Namjera je u ovom radu prikazati i predstaviti oružanu skupinu FARC, njihovu dugogodišnju borbu, propale pregovore s vladom te posljednje pregovore koji su rezultirali sporazumom. Ovaj slučaj pruža uvid u rješavanje sukoba te primjer kako postupati s drugim sukobljenim stranama. Kolumbija se ističe kao zemlja s velikim problemima, a jedan od njih su pobunjeničke grupe. Velikim uspjehom može se smatrati potpisivanje sporazuma s najdugovječnijom oružanom skupinom. Tematski okvir rada predstavlja istraživanje korporacije RAND, odnosno njenih autora Setha Jonesa i Martina Libickog koji su predstavili pet načina na koje dolazi do prestanka djelovanja terorističkih skupina. Fokus u ovom radu je na prestanku djelovanja terorističkih skupina tako što se uključe u legalne i legitimne političke procese. Rad dovodi do zaključka kako je FARC oružana skupina koja je tijekom svojih godina postojanja prošla nekoliko tipova djelovanja te na kraju postala politička stranka. Okolnosti u kojima se zatekla skupina, ali i sama država, dovele su do toga da ponovno pokrenu pregovore. ; The purpose of this paper is to show and introduce armed group named FARC, their long-lasting fight, failed negotiations with the government and the last negotiations that resulted in a peace agreement. This case provides insight in solutions to the conflict and example how to deal with other conflicted groups. Colombia stands out as a country with big problems and one of them are rebel groups. Great success is signing of a peace agreement with the most lasting rebel group. The framework of this subject is the research of the RAND Corporation, that is, their authors, Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, who showed five ways in which terrorist groups end. The focus of this paper is an ending of terrorist groups by involving in legal and legitimate political process. The paper brings to conclusion that FARC is armed group which has had throughout their many years different types of activity and in the end it has become a political party. Circumstances in which ...
Autor analizira simptome krize demokracije u Europi koncentrirajući se na tri skupine simptoma: u prvom redu na simptome krize u tranzicijskim zemljama koje su ušle u članstvo Europske unije u okviru petog proširenja; jedan je od glavnih indikatora te krize slab odaziv glasača iz tranzicijskih zemalja na izbore za Europski parlament godinu dana nakon ulaska u članstvo EU-a. Razlog tog podbačaja autor vidi u razočaranosti demokracijom i tranzicijom te u formalnom udovoljenju kopenhaškim kriterijima, uslijed čega su odmah nakon ulaska u EU nove zemlje članice svoju zadaću demokratizacije smatrale dovršenom.Drugi je simptom krize negativan ishod referenduma za ratifi kaciju ugovora kojim se uspostavlja Ustav za Europu u Francuskoj i Nizozemskoj, što je pokrenulo lančanu reakciju odbacivanja osnovnih instrumenata demokratizacije EU-a koje su zemlje članice prethodno prihvatile i s kojima su se u potpunosti suglasile. Treći element krize demokracije jest demokratski defi cit u EU-u i različito viđenje načina kako da se on prevlada, jačanjem federalističkih elemenata EU-a ili interguvernmentalnih procedura. Na kraju se konstatira da u suvremenoj Europi postoje tri modela demokracije, po uzoru na Siedentopovu klasifi kaciju modela privlačnosti demokracije, i da je kriza demokracije u Europi potencijalno opasna za daljnji razvoj europskih društava jer se pobjedom nad komunizmom nije ostvario očekivani trijumf demokracije, nego je demokracija u Europi izložena nasrtajima raznih oblika političke patologije, uz deziluziju i neispunjena očekivanja. ; In this article the symptoms of the crises of democracy are analyzed. The author concentrates on three sets of symptoms: fi rst, on the symptoms emerged in transition, post-communist countries that joined the EU within the Fifth enlargement. One of the main indicators of such crises is the low turnout in the European Parliament elections in 2004, only one month after their joining the EU. The reasons for such a bad turnout are the disappointment in democracy and in transition, ...
