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National minority language policy is an object of this master thesis. It aims at analyzing how minority language policy is being formed in Lithuania and Romania. Goals of the thesis are: to analyze types of language policy and models of language planning; concept of national minority in social sciences, international law and European countries – Lithuania and Romania; development and regulations of European minorities' linguistic rights as well as language policy of the European Union; to research minority language policy in Lithuania and Romania as well as reception of minority language policy in Lithuania and Romania and to compare implementation of minority language policy in these two countries. There is no single description neither for national minority nor for language policy. However, national minority is often understood as a group of people, who historically live in the territory of another country, and have unique linguistic, cultural, sometimes – religious identity. Therefore, language is a part and parcel of minority's identity. So, it is very important that language policy would ensure rights of minority language's users and help to preserve minority's linguistic identity. Language policies in Lithuania and Romania can be described as combining types of official language valuation policy and different judicial status policy. Romanian language policy also meets definition of bilingualism (territorialized personal rights), because it allows usage of minority language in local public administration and public inscriptions. In Lithuania main laws regulating minority language policy are law of national minorities (expired in 2010) and law of education. Current law of education will be replaced by new one in July, 2011. This law, which strengthens education of minorities in the State language, caused lots of discussions in the society and pretty negative evaluation of the biggest national minorities, especially Polish. Meanwhile Romania recently directed its minority language policy in different way. Here new law of education was also accepted in the beginning of 2011. It ensured teaching of all subjects in the language of national minority. The law was followed by various reactions and critics in society. However, it can be considered as a victory of national minorities. Another law, important for Romania's minorities, is law of local public administration, which grants right to regional bilingualism. Focus group research as well as content analysis in Lithuania and Romania helped to investigate reception of minority language policy in the society. It may be described as quite positive, especially in Lithuania. Even if in both countries respondents admitted that they didn't look for information about minority language policy on purpose, they were interested and sensitive towards focus groups' topics, especially regarding education and integration of national minorities. Respondents critically valued aims of biggest minorities (Polish and Hungarians) to gain more rights. However, at the moment of the research they didn't feel threat for the State language. Content analysis revealed that recently Lithuanian media allotted more attention to minority language policy than Romanian media. However, the most popular minority language policy issue in both countries' was education and new law of education. Variety of opinions and arguments (of both national majority and minorities) was presented here. At the moment main aim for Lithuanian legislators while forming minority language policy is to solve coalition between laws' regulations regarding bilingual inscriptions and approve new law of national minorities. Meanwhile Romania should approve one single law, dedicated to minorities and foreseeing their rights. Both countries should keep on improving minority language policy's legislation in order to satisfy interests and ensure rights of both state and minority languages users.

National minority language policy is an object of this master thesis. It aims at analyzing how minority language policy is being formed in Lithuania and Romania. Goals of the thesis are: to analyze types of language policy and models of language planning; concept of national minority in social sciences, international law and European countries – Lithuania and Romania; development and regulations of European minorities' linguistic rights as well as language policy of the European Union; to research minority language policy in Lithuania and Romania as well as reception of minority language policy in Lithuania and Romania and to compare implementation of minority language policy in these two countries. There is no single description neither for national minority nor for language policy. However, national minority is often understood as a group of people, who historically live in the territory of another country, and have unique linguistic, cultural, sometimes – religious identity. Therefore, language is a part and parcel of minority's identity. So, it is very important that language policy would ensure rights of minority language's users and help to preserve minority's linguistic identity. Language policies in Lithuania and Romania can be described as combining types of official language valuation policy and different judicial status policy. Romanian language policy also meets definition of bilingualism (territorialized personal rights), because it allows usage of minority language in local public administration and public inscriptions. In Lithuania main laws regulating minority language policy are law of national minorities (expired in 2010) and law of education. Current law of education will be replaced by new one in July, 2011. This law, which strengthens education of minorities in the State language, caused lots of discussions in the society and pretty negative evaluation of the biggest national minorities, especially Polish. Meanwhile Romania recently directed its minority language policy in different way. Here new law of education was also accepted in the beginning of 2011. It ensured teaching of all subjects in the language of national minority. The law was followed by various reactions and critics in society. However, it can be considered as a victory of national minorities. Another law, important for Romania's minorities, is law of local public administration, which grants right to regional bilingualism. Focus group research as well as content analysis in Lithuania and Romania helped to investigate reception of minority language policy in the society. It may be described as quite positive, especially in Lithuania. Even if in both countries respondents admitted that they didn't look for information about minority language policy on purpose, they were interested and sensitive towards focus groups' topics, especially regarding education and integration of national minorities. Respondents critically valued aims of biggest minorities (Polish and Hungarians) to gain more rights. However, at the moment of the research they didn't feel threat for the State language. Content analysis revealed that recently Lithuanian media allotted more attention to minority language policy than Romanian media. However, the most popular minority language policy issue in both countries' was education and new law of education. Variety of opinions and arguments (of both national majority and minorities) was presented here. At the moment main aim for Lithuanian legislators while forming minority language policy is to solve coalition between laws' regulations regarding bilingual inscriptions and approve new law of national minorities. Meanwhile Romania should approve one single law, dedicated to minorities and foreseeing their rights. Both countries should keep on improving minority language policy's legislation in order to satisfy interests and ensure rights of both state and minority languages users.

