For the last few years, the German foreign policy has been under constant temptations and substantial reconsideration. The key role in resolving the difficult economic and financial crises in the EU, the development of close economic ties with the Russian and other rising world economic powers, the decision to sustain in the UN Security Council in deciding to authorise the use of force in Libya, as well as the dominant attitude towards the crises in Greece and Kosovo clearly shows the wish of Germany to pursue a more independent foreign policy. In spite of all these efforts and its huge economic power, Germany has failed to become a global political power. Moreover, in order to protect and develop its trade interests Germany must remain within the frameworks of the EU and the NATO. For a long time, Germany has been one of Serbia's most important economic and political partners. Since it is realistic to expect that Germany will be more oriented towards developing its economic ties with the new world economic powers, the Western Balkans and Serbia will not be in the focus of its foreign and economic policies. Therefore, for Serbia, it will be useful to concentrate on the cooperation with the mighty German provinces that have their interests in developing this cooperation. In the future, the Kosovo issues will remain the main obstacle to it.
The author discusses provisions of the German Constitution and the practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court relevant for ratification of the Maastricht treaty and German membership in the European Union. In that context, the Manfred Brunner case decided by the Federal Constitutional Court is discussed. The mentioned decision has removed constitutional obstacles and has confirmed the constitutionality of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. The author suggests that the Constitutional Court has strengthened its position and defined itself as a safeguard of German state sovereignty and an obstacle for creeping extension of powers of the Union at expense of its Member States. At the same time, Constitutional Amendments were adopted in order to protect the German federal structure and affirm the role of the German Federal Countries in supranational decision making processes. The author suggests that the practice of the German Federal Constitutional Court fits well into the general trend of strengthening the role of the judiciary within both the national and supranational balance of power. (SOI : PM: S. 255)
Germany's security dilemma is to fulfill the larger role in Europe and global security that is expected after reunification, while not rekindling a sense of threat particularly among neighbors to the east. Opinion surveys of Germans and Central/East Europeans reveal substantial difficulties were Germany to become more assertive. Changes in German behavior and constitutional interpretation suggest a maturation or "normalization" of German foreign policy. Thus far, th changes have emphasized traditional forms of diplomacy and alliance behavior focused on using the enlarged capacities of a reunited Germany that more direc pursue German interests. An alternative way by which to perform a larger security role are discussed, particularly in light of data regarding the mutual perceptions of Germans among neighboring peoples and leaders. (SOI : PM: S. 62)
The author presents the situation and the fate of the Germans in the Danube-basin (German and Austrian minorities) in Croatia after the World War Two. He also deals with the fundamental problems (political, legal, cultural, economic demographic etc.) and points at the most important Yugoslav, Croatian and German sources and literature. (SOI : CSP: S. 233)
A number of military units were active on the territory of the Independent Stat of Croatia (ISC). Since the end of 1941 there were, in the operational sense, one side the armed forces of ISC, Germans, Italians and chetniks, and on the other side partisans. Numerical ratio changed depending on the events in the field and the international situation. The armed forces of the ISC were repeatedly trained and getting more numerous. Until the middle of 1944 their number exceeded the chetniks and partisans together, which jeopardized ISC. The force of ISC were dependent on Germans, and until 1943 on Italians too. German and Italian units were getting stronger, but they were not supported by the local population. Italian units supported the chetniks, thus provoking strong resistance of the population, who in the so-called Italian zones joined the partisans. Chetniks were also supported by Germans, chetniks from Serbia and Montenegro, and the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Near the end of the war, chetniks went over to the partisans in great number because of loss o support by the Germans and Italians. Partisans, making use of the enemy's mistakes, got stronger and stronger. The partisan predominance was realized only when the countries of the antifascist coalition decided to support Josip Tito, the communist-partisan leader. Since the autumn of 1944 partisans got abundant military and political support which helped them win the war. (SOI : CSP: S. 196)
The German sociologist and anthropologist Helmuth Plessner has tried to explain the ascent of national-socialism in Germany with the belated formation of the German nation. Not only was it formed later than other West European nations, it was formed in a different manner. While West European nations were formed by countering monarchy with the novel concept of the state as a republic, the German nation was founded on the culture within the Reich which was "a great power devoid of the idea of the state". The author has tried to prove the limited analytical value of Plessner's distinction between the belated and the timely nations by pointing out that culture and tradition are an essential medium for the formation of nations. (SOI : PM: S. 206)
Branimir Altgayer was the most prominent Croatian of German nationality in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but he was especially so during the period of the Independent State of Croatia. Altgayer was born December 8, 1897 in the town of Przekopane (Galicia), where his father (born in Osijek) served as an Austro-Hungarian cavalry lieutenant. Altgayer spent his childhood in Slavonia, where he was brought up in a Croatian cultural atmosphere. After completing Croatian public school in Kutjevo and Croatian Gymnasium in Osijek and Zemun, he attended an Austro-Hungarian cavalry cadet school in Moravia between 1912 and 1915. He was an officer (ensign) in the Austro-Hungarian army (after 1915) until the end of the first world war, serving on the Russian, Rumanian, and Italian fronts. He was wounded twice and decorated several times. In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes he was a cavalry captain (first class) of the Royal army. Following four years of service, he resigned. He worked at various civilian occupations for a time, but returned to the military between 1924 and 1927. He was very active in the cultural and political life of the German minority of Osijek and Slavonia. He was selected to the united council of the German minority association, the Kulturbund of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund), in December 1934. He was a prominent representative of the so-called Renewal movement (Erneuerungsbewegung), a radical current in the Kulturbund. Following a conflict between the old leaders of the Germans in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Renewalists which occasioned a split in the Kulturbund, Altgayer and the Renewalists are ejected from the Kulturbund for insubordination. At the beginning of 1936 he established a cultural and charitable organization for Germans of Slavonia in Osijek (Kultur-und Wohlfahrtsvereinigung der Deutschen in Slavonien). In January, 1939, he became a regional leader (Gauobmann) of the Germans in Slavonia (following the re-admittance of the Renewalists to the Kulturbund at the end of 1938). In early 1939, he leaves the Yugoslavian Radical Union, whose city councilor he was in Osijek, and joins the Croatian peasant party. After the creation of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) in 1941, he was named leader of the German National Assembly for the NDH (Volksgruppenführer). From December 1941 he was director of state for the presidency of the NDH, but after January 1943 he was secretary of state for the same, and he was likewise promoted to the rank of reserve colonel in the Ustasha army. He was decorated by Leader of the Ustasha Dr. Ante Pavelic with the title "knight". For a short time in mid-1943 he went to the Eastern Front. At the end of the second world war he was deported to Yugoslavia from Austria by the British. In 1950, the district court of Zagreb sentenced him to death by firing squad. The sentence was carried out May 15, 1950. The investigative material of the Office of State Security (UDB-a) concerning Altgayer, especially the transcript of the trial from 1949, is an excellent source of information about the German minority in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the thirties and during the period of the Independent State of Croatia. (SOI : CSP: S. 638)
