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In the two decades since the emergence of the European Union at Maastricht there has been a concerted attempt to build a European political space, typified by the debates on constitutionalization and democratization. Much less noticed, but no less important, has been the mobilization of publics, interest groups and political parties against the integration process. In the light of the failure to realize the Laeken objectives, the stabilization of an anti-integration bloc in the European Parliament, recurrent 'no' votes in national referendums and the emergence of an increasingly co-ordinated movement of critical interest groups, it is argued in this article that this opposition has become embedded and persistent, at both European and national levels. This will have considerable consequences for the Union itself and the way it has chosen to largely ignore sceptical voices to date. Adapted from the source document.

The appeal of populism has been explained by individual preferences expressed along two dimensions: a left-right economic dimension and a cosmopolitan-traditionalist cultural dimension. However, this distinction has been contested by recent studies pointing out that economic and cultural factors reinforce each other in linking structural transformations, like globalisation and technological change, to populist political outcomes. Given the spatially uneven character of the effects of structural transformations, our contribution argues that 'place' should be a central category in the analysis of Eurosceptic populism. By focusing on place, it becomes easier to understand how material and identity-related factors interact in triggering a demand for populism, and how this interaction sets the ground for the reception of populist narratives in different locations. We set out a research agenda for improving our understanding of the political implications of local socio-economic trajectories in Western European left-behind areas, places in Central and Eastern Europe struggling since transition into democracy begun, Southern European locations hit by the Eurozone crisis, and beyond.

This article presents a new theory -- the VCR (Values, political Culture and Rural society) model -- to clarify what Norwegian Euroscepticism is really about and explain why so many Norwegians do not want their country to be a member of the European Union. It argues that at the centre of Norwegian Euroscepticism is a concern for post-materialist values, political culture and rural society, and that values (the desire to make Norway and the world a better place) is a much more potent explanation for Norwegian Euroscepticism than economic interest (the desire to make Norway a richer place) or perceived threat to Norwegian national identity. The VCR theory finds support in the empirical study conducted: a thematic analysis of newspaper debates in a major Norwegian newspaper from the 1960s, 1970s and 1990s. The findings also indicate that the Euroscepticism found in Norway in the 1990s is extremely similar to that which was formed during the first membership debates in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition to contributing towards the literature on Norway and the EU, the article makes a contribution to the general study of Euroscepticism by putting forward a new approach to studying and comparing the subject across time and across countries. Adapted from the source document.

The phenomenon of Euroscepticism, not long ago a marginal part of the European political landscape, increasingly moves forward to the political foreground. This article explores the meaning of the notion of Euroscepticism, analyzes current peculiarities of this phenomenon, its scale and main sources, as well as differentiation of anti-integrationist political actors. While the very phenomenon existed in European politics throughout the implementation of the European project, a new characteristic of the socio-political situation in the EU is the ongoing broadening of this phenomenon's scale, the growth of its electoral support and the radicalization of its articulation forms. The strengthening of critical public attitudes towards realities of the European integration which is a feature of the contemporary socio-political climate in Europe not only has weakened the traditional pro-integrationist consensus of the political establishment, but has also led to a substantial reinforcement of more or less radical opponents of the European project within the European party-political space. This development seems to be an indicator of the European political mainstream "qualitative renewal". Though the current growth of electoral support for Eurosceptic parties is to a great extent induced by the global financial and economic crisis, economic factor is not the main driving force of the Euroscepticism. At present, a wide range of diverse political and cultural factors increasingly determine commitment of European citizens to the EU. In some cases, these factors are crucial to the development of Euroscepticism. This fact is of significant importance, with regard to assessing the prospects for the given phenomenon, since political and socio-cultural motives of public Euroscepticism build much more sustainable basis for the Eurosceptical trend than economic ones. Issues relating to the prospects of Euroscepticism are of particular relevance, in connection with high performance of Eurosceptic politicians at the 2014 European Parliament elections. The elections result is not only strengthening of the "soft Eurosceptics'" positions, but also a sensational electoral "breakthrough" of "hard Eurosceptics" (Europhobes). While ability of Eurosceptics' direct influence on the decision-making process in the EP seems insignificant, much more important is their capacity to influence the agenda of the mainstream pro-European parties both in Europe and at home. Ultimately, the rise of the Euroscepticism makes the future of the European project more uncertain. Today (and probably, in the foreseeable future), the real purpose of European political elites may only be countering the trends of national sovereignty restoration, and maintenance of an integration process at its current level rather than its extension.

This article explores the link between the financial crisis and Euroscepticism at the level of public opinion, building on and developing further the literature on the impact of economic, identity and institutional factors on Euroscepticism. It argues that the economic crisis did not substantially bring economic factors back in as an important source of Euroscepticism, even though the most pronounced increase in Euroscepticism has taken place in the countries most affected by the crisis. By contrast, national identity and political institutions play an increasingly important role in explaining public Euroscepticism. Adapted from the source document.