Search results

This study aims to perform a comparative analysis of Turkey and Indonesia's foreign policy on Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis in particular. It also reviews both countries' foreign policy toward the Middle East since their declaration of becoming Republic states in general. As foreign policy theory, neoclassical realism is applied. It then discusses changing dynamics and analyses influential factors shaping Turkey and Indonesia policies of Palestine Issue and Syria Crisis at the unit and systemic level of analysis. It summarises that the factors of leaders' perceptions upon international and regional systemic changing trends and pressures as well as state powers have become influential factors. In case of Palestine issue, during 2004-2016, Turkish domestic politics has undergone domestic transformations namely first public opinion and civil society's roles influence the foreign policy. Before the AKP party came to power, a determinant actor of Turkey's foreign policy was the military. However, the military role then decline. Instead, the role of non actor states including civil society and non-government organizations have increased. Domestic public opinion has been marked by a re-emergence of common historical and cultural senses under Ottoman heritages. This factor then results in a reactive engagement of Turkey to the Middle East. Second, the emergence of civilian leader as a new actor of foreign policy. The mechanism of foreign decision-making then shifted v following a decline of military influence. An active civilian control emerged and domestic political structure rebuilt. It resulted in multi-actor of foreign policy such as NGO, think tanks, etc. They contribute as the new tool of Turkish soft power. Third, leader factors. Leaders play roles in attracting international public opinion. Turkish leader's opinion perceives that no permanent peace of region without peace in Palestine. They also put an emphasis to a strategic importance of Muslim world. Therefore Turkey needs to re-engage into the regional issues. Fourth, an increase of Islamist factor. Re-involvement of Muslim groups into domestic politics serves a democratic equality for all parties. Turkish NGO with Islamist outlook also rises as a pressure group, thus it impacts on the concern to the Palestine issue. They put a large concern to the sensitivity of Jerusalem status and nature as a holy city for Muslims especially a concern to who will control that holy city.Fifth, a proactive foreign policy. the Israel-Palestine conflict that perceived as the heart of regional instability results in proactive foreign policy into the settlement of Palestine issue. In regional level, the main source of regional conflict is the Palestine-Israel conflict. In sum, Turkey conducts a balancing policy during the AKP administration regarding Palestine issue. Indonesia sets the aspiration of an active engagement policy in the Middle East. It could be seen such as a presence of special of the Middle East diplomatic mission, Indonesia government recognition and support to Hamas after won the parliament election for Gaza strip, the efforts to be honest broaker in Palestine-Israel conflict, and an official representation in Ramallah. Indonesia also is officially consistent to adopt a nonrecognition policy of the state of Israel. Indonesia has undergone several diplomatic efforts in regional and international level to support the recognition of the state of Palestine and proposed on humanitarian approach by providing a continuation of humantarian aids for Palestinians. In comparison with Turkey, during 2004-2016, Indonesia has undergone transition era to civil democracy era. It has turn into a democracy process and reach democratic stability in post-transition. In democratic era of Indonesia, anti-colonialism spirit of 1945 Constitution has been continued as a historical basis of Indonesia's engagement. Besides, Indonesian government accomodates Muslim aspiration through the presence of Islamist considerations into the state's foreign policy. An increase of Islamist factor in domestic politics namely Islamist-oriented aspirations in domestic public opinion. There a high level of sensitivity upon the issues including the Jerusalem issue in which Al-Aqsa mosque vi placed on as one of prominent issues, beyond Palestinian refugee issue and Israel occupation on Palestinian lands for the Indonesian Muslim groups and government. In other words, there interplay between Muslim groups and Indonesian government in regard to deal with Palestine issue. A major of Indonesian Muslims and government officially are united to struggle for Palestinians. Other Islamist factors are Muslim groups as the moral force. Muslim groups put pressure if the government behave in passive response to the Islamist issues. An example of strong and harsh pressures of all segment Muslim groups over any initiative of opening diplomatic ties with Israel by Indonesian governments, so it is often suspended by eventually cancelled. In addition, an increasingly role of Islamist parties as well as new Indonesia's international orientation and identity have affected a continuity of nonrecognition policy towards Israel and supporting Palestine in accordance with two-state solution. In the level of international, the wave of democratization policy leads to the emergence of democratised foreign policy. Indonesia's democratised foreign policy has been conducted through various diplomatic efforts creating an active involvement of nonstate actors. After the Syrian revolution in 2012 escalated, it has turned into a civil war. The emergence of various non-state actors such the ISIS, the PYD-YPG, and other militant or radical groups, as well as direct intervention of regional and international powers sparked the conflict much more escalated. These have posed direct threat to Turkey and challenged Turkey's Middle East policy, notably in Syria. Therefore, Turkey's Syria policy has changed from soft power to hard power approach. Several domestic influential factors shaping Turkish policy first a humanitarian dimension of crisis namely the influx of refugees results in an open door policy. Since 2011, Syria conflict has sparked refugee waves to Turkey. As a direct neighboring countries, it had been demanded by international community and domestic humanitarian nature to open the borders and secure the people. Second, the security threat in Turkey-Syria's borders. Assad regime's military policy against the Syrian oppositions and the development of the crisis with an engagement various non-state armed groups (the YPG-PYD, ISIS, other moderate and radical groups) that began in 2013 have made the situation more complicated. Due to their activities strived to claim the sovereignty and conducted terror attacks, hence those have posed threats to Turkish national security and territorial integrity. Another risk is the influx of foreign terrorist fighters across the border through Turkey on their way to and from Syria. vii Even, probably they reside in Turkey as a third country before returning to home countries. So, it also has to dealt with the way to send them back to countries of origin. In the international level, the most influential factors are first the international and regional actors' engagement into the conflict. Since 2015, there has increased the international interventions. Foreign countries and non state actors' involvement have created the strategic pattern of alliance and enmity among global and regional powers as well as non-state actors. Second, the rise of ISIS. This terror organization posed the threat to Turkish national security through multiple suicide bombings. Third, the emergence of the PYD threat. This group has taken benefits of Syria conflict through controlling the Syrian Kurds, self-proclaiming several cantons and establishing a sphere of influence or terror corridor in northern Syria bordering Turkey. On the other hand, Indonesian government policy towards the Syria crisis can be explained through the influencing factors as follow. First, a commitment to non-alignment with any military bloc as one of basic ideas of the principle of Independent Foreign Policy. In Syria conflict, Indonesia prevents from any engagement of the multilateral and bilateral military pact with Syria and major powers. Instead, it prefers to strengthen ties rely on peaceful coexistance. Given, Indonesia has a critical and substansial roles in the establishment of the NAM, so it positions itself to commit the basic spirit of nonalignment. Second, the leader perceptions. Indonesia stance is sided with neither the Assad regime nor the oppositions while it adopts non-interference into Syria's domestic politics. In other words, Indonesia's official stance is neutral. This stance is meant it fighting against any colonialism and violation forms caused by the regime under the world peace and security. Indonesia government not interpret the neutral stance as a neutral politic that means not to care to the crisis but conducts policy in a way of achieving its national interest. Third, the protection of Indonesian citizens in Syria as a foreign policy's priority. In order to pursue this goal, Indonesian government is still opening diplomatic representatives in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. This representatives has main task to protect, defend and secure them until they are repatriated to Indonesia. No matter who rules, it will cooperate in line with its strategic interests still remain there. Moreover, the influential factors in international level are first the ISIS and Indonesian foreign fighters dimension. Indonesia was also targeted by the ISIS through multiple ISIS-linked and inspired terror attacks. Besides, ISIS also is defined as a threat as the possible terror attacks conducted by Indonesia-origined foreign fighters return to home. viii The potential threats of the presence of the ISIS' supporters and recruits in Indonesia is revival of local extremist groups' sleep cells that probably conducting terror attacks, promoting inter and intra religious conflict, fulfilling the lack of local militant group's capability, recruiting the new cadres targeting youth cadres. Second, Indonesia's role within the framework of the OIC. Despite, Indonesia is the world's majority Muslim populated country and an active actor in the OIC, in fact, Indonesia has no significant role on Syria crisis. It has only played the limited role due to several factors namely a minor actor in term of regional geopolitics and the lack of experience upon the regional complex politics. It remains to manage limited bilateral ties with Syria government. In sum, it tends to conduct a passive foreign policy on Syria crisis. In conclusion, Turkey has adopted and preferred to choose humanitarian and political-oriented approach towards Syria crisis. However, after several international developments rised which put risks to its national security, Turkish foreign policy has then shifted to propose a security-oriented approach. It combines soft and hard powers in formulating process of the foreign policy. Meanwhile, Indonesian government also has put forth primarily humanitarian approach in dealing with the humanitarian crisis in Syria while suggesting such political solution stance in order to solve that crisis with optimalizing the way of diplomacy. Indonesian leaders stance is to prevent a military approach. When it is evaluated on the basic principle of Indonesian foreign policy namely independent and active principle, Indonesia is independent but not active. In this context, these basic principles determine it not enter a formal alliance, further not interferring and involving into other state's domestic problems. Instead, it should actively encourage bilateral cooperations with other countries. In addition, it demonstrates a status quo of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy in a pragmatic way. In this situation, it might recognise that there is a gap between its aspiration and capability to play wider global roles especially in participating to the conflict resolution of the Middle East region. Indonesia government and Muslim group tend to stand in opposite in case of Syria crisis. Indonesian government tend to position in moderate stance and keep in status quo of non-interference policy upon the domestic problem of Syria. For Indonesian goverment, there several reasons why Indonesia still continue to open its diplomatic representative and develop bilateral ties in Syria while most countries closed their diplomatic office in Damascus. First, historical relations between Syria and Indonesia. Syria was the first countries which recognized Indonesia's independence. Second, Indonesia avoids to be ix perceived by Syria regime of getting involved into Syria's domestic issue especially Syria's territorial sovereignty. Third, respect to Syria as a member of the NAM. In which the NAM adopts non-interefere policy as an agreement amongst member states. While Indonesia considers the NAM was birth and insipired by the Bandung Conference with its "Dasasila Bandung" whose an important principle is to respect other state territorial sovereignty. In other words, Indonesia has been trying to play a normative international role in case of Syria crisis. In sum, Indonesian political power might not be powerful yet in affecting the conflict resolution directly compared to other international and regional actors such as Turkey might be has. ; Bu tez çalışmasında, Türkiye ve Endonezya'nın Filistin Sorunu ve Süriye Krizi'ya yönelik dış politikasını karşılaştırmalı bir analizini amaçlanmıştır. Ayrıca cumhuriyet devletleri olma ilan etmelerinden dolayı iki ülkenin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikalarını incelemiştir. Dış politika teori olarak neoklasik realizm uygulanmıştır. Daha sonra Filistin Sorunu ve Süriye Krizi'nin Türkiye ve Endonezya politikalarını birim ve sistematik analiz düzeyinde şekillendiren, değişen dinamikleri ve analiz etkenleri tartışılmıştır. Liderlerin uluslararası ve bölgesel sistemik değişen eğilimleri, baskıları ve devlet iktidarı üzerindeki algılarının etkili faktörler haline geldiğini özetlenmiştir. Filistin meselesinde, Türkiye'de 2004-2016 yılları arasında iç siyaseti, içsel dönüşüme uğramıştır. İlk olarak kamuoyu ve sivil toplumun rolleri dış politikasına etkilenmesidir; AKP partisi iktidara gelmeden önce, Türkiye'nin dış politikasında asker belirleyici aktörü olarak olmuştur. Fakat, daha sonra askerinin rolü azalmıştır. Bunun yerine sivil toplum ve sivil toplum örgütleri de dahil olmak üzere devlet dışı aktörlerinin rolü artmıştır. Osmanlı mirası altındaki ortak tarihsel ve kültürel duyuların yeniden ortaya çıkmasıyla iç kamuoyunu dikkat çekmektedir. Dolayısıyla Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yeniden aktif katılımını sonuçlanmaktadır. İkinci olarak sivil liderin yeni dış politika aktörü olarak ortaya çıkmasıdır. Askeri etkinin azalmasından sonra dış karar vermenin mekanizması değiştirilmiştir. Aktif bir sivil kontrolunu ortaya çıkmış ve iç siyasi yapını yeniden inşa edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla STK, düşünce kuruluşları, vb. gibi dış politikaları ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Türk yumuşak gücünün yeni aracı olarak katkıda bulunmuştur. Üçüncü olarak ise lider faktörleridir. Liderler uluslararası kamuoyunun çekme rolü oynamaktadır. Türk liderinin Filistin'de barışsız bölgenin kalıcı barışı olmadığını algılanmıştır. Onlar da Müslüman dünyasının stratejik önemine vurgulanmıştır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin bölgesel meselelerine yeniden girmesi gerekmektedir. Dördüncüsü, İslamcı faktörün artışıdır. Tüm taraflar için demokratik bir eşitliğe Müslüman grupların iç politikaya yeniden dahil olmasını hizmet etmektedir. İslamcı bakış açısıyla Türk STK'sı da bir baskı grubu olarak yükselmektedir. Dolayısıyla Filistin meselesine de etkilenmektedir. Kudüs'ün statüsü ve doğasının Müslümanlara karşı kutsal bir şehir olarak hassasiyetini, özellikle de kutsal şehri kimin kontrol edeceğine yönelik kaygısını dile getirmektedir. Beşinci olarak, proaktif bir dış politikasıdır. Bölgesel düzeyde, bölgesel çatışmaların ana kaynağı Filistin-İsrail çatışmasıdır. Bölgesel istikrarsızlığın kalbi olarak algılanan İsrail-Filistin çatışması, Filistin sorununun çözümü için proaktif bir dış politikasını sonuçlanmıştır. Özetle, Türkiye'nin AKP yönetimi sırasında Filistin meselesiyle ilgili bir dengeleme politikası yürütülmüştür. Endonezya'nın Ortadoğu'da aktif bir katılım politikası arzusunu belirlenmiştir. Bunlar da, Orta Doğu diplomatik misyonunun özel bir varlığı, Endonezya hükümetinin Gazze şeridindeki parlamento seçimlerini kazandıktan sonra Hamas'a tanınması ve desteklenmesi, Filistin-İsrail çatışmasında dürüst bir aracı olma çabaları ve Ramallah'da resmi bir temsilcidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya İsrail devletinin tanınmayan bir politikasını resmi olarak tutarlı ile benimsemektedir. Endonezya'nın Filistin devletinin tanınmasını desteklemek ve Filistinlilere insancıl yaklaşımların sürdürülmesini sağlayarak insani yaklaşımı önermek için bölgesel ve uluslararası düzeyde çok sayıda diplomatik çabalarını sarf etmiştir. Türkiye ile karşılaştırıldığında, Endonezya'da 2004-2016 yılları arasında, sivil demokrasi dönemine geçiş dönemi geçirilmiştir. Geçiş dönemi sonrasında demokrasi sürecine dönüşmüş ve demokratik istikrara ulaşılmıştır. Endonezya'nın demokratik döneminde, Endonezya'nın angajmanı tarihsel temeli olarak 1945 Anayasasının antisömürgecilik ruhunu devam etmiştir. Ayrıca, devletin dış politikasında İslamcı faktör varlığının sayesinde Endonezya hükümeti Müslümanların isteklerini karşılamaktadır. İç siyasette İslamcı faktörün artması, iç kamuoyunda İslamcı odaklı hedeflenmiştir. Filistinli xii mülteci meselesinin ve Filistin toprakları üzerinde İsrail işgalinin ötesinde, Endonezya Müslüman grupları ve hükümeti için El-Aksa camisinin yer aldığı Kudüs meselesi de dahil olmak üzere ön plana çıktığı önemli konular arasında yüksek düzeyde hassasiyet vardır. Başka bir deyişle, Filistin meselesiyle ilgili olarak Müslüman gruplar ve Endonezya hükümeti arasında karşılıklı etkileşim vardır. Endonezyalı Müslümanların büyük bir kısmı ve hükümetin resmen Filistinliler için mücadele etmeyi birleşmişlerdir. Diğer İslamcı faktörlerin ahlaki güçü, Müslüman gruplarıdır. İslamcı meselelere pasif bir şekilde tepki gösterdiğinde Müslüman gruplar hükümete baskı yapmışlardır. Endonezya hükümetleri tarafından İsrail ile diplomatik ilişkilerin kurulmasına ilişkin herhangi bir girişimde, tüm müslüman gruplarının güçlü ve sert baskılarından dolayı çoğu zaman iptal edilmiştir. Buna ek olarak, yeni Endonezya'nın uluslararası yönelimi ve kimliğinin yanı sıra İslamcı partilerin giderek artan bir rolü, İsrail'e karşı tanınmayan bir politikasının sürekliliğini etkilemiştir ve Filistin'i iki devletli çözümlere uygun olarak desteklemiştir. Uluslararası düzeyde ise, demokratikleşme politikasının dalgası demokratikleşmiş dış politikanın ortaya çıkmasına yol açmaktadır. Endonezya'nın demokratik dış politikası, devlet dışı aktörlerin aktif katılımını sağlayan çeşitli diplomatik çabalarla gerçekleştirilmiştir. 2012 yılında Süriye devrimi arttıktan sonra bir iç savaşa dönüşmüştür. İlk olarak, IŞİD, PYD-YPG ve diğer militan veya radikal gruplar gibi çeşitli devlet dışı aktörlerin ortaya çıkması ve aynı zamanda bölgesel ve uluslararası güçlerin doğrudan müdahalesi, çatışmayı daha da tırmandırmıştır. Bunlar Türkiye'ye doğrudan tehdit oluşturup özellikle Süriye'deki Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu politikasına meydan okumuştur. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin Süriye politikası yumuşak güçten sert güç yaklaşımına dönüş olmuştur. Türk siyasetini şekillendiren birçok içi faktör, öncelikle insani bir kriz boyutu, yani mülteci akının açık kapı politikasını sonuçlanmaktadır. 2011 yılından itibaren Süriye krizinin mülteci dalgalarını Türkiye'ye ateşlemiştir. Doğrudan komşu ülkeler olarak, Türkiye'yi sınırları açmak ve halkı güvence altına almak için uluslararası toplum ve yerel insani yardımlar tarafından talep edilmiştir. İkinci olarak Türkiye-Süriye sınırlarında güvenlik tehdidi oluşmuştur. Esad rejimi'nin Süriye muhalefetlerine karşı yürüttüğü askeri politika ve krizin gelişmesiyle, 2013 yılında başlayan devlet dışı silahlı grupların (YPG-PYD, IŞİD, diğer ılımlı ve radikal gruplar) durumu daha da kriziye karmaşık hale getirmiştir. Egemenlik iddiasında bulunma ve terör saldırıları yürütme çabaları nedeniyle, Türk ulusal güvenlik ve toprak bütünlüğüne tehdit oluşturmuştur. Başka bir risk ise, Süriye'ye gidip xiii çıkarken yabancı terörist savaşçıların Türkiye üzerinden sınır ötesi girişidir. Hatta, ülkelerine muhtemelen dönmeden önce Türkiye'de üçüncü bir ülke olarak yaşamışlardır. Bu yüzden, onları menşe ülkelerine geri gönderme yolunu da ele almak zorunda kalmaktadır. Uluslararası düzeyde ise, en etkili faktörler öncellikle uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlerin çatışmaya girmesidir. 2015 yılından beri uluslararası müdahalelerini arttırmıştır. Yabancı ülkeler ve devlet dışı aktörlerin katılımı, küresel ve bölgesel güçlerin yanı sıra devlet dışı aktörler arasındaki ittifak ve düşmanlığın stratejik modelini oluşturmuştur. İkincisi, IŞİD'in yükselişidir. Bu terör örgütü, birçok intihar saldırısı ile Türk ulusal güvenliğine tehdit oluşturmuştur. Üçüncü olarak, PYD tehdidinin ortaya çıkışıdır. Bu grup Süriyeli Kürtleri kontrol ederek, birkaç kantonu ilan ederek ve Türkiye sınırındaki kuzey Süriye'de bir etki alanı veya terör koridoru kurarak Süriye çatışmasından yararlanmıştır. Öte yandan, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizine yönelik politikası, aşağıdaki gibi etkileyen faktörler aracılığıyla açıklanabilir. Birincisi, Bağımsız Dış Politika ilkesinin temel fikirlerinden biri olarak herhangi bir askeri bloğa uyumsuzluk bir taahhüdüdür. Süriye krizinde, Endonezya, Süriye ve büyük güçler ile çok taraflı ve iki taraflı askeri paktların her türlü müdahalesini engellemiştir. Bunun yerine, barışçıl bir birlikteliğe güvenmek üzere ilişkileri güçlendirmeyi tercih edilmiştir. Dolayısıyla Endonezya'nın Bağlantısız Hareketi kurulmasında kritik ve yardımcı bir rolleri vardır. Bu yüzden uyumsuzluğun temel ruhunu yerine getirmek için kendini konumlandırmaktadır. İkincisi, lider algılarıdır. Endonezya'nın tutumu, ne Esad rejimi ne de muhalefetlerle karşı karşıya kalırken, Süriye'nin iç siyasetine müdahale etmemektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın resmi duruşu tarafsızdır. Bu duruş, dünya barış ve güvenliği altındaki rejimin neden olduğu sömürgecilik ve ihlal biçimlerine karşı savaşmak anlamına gelmektedir. Endonezya hükümeti'nin tarafsız duruşu tarafsız bir siyaset olarak yorumlamamaktadır, krize dikkat etmemek değildir. Fakat, politikasını ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda yürütmek anlamına gelmektedir. Üçüncüsü, Süriye'deki Endonezya vatandaşlarının korunmasının önceliğine bir bağlılık oluşturmasıdır. Bu hedefe ulaşmak için Endonezya hükümeti Şam, Halep ve Lazkiye'de diplomatik temsilcileri açmaya devam etmiştir. Bu temsilciler Endonezya'ya gönderilmeden önce onları korumak, savunmak ve güvenceye almak için temel görevlere sahiptir. Süriye'deki kimin hükümetleri olursa olsun, stratejik çıkarları doğrultusunda işbirliği yapmaya devam edecektir. xiv Daha sonra, uluslararası düzeyde etkili olan faktörler, ilk olarak IŞİD ve Endonezya'nın yabancı savaşçıları boyutudur. Endonezya'yı IŞİD'e bağlı ve ilham veren terör saldırılarıyla da IŞİD tarafından hedef alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Endonezya kökenli yabancı savaşçıların menşei ülkelerine dönmesiyle ilgili olası terör saldırılarından dolayı IŞİD bir tehdit olarak tanımlanmıştır. Olası terör saldırıları yürüten, iç ve dış dini çatışmaları teşvik eden, yerel militan grubun kapasitesinin eksikliğini yerine getiren, yeni kadroları işe almak genç kadroları hedefleyen yerel aşırı grupların uyku hücrelerinin yeniden canlanmasını kapsamakta Endonezya'daki IŞİD'in destekçileri ve temsilcilerinin varlığının potansiyel tehditleridir. İkincisi, Endonezya'nın İKT çerçevesinde rolüdür. Buna rağmen, Endonezya dünyanın çoğunlukta Müslüman nüfuslu ülkesi ve İKT'de aktif bir aktörüdür. Fakat, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizinde önemli bir rolü yoktur. Bölgesel jeopolitik terim olarak küçük bir aktör ve bölgesel karmaşık siyaset üzerine deneyim eksikliği gibi nedenlerden dolayı sınırlı rol oynamıştır. Süriye hükümetiyle sınırlı ikili ilişkilerin yönetiminde kalmaya devam ettiğini belirlemektedir. Özetle, Süriye krizi durumunda pasif bir dış politika yürütme eğilimindedir. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye Süriye krizine yönelik insani ve politik odaklı yaklaşımı benimsemiş ve tercih etmiştir. Fakat, ulusal güvenliğini tehlikeye sokan birçok uluslararası gelişmenin ardından, Türk dış politikası güvenlik odaklı bir yaklaşım tercih etmiştir. Dış politikanın formüle edilmesinde yumuşak ve sert güçleri birleştirmektedir. Öte yandan, Endonezya hükümeti'nin Süriye'deki insani krizle başa çıkmada insani yardım yaklaşımını ortaya koyarken, bu krizi diplomasi yolunu en uygun hale getirmiştir. Endonezyalı liderlerin duruşu askeri bir yaklaşımı engellemektir. Endonezya dış politikası'nın temel ilkesi olan bağımsız ve aktif ilkeleri olarak değerlendirildiğinde, Endonezya bağımsızdır ancak aktif değildir. Dolayısıyla bu temel ilkeler, diğer devletlerin iç sorunlarına müdahale etmemek ve bunlara müdahalede bulunmamaktan ziyade askeri bir ittifaka girmediğini belirlemektedir. Bunun yerine, diğer ülkelerle ikili ilişkilerini aktif olarak teşvik etmelidir. Ayrıca, Endonezya'nın bağımsız ve aktif statükoyu bir dış politikasını pragmatik bir şekilde göstermektedir. Bu durumda, özellikle Orta Doğu bölgesinin çatışma çözümüne katılma konusunda daha geniş küresel rol oynama isteği ve yeteneği arasında bir uçurum olduğunu fark edilmektedir. Süriye krizi durumunda Endonezya hükümeti ve Müslüman grup karşıt olarak durmaktadır. Endonezya hükümeti ılımlı duruşa yönelme ve Süriye'nin iç sorunu üzerine müdahale etmeme politikası'nın statüsünü korumaktadır. Endonezya'nın diplomatik xv temsilcisini açmaya ve Süriye'de ikili ilişkiler geliştirmeye devam ederken, çoğu ülke Şam'da diplomatik bürosunu kapatmaya devam etmesinin birkaç nedeni vardır. İlk olarak, Süriye ve Endonezya arasındaki tarihi ilişkiler olmasıdır. Süriye, Endonezya'nın bağımsızlığını tanıyan ilk ülkelerdir. İkincisi, Endonezya Süriye'nin iç meselesine özellikle Süriye'nin toprak egemenliğine dahil olma Süriye rejimi tarafından algılanmaktan kaçınmasıdır. Üçüncüsü, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üyesi olarak Süriye'ye saygı göstermesidir. Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin üye devletler arasında bir anlaşma olarak müdahaleci olmayan bir politikasını benimsemektedir. Endonezya, Bağlantısız Hareketi'nin önemli bir ilkesi olarak diğer devlet topraklarının egemenliğine saygı duyması gereken "Dasasila Bandung" ile Bandung Konferansı'nda doğup yaşandığını düşünmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, Endonezya'nın Süriye krizi durumunda normatif bir uluslararası rolü oynamaya denilebilmektedir. Özetle, Endonezyainın siyasi gücü Türkiye'nin sahip olabileceği gibi diğer uluslararası ve bölgesel aktörlere kıyasla çatışma çözümünü doğrudan etkilememektedir. ; Türkiye Bursları

