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In: Ratio Juris, Volume 25, Issue 3, p. 318-342
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In: Zbornik radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Nišu: Collection of papers, Faculty of Law, Niš, Volume 60, Issue 91, p. 243-267
ISSN: 2560-3116
Legal rules are respected and observed for various reasons but Raz believes that a legal norm is an exclusionary reason for action, i.e. the reason that cannot be weighed with other reasons which have to direct our conduct. Thus, there are first-order reasons which may be balanced in reaching some practical decision, but there are also second-order reasons which preclude such balancing. Raz's theory starts from the fact that norms are created by authorities whose statements represent (second-order) reasons for action, regardless of their merits and moral acceptability. However, although the norm is valid regardless of its merits, Raz does not deny the importance of legitimacy and morality because he believes that law claims to legitimate moral authority. The first part of this paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of the reasons for action, while the second part focuses on rules as reasons for action. Their uniqueness is visible even intuitively but the author particularly considers Raz's views that a rule is a content-independent and exclusive reason for action. The third part of the paper is dedicated to Raz's understanding of authority and the final assessment of the following question: is the norm a strong or an exclusionary reason for action?
In: Philosophical Studies (Forthcoming)
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In: Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 15/95
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Working paper
In: Morality, Authority, and Law, p. 151-167
This book focuses on three problems: In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? All three questions are answered by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity. Rules are a structure of reasons to perform the required act and an exclusionary reason not to follow some competing reasons. Exclusionary reasons are explained, and used to unlock the secrets of orders, promises, and decisions as well as rules. Games are used to exemplify normative systems. Inevitably, the analysis extends to some aspects of normative discourse, which is truth – apt, but with a diminished assertoric force. ; https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1265/thumbnail.jpg
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In: Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, Volume 25, Issue 2
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In: Legal Directives and Practical Reasons, Noam Gur, Oxford University Press, ISBN: 9780199659876, 2018
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In: University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming
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In: Gregoire Weber, Grant Huscroft, and Bradley Miller (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning 397 (Cambridge University Press 2013)
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In: Reason: free minds and free markets, Volume 23, p. 32-35
ISSN: 0048-6906
In: University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Forthcoming
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Blog: Reason.com
Policy analyst Justin Hayes summarizes the reasons why conservatives, progressives, and libertarians all have reason to support zoning reform.