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Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.

The US governance model created in the 1930s & known as Big Government is analyzed within the context of its application in foreign policy. The author looks into the foreign policy role of the American federal government, the dynamics of the relationship between the executive & the legislative branches during & following the Cold War period, & the changes occurring after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. Emphasis is on analysis of the Cold War legacy of the so-called nontraditional instruments of foreign policy interventions or the resources & techniques of covert activity. The author concludes that the extensive utilization of these instruments has significantly undermined the principle of limited federal government as one of the fundaments of American politics. However, in light of the new mobilization of resources in the fight against terrorism, it is necessary once again to evaluate the means of covert activity. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.

U ovom radu tvrdim kako je za istočnu Europu istovremeno prisustvo slabih država i slabih društava ključna prepreka s kojom se analitičari i reformatori moraju suočiti. Razumijevanje drugih normativno važnih procesa bit će nepotpuno bez osviještenog razmišljanja o ovom problemu i njegovim implikacijama. Ovaj rad pokušava artikulirati "relacijski" pristup državi i društvu. Uz to rad daje tipologiju mogućih obrazaca odnosa između države i društva ovisno o tome je li država slaba ili jaka i je li društvo slabo ili jako. Predstavljaju se komparativni podaci kako bi se dala empirijska podrška tezama. Na kraju rad skicira dva reformska pristupa koja bi mogla omogućiti razbijanje začaranog kruga koji nastaje u kontekstu slabih država i slabih društava. ; This paper argues that, for Eastern Europe, the simultaneous presence of weak governments and weak societies is a crucial obstacle which must be faced by analysts and reformers. The understanding of other normatively significant processes will be deficient without a consciousness-raising deliberation on this problem and its implications. This paper seeks to articulate the "relational" approach to state and society. In addition, the paper lays out a typology of possible patterns of relationship between state and society, dependent on whether the state is weak or strong and whether society is weak or strong. Comparative data are presented in order to provide an empirical support for the theses. Finally, the paper outlines two reform approaches which could enable breaking the vicious circle emerging in the context of weak governments and weak societies.

