufficient voter turnout. An official information campaign of the Government on the EU accession started in 2000. Gradually it turned into a one-sided agitation campaign, let alone before the referendum date. Positive involvement of the institutions possessing high public confidence such as te mass media & Catholic Church, a well-established consensus of the major political parties on the EU accession, weak organization of the euro-skeptical movement all led to an absence of any substantial political competition. Finally, the advertising as such started dominating the campaign. Features of propaganda, sometimes coming very close to a violation of laws banning advertising during the voting days, could be observed here too. Different points of view should be endorsed in order to interpret the high positive result of the referendum in a sufficient manner. As regards the history of Lithuania's political system, it was the fourth successful referendum since the 90s. What was typical for all of them was that the citizens & the elites held a common position on the issue. Seen within the context of the latest internal political developments in Lithuania, it could be nevertheless equated to an exception first of all in view of electorate's positive motivation, less apathy & the lack of tangible protest features. Referendum proceeding & its results -- maximal active support for the YES statement among all countries of fourth wave of EU enlargement -- give a fresh & useful data for testing "elite-centric," "rational choice," "ideological-cultural" theories of euro-integration. 6 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.

The article discusses the impact of European Union membership on the economy, politics and policies of the new member's states, in particular, Lithuania. It first presents the forecasts and arguments regarding the impact of EU enlargement that were discussed before the enlargement in 2004/2007. Afterwards it evaluates the experience so far, by discussing the studies which have been made on the impact of EU and concludes that, the enlargement has been a positive sum game for the economies of new member states (as well the whole EU), increasing trade and investments flows and contributing to the catching up with the rest of the EU. However, it argues that the impact of the EU membership is mediated by domestic policies of each member state, and that Lithuania has not attempted to strengthen the positive impulses coming from the EU accession, in particular by postponing the structural reforms in the country. So far most evidence shows that new members have not changed radically the functioning of the EU, and the implementation of the EU norms has been better than expected, with Lithuania consistently being one of the leading countries in this respect. Finally, it assesses the main European policy priorities in Lithuania, in particular the reasons for some failures (such as the failure to join the eurozone in 2007) and achievements. It argues that most European policy failures have been due to the inconsistency and low credibility of some domestic policies. It concludes by providing venues for future research of European policy after the enlargement. Adapted from the source document.

The fiscal federalism theory was developed to explain budget formation in independent states. At present, this theory is often applied to supranational institutions like the European Union (hereinafter EU), without paying enough attention to the unique characteristics of this level of analysis. This article identifies which assumptions of the classical fiscal federalism theory cannot be applied to the supranational level. This paper answers the question of whether changes in the EU budget of 2014 were in line with the normative principles of the fiscal federalism. Recommendations to the policy makers how the EU budget could be improved are presented in the conclusions. Meanwhile, funding for the remaining three areas consists of ~40.6% of the EU budget. On this basis, we cannot say that the first of the EU budgets in the new multiannual financial framework is more in line with the principles of the fiscal federalism than the previous financial framework's first budget. Adapted from the source document.

2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.