This article examines the impact of political cleavages existing in the host state on the receptivity of the political system toward minority claims, its proneness to accommodation and inclusivity toward minority political participation. Applying the theoretical framework of Political Opportunity Structure, the nation-wide political spectrum is regarded an as important element of the structure of political opportunities available to minority communities. By bringing together the cases of Russians in Estonia and Hungarians in Serbia, the article hypothesizes that in post-socialist nation-states, a higher degree of polarization of the political spectrum is more likely to expand the political opportunity structure for ethnic minorities in terms of inclusivity toward minority claims, compared to a political environment characterized by a consensus on the main directions of the country's development. The structure of established political conflicts in Estonia and Serbia are analyzed from the point of view of ethnic minority politics, assessing the effect of nation-wide cleavages on the patterns of cooperation with ethnic minority political forces and concrete impact on minority-related policies.

This article examines the impact of political cleavages existing in the host state on the receptivity of the political system toward minority claims, its proneness to accommodation and inclusivity toward minority political participation. Applying the theoretical framework of Political Opportunity Structure, the nation-wide political spectrum is regarded an as important element of the structure of political opportunities available to minority communities. By bringing together the cases of Russians in Estonia and Hungarians in Serbia, the article hypothesizes that in post-socialist nation-states, a higher degree of polarization of the political spectrum is more likely to expand the political opportunity structure for ethnic minorities in terms of inclusivity toward minority claims, compared to a political environment characterized by a consensus on the main directions of the country's development. The structure of established political conflicts in Estonia and Serbia are analyzed from the point of view of ethnic minority politics, assessing the effect of nation-wide cleavages on the patterns of cooperation with ethnic minority political forces and concrete impact on minority-related policies.

This article examines the impact of political cleavages existing in the host state on the receptivity of the political system toward minority claims, its proneness to accommodation and inclusivity toward minority political participation. Applying the theoretical framework of Political Opportunity Structure, the nation-wide political spectrum is regarded an as important element of the structure of political opportunities available to minority communities. By bringing together the cases of Russians in Estonia and Hungarians in Serbia, the article hypothesizes that in post-socialist nation-states, a higher degree of polarization of the political spectrum is more likely to expand the political opportunity structure for ethnic minorities in terms of inclusivity toward minority claims, compared to a political environment characterized by a consensus on the main directions of the country's development. The structure of established political conflicts in Estonia and Serbia are analyzed from the point of view of ethnic minority politics, assessing the effect of nation-wide cleavages on the patterns of cooperation with ethnic minority political forces and concrete impact on minority-related policies.