Cilj je ovoga rada pokazati da Toma Akvinski problem zla promišlja ne samo kao pitanje zla u njemu samome nego i u puno širem kontekstu Božjeg stvarateljskog djela i providnosnog upravljanja te na taj način dokazuje da činjenica postojanja zla u svijetu nije održiv argument protiv Božjeg postojanja. Naime, za Tomu Akvinskog zlo nije nešto, nekakvo biće sa svojom biti i naravi, nego je ono lišenost dobra, nedostatak onoga dobra koje je neko biće po naravi dužno imati. Zlo ima dobro za svoj subjekt, objekt i uzrok, a može na koncu imati i dobro kao svoj učinak. Takva potpuna uronjenost i ovisnost zla o dobru kazuje da je ontološki status zla s jedne strane realan, a s druge strane da nije apsolutan. Zlo ne može postojati od sebe, po sebi i za sebe. Ono je pod svakim vidom podređeno dobru. Takav statuszla postaje još očitiji u Akvinčevu osvrtu na odnos zla i apsolutnog dobra koje je Bog. Bog je onaj koji jest u apsolutnom smislu, a zlo postoji samo u odnosu na dobro koje je Božje stvorenje. Propadanje stvari je tek posljedica Božjeg stvaranja dobrog svijeta u kojemu postoje bića koja mogu biti deficijentna u dobru, što ona ponekad i jesu. To znači da Bog ne želi zlo, nego ga na neki način dopušta dok sve providnosno upravlja k dobru koje je on sam. Naime, Bog je toliko svemoguć da dopuštajući zlo može ostvariti i veća i brojnija dobra. U djelu Božjega upravljanja svijetom čovjek zauzima posebno mjesto jer je sposoban za osobni odnos s Bogom. No čovjek se slobodnom voljom može i odmetnuti od poretka i pravila koji ga vodi sjedinjenju s njegovim krajnjim dobrom koje je Bog. Takav čin se naziva moralno zlo krivnje ili grijeh. Toma Akvinski primjer i uzor pobjede dobra nad zlom nalazi u liku pravednog i nevinog Joba koji je, upravo zahvaljujući iskustvu strahovitoga zla, shvatio da Bog beskrajno transcendira ljudsku spoznaju, bitak i moć, te da bi svako pripisivanje zla Bogu bilo ludost, a svako nijekanje Božjega postojanja zbog zla koje ga je zadesilo bezumlje. Job je shvatio da Božja pravednost i logos vladaju svime i da je konačna pobjeda dobra sigurna. ; This paper aims to show that Thomas Aquinas consider the problem of evil, not only as a question of evil in itself, but in the much broader context of God's work of creation and providential government, and thus proves that the existence of evil in the world is not a viable argument against God's existence. For Thomas Aquinas, evil is not something, some being with its essence and nature, but it is the lack (or privation) of a good that should by nature be present in a being. Evil has good as its subject, object, and cause, and may ultimately have good as its effect. Such complete immersion and dependence of evil on good says that evil's ontological status is real, but not absolute. Evil cannot exist from itself, by itself and for itself. It is in every way subordinated to the good. Such a status of evil becomes even more apparent in Aquinas' view of the relation between evil and the absolute good that is God. God is the one who exists in the absolute sense, and evil exists only in relation to the good that is God's creation. The decay of things is only a consequence of God creating a good world in which some beings may be deficient in good, which they sometimes are. This means that God does not want evil, but in a way allows it while providentially governing everything to the good that he is. God is so omnipotent that by allowing evil he can accomplish even greater and more numerous goods. In the work of God's governing over the world, man occupies a special place because he is capable of a personal relationship with God. But man can also voluntarily deviate from the order and rules that lead him to union with his ultimate good which is God. Such an act is called the moral evil of guilt or sin. Thomas Aquinas finds the example and model of the victory of good over evil in the character of the righteous and innocent Job, who, thanks to the experience of a terrible evil, has realised that God infinitely transcends human cognition, being and power, and that any attribution of evil to God would be foolishness, that every denial of God's existence because of the evil that befell him would be insane. Job realised that God's righteousness and logos rule everything and that the ultimate victory of good is certain.

U Hrvatskoj se razvoj društveno odgovornog ponašanja odvija vrlo sporo. Stoga je glavni cilj neprofitnih organizacija iznaći rješenja za socijalne probleme koje državne strukture nisu pravovremeno detektirale, dok je njihova misija podrška društvu (uglavnom marginalnim skupinama), jačanju humanosti i volonterstva i podizanju svijesti javnosti o društveno relevantnim pitanjima. Ovaj rad bavi se odnosima s javnošću u neprofitnim organizacijama na primjeru udruga osoba s invaliditetom. Cilj rada je definirati odnose s javnošću, objasniti što su to neprofitne organizacije i udruge osoba s invaliditetom u Hrvatskoj te analizirati odnose s javnošću u hrvatskim udrugama osoba s invaliditetom na temelju ankete. Rad je podijeljen u dva dijela. Prvi dio daje teoretski pregled odnosa s javnošću u neprofitnim organizacijama, definira što su to udruge osoba s invaliditetom u Hrvatskoj te pruža teorijski i pravni okvir. Drugi dio je istraživanje i sastoji se od prikaza stavova i mišljenja zaposlenika o odnosima s javnošću u udrugama osoba s invaliditetom i analize dobivenih podataka putem ankete. ; The development of socially responsible behavior has been very slow in Croatia. The main goal of non-profit organizations is to come up with solutions for social problems that the government organizations have not detected in a timely manner, while their mission is to provide support to society (mainly marginal groups), enhance humanity and volunteerism and raise public awareness of socially relevant issues. This paper deals with public relations in non-profit organizations based on the example of associations of persons with disabilities. The aim of this paper is to define public relations, non-profit organizations and associations of persons with disabilities in Croatia and to analyze public relations in Croatian associations of persons with disabilities based on the survey. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part gives a theoretical overview of public relations in non-profit organizations, defines associations of persons with disabilities in Croatia and provides a theoretical and legal framework. The second part comprises research that consists of employee attitudes to and opinions about public relations in associations of persons with disabilities and the analysis of data obtained through a survey.