Many are seeing the current impasse over the future of U.S. aid to Ukraine as the ultimate manifestation of congressional dysfunction. Following several attempts, the Senate in February passed a $95 billion bill that includes most of the Biden administration's previous requests, minus border funding. That bill sits in limbo in the House, with Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.), who, while signaling he wants a vote on it, has so far been unwilling to bring it to the floor. Last month House Democrats introduced an arcane "motion to discharge" petition, which could allow supporters to bring the bill to a vote if 218 members agree. While 191 have signed the petition, the odds of finding another 27 appear daunting, given the number of progressive Democrats who oppose military assistance for Israel, and opposition by Republicans to bypassing the Speaker.This situation — while distressing to the Ukrainians, and it seems, the foreign policy establishment — presents an opportunity to reestablish some measure of congressional control, if only in a limited area. Members of Congress wary of presidential overreach and endless military intervention can use this delay to push the administration to define its strategy for Ukraine more transparently. Such a definition is essential for Congress, and the voters they represent, to evaluate the total costs, in treasure and risk of escalation, of our current policy.A common task for government bureaucrats is drafting responses to congressional questions for the record sent to their agencies. These QFRs range from in-the-weeds clarifications of budgets to essentially rhetorical questions on why a particular senior administration official is clueless, and everything in between. The best QFRs can cause policymakers to question some of their assumptions. Since the Ukraine war began, the administration's statements have been opaque, often contradictory, and sometimes lacking in elementary logic. We are past the point where the American people deserve straight answers on where this war is going, what our real critical interests are, and how we can best achieve them.Before approving further military assistance for Ukraine, lawmakers should ask, preferably in hearings with administration officials, or at least in detailed letters, a number of overarching questions.The first should be: Can you define what constitutes victory in this war? Does it require Ukraine recapturing all its internationally recognized territory, as President Zelensky and others maintain? Or can victory be defined more simply as preventing the collapse of the current government? What do we mean by providing Ukraine aid "as long as it takes"? The Biden administration should provide actual analysis, based on U.S. national interests, and not simply Ukrainian government talking points.Second, if our definition of victory is the expulsion of all Russian forces from Ukrainian territory, how plausible is that from a military perspective? Can the Biden administration provide a historical example in which a numerically smaller force, without air superiority, successfully attacked a larger force entrenched in strong defensive positions hundreds of miles long, dislodged that force, and inflicted more casualties on the defender than it suffered itself while on the offensive?Next, there has been much speculation about the risks of nuclear escalation, and whether Russian statements are merely aggressive bluffing, with no likelihood such weapons would be used. During the Cold War, wasn't it U.S. doctrine to implicitly threaten to use tactical nuclear weapons, not just to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the US homeland or using nuclear weapons in Europe, but to deter a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact? If those threats were credible, why would Putin not consider using tactical nuclear weapons if he were facing a conventional defeat in which Ukraine threatened to retake Crimea and the Donbas, areas Russia now considers part of its territory?Fourth, a major talking point has been that a Russian defeat would deter China from attacking Taiwan, and represent a victory for the democratic world over an authoritarian axis. If this is a rationale to keep the war going, wouldn't China take us at our word, and decide that a Russian defeat is an unacceptable red line? Why wouldn't China begin providing munitions, artillery, tanks, and aircraft to Russia to prevent such an outcome?Fifth, in addition to Ukraine's shortage of ammunition and weapons, we increasingly hear about a manpower shortage, and an inability to replace casualties. Despite the battlefield situation, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men remain outside the country or are in Ukraine but making extraordinary efforts to avoid being drafted. Is this due to dissatisfaction with the current government, or a sense that while it was important to save the country in 2022, it's not worth continued fighting to retake Crimea and Donbas, or something else? Regardless of its cause, why should the American taxpayer be more committed to a Ukrainian victory than hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens themselves are?And finally, following Ukraine's unsuccessful counteroffensive last year, Russia is now undertaking limited attacks in several areas, using its superiority in artillery and airpower to wear down Ukrainian defenses. The Biden administration often states that its objective is to give Ukraine as strong a position on the battlefield as possible going into any negotiations. Is it possible that Ukraine is now in the best position militarily that it can reasonably hope for? Is it time for us to urge Ukraine to begin negotiations now, based on realities on the ground, rather than strive for maximum objectives, before it loses any more territory, and its bargaining position is further weakened?***Questions such as these would help start the dialogue on how our policy should evolve. The result may be a security assistance package much smaller than what the administration is proposing. There may be consensus to include, for example, artillery ammunition and shorter range air defense missiles to defend Ukraine's current positions, while excluding longer range munitions and aircraft. Those systems, by allowing strikes inside Russia, might encourage Ukraine to pursue unrealistic victory conditions, reducing the chances for diplomacy.For this approach to succeed, two elements are essential. First, members of Congress must make clear their sympathy for the Ukrainian people and their suffering. The point is not whether Ukraine is justified in seeking the return of its territory — it certainly is. The question is whether this goal is in any way realistic. Since the answer is likely "no," to continue throwing away lives as a performative gesture is immoral as well as pointless. Congress might consider a bill that separates out humanitarian assistance and voting for that now, since those funds are needed regardless of military policy.Second, this approach must be a bipartisan effort, with lawmakers on the left and right working together toward a common goal. So far certain Republicans have been in the lead on this issue, with Democrats lagging behind. More than a year has elapsed since the fiasco in late 2022, when the Congressional Progressive Caucus was forced to retract its already anodyne call for diplomacy. Progressives must overcome their fear of White House displeasure and attack from the Washington foreign policy establishment. People will take notice when similar questions are raised by members of both the Freedom Caucus and "the Squad." Members of Congress who favor endless military intervention have no problem with bipartisan cooperation, and those who think differently need to catch up.With the current effort in the House to act on the Senate's bill, the window is closing to ask tough questions. If Congress is to have any meaningful voice, these issues must be addressed as soon as possible.