2003 EU accession referenda results in the 8 East Central European countries (Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, & Latvia) have been analyzed examining regional dimension of their results. Two criteria, active euro-optimism (percentage of YES voters out of all the electorate in particular region), & active euro-skepticism (percentage of NO voters out of all the electorate in the region), have been used. Comparison with two other variables, economic (GDP per capita in the region) & ethnic (percentage of ethnic group other than title one, if remarkable) has been made; Pearson correlations have been calculated. Though there is common agreement on suppositional influence of regional factors (possibly, North-South, East-West, urban-rural, richer-poorer regional cleavages, exceptional case of the capital city, influence of densely inhabited ethnic groups etc.) in previous euro-integration referenda, there were no consistent analyses on it. Examining of 8 East Central European countries has showed both varieties from country to country as well as a number of general trends. In Slovenia, region of its capital city, Ljubljana, is more euro-optimistic compared with eastern Pomurska region (Maribor & Ptuj). Though regional economic irregularities not enough significant, as well as the number of examples too small for generalization, one can suppose West-East cleavage connected with the economic factor here. In Hungary, though voters' turnout was exceptionally low, both factor of higher euro-optimism in the capital city, Budapest, was evident, as well as strong relation between economic factor & voting behavior. However, Hungary has its own specifics: higher economic development of the region increases both active euro-optimism & active euro-skepticism, too. This, in turn, cannot exclude that factor of "passive euro-skepticism" is important here. In Lithuania, strong relations between size of ethnic minorities in the region & both active euro-optimism (negative) & active euro-skepticism (positive) were evident. More complications were, to evaluate influence of the economic factor: present statistics of GDP per capita in apskritys are far not enough to support supposition that voting results in particular Lithuania's territories are related with their economic development, too. In Slovakia, quite strong influence can be found of the size of Hungarian ethnic minority, but the opposite compared to Lithuania: increasing number of ethnic Hungarians do increase active euro-optimism & decrease active euro-skepticism. This is in good accordance with widely known believe of Hungarian ethnic group that EU membership will improve their status. Surprisingly, in Slovakia it was impossibly to evaluate the influence of another ethnic factor: though this country is widely known by the problems connected with Roma ethnic group, official statistics does not even show remarkable percentage of Roma in any region at all. Influence of economic factor, though number of examples is very small, is also present in Slovakia: the higher is GDP per capita, the higher is active euro-optimism, & at the same time the lower active euro-skepticism. In Poland, clear pattern of lower active euro-optimism was shown for its eastern regions, Podlaskie, Lubelskie, & Podkarpackie; they are economically poorest, at the same time, & characterized by specific political culture (bigger number of orthodox, smaller agricultural incomes, dependence on small trans-border trade, etc.). In the Czech Republic, regional economic pattern is also present: increase in regional GDP per capita also increases the active euro-optimism. Capital city, Prague, has exceptional position: it is most economically developed, & most euro-optimistic, too. For Estonia, complicated picture of inter-related influence of both ethnic & economic factors is typical. On one hand, there are no clear correlations between economic & voting variables. On the other, eastern Ida-Virumaa region, densely populated by ethnic Russians & the least economically developed, is described at the same time as mostly active euro-optimistic, & less euro-skeptical. The most reliable explanation would be, economic underdevelopment & ethnicity, complicated by stronger trans-border relations of individuals living near Russian border, may reinforce uncertainty in euro-integration perspective. For Latvia, the ethnic factor is very much evident: Pearson correlation between regional percentage of Russian population & active euro-skepticism is 0.906; reversely, it is connected with active euro-optimism. Eastern regions of Daugavpils & Rezekne affected also by economic underdevelopment were the most euro-skeptical among all 8 East European countries & became only regions where bigger part of inhabitants were actively opposed EU integration than supported. Thus, a number of cleavages can be generalized for majority of the acceding countries examined. "Center-periphery" cleavage is more or less evident for all countries except of Lithuania & Latvia: better socio-economic development seems to be overcomplicated by ethnic factors in two the latter. In Slovenia, Poland, and, especially, the Baltic States, the East-West cleavage is important. This can be explained by specifics of eastern regions: economic underdevelopment, personal & business ties beyond border, especially among Russian ethnic group in the East of the Baltic States, can lead to rational individual arguments against integration into European Union. With reversed relation, ethnic factor is typical for Hungarian ethnic group in Slovakia: support for euro-integration is predominant within it. The universal factor influencing electoral behavior in referenda is economic one, especially remarkable for Visegrad countries & Slovenia. Adapted from the source document.