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AbstractIn the multilevel system of the European Union (EU), national governments have been empowered at the expense of parliaments. We study the executive power shift in EU politics in the formation of national preferences. This article shows that governments are more likely to integrate parliaments and external actors, such as other governments and EU institutions, when they advocate extreme bargaining positions in EU negotiations. We theoretically develop this argument and provide an empirical study of Eurozone politics, covering the preference formation of 27 EU member states. The analysis shows that the executives are overall the dominating power: most of the time, governments form national preferences on their own. When governments integrate additional actors, they mostly rely on external actors and do so to avoid blame and to shift responsibility. These findings question whether the integration of national parliaments in EU politics indeed addresses democratic accountability concerns.

In this article, we analyze how European Union Politics has evolved over the last 25 years. Our analysis demonstrates that the goals the editorial team has pursued over this quarter century have only partly been reached. While the journal has helped to consolidate EU studies as a field of research in its own rights, several problems of representation persist in the journal and the social sciences in general. We identify besides the well-known gender gap that especially authors from the (European) South and East continue to be underrepresented in submitted and published articles. While less represented and successful at the submission stage, our results show that female scholars are more likely than male author teams to publish high-impact articles. Our findings indicate that studies of political behavior, broadly conceived, and articles using quantitative methods are well-represented. The article concludes with some remarks on how the journal might help to further professionalize the study of the EU in the coming years.

AbstractIn this article, I distinguish between four foundational narratives about the EU and outline how they continue to shape EU politics of the present day. The foundational narratives are (1) the EU as a peace project, (2) the notion that the EU is forged in crisis, (3) the sense that deeper economic interdependence fosters political change and (4) the idea that law can replace power politics in the EU. In order for the European project to address current challenges, such as climate change, economic instability, political polarization or the rule of law crisis, I argue that Europeans need to confront their past. History is not only the recollection of events; it represents the connections that the public and elites wish to make. So, in order to develop policy solutions to cross‐border issues, European contemporaries need to critically revisit past connections and to uncover blind spots. If Europeans revisit the EU's foundational narratives, they might also figure out what should change in the EU today.

This article analyzes the literature on procedural models of European Union politics. We present an overview of the main models of the legislative procedures, with a focus on their relevance to European Union politics and the literature today. We discuss early controversies in the literature and examine the empirical research that tested the models. Furthermore, we consider models of other aspects of policy-making in the European Union. Finally, we discuss the literature's main contributions and principal shortcomings and formulate suggestions for improvement. We argue that the models contribute greatly to our understanding of European Union politics, offer clear predictions regarding policies, institutions' powers, and the extent of gridlock and have sparked extensive empirical research. The models of consultation and codecision can serve as standard models of unicameral legislatures with an agenda setter and bicameral legislatures with bargaining between the two chambers, respectively. Moreover, they contribute to the study of the implications of institutional reform.

Forecasting plays an increasingly important role in the scientific study of European Union politics and in political science in general. This is because forecasts are not only indispensable for (political) actors who need to form expectations about future events, but can also be used to judge the validity of (competing) theoretical models. While the debate about whether political science should engage in forecasting is largely over, many questions about how this should be done in everyday research are still open. One of these is how forecasts of political time series can be derived from theoretical models. Using a practical example from European Union research, we start to address this question. We first show how forecasts of political time series can be derived from both theoretical and atheoretical models. Subsequently, we use an atheoretical time series (ARMA) imputation approach to demonstrate how they can be fruitfully integrated in order to overcome some of the limitations to making forecasts of political time series which are based on theoretical models.

AbstractAccording to the 'opposition deficit thesis' European Union politics is characterized by a conspicuous absence of opposition to the policies promoted by the EU. However, once we start looking for systematic evidence supporting the claim of an opposition deficit in EU politics, we come up surprisingly empty handed. This article seeks to rectify the lacuna in previous research by examining how much and what type of opposition actually exist in EU politics. The study formulates four hypotheses on the state of political opposition in EU politics, and breaks new ground by testing their validity by use of unique data collected from the Swedish European Affairs Committee for the period 1995–2016. The results show there is in fact considerably more opposition present in EU politics than has previously been assumed. The opposition deficit thesis thus seems to be more myth than reality.