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Why does European integration proceed? This article tests among three theories of representation. (1) The "permissive consensus" theory argues that political elites have been able to pursue their own policy interests because of public disinterest. (2) Stimson's (1991) "policy mood" theory argues that public disinterest is a sign that political elites are hewing close enough to public preferences. (3) The "cue-taking" theory argues that a disinterested public's preferences will be correlated with political elite policy positions not because elites are responding to public preferences, but because political elites shape weakly held preferences through their policy positions. A two-stage least squares regression model is used to test among the theories. The results provide support for the policy mood theory. 3 Tables, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.

Examines recent developments among European transnational political parties and their role in relation to European integration; focus on the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People's Party (EPP).

How provinces effectively negotiated their European interests before Austria's admission to the European Union; with comparisons to regional government in Germany and other nations.

As the European Union (EU) has evolved, the study agenda has shifted from 'European integration' to 'EU politics'. Missing from this new agenda, however, is an understanding of the 'cognitive constraints' on actors and how actors respond, i.e. the shape of the EU 'political space' and the location of social groups and competition between actors within this space. The article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the shape of the EU political space (the interaction between an Integration-Independence and Left-Right dimension and the location of class and sectoral groups within this map), and tests this framework on the policy positions of the Socialist, Christian Democrat and Liberal party leaders between 1976 and 1994 (using the techniques of the ECPR Party Manifestos Group Project). The research finds that the two dimensions were salient across the whole period, explains why the party families converged on pro-European positions by the 1990s and discovers the emergence of a triangular 'core' of EU politics. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Abstract. As the European Union (EU) has evolved, the study agenda has shifted from 'European integration' to 'EU politics'. Missing from this new agenda, however, is an understanding of the 'cognitive constraints' on actors and how actors respond, i.e. the shape of the EU 'political space' and the location of social groups and competition between actors within this space. The article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the shape of the EU political space (the interaction between an Integration–Independence and Left–Right dimension and the location of class and sectoral groups within this map), and tests this framework on the policy positions of the Socialist, Christian Democrat and Liberal party leaders between 1976 and 1994 (using the techniques of the ECPR Party Manifestos Group Project). The research finds that the two dimensions were salient across the whole period, explains why the party families converged on pro–European positions by the 1990s and discovers the emergence of a triangular 'core' of EU politics.

This paper compares legislative dynamics under all procedures in which the Council of Ministers votes by qualified majority (QMV). We make five major points. First, the EU governments have sought to reduce the democratic deficit by increasing the powers of the European Parliament since 1987, whereas they have lessened the legislative influence of the Commission. Under the Amsterdam treaty's version of the codecision procedure, the Parliament is a co-equal legislator with the Council, whereas the Commission's influence is likely to be more informal than formal. Second, as long as the Parliament acts as a pro-integration entrepreneur, policy outcomes under consultation, cooperation & the new codecision will be more integrationist than the QMV-pivot in the Council prefers. Third, the pace of European integration may slow down if MEPs become more responsive to the demands of their constituents. Fourth, the EU is evolving into a bicameral legislature with a heavy status quo bias. Not only does the Council use QMV but absolute majority voting requirements & high levels of absenteeism create a de facto supermajority threshold for Parliamentary decisions. Finally, if the differences between the Council & the Parliament concern regulation issues on a traditional left-right axis, the Commission is more likely to be the ally of the Council than the Parliament. 2 Figures, 36 References. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd.]

This paper compares legislative dynamics under all procedures in which the Council of Ministers votes by qualified majority (QMV). We make five major points. First, the EU governments have sought to reduce the democratic deficit by increasing the powers of the European Parliament since 1987, whereas they have lessened the legislative influence of the Commission. Under the Amsterdam treaty's version of the codecision procedure, the Parliament is a coequal legislator with the Council, whereas the Commission's influence is likely to be more informal than formal. Second, as long as the Parliament acts as a pro-integration entrepreneur, policy outcomes under consultation, cooperation and the new codecision will be more integrationist than the QMV-pivot in the Council prefers. Third, the pace of European integration may slow down if MEPs become more responsive to the demands of their constituents. Fourth, the EU is evolving into a bicameral legislature with a heavy status quo bias. Not only does the Council use QMV but absolute majority voting requirements and high levels of absenteeism create a de facto supermajority threshold for Parliamentary decisions. Finally, if the differences between the Council and the Parliament concern regulation issues on a traditional left-right axis, the Commission is more likely to be the ally of the Council than the Parliament.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Tables -- List of Figures -- Preface -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Implementing European Union Environmental Policy: Themes and Issues -- 1.2 Aims and Objectives of the Book -- 1.3 Structure of the Book -- Chapter 2 EU Environmental Policy: Political Processes, NEPIs and Policy Implementation -- Part 1 - Environmental Policy and Politics in the EU -- 2.1 The Rise of European Environmental Policy -- 2.2 The Nature of European Environmental Decision-Making -- 2.3 Models of European Environmental Policy-making -- 2.4 Issues in EU Environmental Politics -- 2.5 Concluding Comments -- Part 2 - Environmental Policy Instruments -- 2.6 Introduction -- 2.7 Command-and-Control Regulation -- 2.8 Environmental Taxes and Charges -- 2.9 Tradable Permits -- 2.10 Voluntary Agreements -- 2.11 Experiences with NEPIs in the European Union -- 2.12 Conclusions -- Chapter 3 The Packaging Waste Directive -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 National Policies and the Packaging Waste Directive -- 3.3 Negotiating and Transposing the Packaging Waste Directive -- 3.4 National Packaging Waste Management Systems -- 3.5 Comparison of the UK and German Models -- 3.6 Conclusions -- Chapter 4 Recycling Infrastructure in Britain and Germany -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Voluntary Agreements in Britain and Germany -- 4.3 Hypothecation and The Expansion of Recycling Infrastructure -- 4.4 PRNs and Tradable Permits in Packaging Waste -- 4.5 Conclusions -- Chapter 5 Corporate Responses to Environmental Taxes and Charges -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 National Indicators of Packaging Production -- 5.3 Producer Perceptions of Economic Instruments -- 5.4 Corporate Waste Management -- 5.5 Economic Instruments and Packaging-Waste Management -- 5.6 Alternative Policy Strategies -- 5.7 Conclusions -- Chapter 6 NEPIs and EU Environmental Policy