The coming month will be crucial for determining what the Venezuelan opposition's participation will look like in the July 28 presidential election.The five-day window for candidate registry opened Thursday. But the Venezuelan opposition faces a barrage of efforts by the Nicolás Maduro government aimed at harassing and disqualifying his challengers.The National Electoral Council (CNE), controlled by President Nicolás Maduro, reaffirmed the disqualification of top opposition candidate María Corina Machado in January based on a collage of specious charges. Rumblings from Caracas had already suggested serious talks about naming a replacement candidate for Machado. However, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the most likely substitute, her campaign manager Magalli Meda, on Wednesday. Several of Machado' team were also arrested and taken away. The charges? All have been accused of taking part a violent anti-government conspiracy. Meanwhile, the CNE has also annulled the registry of a number of opposition parties, at this point leaving only two from the dominant coalition. The Venezuelan opposition faces several complex challenges in trying to channel the energy and enthusiasm expressed for Maria Corina Machado in the opposition's primary election last October into the general election in July. U.S. policy makers need to encourage opposition participation and prioritize the Venezuelan people's right to self-determination.Machado is a long-time hardline activist and politician who for years has been at odds with the dominant opposition coalition in demanding foreign intervention, suggesting that no election was possible with President Nicolas Maduro remaining in power, and insisting that dialogue with the regime was a farce. But her popularity soared over the past year as she plunged headlong into the primary process and even embraced the Norwegian-mediated negotiation process between the Maduro government and opposition coalition that has been taking place on and off again since 2019. Citizen participation in the opposition's primary surpassed all expectations and gave her over 90% support among a population desperate for change. This has essentially made her the opposition's candidate and given her a predominant voice in the coalition.However, recent polling shows that a majority of Venezuelans would support any unified opposition candidate. This contradicts the message that she and her advisors have been propagating — that she is the only viable candidate — and explains why, in recent weeks, she has taken to attacking pollsters and analysts.In a recent article, a colleague and I suggested that, despite a decade of efforts to counter Nicolás Maduro's authoritarian slide, the U.S. government's ability to impact the Maduro government is quite limited. Under three U.S. presidents, efforts have ranged from diplomacy to outright attempts at regime-change. Yet during that time, the Maduro government has become a comprehensive authoritarian state that the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights has accused of not just censorship of media and harassment of opposition politicians, but enforced disappearances and torture.Washington, however, does have significant influence with the Venezuelan opposition. At this point, the U.S. needs to be absolutely consistent that an electoral boycott is not its preferred path forward. The Venezuelan people are clear about this, as is most of the opposition, and Biden officials also seem to have heard that message. Multiple times in the past, however, the opposition has snatched dysfunction out of the jaws of consensus, with factional leaders each pulling in different directions or preferring abstention rather than letting a rival leader end up on top. This possibility should not be underestimated this year as well. While boycotting an election that does not meet international standards may seem morally and emotionally satisfying, the research is quite clear that participation in an unfair election is more effective than abstaining. Tacit U.S. approval of past boycotts should not be repeated this time around.Machado has insisted on running despite her disqualification and has taken a hard line against candidate substitution in order to maximize pressure on the regime. Her logic is that the regime will buckle to pressure and lift her ban and allow her on the ballot. This position has been embraced in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill by Republican lawmakers and even some Democrats for whom Machado's hard line may resonate with their constituents. But there is a distinct danger that Machado will pivot and get behind a substitute candidate, and lawmakers in Washington will fail to support such a move, thus complicating the opposition's participation in the elections. In the past, U.S. government inertia has dragged down an opposition that was willing to take new paths. This kind of muscle memory absolutely needs to be avoided this time around.If Machado does pivot, there are a number of reasons the gambit could still fail — from opposition dysfunction to the Maduro regime simply disqualifying or jailing the substitute candidate, or complicating the registration process. If this happens and a new opposition candidate emerges who has the potential to unify Venezuela's discontented electorate even without Machado's blessing, that process must be allowed to proceed without interference from Washington. This election is about the long-suffering Venezuelan people. It is important to realize that popular support for Machado is based largely on her being perceived as someone who can deliver change in terms of getting them to a post-Maduro future. Many of those who support her do not support her policies on major issues such as sanctions, foreign intervention, and privatization of the state oil company. Thus, a quick swing of public support to another candidate with quite different policy positions is entirely possible. It is fine for U.S. policymakers to have favorite foreign politicians and allies, but these relationships should not be allowed to interfere with Venezuelans' attempts to take new directions to unify against Maduro.Meanwhile, U.S. officials need to prepare for the likelihood that the election will not be competitive. Any truly free and fair electoral event would lead to the defeat of Maduro and his loyalists. They have a great deal to lose and they will do what they can to avoid such an outcome. Nonetheless, it is always worth making an authoritarian government play the election game because it can make mistakes, and a "stunning election" result can generate a cascade of events that leads to a transition in spite of the incumbent government's efforts. At the same time, everyone should be clear that the Maduro regime controls all of the institutions of government as well as the armed forces and the oil industry. The most likely outcome is that they maintain power with the only real doubt being how inelegantly they do so.What happens in this scenario needs to be carefully planned out ahead of time. As a result of last October's Barbados Accords that laid out the path for a democratic election, the Biden Administration issued licenses that effectively suspended the most important U.S. sanctions on the Venezuelan economy — namely, on oil and gas — for six months. Those licenses are up for review in mid-April, and snapping sanctions back in place would be a mistake. Economic sanctions on Venezuela have exacted heavy humanitarian costs, impoverishing the population and significantly impacting emigration. And since they affect the population more than the government, they have actually strengthened the regime's power over the population. Targeted sanctions on specific individuals should be maintained. While they have not proved terribly effective either, they do provide a level of international stigmatization for individuals who have violated the rights of others. If properly implemented and monitored, they can provide useful impetus for reform and democratization.The most important thing the U.S. government can do in the longer run is to robustly support a deepening and extension of dialogue and negotiation within Venezuela. Only when the shape of the conflict and nature of the game change will Chavismo be willing to let go of power. Processes of reconciliation and reconstruction of the social fabric are the only way intractable conflicts can become something else. The effort that has been led by Norwegian diplomats is well-conceived and carried out with genuine expertise. But it needs more international, and especially U.S., support if it is to succeed.

At the end of 2013, there were about 3.3 million people who remained forcibly displaced within the Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa. Of these, 82 percent were internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 18 percent refugees; 64 percent were under 18 years old. This Report analyzes the extent, causes, and character of this forced displacement, with particular attention to certain situations.

In a moment of unguarded honesty that went viral last week, President Biden was asked by reporters if U.S. airstrikes in Yemen targeting the Shia Islamist group known as the Houthis were "working."The President sheepishly replied, "Well, when you say 'working'—are they stopping the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue? Yes." In a single sentence, Biden captured the impuissant hollowness of two decades of U.S. foreign policy bromides on the use of military force, the Middle East, and deterrence.Washington's critics have often said that, whenever a crisis occurs, U.S. policymakers exhibit an almost Pavlovian instinct to reach for military options — no matter the facts on the ground or the odds of success — in a desperate attempt to "do something." Amid mounting tension in the Middle East stemming from the Israel-Hamas conflict, the foreign policy establishment is again hand-waving those criticisms away amid vague calls for indefinite U.S.-led intervention in Yemen and even war with Iran — this, despite the President's own admission that doing so will fail to change a thing.Indeed, despite at least eight rounds of U.S. strikes that expended hundreds of valuable precision-guided munitions, Houthi attacks on ships transiting the Red Sea have only increased in frequency and scope, targeting more U.S.-owned and U.S-flagged vessels. While legitimate military analysts and regional experts knew these strikes were doomed to fail from the start, it should now be obvious there is no credible military solution to the crisis in the Red Sea.More importantly, as three U.S. troops were killed and more than 30 injured in a local Shia militia attack on a remote outpost along the Syria-Jordan border known as "Tower 22" on Sunday, the last thing the Biden Administration should be doing is looking to escalate things in Yemen. Instead, Washington should start by recognizing that both its economic and national security interests are largely unaffected by Red Sea transit. If it wants, the U.S. can truly afford to do nothing there. Despite a 65% decline in expected freight container volumes transiting the Red Sea, the U.S. saw just a 1% decline in net imports for the month of December. The U.S. does not need to spend between $260 and $573 million per month, as some analysts estimate, to defend foreign merchant shipping with no end in sight.Meanwhile, China has eschewed the use of force and is instead free-riding on U.S. military action in the Red Sea, even though Beijing faces mounting freight and insurance costs that have caused its economy significant harm. China has a destroyer, frigate, and replenishment vessel currently situated in the Gulf of Aden — not to mention a naval base in Djibouti at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb strait — and is perfectly capable of stepping up to conduct defensive operations in the Red Sea.Yet, through no cogent or intentional U.S. action, the demonstrated ineffectiveness of military action — alongside rising costs — are likely now spurring new Chinese efforts to pressure Iran to rein in the Houthis. While Iran retains very strong ties to the group, having provided them with weapons, training, and assistance over the years, it doesn't have total control over the Houthis. Nonetheless, China has the requisite economic leverage over Tehran — and by extension the Houthis — to demand an end to the crisis.For its part, the U.S. should not impede any such resolution simply because it didn't play a leading role in brokering a deal. If a deal is eventually reached, many in Washington would view it as evidence of Beijing establishing itself as a key security broker in the Middle East. But if America's recent experience as a security provider in the region is any guide, it is not clear such a development would be bad for the United States vis-à-vis its rivalry with China.However, if the U.S. wanted to take a more active role in resolving the crisis than passing the buck to China, a diplomatic response could also be pursued. Diplomacy would serve to avoid an unpredictable and costly U.S. military campaign that would immediately compromise two of Washington's stated objectives in the Middle East: to prevent the war in Gaza from further consuming the region, and officially ending the civil war in Yemen.The Houthis have repeatedly linked their motive for attacking ships in the Red Sea to the Israel-Hamas conflict. Over the course of the war, Houthi attacks have correlated with events in Gaza. For example, Houthi attacks decreased during the brief truce in November, only to resume afterwards. In December, the group's official spokesman claimed attacks on ships transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward the Suez Canal will continue until "Gaza receives the food and medicine it needs." As Houthi strategic intentions have not changed, and their attack capabilities have not been meaningfully degraded, diplomacy is a low-cost option for Washington to consider without foisting some terrible result on the United States.Working to increase aid shipments to Gaza would not just help to alleviate the humanitarian crisis there, but would deprive the Houthis of their claimed justification for attacks in the Red Sea and provide the group with an offramp for de-escalation that would also serve to prevent indefinite U.S. participation in a broader regional war. However, this would also necessitate increased diplomatic pressure on the Israeli government to allow more aid into Gaza, a step the Biden Administration remains uninterested in taking.Put simply, there are no existential or vital U.S. national interests at stake in Yemen, and very little is at stake for the U.S. economically in the Red Sea. Any multi-billion-dollar effort to fight a war in Yemen would render no political, economic, or security benefits to the United States. Strategies like "buck passing" and diplomatic engagement are perfectly viable, would do the U.S. no harm, and could resolve the crisis. Continued military action in Yemen, by contrast, presents dubious prospects for success. The pitfalls of sustained U.S. military action in Yemen — and in other fronts across the Middle East tied to the war in Gaza like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, or yesterday's tragedy in Jordan — still include a non-trivial risk of regional war that can only be ignored at the world's peril.