Autor u članku daje pregled programa hrvatskoga književnog predromantizma i romantizma i s njima preklapajućega narodnog preporoda i ilirizma te pokazuje kako su se u programskim tekstovima, u okolnostima mađarsko-hrvatskih napetosti i neoapsolutizma, izmjenjivale tendencije nacionalnoga romantizma i romantičnoga nacionalizma, kako ih je u europskim okvirima definirao Joep Leerssen. ; In this article the author gives an overview of the programmes of Croatian literary pre-Romanticism and Romanticism and the National Revival and Illyrian Movement that overlap with them. He also shows how the tendencies of national Romanticism and Romantic nationalism, as defined by Joep Leerssen in European terms, interchanged in the programmatic texts in circumstances defined by Hungarian-Croatian tensions and neo-absolutism.
Hrvatski sabor donio je 25. lipnja 1991. Ustavnu odluku o suverenosti i samostalnosti i Deklaraciju o proglašenju suverene i samostalne Republike Hrvatske, čime je objavio i formalizirao volju hrvatskoga naroda i građana Republike Hrvatske izrađenu na referendumu održanom pet tjedana prije. Usvajanjem navedenih dokumenata, a u nemogućnosti postizanja novog političkog dogovora kojim bi se razriješila jugoslavenska državna i politička kriza, Hrvatska je ušla u završnu fazu procesa osamostaljenja. No, unutarjugoslavenske i međunarodne prilike i odnosi nisu predstavljali povoljan okvir hrvatskoga osamostaljenja, nego je u tom procesu Hrvatska nailazila na brojne prepreke, opstrukcije, nerazumijevanja, pa i otpore. Dio međunarodnih aktera, pritisnut odlučnošću hrvatskog političkog vodstva kao i brutalnošću srbijanske oružane agresije, postupno je gradio afirmativan stav prema odluci o izlasku Hrvatske iz SFRJ kao jedinom racionalnom odgovoru na jugoslavensku krizu i rastući velikosrpski nacionalizam i ekspanzionizam. Tri desetljeća nakon sudbonosnih odluka Hrvatskoga sabora prigoda je da podsjetimo na ključne državno-političke i međunarodnopravne akte koji su doveli do priznanja te međunarodne i diplomatske afirmacije Republike Hrvatske, kao i da ukratko ukažemo na one unutarnje i međunarodne dionike koji su se tom procesu odupirali, ali i na one koji su ga podržavali. ; On June 25, 1991, the Croatian Parliament passed the Constitutional Decision on Sovereignty and Independence and passed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia. In doing so, the Parliament declared and formalized the will of the people and citizens of the Republic of Croatia, which was expressed at a referendum held five weeks earlier. By adopting these documents, and without the possibility of reaching a new political agreement that would dissolve the Yugoslav state and solve the political crisis, Croatia entered the final phase of its independence-gaining process. However, inner Yugoslav and additional international circumstances and relations did not provide a favourable framework for the Croatian independence. In this process, Croatia had to overcome a number of obstacles, an overall lack of understanding, even resistance. Having understood the pressure of decisive Croatian political leadership and the brutality of the Serbian armed aggression, a number of actors on the international stage gradually built their acceptance of the Croatian decision to leave the SFRY. They saw it as the only rational answer to the Yugoslav crisis and the growing Greater Serbian nationalism and expansionism. Three decades after these historic decisions of the Croatian Parliament, it is now a good time to remember the key national political and international legal acts that have led to the international and diplomatic affirmation, as well as the recognition of the Republic of Croatia. This is an opportunity to highlight the local and international stakeholders who resisted this process, as well as those who supported it.