What shapes a European Union member state's preferences & why do some states seem much more enthusiastic about further integration in some policy areas than others? This paper examines the factors which shape the preferences of three of the 2004 entrants: Slovakia, Slovenia & the Czech Republic. Based on a detailed study of government & party documents complemented by a series of 40 semi-structured interviews, I argue that whilst there is merit in many of the explanations used to explain national preference formation in the longer-established member states, the key to preference formation lies in vulnerabilities & perceived weakness. Adapted from the source document.

If the functioning of the fiscal system implies the functioning of democracy, then the interest in its smooth operation is understandable. Particularly important is its segment concerning the financing of local government & self-government. Well-regulated relations between the state & local communities is the basic prerequisite of economic, social, & any other development. The decentralization of the fiscal system in the Republic of Croatia is one of the barriers standing in the way of achieving these goals. The crucial question is the acceptable degree of decentralization, economically & politically. The experiences of other European countries may serve as a basis for regulating the fiscal relations among the higher & lower levels of government. The central government should retain only those responsibilities that cannot be carried out by the units of local government & self-government. 3 Tables, 25 References. Adapted from the source document.

Na osnovu analize izvornih arhivskih dokumenata i propisa objavljenih u službenim listovima, opisuje se djelokrug, ustroj i sastav Prezidijuma Sabora NRH. Njegovi temelji postavljeni su u radu Zemaljskog antifašističkog vijeća narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske (ZAVNOH), odnosno njegova Predsjedništva, koje je kao uže tijelo plenuma osnovano 9. svibnja 1944. godine. Na Četvrtom zasjedanju održanom 24. i 25. srpnja 1945. u Zagrebu, ZAVNOH je promijenio naziv u Narodni sabor Hrvatske, a njegovo Predsjedništvo od tada djeluje kao Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske. U razdoblju 1945.–1953. njegovo djelovanje može se podijeliti u četiri mandatna razdoblja: Predsjedništvo Narodnog sabora Hrvatske/Prezidijum Sabora NRH (25. srpnja 1945.–30. studenoga 1946.), Prezidijum Ustavotvornog sabora NRH (30. studenoga 1946.–20. siječnja 1947.), Prezidijum Sabora NRH prvoga saziva (20. siječnja 1947.–4. prosinca 1950.) i Prezidijum Sabora NRH drugoga saziva (4. prosinca 1950.–6. veljače 1953.). U prvom dijelu rada opisuje se osnivanje i prestanak rada Prezidijuma Sabora, u drugom njegov djelokrug, a u trećem ustroj i sastav po mandatnim razdobljima. Njegov ustroj i djelokrug uspoređeni su s ustrojem i djelokrugom Prezidijuma Narodne skupštine FNRJ i prezidijuma drugih jugoslavenskih republika. Rezultati istraživanja prezentirani su kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a dijelom su sistematizirani u obliku tabelarnih prikaza. ; This paper describes the scope, structure and the composition of the Presidium of Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia (PRC) which was active as a political governmental body in Croatia from 1945 to 1953. According to the Yugoslav constitutional system of government, the same political body existed on the federal level as the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), as well as in every republic-member of the Yugoslav federation and the scope, organization and composition of the Presidium of Parliament are compared with the scope, organization and composition of those bodies. The foundations of the activities of the Presidium of Parliament, as well as other central governmental institutions in Croatia (namely, Parliament, Government, and Supreme Court) were laid in the work of the State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH) i.e. its Presidency, since until the end of the war they together performed the legislative, executive and judiciary government. During the 4th session that took place in Zagreb from 24 to 25 July 1945 ZAVNOH changed is title to the People's Parliament of Croatia and since then its Presidency worked as the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia. In the period from 1945 to 1953 its activity can be divided into four mandate periods: the Presidency of the People's Parliament of Croatia/the Presidium of the Parliament of the PRC (25 July 1945–30 November 1946), the Presidium of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC (30 November 1946–20 January 1947), the Presidium of the 1st Session of the Parliament of the PRC (20 January 1947–4 December 1950) and the Presidium of the 2nd Session of the Parliament of the PRC (4 December 1950–6 February 1953). Its existence in the system of governmental power is the result of taking over the Soviet constitutional solutions about organizing the state and governmental institutions in the 1946 constitution of the FPRY and through it also in the constitutions of each federal unit. It was the main legislative body in the period until the constituting of the Constituent Parliament of the PRC, since the Parliament of the PRC only had a single short five-day session in late August 1946. This is confirmed by the information about 29 laws passed by the Presidium of Parliament in the period from 8 September 1945 to 20 November 1946. Besides legislative, it also performed other functions from the jurisdiction then belonging to the Parliament. The constitution of the PRC from 1946 bestowed upon it performing tasks that are usually given to the president of the state (representing in the country the people's and state sovereignty of the PRC, calling the general elections, granting pardons, awarding medals and recognitions), as well as other executive tasks partly closely linked to the legislative activities. The special function pertained to supervising the people's committees. The important difference in the scope in relation to the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY was that it did not have the authority in the area of foreign affairs. Even though the constitution of the PRC from January 1947 lists it together with the Parliament in the chapter on the highest bodies of the governmental power in Croatia, the sources and constitutional-legal texts of the time, in accordance with the principle of unity of power, define it as a body which "stems from the Parliament" and is subordinated to it. Also, despite being formally constitutionally defined as one of the highest bodies of governmental power in Croatia, in reality it was the Party's transmission, since the actual power and monopoly in decisionmaking was in the hands of the bodies of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia/the League of Communists of Yugoslavia i.e. the Communist Party of Croatia/the League of Communists of Croatia. It was a collegiate body comprised of members of the Parliament. The decision of its composition was formally passed by the Parliament, but based on the conclusions reached during sessions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia. It was elected for the same term as the Parliament, but it continued to perform its duties after the dissolution of the Parliament, until the election of the new Presidium of Parliament. From 1945 to 1953 the total of 45 MPs were included in its activities. 13 of them were members during all four mandate terms, 11 during two and 14 during only one. The structure and the way of work were determined by the Rulebook dated from 7 August 1947. They were the exact copy of the structure and the way of work of the Presidium of the People's Assembly of the FPRY, with differences deriving from different jurisdictions (federal, republic) of these two bodies.