Email



Share

Tweet

Share


Comment










Image

























It has been a very exciting year for social protection! In 2019, my weekly social protection links newsletter reviewed 1042 materials in 43 editions. So here is a personal selection of papers articulated around 10 major themes. Enjoy!

1. Economic and other long-term effects

Daidone et al have a great article summarizing and explaining the economic effects of cash transfers in 7 African countries. Egger et al add another precious data point on the multiplier effects of cash transfers (I counted 12 such points for the moment): in Kenya, every $ injected generates $2.6 in the local economy.

Blattman et al show that after 5 years, a one-off cash grants in Ethiopia has fading effects. Similarly, in Malawi Baird et al estimate that the impact on reduced fertility of an unconditional cash transfers on adolescent girls rapidly vanished.

In Mexico, after 20 years of operations cash transfers ex-beneficiaries showed higher ownership of durable assets (Aguilar et al); 49.2% of them experienced upward mobility (Yaschine et al); they grew 2.8-4.1cm taller and have 5.3-5.7 more years of schooling than their parents (Gutierrez et al), with enrollment in secondary school increasing by 5-10 percentage points over grades 7-12 (Behrman et al). A 10-country review by Millan et al found that the evidence is strong on school completion, more mixed on learning, and limited on employment. Another paper by Millan et al estimate that 13 years after its inception, transfers in Honduras increased secondary education completion by 50%, but also rose the chance of migration by 3-7 percentage points.

2. Health, nutrition and education

Klein et al show that cash transfer participants in Buenos Aires showed higher success rates against tuberculosis (TB); yet Rudgard et al estimate that making transfers "TB-sensitive" would require an additional budget between $165M and $298M per country. Choko et al showed that in Malawi cash plus HIV self-test kits increased HIV anti-retroviral therapy compared to other solutions. Palermo et al find that in Ghana, combining cash and health measures increased enrolment in health insurance in the treatment group from an average of 37.4% to 46.6%.

In Ecuador, Moncayo et al show that a 1% increase in the coverage of cash transfers decreases mortality from malnutrition by about 3%. In Nigeria, Okeke and Abubakar estimate that cash reduced mortality of children in utero by at least 20%. Celhay et al found that cash increased the survival rates of birth cohorts exposed to the program by up to 14.7%. and Dow et al find that in the US, a 10% increase in the Earned Income Tax Credit or in the minimum wage reduces suicides between 3.6 and 5.5%.

In Ghana, Gelli et al found that the national school meals program improved stunting among children of 5-8 years (effect size: 0.12 standard deviations). Neufeld et al on the history of nutrition evidence on cash transfers in Mexico. And a paper by Evans and Yuan shows that girl-targeted versus general interventions in education seem to deliver similar gains, including featuring cash transfers both at the top and bottom among the most effective interventions.

3. Gender

Peterman et al summarize the impacts of safety nets on gender in Africa: safety nets perform well in reducing physical violence as well as improving psychological well-being, dietary diversity and savings. But changes in labor force participation are minimal. In terms of toolkits, FAO produced great guidelines on gender-sensitive cash transfers and public works.

A review of evidence on social assistance and intimate partner violence (IPV) by Hidrobo and Roy shows reductions in physical violence between 25-41% in Bangladesh, Ecuador, and Mali. Another brief by Heise summarizes results from 22 studies across 13 countries.

4. Crime

Tuttle shows that banning convicted drug felons from SNAP food stamps in the United States makes them more likely to return to jail. Sviatschi estimates that in Peru, cash transfers reduced drug production. And in Brazil, Machado et al find that Bolsa reduced homicide rate and hospitalizations due to violence by 8-25%.

5. Crises

Barca and Beazley estimate that it takes between 2 weeks to 14 months to scale up social protection in response to natural disasters. Bruck et al show that a new generation of 7 high-quality evaluations sheds light on social protection in fragile and displacement settings. Cherrier et al produced an excellent compendium on humanitarian-social protection linkages, while Seyfert et examine the trade-offs of integrating refugees into national safety nets.

6. Universality and targeting

A new book by Gentilini et al offers a framework to navigate the analytics, evidence and practices on universal basic income (UBI), while Banerjee et al discuss how UBI may address barriers like lack of credit, insurance or psychological factors among low-income people. Jolliffe et al show that SNAP, the American "floor for the poorest", has been sinking over the past 30 years.

ILO and UNICEF have an overview note on "universal" child grants present in 21 countries, while Kidd and Athias offer a critique of proxy means testing. In Indonesia, Tohari et al estimates that the poverty-based unified database of beneficiaries improved the chance of participating in 3 core programs by 117%, while Bah et al estimate that if all households were included in such database undercoverage would be reduced by one-third. Bonus: Ndiaye et al trace the evolution of the national social registry in Senegal.

7. Insurance and labor markets

Packard et al examines how social protection could be adapted to the changing nature of work, while Jorgensen and Siegel unveil social risk management 2.0. Guven shows that in Africa only 10.6% of Africa's working-age population contributes to pension schemes. The ILO has a fascinating "living document" laying out a number of options disaggregated by occupation.

A review of minimum wages in high-income countries by Dube finds "… muted effect of minimum wages on employment, while significantly increasing the earnings of low paid workers". However, a new compilation of evidence on minimum wage in low and middle-income countries by Neumark and Corella finds that "… when minimum wages are binding and enforced, and when they apply to vulnerable workers, the disemployment effects are most apparent".

8. Tech and financial inclusion

Gelb and Mukherjee take stock of lessons from India's biometric ID (Aadhaar) in providing inclusive services; Masino and Nino-Zarazua show that transitioning to electronic cash payments in Mexico increased households' access to formal financial services. In South Africa, however, Torkelson documents abuses in using cash transfers as loan collateral by a financial company delivering cash itself.

9. Political economy

Hickey et al have an amazing open-access book on the political economy of cash transfers in Africa. Mosec and Mo found that in Pakistan those receiving BISP cash transfers increased support for their political leaders and institutions, while in typhoon-hit Fiji Rios et al show that people receiving cash transfers are up to 20% more likely to be very satisfied with the government than non-recipients. In Brazil and Turkey, Zucco et al show that conditional transfers are only marginally more popular than similar unconditional transfers. Ciminelli et al find that reforms generating large short-term adverse distributional effects are associated with electoral costs for politicians. In Mexico, Cantu documents that cash-vouchers to be used in local supermarkets were provided in exchange for electoral support.

10. Cash plus and cash versus….

In Bihar, Khemani et al asked whether people prefer cash or other services: only 13% chose cash instead of spending on public health and nutrition; in contrast, if cash came in lieu of improving roads, preference for cash rose to 35% (see counter views). In Mozambique, De Walque and Valente compare the effects of a conditional cash transfer program with the sole provision of information to parents on school attendance: information provision is as large as 75% of the effect of the CCT.

Two papers – one on Ghana by Banerjee et al and another on Uganda by Sedlmayr et al – points to the power of combining cash transfers with assets and complementary measures (as opposed to individual components). Also, Carneiro et al evaluate an integrated cash program for 3,600 mothers in Northern Nigeria: after 2-4 years, the program reduced stunting by 8%. Bonus: Bedoya et al show that a package of transfers and assets in Afghanistan increased consumption by 30% and poverty fell from 82 to 62%.

















Authors













https://www.linkedin.com/in/ugo-gentilini-8b6a8936/

twitter.com/intent/follow?screen_name=@Ugentilini


Ugo Gentilini
Global Lead for Social Assistance, World Bank
More Blogs By Ugo









































0

The nutrition cluster is a very important entity to coordinate actions during emergencies. It is important that the nutrition cluster know in advance which institutions work where and what kind of inputs are pre-positioned. Risk management plans need to be ready at the local level in advance of emergencies. Although emergencies occur every year in Guatemala, the emergency response often fails to incorporate the management of malnutrition among its priority actions. Community programs, like AIN-C (a community- based child care program - atencion integral a la ninez comunitaria), can be an efficient mechanism to protect young children's nutrition and provide an important channel for the government or other assistance agencies to funnel support to communities in need during a period of crisis or emergency. This is because community workers know the families and those who are most vulnerable; they are willing to be called upon to help their community; and they can provide educational support to families to ensure rapid recovery among young children. Community-based growth promotion programs such as AIN-C can be strengthened and scaled up, and they are a good investment, in the aftermath of an emergency or during a time of economic crisis, to swiftly deliver services to affected families. Community agents can carry important information to the community and can distribute food, nutrition and health supplements such as micronutrient powders and oral rehydration salts for young children, as well as hygiene and water purification products. Community kitchens are an efficient approach to reduce hunger among the poor during times of high economic stress. They provide a social safety net and can have a nutrition effect when carefully planned. Community kitchens adjust to the labor market and general economic conditions; hence targeting of the poor and most in need through community kitchens is self-selective. The kitchens can expand and shrink as participants continually assess the trade-off between unpaid work in exchange for free or inexpensive meals and the pursuit of opportunities in the labor market.

Nigeria is a country of immense natural resources and potential, but the government's capacity to deliver public goods has generally been weak. It was against this backdrop that Nigeria faced the arrival within its borders of the deadly Ebola virus disease in July 2014. Despite assurances that the Nigerian government was prepared to respond to an outbreak of Ebola, the country was caught unaware and forced to mount an emergency response. Yet despite these serious concerns, the spread of Ebola was successfully contained in Nigeria. This case study seeks to understand why Nigeria's Ebola response was so successful despite the challenging context. The case study will focus on institutional architecture and political will, taking an exploratory qualitative approach to examine the institutional dynamics and motivations among various stakeholders involved in the country's response. The aim is to distill lessons that may be applied to other emergency response initiatives, as well as elsewhere in the health sector and in other areas of service delivery. A proactive communication strategy is required to build a broader coalition of support, and demand-side actors such as nongovernmental organizations play a helpful role.