Iako intervencijska kardiologija u Hrvatskoj unatrag dvaju desetljeća bilježi napredak, ne nalazimo analizu broja intervencijskih kardioloških zahvata na nacionalnoj razini. Cilj je rada bila analiza broja koronarnih angiografija (CA) i perkutanih koronarnih intervencija (PCI) u razdoblju od 2010. do 2014. godine. Analizirani su dijagnostičko-terapijski postupci iz računa hospitaliziranih bolesnika u Hrvatskoj koji se odnose na CA i PCI u 13 hrvatskih centara. U promatranom je razdoblju prosječna stopa CA bila 4390 na milijun stanovnika godišnje uz porast od 8,5 % u promatranom razdoblju. Prosječna stopa PCI-ja bila je 2208 uz porast od 15 %. Omjer PCI/CA porastao je s 0,48 na 0,52. Od 47 470 PCI-ja učinjenih u Hrvatskoj od 2010. do 2014. godine 18,6 % učinjeno je u Klinici za kardiovaskularne bolesti Magdalena, 13,8 % u Kliničkom bolničkom centru (KBC) Zagreb, 11,9 % u KBC-u Rijeka i 11,3 % u Kliničkojbolnici Dubrava, dok su ostali centri imali udjele manje od 10 %. Prema broju PCI-ja, sedam hrvatskihcentara (54 %) ubrajamo u velike centre, a četiri (30,7 %) među srednje velike centre. Opća bolnica Dubrovnikod 2013. godine ima dovoljan godišnji broj PCI-ja (> 200), dok Opća bolnica Karlovac radi samo CA. Rezultati upućuju na izniman uspjeh hrvatske intervencijske kardiologije u zadnja dva desetljeća. Hrvatska je 2010. godine imala višu stopu PCI-ja od prosjeka članica Organizacije za ekonomsku suradnju i razvoj (OECD) i 21 zemlje članice Europske unije i veći prosječan godišnji rast (26,8 %) od svih analiziranih zemlja, osim Rumunjske. Stopa PCI-ja bila je viša od većine europskih zemalja, osim Njemačke, Belgije, Austrije i Norveške. Za daljnju analizu uspješnosti intervencijskih zahvata i planiranje daljnjeg razvoja nužno je formiranje unificiranoga Hrvatskog registra kardioloških procedura. ; Although there has been progress in interventional cardiology in Croatia over the last two decades, there has been no analysis of interventional cardiologic procedures at the national level. The aim of this article was to analyze of the number of coronary angiographies (CA) and percutaneous coronary interventions (PCI) in the period from 2010 to 2014. Diagnostic and treatment procedures were analyzed based on the CA and PCI hospital claims of Croatian patients in 13 Croatian centers. The average rate of CA in the observed period was 4 390 per million population annually, with a growth of 8.5% over the observed period. The average rate of PCI was 2 208 with an increase of 15%. The PCI/CA ratio grew from 0.48 to 0.52. Of the 47 470 PCI procedures performed in Croatia between 2010 and 2014, 18.6% were performed in the Magdalena Special Hospital for Cardiovascular Surgery and Cardiology, 13.8% in the University Hospital Centre Zagreb, 11.9% in the University Hospital Centre Rijeka, and 11.3% in the University Hospital Dubrava, while other centers had shares below 10%. Based on PCI numbers, 7 Croatian centers (54%) can be classified as high volume centers, and 4 (30.7%) as medium volume centers. The Dubrovnik General Hospital since 2013 had a sufficient annual number of PCIs (>200), while the Karlovac General Hospital only performed CA. Results indicate that Croatian interventional cardiology has achieved a great success over the last two decades: in 2010, Croatia already had an above average rate of PCIs compared with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and 21 countries of the European Union, as well as a larger annual growth (26.8%) than all analyzed countries except Romania. PCI rates were higher than most European countries except Germany, Belgium, Austria, and Norway. Further analysis of the success of interventional procedures and further development plans require the formation of a unified Croatian Registry of Cardiologic Procedures.
