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This article analyzes the literature on procedural models of European Union politics. We present an overview of the main models of the legislative procedures, with a focus on their relevance to European Union politics and the literature today. We discuss early controversies in the literature and examine the empirical research that tested the models. Furthermore, we consider models of other aspects of policy-making in the European Union. Finally, we discuss the literature's main contributions and principal shortcomings and formulate suggestions for improvement. We argue that the models contribute greatly to our understanding of European Union politics, offer clear predictions regarding policies, institutions' powers, and the extent of gridlock and have sparked extensive empirical research. The models of consultation and codecision can serve as standard models of unicameral legislatures with an agenda setter and bicameral legislatures with bargaining between the two chambers, respectively. Moreover, they contribute to the study of the implications of institutional reform.

Forecasting plays an increasingly important role in the scientific study of European Union politics and in political science in general. This is because forecasts are not only indispensable for (political) actors who need to form expectations about future events, but can also be used to judge the validity of (competing) theoretical models. While the debate about whether political science should engage in forecasting is largely over, many questions about how this should be done in everyday research are still open. One of these is how forecasts of political time series can be derived from theoretical models. Using a practical example from European Union research, we start to address this question. We first show how forecasts of political time series can be derived from both theoretical and atheoretical models. Subsequently, we use an atheoretical time series (ARMA) imputation approach to demonstrate how they can be fruitfully integrated in order to overcome some of the limitations to making forecasts of political time series which are based on theoretical models.

The implementation of European Union directives into national law frequently triggers extensive parliamentary activities, especially if they are complex, salient, and conflictive. These activities can cause delayed transposition. The literature suggests that early parliamentary involvement may speed up the subsequent transposition process. In this article, it is argued theoretically and empirically shown that this hope is only fulfilled where parliaments are sufficiently strong. On the empirical side, the article looks at the effect of ex-ante scrutiny on the duration of the transposition of more than 650 directives in four weak parliaments as well as in four strong parliaments. It is found that an early involvement of strong parliaments may speed up transposition. By contrast, weak parliaments' early engagement with EU directives may even cause a further delay of the transposition process.

According to the 'opposition deficit thesis' European Union politics is characterized by a conspicuous absence of opposition to the policies promoted by the EU. However, once we start looking for systematic evidence supporting the claim of an opposition deficit in EU politics, we come up surprisingly empty handed. This article seeks to rectify the lacuna in previous research by examining how much and what type of opposition actually exist in EU politics. The study formulates four hypotheses on the state of political opposition in EU politics, and breaks new ground by testing their validity by use of unique data collected from the Swedish European Affairs Committee for the period 1995–2016. The results show there is in fact considerably more opposition present in EU politics than has previously been assumed. The opposition deficit thesis thus seems to be more myth than reality.

How provinces effectively negotiated their European interests before Austria's admission to the European Union; with comparisons to regional government in Germany and other nations.

AbstractAccording to the 'opposition deficit thesis' European Union politics is characterized by a conspicuous absence of opposition to the policies promoted by the EU. However, once we start looking for systematic evidence supporting the claim of an opposition deficit in EU politics, we come up surprisingly empty handed. This article seeks to rectify the lacuna in previous research by examining how much and what type of opposition actually exist in EU politics. The study formulates four hypotheses on the state of political opposition in EU politics, and breaks new ground by testing their validity by use of unique data collected from the Swedish European Affairs Committee for the period 1995–2016. The results show there is in fact considerably more opposition present in EU politics than has previously been assumed. The opposition deficit thesis thus seems to be more myth than reality.

This study highlights both the significance and impact of the developing changes in the last decades around Europe, the notion-related adjustments that remain to be carried and in parallel to provide a more general explanation concerning the institution of sovereignty in relation to the process of European integration. The main questions that this article seeks to answer are the following: Who governs who within the EU? How does the European nexus of institutions and governance affect sovereignty? Which are the main consequences of the Maastricht's framework in relation to sovereignty? In order to provide an answer to the above questions, we intend to analyze the relationship of the institution of sovereignty and the ability of exercising independent economic policy within the EMU as well as reexamine the development of this relationship in close regard to the process of European integration. The major contribution of this research is that offers a complementary study in order to understand better the relationship between European integration and state sovereignty. This research integrates sovereignty in the current debates, and provides an exegesis not only for the main factors that affect the transformation of the EMU but also for the limits of the European integration.

As the European Union (EU) has evolved, the study agenda has shifted from 'European integration' to 'EU politics'. Missing from this new agenda, however, is an understanding of the 'cognitive constraints' on actors and how actors respond, i.e. the shape of the EU 'political space' and the location of social groups and competition between actors within this space. The article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the shape of the EU political space (the interaction between an Integration-Independence and Left-Right dimension and the location of class and sectoral groups within this map), and tests this framework on the policy positions of the Socialist, Christian Democrat and Liberal party leaders between 1976 and 1994 (using the techniques of the ECPR Party Manifestos Group Project). The research finds that the two dimensions were salient across the whole period, explains why the party families converged on pro-European positions by the 1990s and discovers the emergence of a triangular 'core' of EU politics. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)