A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. ; Winner of the 2020 Friends of the Kreitzberg Library Award for Outstanding Research in the College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Graduate category. ; Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 1 International Law & the Cyber Domain: Assessing the Human Rights Concerns of Cyber Legislation GD520 International Law and the International System Dr. John Becker Norwich University College of Graduate and Continuing Studies Kathryn R. Lamphere 23 May 2020 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 2 Introduction A 2018 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in partnership with computer security company McAfee, estimated that cybercrime costs the world almost $600 billion or .8% of the global Gross Domestic Product (CSIS, 2018, p. 4). In response to this booming element of transnational crime, states, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, and individual citizens have sought to implement systems for the investigation, prosecution, and restitution of these crimes. One such solution is the development and enactment of international law. On December 27, 2019, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed Russia-led resolution A/74/401, entitled "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019, Countering the use)." Vehemently opposed by Western states such as the United States, the resolution approved the establishment of a committee of experts to evaluate the potential for an international cybercrime treaty (United Nations). While international cooperation of this kind is commendable, Western states and human rights groups have professed concerns that the vague language of the resolution has the potential to erode the human rights protections afforded to citizens under international law (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). The purpose of this paper is to identify the human rights concerns of Russia's proposed United Nations resolution and analyze the obligations the international community has to uphold relevant human rights protections while balancing international cooperation necessitated by international law and legal norms. The first section of this paper provides historical background on the relationship between cyber issues like cybercrime and international law. International Cyber Law Background The cyber domain is often presented as another realm, a world that exists outside of the mostly tidy borders the international community has used to separate themselves. Aligning with Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 3 this view is the notion that cyberspace cannot be regulated because it expands beyond the traditional idea of territorial sovereignty (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573). These ideas raise two concerns over the identification and prosecution of cybercrime. The first concern is the conflict between "cybercrime, which is global in scale, and police activities that are confined to national borders (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166)." The conflict arises in the very structure of the Internet, which "can be characterized as a multitude of individual, but interconnected, electronic communications networks (Zekos, 2008, p. 30)." This interconnectedness has created a grey area within the legal system, where no one entity has regulatory control over what happens in that area. The second concern is far more technical and highlights the transient nature of information and data (Cangemi, 2004, p. 166). The source of information can be easily masked to hide its actual location, and data "may be amended, moved, or altered in a few seconds (p. 166)." The speed in which data travels presents a significant hurdle to the legal and law enforcement mechanisms typically used to investigate crimes. As Cangemi notes, this creates "an appreciable risk that the evidence of cyber-offences will disappear" long before implementing the required resources (p. 166). Nevertheless, despite these concerns, "nation-states do strive to exercise their sovereignty over cyberspace (Kanuck, 2010, p. 1573)." The physical elements of cybercrime, such as the location of the people perpetrating the crimes or the location of the hardware used to execute the crimes, are used as a connecting link to allow governments "to address cyber conflicts involving both state and nonstate actors as matters to be resolved by sovereign powers under their respective legal systems (p. 1573)." When evidence moves beyond territorial borders, states seek to invoke bilateral or international action to further pursue the crime. This model follows the same formula that society developed over time, whether it be in stopping crimes such as international drug trafficking or heinous acts of terrorism. The international community is well-Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 4 versed in this cycle, and the "nature of the international legal system affords this sovereign-centric approach primacy under the United Nations (U.N.) Charter regime (p. 1573)." If the international community is content in continuing to use this cycle, then "international legislation and action are essential to combat the phenomenon" of cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, 27). The essential requirement of international involvement and negotiation has rung true in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, as the international community takes steps to evolve international law to include cyber issues, specifically cybercrime. The 1980s introduced international consultation on cybercrime by multiple organizations. In 1983, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) commissioned a two-year study focusing "on the possibility of harmonizing and internationalizing national cybercrime laws (Brenner, 2012, p. 133)." OECD later published a report in 1986 summarizing the results of the study and recommending countries criminalize certain cybercrimes. In 1985, the Council of Europe convened its own study, which involved a four-year focus on "the legal issues raised by cybercrime (p. 133)." In 1997, the Council of Europe convened another study tasked with "the drafting of a cybercrime treaty that would harmonize national laws dealing with cybercrime offenses and investigations (p. 133). In 2001, the study's efforts came to fruition in the creation of the Convention of Cybercrime. Also referred to as the Budapest Convention, the international treaty entered into law in July 2004 with the principle objective of "pursuing a common criminal policy aimed at the protection of society against cybercrime, especially by adopting appropriate legislation and fostering international co-operation (Council of Europe, 2001, Preamble)." As of 2018, 29 states have ratified the treaty, but the rapid development of technology has resulted in the convention becoming outdated, leaving governments and organizations calling for a new treaty (Murphy, 2018, p. 549) (Shackelford, 2014, p. 312). Russia's 2019 United Nations resolution is the latest attempt to modernize international cyber Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 5 law and has received much adulation despite its vague, concerning language and human rights implications. The next section of this paper addresses human rights and provides an overview of states' obligations to this arena as members of the international community. Human Rights & the International Community Modern international human rights law begins with the first article of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), which dictates that one of the purposes of the UN is to "achieve international cooperation…in promoting and encouraging "respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 785)." While the Charter provided minimal specificity as to what "respect for human rights" entailed, this provision and others within the Charter catalyzed a new international perspective on human rights. In joining the United Nations, members inherently accepted "the proposition that the Charter had internationalized the concept of human rights (p. 787)." Furthermore, the Charter insinuated that "states were deemed to have assumed some international obligations relating to human rights (p. 787)." Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter cemented the beginnings of these obligations, requiring member states to "take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of purposes" such as promoting "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56)." The specificity of human rights became more overt when the United Nations devoted the UN Commission on Human Rights to the task of drafting non-legally-binding human rights instrument. In December 1948, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Murphy, 2018, p. 402). Composed of thirty articles, the declaration instituted vital human rights and eventually "served as a template for numerous subsequent treaties on human rights (p. 404)." As a result, the Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 6 Universal Declaration on Human Rights "has come to be accepted as a normative instrument in its own right (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787)." Both documents uphold two pedestals of traditional international law as it pertains to human rights. The first pedestal retains responsibility for "the treatment by one state of another's nationals, an area known as state responsibility for injury to aliens (p. 389)." Although addressed at the state level, this notion asserts that individuals are afforded certain protections when in another state. The second pedestal, advanced by scholars such as Hugo Grotius, focuses on "the protection of persons against the acts of their own governments (p. 389)." It is this pedestal that introduces what is now known as humanitarian intervention, or the "idea of state intervening to protect the other state's nationals (p. 389)." Together, both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration are "considered to spell out the general human rights obligations of all UN member states," of which there are now 193 (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 787) (Murphy, 2018, p. 59). Each international legal instrument has lent itself to the creation of international institutions dedicated to monitoring "compliance by the states parties with the obligations imposed by these instruments (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 788)." Such institutions include entities like the UN Human Rights Council and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (p. 788). Together, the instruments and institutions "laid the normative foundation of the contemporary international human rights revolution" and "influenced, in part at least, the contents of the legal norms under which international criminal tribunals operate today (p. 791)." The criticality of these elements to the international system, particularly as it pertains to international law, is justification for using each as measuring tools with which to judge the new UN cyber-focused resolution objectively. The third section of this paper will assess the purpose of the resolution and explain the supporting argument for its contents. Supporting Arguments & Analysis of A/74/401 Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 7 In order to truly understand the intent of international laws, it is crucial to develop an understanding of the stances actors take concerning the specific issues at hand. This understanding is of particular importance when discussing Resolution A/74/401 and the underlying views of cyberspace. Two opposing perspectives lie at the heart of debates surrounding the cyber domain and Internet governance and center around the notion of sovereignty. The first perspective is that "many governments are attempting to exert sovereignty in cyberspace in the same way as they do in physical domains (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111)." For these governments, the dominance of private sector institutions within cyberspace and "the unfettered internet access of their fellow citizens" are causes of concerns (p. 111). This sentiment is particularly true within the Russian government. Under its traditional views of governance, Russia "conceives of cyberspace as a territory with virtual borders corresponding to physical state borders, and wishes to see the remit of international laws extended to the internet space (p. 112)." Furthermore, Russia's domestic fears of an open Internet fuel its international concerns. Russia sees the Internet as "politically disruptive because it enables citizens to circumvent government-controlled 'traditional media (p. 113).'" It aligns this perspective "with the inherently authoritarian nature of the Russian regime (p. 114)." Russia's negative perception of the Internet as it is today ultimately lends itself to Russia's ideal mechanism of perpetuating its belief that "global internet governance is envisioned as an issue of high politics in which states - and the interstate balance of power-play – play an essential role (p. 116, 117)." Under this mechanism, it is little wonder that Russia has led international legal initiatives to refine control over the Internet since the Council of Europe's enactment of its Convention on Cybercrime. In a Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release following the General Assembly's adoption of Resolution A/74/401, Russia proclaimed that the "resolution shows that the world community urgently needs to develop a universal, comprehensive, and open-ended convention Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 8 on countering cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." The adopted resolution's language appears to align with this projected intent from Russia. The resolution stresses "the need to enhance coordination and cooperation among States in combating the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" and notes "the importance of the international and regional instruments in the fight against cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." In order to fulfill these objectives, the resolution establishes an "intergovernmental committee of experts, representative of all regions" that will "elaborate a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (United Nations, 2019)." Remarks of supporting nations support this appearance of cohesion. The representative from Nicaragua indicated the resolution would address cybercrime "in a more representative, democratic and transparent manner, taking into account the individual circumstances of developing and developed countries (Third Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage)." China echoed this support, stating the resolution "is conducive to filling legal gaps in international cooperation (Third Committee)." At the same time, Belarus declared that "international cooperation is vital in investigating and combating cybercrime (Third Committee)." At face value, the resolution is a gesture of goodwill, a written contract to pursue options to disrupt cybercrime that will benefit all states. However, Russia's press release takes these notions a step further, realigning its message to its traditional view of international politics. It notes, "the resolution proposed by Russia essentially enhances states' digital sovereignty over their information space and ushers in a new page in the history of global efforts to counter cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019)." Furthermore, the press release dictates that the "convention must be based on the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (2019)." There are two Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 9 essential points within this statement that require further analysis. The first is the reassertion of the authoritarian construct with which Russia chooses to view cyberspace. In a press release initially dedicated to lauding the necessity of international cooperation, Russia simultaneously defaults to its traditional views of the international community and advocates for a "digital Westphalia (Nocetti, 2015, p. 117)." In recognizing sovereignty, Russia insinuates that the international community will successfully legislate mechanisms that will reduce cybercrime. A quick review of the supporting states in favor of the resolution upholds Russia's authoritarian views (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In addition to China, Nicaragua, and Belarus, countries like Iran, Syria, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are only some of the 88 Member States of the General Assembly who voted to adopt the resolution. Unsurprisingly, these states also abide by similar authoritarian perspectives on international law and sovereignty. China, for example, maintains a "comprehensive, multidimensional system that governs Internet infrastructure, commercial and social use as well as legal domains (Liang & Lu, 2010, p. 105)." This system supports "Internet censorship" and "China's single-party political system and its heavy intervention in Internet development (p. 105)." Given the nature and history of these states' political systems and methods of governance, the sudden focus on international cooperation generates questions of the underlying goals that may hide behind the official demands of the resolution. The second point requiring acknowledgment is the additional re-emphasis of sovereignty while also emphasizing non-interventionist beliefs in discussing non-interference in internal affairs. The resolution itself makes no mention of sovereignty or internal affairs beyond assisting countries with improving "national legislation and frameworks and build the capacity of national authorities" to deal with cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Despite the lack of language on this topic, the leading state on this initiative, Russia, felt the need Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 10 to emphasize its sovereignty in a press release about the resolution (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Once again, Russia gives the impression that there may be a hidden desire layered within the words of the resolution. Additionally, the concept of non-interference within the international system is not without exceptions. The most critical exception being suspicion of human rights violations. As previously stated, humanitarian intervention and protecting citizens from their own government is a staple of international human rights law (Murphy, 2018, p. 389). Therefore, while non-interference in domestic matters is undoubtedly an essential tenet of international law, the resolution cannot call for international cooperation to combat cybercrime and simultaneously ignore the international cooperation required to maintain peace and security (United Nations, 1945, Charter of the United Nations). The next section of this paper will address these obligations to cooperation as it pertains to human rights while also highlighting the opposing arguments against Resolution A/74/401. Opposing Arguments for A/74/401 & Analysis of Human Rights Concerns The first perspective at the heart of the cyber domain debates, as described previously, is modeled after authoritarian beliefs and government control. The second perspective, modeled after a more Western approach to governance, is the belief of a free and open Internet that should remain decentralized and that "the best regulatory system is one that develops organically (Shackelford, 2013, p. 53)." A free Internet is more firmly the belief of the United States. This idea introduces the initial context necessary to understand the United States' opposition to the Russian-led cybercrime resolution. Even before the rapid development of the Internet, American foreign policy internalized the notion of "free flow of information internationally as an important element of national security (McCarthy, 2011, p. 92)." Former Secretary of State George Schultz argued that the free flow of information "undermined the Soviet Union and authoritarianism (p. 92, 93)." At its earliest beginnings, the Internet was a product of American ingenuity and, as a Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 11 result, built with a bias for "American libertarianism (p. 93)." In the present, the West has developed this concept in the "context of freedom expression, protection of intellectual property rights, and national security (Powers & Jablonski, 2015, p. 3)." As former Secretary of State Clinton asserted, the United States and other Western nations support the "freedom to connect" in opposition to efforts by states such as China, Iran, and Russia to create state-level information infrastructures designed for censorship (p. 3). The historical rivalry and disagreement between the two states on information, particularly as it pertains to cyberspace, only further roots the United States' opposition to the new United Nations cybercrime resolution. In its statement to the United Nations during the 49th & 50th meetings of the Third Committee, the United States expressed disappointment "with the decisions of the sponsors of this resolution to bring it to the Third Committee (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019)." Contrary to the resolution's focus on cooperation, the United States' proclaimed the resolution would "drive a wedge between Member States and undermine international cooperation to combat cybercrime at a time when enhanced coordination is essential (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Furthermore, the United States asserted Russia's actions in introducing the resolution essentially bypass the "expert-driven, consensus-based process and therefore is not in line with their precedent (United States Mission to the United Nations)." Other Western states appear to agree with the United States assertions, as states such as the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Republic of Korea, and Germany composed part of the 58 Member States who opposed the adoption of the resolution (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In a manner similar to the states in favor of the adoption, some opposed states made remarks in agreement with those of the United States during the Third Committee. Finland, on behalf of the European Union, remarked that "there is no consensus on the need for a new international instrument to fight cybercrime" and that the draft "represents a duplication of resources (Third Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 12 Committee, 2019, Meetings Coverage). Canada and Australia presented similar sentiments, remarking that "the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is an important baseline for international cooperation" and that the new resolution "seeks to undercut consensus and will diminish existing global efforts that are already delivering results (Third Committee, 2019)." There is one remaining argument against the new cybercrime resolution: the potential that the document's vague language will create an environment where human rights will be more easily violated if left unchecked (Hakmeh & Peters, 2020). In a letter to the United Nations General Assembly, 37 organizations and six individuals expressed their concern for human rights protections as they pertain to the cybercrime resolution (Association for Progressive Communications (APC), 2019, Open Letter, p. 4). The first concern is a lack of clarity surrounding the scope of the "use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (APC, p. 1)." If left undefined, the language in the resolution arguably "opens the door to criminalising ordinary online behaviour that is protected under international human rights law (APC, p. 1)." If steps to do so were taken as a result of the new resolution, they would be in direct violation of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights; who stated in 2011 that "human rights are equally valid online as offline (Shackelford, 2019, p. 168)." The second concern offered by non-government entities is the increasing trend in "criminalising ordinary online activities of individuals and organisations through the application of cybercrime laws (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 1, 2)." The letter even goes so far as to quote the UN Special Rapporteur over these concerns, that the "surge in legislation and policies aimed at combating cybercrime has also opened the door to punishing and surveilling activists and protestors in many countries around the world (APC, p. 2)." If used in such a manner, these initiatives, in addition to the UN cybercrime resolution, are in direct violation of the Charter of United Nations and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Within the Charter of the United Nations, efforts to Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 13 restrict or punish opposition elements such as activists or protestors violates Articles 55 and 56, which requires states to cooperate with the UN in achieving the organizations' purposes such as promoting human rights (United Nations, 1945, Article 55, 56). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides more specific language with which to attribute potential violations. The open letter notes that legislation of this kind is used to "criminalise legitimate forms of online expression, association and assembly through vague and ill-defined terms that allow for arbitrary or discretionary application (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." Immediately, legislation that allows for criminalization of these elements is in direct violation of Articles 18, 19, and 20, which declare "all persons have a right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and assembly (Murphy, 2018, p. 402)." Furthermore, violations such as these also violate article two, which guarantees people "the right to life, liberty, and security" and dictates that "these rights are to be held without discrimination of any kind (Murphy, p. 402, 403)." Upholding these rights within cyberspace continues to fall in line with the Western perspective on the Internet. As McCarthy quotes, "the Internet is arguably the greatest facilitator for freedom of expression and innovation in the world today (McCarthy, 2011, p. 94)." The status of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights as "legitimate norms within the international system" permits this interpretation and application of international law to future resolutions (p. 94). If states are signatories to the declaration, any future adoption of any resolution must adhere to the principles and freedoms guaranteed by it. Resolution A/74/401 does refer to human rights protections, "reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the use of information and communication technologies (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." However, the resolution's open language is in direct contradiction to this promise, if not clarified. As the open letter indicates, "simply reaffirming the importance of respect for human rights" is "insufficient to safeguard human rights while Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 14 countering cybercrime (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 2)." The final section of this paper recommends additional actions that may further unify opposing entities on this resolution while simultaneously addressing all human rights concerns. Recommendations The Russian-led supporters of the resolution and the United States-led opposition are unified in one common element, at least in writing. The element is that consensus and international cooperation are vital in addressing cybercrime (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019) (United States Mission to the United Nations, 2019). This notion is in concert with the Council of Europe, who remains the only entity to successfully orchestrate an international cybercrime treaty (Council of Europe, 2004, Convention on Cybercrime). In 2001, the Council of Europe postulated that "solutions to the problems posed must be addressed by international law, necessitating the adoption of adequate international legal instruments" that can "ensure the necessary efficiency" required to combat cybercrime (Pocar, 2004, p. 28). If the international community determines that another cybercrime treaty is required within the intergovernmental committee of experts authorized by Resolution A/74/401, then the new treaty should consider the aims of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). In doing so, the United Nations should strive to create a "basic framework for the establishment by contracting states of domestic substantive and procedural laws" in a manner that allows states to "cooperate expeditiously with one another (Pocar, 2004, p. 30)." If successful, the United Nations will be able to "establish procedures for relevant international relations" and provide "forms of cooperation between national judicial authorities as many interact with each other both swiftly and efficiently (p. 31)." Furthermore, the necessity of these requirements is supported by the very nature of the "the world-wide dimension of the Internet," Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 15 which "implies that its illegal use and related offenses must prompt responses and concerted efforts from all relevant domestic and international authorities (p. 34)." The non-governmental organizations' open letter to the United Nations supports the need for cooperation but takes it one step further than the states themselves. In its current structure, the Internet is a public-private endeavor, with private entities dominating cyberspace (Nocetti, 2015, p. 111). The present language of the United Nations cybercrime resolution allows for an intergovernmental committee of experts. However, it does not expand on the actual composition of the committee (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use). Noting that Russia and other authoritarian regimes prefer non-government entities to use the government as a proxy for communication, it can be inferred that a Russia-led resolution intends the committee to be comprised of only government entities (p. 117). The open letter rightly points out that collaboration on cyber issues must expand beyond state cooperation. Addressing cybercrime is "necessarily a multi-stakeholder endeavour" that "requires government officials and experts, members of the technical community, civil society, the private sector, and scientific and research institutions (APC, 2019, Open Letter, p. 4)." An assessment of this viewpoint reveals that a committee dedicated to combatting cybercrime cannot rely on government expertise alone. In order to accurately reflect the composition and requirements of a private-public Internet, all discussions surrounding this resolution should involve both private and public entities. Therefore, the committee should be reformed to more accurately reflect the Internet's users. In doing so, the United Nations breaches the divide between authoritarian and more democratic governments, further increasing cooperation on this resolution. However, increased cooperation through a broader, inclusive committee and implementation of lessons learned from the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime will not ensure that the future convention successfully resolves the resolution's weaknesses. In Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 16 modern-day, the international system emphasizes international human rights more than ever before, as "this branch of international law has experienced phenomenal growth over the past one hundred years (Buergenthal, 2006, p. 807)." This growth has contributed to the "growing political impact of human rights on the conduct of international relations and the behavior of governments (p. 807)." If real success is desired within international governance, then the committee established under the "Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes" resolution must account for human rights protections when determining the requirements of the "comprehensive international convention (United Nations, 2019, Countering the Use)." As the representative from Costa Rica during the 49th and 50th meetings of the Third Committee, "the international community must protect and observe fundamental freedoms, including the right to privacy (Third Committee, 2019, Meeting Coverage)." Until there is consensus on "sensitive topics such as…State responsibility to prioritize and protect human rights," the future proposed convention will fall short of its goal of achieving complete international ratification (Third Committee). Conclusion As cyberspace expands in conjunction with the rapid advancement of technology, the fear of the unknown drives further division between already opposing states in the international system. Resolution A/74/401 is the latest testament to the evolution of politicization within Internet governance. In addressing a topic that impacts every Internet-accessible region of the world, the resolution simultaneously magnifies the opposing perspectives of states as it pertains to sovereignty within the cyber domain. Furthermore, it reignites the protracted debate over whether or not human rights obligations addressed in such documents as the Charter of the United Nations or Universal Declaration on Human Rights are legally binding. Preventing further polarization requires both an acknowledgment of a fracturing international system of Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 17 governance and a proposed solution to address the issue. While state-centric governance provides legitimacy and the potential for a higher allocation of resources dedicated to protecting the Internet, increased sovereignty also "risks sacrificing innovation, complicates the regulatory environment of cyberspace, and may threaten a positive vision of cyber peace (Shackelford, 2013, p. 50)." These risks are why an alternative method to an intergovernmental committee must develop in response to the resolution. This method should integrate a multi-stakeholder construct to more fully recognize the competing impacts of cybercrime and fairly address the allegations of human rights infringement. One such method is polycentric governance, a system composed of "diverse organizations and governments working at multiple levels" in order to "increase levels of voluntary cooperation or increase compliance with rules established by governmental authorities (p. 330)." Individually, each organization or type of government faces its own unique hurdles. Together, they "contribute to a governance regime that is multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral in scope that could complement the top-down governance model increasingly favored" by states such as Russia or China (p. 331). Implementing polycentric governance to more equitably debate the appropriate response to international cybercrime will create an international community willing to consider the developing convention. In doing so, the environment will be better suited to determining whether or not the international system can leverage international law to investigate and prosecute cybercrime. Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 18 References Association for Progressive Communications (APC). (2019). Open Letter to UN General Assembly: Proposed international convention on cybercrime poses a threat to human rights online. Retrieved from https://www.apc.org/sites/default/files/Open_letter_re_UNGA_cybercrime_resolution_0.pdf Brenner, S. (2012). Cybercrime and the Law: Challenges, Issues, and Outcomes. Northeastern University Press. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/norwich/reader.action?docID=1085118&ppg=124 Buergenthal, T. (2006). The Evolving International Human Rights System. The American Journal of International Law, 100(4), 783-807. Retrieved from https://www-jstor-org.library.norwich.edu/stable/pdf/4126317.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae4ea9f31648cbd83f8f97bc7dae8e67a Cangemi, D. (2004). Procedural Law Provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime. International Review of Law Computers & Technology, 18(2), 165-171. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5272830680 Center for Strategic & International Studies & McAfee. (2018). Economic Impact of Cybercrime – No Slowing Down. Retrieved from https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-impact-cybercrime Council of Europe. (2004). Convention on Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185 Hakmeh, J. & Peters, A. (2020). A New UN Cybercrime Treaty? The Way Forward for Supporters of an Open, Free, and Secure Internet. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-un-cybercrime-treaty-way-forward-supporters-open-free-and-secure-internet Kanuck, S. (2010). Sovereign Discourse on Cyber Conflict Under International Law. Texas Law Review, 88, 1571-1597. Retrieved from https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/cerl/conferences/cyberwar/papers/reading/Kanuck.pdf Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 19 Liang, B., & Lu, H. (2010). Internet Development, Censorship, and Cyber Crimes in China. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 26(1), 103–120. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5322181473 McCarthy, D. (2011). Open Networks and the Open Door: American Foreign Policy and the Narration of the Internet. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7(1), 89-111. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (2019, December). Press Release on the UN General Assembly Vote on the Russian Draft Resolution on Countering Cybercrime. Retrieved from https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3988579 Murphy, S. (2018). Principles of international law (3rd edition). West Academic Publishing. Nocetti, J. (2015). Contest and Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance. International Affairs, 91(1), 111-130. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5721220595 Pocar, F. (2004). New Challenges for International Rules Against Cyber-Crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 10(1), 27-37. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/5649374698 Powers, S. & Jablonski, M. (2015). The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of Internet Freedom. University of Illinois Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/903245891 Shackelford, S. J. (2013). Managing Cyber Attacks in International Law, Business, and Relations: In Search of Cyber Peace: Vol. Revised Edition. Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/882104883 Shackelford, S. (2019). Should Cybersecurity Be a Human Right? Exploring the "Shared Responsibility" of Cyber Peace. Stanford Journal of International Law, 55(2), 155–184. Retrieved from https://norwich.on.worldcat.org/oclc/8185136062 United Nations General Assembly. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html United Nations General Assembly. (2019). Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes. Retrieved from https://www.undocs.org/A/74/401 United Nations Third Committee. (2019, November). Meetings Coverage Seventy-Fourth Session, 49th & 50th Meetings. Retrieved from https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gashc4284.doc.htm United States Mission to the United Nations. (2019, November). Statement on Agenda Item 107 'Countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes.' Retrieved from https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-on-agenda-item-107-countering-the-use-of-information-and-communications-technologies-for-criminal-purposes/ Running head: INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE CYBER DOMAIN 20 Zekos, G. (2008). Electronic State Sovereignty. The Icfai University Journal of Cyber Law, 7(4), 30-60.