Teritorijalna organizacija lokalne i regionalne samouprave koja je postojala u Hrvatskoj omogućila je centralističko upravljanje javnim poslovima. Analizira se stanje u pogledu položaja općina, gradova i županija i predlažu osnovni pravci reforme teritorijalne organizacije. Posebno se obrazlažu položaj i osnovni sistemski problemi upravljanja Gradom Zagrebom te predlažu moguća poboljšanja. ; The territorial organization of local and regional self-government which existed in Croatia led to centralistic administration of public affairs. The situation with regard to the position of municipalities, towns or cities and counties has been analysed and basic tendencies of the reform of the territorial organization are proposed. The position and main systemic problems of the City of Zagreb administration have been explained in particular and possible improvements are suggested. The territorial organization is only formally polytypical, since in reality differences in the status of municipalities and towns or cities are almost insignificant, two-tier, counties being units of the second tier, with a great number of small municipalities, In each category of local units, from municipalities through towns or cities to counties, there are very considerable differences in size among particular units. It is proposed to stop the tendency of multiplying basic local units (municipalities and towns or cities), widen independence and responsibility of larger towns and gradually reform the organization of counties. The main systemic problems of the City of Zagreb have not been solved satisfactorily. Zagreb is under the tutorship of the central state government, its relations with the closer surrounding area are regulated badly, influence on the city level is concentrated within the executive bodies, particularly the mayor whose responsibility is questionable, and not even incomplete decentralisation in the form of local self-government within the area of the City has been established for more than seven years. It is proposed to establish such a system which would combine elements of strong and efficient political leadership and an appropriate level of democracy, with the direct election of the mayor by citizens, independence of the city administration of the central state administration as well as multilevel metropolitan administration which would ensure the realization of the interests of the City, but also its close surrounding area.