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In this volume Mitrokhin presents two dictionaries produced by the KGB itself to define their activities in both offensive and defensive intelligence work. The translated documents tell the story of the KGB's methods and targets and should interest the general public as well as the specialist

When intelligence officers defect, they take with them privileged information and often communicate it to the receiving state.

Appendix D. Directors of U.S. Naval Communications 1912-1942Appendix E.U.S. Naval Attachés in Tokyo, 1914-1941; Appendix F.U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Section "OP-20-G" and Its Antecedents; Appendix G. Officers in Charge, Office of Naval Communications, Code and Signal Section, "Research Desk" (OP-20-GX); Appendix H. Officers in Charge, Office of Naval Communications, Code and Signal Section, Translation Section (OP-20-GZ); Appendix I. Growth of U.S. Navy Radio Intelligence; Appendix J.U.S. Naval Radio Intelligence, Primarily Focused upon Japan, as of December 1941.

AbstractThis article explores Allied intelligence officers' encounters with and interrogations of German civilians from autumn 1944 onwards, psychological warfare operations directed at civilians, and their wider ramifications. Focusing especially on the officers serving with the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), I will demonstrate that field intelligence officers' stance towards German civilians was fluid and often ambiguous, with the encounter causing considerable distress to some of them. Their reports and correspondence further suggest that in this period, Germans readily professed knowledge of atrocities. But contrary to intelligence officers' expectations, they failed to accept any guilt or responsibility. Finally, I will argue that the very foundations and techniques of Western Allied psychological warfare may have reinforced and legitimised justification strategies that separated between "real" Nazis and everyone else. This was at odds with one of the central aims of Military Government, i.e. to inculcate a sense of culpability in Germans.

Spymasters is a collection of interviews revealing enlightening perspectives on the covert operations of this powerful, secretive arm of the U.S. government. Here former top-ranking CIA officials shed light on some of the most sensitive issues and practices in American foreign intelligence to date. These men disclose information about: President Harry S. Truman's demands for a centralized intelligence agency and the stubborn resistance of James F. Byrnes, J. Edgar Hoover, and the military services the tumultuous early stages of the National Security Council the failed Bay of Pigs invasion the

Explores benefits and limitations of a civilian reserve program.