Search results

Cover Page -- Half Title Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Chapter 1: Causes of the Global Financial Crisis -- 1. China and Russia Blame U.S. Policies for the Crisis -- 2. The Greed of Financial Institutions Caused the Crisis -- 3. "Boom Thinking" Caused the Crisis -- 4. The Weakness of Banking Regulations Caused the Crisis -- 5. Low Interest Rates Caused the Crisis -- 6. Abandoning the Gold Standard Caused the Crisis -- 7. United States and China Must Join Forces to Control Crisis -- Periodical Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Wealthier Nations -- 1. In the United States, the Financial Crisis Creates Tent Cities and Homelessness -- 2. Canada Will Not Suffer a Subprime Mortgage Crisis -- 3. Australia's Economy Remains Bound Up with That of the United States -- 4. The European Union Is Buckling Under the Crisis -- 5. In Iceland, an Economic Miracle Ended in Disaster -- 6. The Crisis Fuels Unrest in France, Britain, China, and Russia -- 7. Israel Will Cut Social Programs, but Not Military Spending -- Periodical Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Effects of the Global Financial Crisis on Developing Nations -- 1. Worldwide, Migrant Workers Are Threatened by Job Losses and Xenophobia -- 2. In India and China, the Crisis May Worsen Poverty -- 3. China Could Use the Crisis to Become a Responsible World Power -- 4. The Philippines Is in a Good Position to Weather the Crisis -- 5. Latin America Is Struggling to Deal with the Crisis -- 6. Islamic Banks Are Insulated from the Crisis -- Periodical Bibliography -- Chapter 4: Solutions to the Global Financial Crisis -- 1. International Investments Complicate the Financial Crisis and Its Remedy -- 2. Protectionist Measures Will Worsen the Crisis -- 3. In Africa, Ending Neoliberal Economic Policies Will Solve the Crisis

Using a large panel of UK manufacturing firms over the period 2000–9, we consider how firms responded during the most recent financial crisis, estimating models for export market participation decisions and firm growth and survival. The results indicate that financial variables are highly important in predicting export market entry, especially in the midst of the global financial crisis. With respect to firm growth and survival, we find that starters and continuous exporters are more likely to perform well in and out of the crisis than non-exporters.

Following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, there has been an abundance of books and articles purporting to explain its causes and consequences, with some offering tentative remedies. One of the major targets of criticism was the economics profession, which ignored the warnings of impending catastrophe prior to the onset of the crisis. As a result its public esteem suffered, much like that of the bankers and other professional groups implicated in the crisis. The books under review in this article represent a broad cross-section of work undertaken within the disciplinary boundaries of political science. As such, they provide complementary insights that yield deeper understanding of both the origins of the crisis and the nature of the solutions required to prevent a recurrence.

AbstractExisting scholarship attributes various political and economic advantages to democratic governance. These advantages may make more democratic countries prone to financial crises. Democracy is characterized by constraints on executive authority, accountability through free and fair elections, protections for civil liberties, and large winning coalitions. These characteristics bring important benefits, but they can also have unintended consequences that increase the likelihood of financial instability and crises. Using data covering the past two centuries, I demonstrate a strong relationship between democracy and financial crisis onset: on average, democracies are about twice as likely to experience a crisis as autocracies. This is an empirical regularity that is robust across a wide range of model specifications and time periods.

Arturo Guillén R.: The effects of the global economic crisis in Latin America. - S. 187-202 Angel Asensio: Macroeconomic trouble and policy challenges in the wake of the financial bust. - S. 203-216 Flávio Vilela Vieira: The new international financial crisis: causes, consequences and perspectives. - S. 217-237

AbstractDespite a relatively healthy financial sector, the Japanese economy contracted 6.3% in 2009 during the global financial crisis (GFC) after the Lehman shock, the starkest drop among the OECD countries. Since then, the Japanese economy has been slow to recover, although the Japanese government has implemented multiple economic stimulus packages with a high aggregate value.By tracing the Japanese government's response to the GFC in the critical months of October 2008 through the end of 2009, this study argues that the Japanese government failed to manage the crisis decisively due to institutional constraints derived, ironically, from the experiences that Japan gained from a series of financial crises in the 1990s and 2000s. Financial crisis fatigue constrained the supply of Japan's fiscal and monetary measures against the GFC and slowed political response. Furthermore, it made Japanese society unresponsive to these measures.

Using eight annual household surveys for the Netherlands between 2006 and 2013, we find that respondents' personal adverse financial crisis experiences do not only reduce their trust in banks, but also have an immediate negative effect on generalized trust. Respondents who were customers of a bank that ran into problems have less trust in banks than respondents without this experience. Respondents who were customer of a bank that failed have a significantly stronger decline of generalized trust than other respondents. Our results also suggest that personal financial crisis experiences do not have a significant direct effect on trust in the banking supervisor.

The financial crisis has opened up a global debate on the taxation of the financial sector. A number of international policy initiatives, most notably by the G20, have called for major changes in the tax treatment of financial institutions and transactions as well as individuals working in the financial sector. This book examines how tax policies contributed to the financial crisis and whether taxation can play a role in the reform efforts under way to establish a sounder and safer financial system. The book looks at the pros and cons of various tax initiatives, including limiting the tax advantages to debt financing, special taxes on the financial sector and financial transactions taxes.

"The collapse of Lehman Brothers, the oldest and fourth-largest US investment bank, in September 2008 precipitated the global financial crisis. This deepened the contraction in economic activity that had already started in December 2007 and has become known as the Great Recession. Following a sluggish and uneven period of recovery, levels of private debt have recently been on the rise again making another financial crisis almost inevitable. This book answers the key question: can anything be done to prevent a new financial crisis or minimize its impact? The book opens with an analysis of the main elements responsible for the 2007/2009 financial crisis and assesses the extent to which they are still present in todays financial system. The responses to the financial crises - particularly the Dodd-Frank Act, the establishment of the Financial Stability Board, and attempts to regulate shadow banking - are evaluated for their effectiveness. It is found that there is a high risk of a new bubble developing, there remains a lack of transparency in the financial industry, and risk-taking continues to be incentivised among bankers and investors. Proposals are put forward to ameliorate the risks, arguing for the need for an international lender of last resort, recalling Keynes' idea for an International Clearing Union."