This paper describes forced displacement in the Europe and Central Asia Region (ECA) and the vulnerabilities associated with being a displaced person. It analyzes the development challenges of forced displacement particularly protracted displacement in the region and the prospects for durable solutions. Displaced persons face challenges related to recovery of or access to housing and land, employment and livelihoods, access to services and public goods including health, education, and infrastructure, and accountable and responsive governance.

America's Global War on Terror has seen its share of stalemates, disasters, and outright defeats. During 20-plus years of armed interventions, the United States has watched its efforts implode in spectacular fashion, from Iraq in 2014 to Afghanistan in 2021. The greatest failure of its "Forever Wars," however, may not be in the Middle East, but in Africa."Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated," President George W. Bush told the American people in the immediate wake of the 9/11 attacks, noting specifically that such militants had designs on "vast regions" of Africa.To shore up that front, the U.S. began a decades-long effort to provide copious amounts of security assistance, train many thousands of African military officers, set up dozens of outposts, dispatch its own commandos on all manner of missions, create proxy forces, launch drone strikes, and even engage in direct ground combat with militants in Africa. Most Americans, including members of Congress, are unaware of the extent of these operations. As a result, few realize how dramatically America's shadow war there has failed.The raw numbers alone speak to the depths of the disaster. As the United States was beginning its Forever Wars in 2002 and 2003, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in Africa. This year, militant Islamist groups on that continent have, according to the Pentagon, already conducted 6,756 attacks. In other words, since the United States ramped up its counterterrorism operations in Africa, terrorism has spiked 75,000%.Let that sink in for a moment.75,000%.A Conflict that Will Live in InfamyThe U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq opened to military successes in 2001 and 2003 that quickly devolved into sputtering occupations. In both countries, Washington's plans hinged on its ability to create national armies that could assist and eventually take over the fight against enemy forces. Both U.S.-created militaries would, in the end, crumble. In Afghanistan, a two-decade-long war ended in 2021 with the rout of an American-built, -funded, -trained, and -armed military as the Taliban recaptured the country. In Iraq, the Islamic State nearly triumphed over a U.S.-created Iraqi army in 2014, forcing Washington to reenter the conflict. U.S. troops remain embattled in Iraq and neighboring Syria to this very day.In Africa, the U.S. launched a parallel campaign in the early 2000s, supporting and training African troops from Mali in the west to Somalia in the east and creating proxy forces that would fight alongside American commandos. To carry out its missions, the U.S. military set up a network of outposts across the northern tier of the continent, including significant drone bases – from Camp Lemonnier and its satellite outpost Chabelley Airfield in the sun-bleached nation of Djibouti to Air Base 201 in Agadez, Niger — and tiny facilities with small contingents of American special operations troops in nations ranging from Libya and Niger to the Central African Republic and South Sudan.For almost a decade, Washington's war in Africa stayed largely under wraps. Then came a decision that sent Libya and the vast Sahel region into a tailspin from which they have never recovered."We came, we saw, he died," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton joked after a U.S.-led NATO air campaign helped overthrow Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, the longtime Libyan dictator, in 2011. President Barack Obama hailed the intervention as a success, but Libya slipped into near-failed-state status. Obama would later admit that "failing to plan for the day after" Qaddafi's defeat was the "worst mistake" of his presidency.As the Libyan leader fell, Tuareg fighters in his service looted his regime's weapons caches, returned to their native Mali, and began to take over the northern part of that nation. Anger in Mali's armed forces over the government's ineffective response resulted in a 2012 military coup. It was led by Amadou Sanogo, an officer who learned English in Texas and underwent infantry-officer basic training in Georgia, military-intelligence instruction in Arizona, and was mentored by U.S. Marines in Virginia.Having overthrown Mali's democratic government, Sanogo and his junta proved hapless in battling terrorists. With the country in turmoil, those Tuareg fighters declared an independent state, only to be muscled aside by heavily armed Islamists who instituted a harsh brand of Shariah law, causing a humanitarian crisis. A joint Franco-American-African mission prevented Mali's complete collapse but pushed the militants into areas near the borders of both Burkina Faso and Niger.Since then, those nations of the West African Sahel have been plagued by terrorist groups that have evolved, splintered, and reconstituted themselves. Under the black banners of jihadist militancy, men on motorcycles — two to a bike, wearing sunglasses and turbans, and armed with Kalashnikovs — regularly roar into villages to impose zakat (an Islamic tax); steal animals; and terrorize, assault, and kill civilians. Such relentless attacks have destabilized Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and are now affecting their southern neighbors along the Gulf of Guinea. Violence in Togo and Benin has, for example, jumped 633% and 718% over the last year, according to the Pentagon.U.S.-trained militaries in the region have been unable to stop the onslaught and civilians have suffered horrifically. During 2002 and 2003, terrorists caused just 23 casualties in Africa. This year, according to the Pentagon, terrorist attacks in the Sahel region alone have resulted in 9,818 deaths — a 42,500% increase.At the same time, during their counterterrorism campaigns, America's military partners in the region have committed gross atrocities of their own, including extrajudicial killings. In 2020, for example, a top political leader in Burkina Faso admitted that his country's security forces were carrying out targeted executions. "We're doing this, but we're not shouting it from the rooftops," he told me, noting that such murders were good for military morale.American-mentored military personnel in that region have had only one type of demonstrable "success": overthrowing governments the United States trained them to protect. At least 15 officers who benefited from such assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes officers from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, and 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of a July coup in Niger, for example, received American assistance, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as that country's governors.Military coups of that sort have even super-charged atrocities while undermining American aims, yet the United States continues to provide such regimes with counterterrorism support. Take Colonel Assimi Goïta, who worked with U.S. Special Operations forces, participated in U.S. training exercises, and attended the Joint Special Operations University in Florida before overthrowing Mali's government in 2020. Goïta then took the job of vice president in a transitional government officially charged with returning the country to civilian rule, only to seize power again in 2021.That same year, his junta reportedly authorized the deployment of the Russia-linked Wagner mercenary forces to fight Islamist militants after close to two decades of failed Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Since then, Wagner — a paramilitary group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former hot-dog vendor turned warlord — has been implicated in hundreds of human rights abuses alongside the longtime U.S.-backed Malian military, including a 2022 massacre that killed 500 civilians.Despite all of this, American military aid for Mali has never ended. While Goïta's 2020 and 2021 coups triggered prohibitions on some forms of U.S. security assistance, American tax dollars have continued to fund his forces. According to the State Department, the U.S. provided more than $16 million in security aid to Mali in 2020 and almost $5 million in 2021. As of July, the department's Bureau of Counterterrorism was waiting on congressional approval to transfer an additional $2 million to Mali. (The State Department did not reply to TomDispatch's request for an update on the status of that funding.)The Two-Decade StalemateOn the opposite side of the continent, in Somalia, stagnation and stalemate have been the watchwords for U.S. military efforts."Terrorists associated with Al Qaeda and indigenous terrorist groups have been and continue to be a presence in this region," a senior Pentagon official claimed in 2002. "These terrorists will, of course, threaten U.S. personnel and facilities." But when pressed about an actual spreading threat, the official admitted that even the most extreme Islamists "really have not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia." Despite that, U.S. Special Operations forces were dispatched there in 2002, followed by military aid, advisers, trainers, and private contractors.More than 20 years later, U.S. troops are still conducting counterterrorism operations in Somalia, primarily against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. To this end, Washington has provided billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance, according to a recent report by the Costs of War Project. Americans have also conducted more than 280 air strikes and commando raids there, while the CIA and special operators built up local proxy forces to conduct low-profile military operations.Since President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, the U.S. has launched 31 declared airstrikes in Somalia, six times the number carried out during President Obama's first term, though far fewer than the record high set by President Trump, whose administration launched 208 attacks from 2017 to 2021.America's long-running, undeclared war in Somalia has become a key driver of violence in that country, according to the Costs of War Project. "The U.S. is not simply contributing to conflict in Somalia, but has, rather, become integral to the inevitable continuation of conflict in Somalia," reported Ẹniọlá Ànúolúwapọ Ṣóyẹmí, a lecturer in political philosophy and public policy at the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University. "U.S. counterterrorism policies are," she wrote, "ensuring that the conflict continues in perpetuity."The Epicenter of International Terrorism"Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries contributes to increasing security and stability in Africa," said General William Ward, the first chief of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) — the umbrella organization overseeing U.S. military efforts on the continent — in 2010, before he was demoted for profligate travel and spending. His predictions of "increasing security and stability" have, of course, never come to pass.While the 75,000% increase in terror attacks and 42,500% increase in fatalities over the last two decades are nothing less than astounding, the most recent increases are no less devastating. "A 50-percent spike in fatalities tied to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel and Somalia over the past year has eclipsed the previous high in 2015," according to a July report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Defense Department research institution. "Africa has experienced a nearly four-fold increase in reported violent events linked to militant Islamist groups over the past decade… Almost half of that growth happened in the last 3 years."Twenty-two years ago, George W. Bush announced the beginning of a Global War on Terror. "The Taliban must act, and act immediately," he insisted. "They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate." Today, of course, the Taliban reigns supreme in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda was never "stopped and defeated," and other terror groups have spread across Africa (and elsewhere). The only way "to defeat terrorism," Bush asserted, was to "eliminate it and destroy it where it grows." Yet it has grown, and spread, and a plethora of new militant groups have emerged.Bush warned that terrorists had designs on "vast regions" of Africa but was "confident of the victories to come," assuring Americans that "we will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail." In country after country on that continent, the U.S. has, indeed, faltered and its failures have been paid for by ordinary Africans killed, wounded, and displaced by the terror groups that Bush pledged to "defeat." Earlier this year, General Michael Langley, the current AFRICOM commander, offered what may be the ultimate verdict on America's Forever Wars on that continent. "Africa," he declared, "is now the epicenter of international terrorism."This article has been republished with permission from TomDispatch.

Droughts are phenomena that occur worldwide, in humid and arid environments as well as in the Global North and the Global South. They are considered as slow onset hazards that affect more people than any other natural process with an estimated economic damage of USD 135 Billion and 12 Million casualties globally between 1900 and 2013 (Masih et al., 2014, p. 3636). Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is a major drought hot-spot due to vulnerable livelihoods (e.g. dominance of rain-fed agriculture), limited capacities (e.g. financial, institutional), weak infrastructure (e.g. water, mobility) and political instability (e.g. conflicts, corruption). When droughts occur, as recently triggered by El Niño (2015/2016), vulnerability conditions of the affected societies determine, if drought risk manifests as a disaster. As a critical, recent example, the drought in Somalia resulted in a serious humanitarian disaster primarily as the precarious vulnerability situation was further deteriorated by political and violent conflicts (Maxwell et al., 2016). Overall, SSA faces severe challenges to manage drought risk, primarily due to two reasons: First, despite progress, the living conditions remain difficult with prevailing poverty, limited health services and ongoing political unrest in many regions (UNECA et al., 2015). This is alarming, especially against the projected population growth of about 1.3 Billion people in Africa until 2050 (UN-DESA, 2015, p. 3). Second, achieving good living conditions for all, as envisioned by the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), is a challenge, as climate projections indicate a likely increase of drought frequency and severity in SSA. Higher rainfall variability paired with a strong increase in average temperatures (Niang et al., 2014) will render today's exceptional droughts as the new normal in the near future. These urgent problems require sustainable solutions to improve short- and long-term adaptation. Transdisciplinary science that conflates the strengths of academic disciplines and stakeholders from politics and society is needed to develop risk reduction strategies. Under the umbrella of the Southern African Science Service Centre for Climate Change and Adaptive Land Management (SASSCAL), this thesis makes a contribution to integrated drought risk management schemes by assessing the drought hazard conditions and the societal vulnerability settings in a case study region: the Cuvelai-Basin. This transnational region across Namibia and Angola regularly experiences droughts as recently during 2012 – 2015 with hundreds of thousands of people being water and food insecure (DDRM, 2013; UN-OCHA, 2012). Environmentally, it covers a gradient from humid in the north to semi-arid conditions in the south with associated vegetation patterns. The population practices subsistence agriculture and livestock herding with tendencies of urbanization and lifestyle changes. The societal pre-conditions in both countries are heterogeneous with Angola having experienced decades of civil war until 2002 while Namibia saw continuous institutional and infrastructural development particularly after independence in 1990. To capture the multi-layered impacts of droughts on people's livelihoods, the thesis follows an interdisciplinary approach in the sense of integrating methodologies from physical and human geography. Key questions to be answered are (i) how droughts impact on local livelihoods, (ii) how the environmental drought hazard manifests, (iii) which societal groups are most vulnerable and (iv) what are risk mitigation strategies. Based on the theory of societal relations to nature, a guideline for a social-ecological drought risk assessment is proposed and exemplarily carried out in this thesis. First, a qualitative research phase was conducted to gain system knowledge, followed by quantitative analyses of environmental parameters on the drought hazard and socio-economic variables for drought vulnerability. Finally, this data was conflated in the Household Drought Risk Index (HDRI) to gain orientation knowledge and quantify risk levels among the households in the basin. This provided transformation knowledge to develop and identify risk mitigation strategies. The initial qualitative survey (n = 26) explored the drought impact on local livelihoods. It revealed structural insights into people's utilization of water resources and the negative impacts of drought on physical and mental health, family/community life and livelihood maintenance. Coping mechanisms were identified on multiple levels from the household level (e.g. selling of agricultural products) via the community (e.g. neighbourly support) to the governmental level (e.g. drought relief). As critical entry point for droughts, the water and food consumption patterns were identified that shape a household either more or less sensitive. The internal capital endowment (human, social, financial, physical and natural) and the infrastructural and institutional endowment of an area determine a household's ability to cope with drought. These qualitative insights culminated in the construction of the HDRI indicator that was populated with data in the subsequent research phases. To capture the drought hazard, three common drought indicators were combined in the Blended Drought Index (BDI). This integrated drought indicator incorporates meteorological and agricultural drought characteristics that impair the population's ability to ensure food and water security. The BDI uses a copula function to combine common standardized drought indicators that describe precipitation, evapotranspiration, soil moisture and vegetation conditions. Remote sensing products were processed to analyse drought frequency, severity and duration. In this regard, the uncertainty among a range of rainfall products was evaluated to identify the product that corresponds best to local rain gauge measurements. The integrated drought hazard map indicates the north of the Etosha pan and the area along the Kunene River to be most threatened by droughts. Temporally, the BDI correlates well with millet/sorghum yield (r = 0.51) and local water consumption (r = -0.45) and outperforms conventional indicators. The vulnerability perspective was captured using primary socio-economic data from a household survey (n = 461). The consumption patterns reveal a statistically significant switch from critical sources (e.g. wells, subsistence products) during the rainy season to more reliable sources (e.g. tap water, markets) during the dry period. Households with a high dependence on critical sources are particularly sensitive to drought. The capital endowment of households is heterogeneous, especially on a rural-urban gradient and between Namibia and Angola. Human and financial capital turned out to be important control variables in addition to the infrastructural and institutional endowment of an area. Overall, the HDRI results show that the Angolan population shows higher levels of risk, particularly caused by less developed infrastructural systems, weaker institutional capabilities and less coping capacities. Urban inhabitants follow less drought-sensitive livelihood strategies, but are still connected to drought conditions in rural areas due to family relations with obligations and benefits. Furthermore, the spatial HDRI estimates point to areas in Angola and Namibia that are both drought-threatened and vulnerable. The thesis results indicate the following recommendations for policy and science: First, the continuous monitoring of drought patterns in the basin should consider drought indicators that go beyond precipitation metrics and incorporate people's vulnerability to develop integrated Drought Information Systems. Second, reducing the sensitivities of the population requires enhanced local water buffers via better water use efficiencies. This is true for both blue and green water flows. Water-saving irrigation schemes in combination with decentral rain- and floodwater harvesting are promising opportunities. Furthermore, centralized backup infrastructures of water supply and market systems need to be expanded. Third, local community solidarity is an important institutional backbone for the population to cope with drought and adapt to future changes. In particular rural development efforts should go beyond technological interventions and support community-building, collective-action and capacity development in water management and agricultural production to decouple livelihoods from local rainfall. ; Dürren sind Phänomene, die weltweit sowohl in humiden als auch ariden Räumen sowie im Globalen Norden und im Globalen Süden auftreten. Sie gelten als langsam einsetzende Gefahren, die mehr Menschen betreffen als jeder andere natürliche Prozess mit einem geschätzten wirtschaftlichen Schaden von 135 Mrd. US-Dollar und 12 Mio. Toten weltweit zwischen 1900 und 2013 (Masih et al., 2014, p. 3636). Sub-Sahara Afrika gilt als Krisenherd aufgrund vulnerabler Lebensgrundlagen (z.B. Dominanz des Regenfeldbaus), begrenzter Kapazitäten (z.B. finanzielle, institutionelle), schwacher Infrastruktur (z.B. Trinkwasser, Mobilität) und politischer Instabilität (z.B. Konflikte, Korruption). Treten Dürren auf, wie kürzlich verstärkt durch El Niño (2015/2016), bestimmt die Vulnerabilität der Gesellschaft, ob sich das Dürrerisiko als Katastrophe manifestiert. Ein kritisches Beispiel ist die Dürre in Somalia, die v.a. zu einer humanitären Katastrophe wurde, da die prekären Vulnerabilitäts-bedingungen durch gewaltsame, politische Konflikte weiter verschlechtert wurden (Maxwell et al., 2016). Insgesamt steht Afrika aus zwei Gründen vor großen Heraus-forderungen bei der Bewältigung des Dürrerisikos: Erstens, sind die Lebensbedingungen u.a. aufgrund anhaltender Armut, begrenzter Gesundheitsversorgung und politischer Unruhen weiterhin schwierig (UNECA et al., 2015). Dies ist alarmierend, v.a. vor dem Hintergrund eines prognostizierten Bevölkerungswachstums von 1,3 Mrd. bis 2050 (UN-DESA, 2015, p. 3). Zweitens, ist die Schaffung guter Lebensbedingungen nach den Zielen für nachhaltige Entwicklung (SDG) eine Herausforderung, da mit dem Klimawandel eine Zunahme von Dürrehäufigkeit und -stärke zu erwarten ist. Höhere Niederschlags-variabilität gepaart mit einem starken Anstieg der Durchschnittstemperatur (Niang et al., 2014) werden die heutigen extremen Dürren in Zukunft zur neuen Normalität machen. Diese Probleme erfordern nachhaltige Lösungen, um kurz- und langfristige Anpassungen zu ermöglichen. Transdisziplinäre Forschung ist gefordert, welche die Stärken wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen und Akteure aus Politik und Gesellschaft bündelt, um geeignete Strategien zur Risikominderung zu erarbeiten. Unter dem Dach des Southern African Science Service Centre for Climate Change and Adaptive Land Management (SASSCAL) leistet diese Dissertation einen Beitrag zu integrierten Managementansätzen von Dürrerisiken, indem sie die naturräumliche Gefährdung kombiniert mit der gesellschaftlichen Vulnerabilität anhand einer Fallstudie untersucht: dem Cuvelai-Becken. Diese transnationale Region in Namibia und Angola ist regelmäßig Dürren ausgesetzt, wie zuletzt in den Jahren 2012 – 2015 mit Wasser- und Ernährungsunsicherheit für Hunderttausende von Menschen (DDRM, 2013; UN-OCHA, 2012). Naturräumlich erstreckt sich die Region von einem humiden Norden in einen semi-ariden Süden mit entsprechenden Vegetationsverhältnissen. Die Bevölkerung betreibt Subsistenzland-wirtschaft und Viehzucht, wobei Urbanisierungstendenzen und Lebensstiländerungen an Dynamik gewinnen. Die gesellschaftlichen Voraussetzungen sind heterogen: Während Angola bis 2002 Jahrzehnte des Bürgerkriegs erlebte, erfuhr Namibia v.a. nach der Unabhängigkeit 1990 eine kontinuierliche institutionelle und infrastrukturelle Entwicklung. Um die vielschichtigen Auswirkungen von Dürren auf die Lebensgrundlagen zu erfassen, verfolgt diese Dissertation einen interdisziplinären Ansatz im Sinne der Integration von Methoden aus der Physischen- und Humangeographie. Kernfragen darin sind (i) wie sich Dürren auf die Lebensgrundlagen auswirken, (ii) wie sich die naturräumliche Dürregefährdung manifestiert, (iii) welche gesellschaftlichen Gruppen vulnerabel sind und (iv) welche Strategien zur Risikominderung geeignet sind. Dabei entwickelt die Dissertation auf Basis der Theorie gesellschaftlicher Naturverhältnisse einen Leitfaden für eine sozial-ökologische Risikoabschätzung und wendet diesen in der vorliegenden Fallstudie an. Zunächst wurde eine qualitative Forschungsphase durchgeführt, um Systemwissen zu gewinnen, gefolgt von einer quantitativen Analyse von Umweltparametern zur Abschätzung der Dürregefahr sowie sozioökonomischer Variablen für die Abschätzung der Vulnerabilität. Schließlich wurden diese Daten im Household Drought Risk Index (HDRI) zusammengeführt, um Orientierungswissen zu generieren und das Dürrerisiko der Haushalte zu bestimmen. Daraus abgeleitetes Transformationswissen ermöglichte dann die Identifizierung geeigneter Risikominderungsstrategien. Die qualitative Erhebung (n = 26) explorierte die Wirkung von Dürren auf die lokalen Lebensbedingungen. Sie eröffnete Einblicke in die Nutzung von Wasserressourcen und die negativen Auswirkungen von Dürren auf die körperliche/geistige Gesundheit, das Familien-/Gemeinschaftslebens sowie den Lebensunterhalts. Bewältigungsmechanismen konnten auf mehreren Ebenen identifiziert werden, vom Haushalt (z.B. Verkauf landwirtschaftlicher Produkte) über die Gemeinde (z.B. Nachbarschaftshilfe) bis hin zur staatlichen Ebene (z.B. Dürrehilfe). Als kritische Wirkpunkte für Dürren wurden Nutzungsmuster von Wasser- und Nahrungsmitteln identifiziert, die einen Haushalt mehr oder weniger anfällig machen. Die interne Kapitalausstattung (Humanes, Soziales, Finanzielles, Physisches und Natürliches) und die infrastrukturelle und institutionelle Ausstattung eines Gebiets bestimmen weiterhin die Fähigkeit eines Haushalts, mit der Dürregefahr umzugehen. Diese Erkenntnisse ermöglichten die Konstruktion des HDRI Indikators, der in den Folgephasen mit entsprechenden Daten bestückt wurde. Zur Erfassung der Dürregefahr wurden drei Dürreindikatoren im Blended Drought Index (BDI) zusammengefasst. Dieser integrierte Dürreindikator berücksichtigt meteorologische und landwirtschaftliche Merkmale, die die Ernährungs- und Wassersicherheit der Bevölkerung beeinträchtigen. Der BDI verwendet eine Copula-Funktion, um gängige Dürreindikatoren zu kombinieren, die auf Niederschlag, Evapotranspiration, Bodenfeuchte und Vegetation zurückgreifen. Fernerkundungsprodukte wurden verarbeitet, um Häufigkeit, Stärke und Dauer der Dürren zu analysieren. Dabei wurden verschiedene Niederschlagsprodukte einer Unsicherheitsanalyse unterzogen, um jenes Produkt zu identifizieren, das am besten mit lokal gemessenen Stationsdaten korrespondiert. Die resultierende, integrierte Dürregefahrenkarte zeigt den Norden der Etosha-Pfanne und das Gebiet entlang des Kunene-Flusses als am stärksten von Dürren bedroht an. Zeitlich korreliert der BDI gut mit den Daten des Hirseertrages (r = 0,51) und dem lokalen Wasserverbrauch (r = -0,45) und übertrifft dabei konventionelle Indikatoren. Die Vulnerabilität wurde anhand von sozioökonomischen Daten aus einer Haushalts-befragung (n = 461) erfasst. Die Nutzungsmuster zeigen einen statistisch signifikanten Schwenk von kritischen Wasser- und Nahrungsquellen (z.B. Brunnen, Subsistenz-produkte) hin zu verlässlichen Quellen (z.B. Leitungswasser, Märkte) während der Trockenzeit. Haushalte mit einer starken Abhängigkeit von kritischen Quellen sind besonders sensitiv gegenüber Dürren. Die Kapitalausstattung der Haushalte variiert v.a. zwischen Land und Stadt sowie zwischen Namibia und Angola. Dabei treten Human- und Finanzkapital gemeinsam mit der infrastrukturellen und institutionellen Raumausstattung als wichtige Kontrollvariablen hervor. Die HDRI Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die angolanische Bevölkerung ein höheres Risiko aufweist, was v.a. durch weniger entwickelte Infrastruktursysteme, schwächere institutionelle- und geringere Bewältigungskapazitäten verursacht wird. Insgesamt gehen Stadtbewohner weniger dürresensitiven Nutzungsmustern nach, sind aber aufgrund familiärer Beziehungen weiterhin mit den ländlichen Gebieten verbunden. Die integrierte, räumliche Risikoabschätzung zeigt Gebiete in Angola und Namibia die sowohl dürregefährdet als auch vulnerabel sind. Die Ergebnisse erlauben zentrale Empfehlungen für Politik und Wissenschaft: Erstens sollte die Dürrebeobachtung im Cuvelai-Becken ein breiteres Spektrum von Indikatoren berücksichtigen und zusätzlich die Verwundbarkeit der Bevölkerung einbeziehen. Dies ermöglicht die Entwicklung von integrierten Dürreinformationssystemen. Zweitens, zur Verringerung der Sensitivität der Bevölkerung müssen lokale Wasserspeicher durch eine verbesserte Wassernutzungseffizienz erhöht werden. Dies gilt sowohl für blaues als auch grünes Wasser. Wassersparende Bewässerungssysteme in Kombination mit dezentralen Regen- und Flutwasserspeichern sind vielversprechende Möglichkeiten. Darüber hinaus müssen zentrale Infrastrukturen der Wasserversorgung und der Marktsysteme ausgebaut werden. Drittens, ist der Zusammenhalt der lokalen Gemeinschaften ein wichtiges institutionelles Rückgrat zur Bewältigung von Dürren und zur Anpassung an künftige Veränderungen. Anstrengungen zur Entwicklung des ländlichen Raums sind erforderlich, die über technische Interventionen hinausgehen und Gemeinschaften durch kollektive Maßnahmen und Ausbildung sowohl in der Wasserwirtschaft als auch der Landwirtschaft unterstützen und so die Lebensgrundlagen von den Niederschlägen entkoppeln.

This study examines the role of social protection programming, and programming design and implementation features, that are prominent in fragile and conflict-affected states. The main objective is to build on existing, available information from a sample of fragile and conflict-affected countries and develop operational guidance that addresses policy, design, and implementation issues and offers operational solutions for social protection programming and policy making in different fragile settings. The analysis showcases the universe of social protection objectives that are evident in these countries as well as the programming trends, types, coverage, and expenditure patterns. The paper also examines dimensions specific to fragile and conflict-affected settings in implementing social protection and labor programs, such as social cohesion, the role of community-driven development, and postwar benefits. Finally, the study highlights social protection and labor program delivery in seven different country contexts, and discusses the country-specific programming options chosen to achieve the objectives and overcome capacity and operational constraints.

The latest Houthi strike in the Red Sea has for the first time killed civilians — three workers on a Barbados-flagged cargo ship — underscoring the ineffectiveness of the Biden military response after five long months of militant attacks there. It also shows how elusive the goal is for ending the nearly decade-long war in Yemen.Just two weeks after assuming the presidency in January 2021, Joe Biden took three key steps in hopes of ending the war in Yemen. First, he removed the Houthis from the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation that was announced in the last days of Donald Trump's tenure. Second, he appointed Tim Lenderking as Special Envoy to Yemen. Finally, he announced that Washington would stop supporting Saudi offensive operations in Yemen, and declared that the war in Yemen had to end. Ending the war in Yemen has remained a major policy objective of his administration.By the time of these announcements, the Saudi regime, under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, had begun extracting itself from the Yemeni quagmire, so the new U.S. position was not received with the hostility from Riyadh it might have expected; indeed, it was formally "'welcomed" in the hope that Washington's diplomatic involvement might assist this process. Since then, Lenderking has actively joined UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg in his efforts to bring about an end to the war in Yemen, although the impact of his involvement remains unclear. Major developments took place in April 2022 with the announcement by Grundberg of a truce between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. (While that truce officially expired the following October, fighting since then has been small scale, and neither the Saudis nor the Emiratis have conducted air strikes against the Houthis.) A few days after Grundberg's announcement, the president of Yemen's internationally recognized government (IRG), Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who had clung to that post since 2012, was unceremoniously replaced by a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) at a meeting in Riyadh hosted by MBS. Much like the resignation statement announced by Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in Riyadh in 2017, Hadi's renunciation was read in circumstances that suggested duress.The PLC consists of eight men -- Rashad al Alimi, the former Interior Minister who ascended to the presidency, and leaders of the various anti-Houthi military factions as vice presidents, some of them aligned with the Saudis and others with the Emiratis. When handing over his authority, Hadi gave them the mandate to negotiate "with (Ansar Allah) the Houthis for a permanent ceasefire throughout the republic and sit at the negotiating table to reach a final and comprehensive political solution that includes a transitional phase that will move Yemen from a state of war to a state of peace." Predictably, given the composition of the council, its members have since spent more energy disagreeing with each other than fighting the Houthis. Another major development later in 2022 was the start of direct and publicly acknowledged negotiations between the Saudis and the Houthis, resulting in the effective marginalization of both the UN-sponsored process and the PLC, but opening space for Omani mediation. During most of 2023, those talks progressed with two major markers: in April, an official trip to Sana'a, the Houthi-controlled capital, by a senior Saudi delegation, followed in September by a return visit to the Kingdom by senior Houthis. On both occasions there were widespread rumors that an agreement was on the verge of being reached. Indeed, PLC members were summoned to Riyadh on both occasions to be informed of the situation, rather than consulted. Similarly, the UN Special Envoy was, at best, informed of developments. The draft agreement involved a six-month cease-fire, to be followed by three months of intra-Yemeni discussions in preparation for a two-year transition phase. The Houthis' main concession was that the Saudis would sign as "mediators" rather than "participants" thus reducing the possibility of war crimes charges against Riyadh stemming from its highly destructive bombing campaign during earlier years in the conflict. In return, the Saudis agreed to pay the salaries of all government staff, including the Houthis' military and security personnel, for at least six months. The expected culmination would have been an event where the Houthis and the IRG, which had a great deal to lose by such an agreement, including generous Saudi subsidization, would sign as participants a document witnessed by the Saudis and likely the Omanis as mediators. It would have formalized Saudi Arabia's exit from the Yemen conflict while leaving to UN mediation the more difficult task of addressing the intra-Yemeni struggles.More recent developments in the Red Sea, however, have made it increasingly difficult to continue negotiations, let alone conclude the pending agreement. The Houthi seizure of the Galaxy Leader on November 19 was followed by a series of attacks on Israeli-connected shipping out of what Houthis said was solidarity with the Palestinian civilians in Gaza. The initial U.S. response was timid, largely because of the Biden administration's remaining hope that a public event formalizing the "end" of the Yemen war, would enable it to claim a major foreign policy success in an election year. While this hope explains Washington's restraint, it doesn't explain why the administration failed to consult with its major allies in Europe. As a result, when the U.S. established the ineffective Prosperity Guardian operation on December 18, it gained meager international support and a rapid disavowal by major European countries who announced their own operation in mid-February 2024.In the absence of a formal agreement, UN Special Envoy Grundberg, on December 23, announced a roadmap towards peace which includes "the parties' commitment to implement a nationwide ceasefire, pay all public sector salaries, resume oil exports, open roads in Taiz and other parts of Yemen, and further ease restrictions on Sana'a airport and the Hudaydah port…. and prepare for a Yemeni-owned political process under UN auspices." The IRG's welcoming of the announcement was, to say the least, muted. Regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia, were more positive, and both the UAE and the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council expressed support. Grundberg has tried to move his road map forward, but the escalations that have taken place in the Red Sea increasingly threaten those efforts. On January 11, the U.S. and UK initiated Operation Poseidon Archer against targets on the Yemeni mainland for the first time, intending to downgrade the Houthis' capability to launch missiles and drones. Initially presented as a "one-off," the strikes have become almost daily, and, by the end of February, had hit 230 sites throughout the country. The number of Houthi attacks, however, has not diminished. While few ships are hit, and those that have been have suffered only minor damage, the Rubymar, a British-owned ship struck on February 18 sank two weeks later, polluting the sea with fertilizer and a massive oil slick. There is no sign of an end to Houthi attacks: despite weeks of strikes, the U.S. officials remain unclear about their impact due to lack of information about Houthi stocks of projectiles. Meanwhile, the majority of Yemenis support Houthi actions in support of Palestine, even if they are unhappy with Houthi governance. The only explicit support for U.S. and UK strikes within Yemen comes from the IRG, a number of whose leaders have asked for the strikes to be complemented by materiel, training and other military support to fight and somehow defeat the Houthis. Widely seen as acting in defense of the Palestinians, however, the Houthis' popularity appears to have risen sharply both domestically and abroad, especially in Arab and predominantly Muslim countries. Should the U.S. and UK escalate their involvement in the Yemen conflict — a possibility made more likely by Wednesday's fatal Houthi strike— prospects for a worsening of the situation loom, increasingly reminiscent of Iraq or Afghanistan decades ago. While the Saudi involvement in the Yemen war appears to have ended, however informally, Yemenis are now facing the prospect of a new form of international intervention in their crisis, alongside the already worsening economic situation and humanitarian crisis which, between 2015 and until recently was considered the "world's worst" by the United Nations. Unfortunately, in the absence of any immediate likelihood of an end to Israel's catastrophic destruction of Gaza, prospects for peace in Yemen appear increasingly remote.