Djelatna uloga Međunarodnoga odbora Crvenoga križa (MOCK) do izražaja dolazi u ratnim okolnostima u provođenju aktivnosti utemeljenih na međunarodnom ratnom pravu da bi se osigurala pomoć za sve ratne stradalnike. U osiguravanju uvjeta rada tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata MOCK je pokušao uspostaviti službene odnose sa svim zaraćenim državama, odnosno svim vojnim snagama bez obzira na to je li im bio priznat status zaraćene strane. Stoga su u radu prikazani i napori koje je MOCK uložio u pokušaje da pripadnici Narodnooslobodilačke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije steknu službeni položaj zaraćene strane, odnosno službeni status ratnih zarobljenika, te da se na njih dosljedno primijene odredbe međunarodnoga ratnog prava. Usprkos prethodnim kontaktima MOCK je tek nakon imenovanja stalnoga predstavnika u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj (1943.) započeo opsežne aktivnosti u korist pripadnika partizanskoga pokreta Jugoslavije, od kojih su najvažnije bile praktična primjena odredaba međunarodnoga ratnog prava na zarobljene pripadnike partizanskih jedinica te osiguravanje raznih oblika pomoći. S istom je nakanom predstavnik MOCK-a uspostavio kontakt i s Vrhovnim štabom Narodnooslobodilačke vojske i partizanskih odreda Jugoslavije, a suradnja je olakšana tek nakon potpisivanja sporazuma Tito-Šubašić, što je rezultiralo uspostavom službenih odnosa krajem 1944. godine. Na temelju izvornoga arhivskoga gradiva, objavljenih izvora i literature autor pokazuje i neke aspekte suradnje do završetka rata te u neposrednom poraću. ; The active role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) comes to the fore in wartime circumstances, in carrying out activities based on international war law (the Geneva and Hague Conventions) regarding providing assistance to all war victims. In securing working conditions during World War II, the ICRC attempted to establish official relations with all belligerent parties regardless of whether they were or were not recognised as belligerent parties. Therefore, the author presents part of the ICRC efforts made in the process of recognising the international war law-regulated status of belligerent party to members of the People's Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, i.e. the status of prisoners of war. Despite some earlier contacts, after the designation of a permanent representative to the Independent State of Croatia (1943), the ICRC launched extensive activities in favour of members of the Yugoslav Partisan movement, the most important of which was the practical application of the international law of war. Permanent representative Schmidlin constantly intervened in the ministries and the prime minister of the Independent State of Croatia through the Central Office of the Croatian Red Cross and as well through prominent figures in the political and social life of the State. However, although the Partisans de facto achieved the position of a belligerent party in their relations with the German military forces, this status was strongly opposed by the ISC authorities. Due to the change in the British attitude towards the Yugoslav Partisans, in the summer of 1943 the ICRC leadership ordered its permanent representative in Zagreb to establish contact with members of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia as soon as possible. Very soon, Schmidlin contacted the Supreme Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army and Partisan detachments of Yugoslavia. In late November 1943, shortly after the beginning of the Allied Conference in Tehran, the ICRC leadership also received an Allied recommendation on the same subject. The existence of the Yugoslav Committee of the Red Cross in London, which had legitimacy and was the only recognised Yugoslav national Red Cross society, was a major problem in establishing relations between the ICRC and the Yugoslav Partisans. The ICRC leadership remained committed to not recognising the new societies created during the war. After the signing of the Tito-Šubašić agreement in mid-June 1944, the ICRC leadership changed its position, and representatives of the Yugoslav government and Marshal Tito sent several letters to the ICRC Permanent Delegation in London in late September and early October 1944. In those letters, they informed the ICRC leadership of the establishment of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Red Cross on the island of Vis. At the same time, the Royal Yugoslav Red Cross Society in London was dissolved. All of this resulted in the unification of the national organisation of the Red Cross in Yugoslavia, which led to the establishment of official relations between the ICRC and Yugoslav Partisans at the end of 1944. Based on original archival sources and literature, the author points to some aspects of cooperation until the end of World War II and in the early post-war period. One of the main aspects of the ICRC's work during this period was the practical application of the provisions of the international law of war to prisoners of war in Yugoslavia. Tito himself made the same promises, though the Yugoslav Ministry of Social Policy made this conditional: they would be applied only if it was proven that captured members of the Partisan movement had been treated in the same way during the war. The treatment of prisoners of war in Yugoslavia could only be speculated about, and the authorities immediately refused to allow foreign diplomatic or ICRC representatives to gain insight into the treatment of prisoners of war. It is clear that the ICRC faced the same problems in its relations with the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia and the German Reich during the war and the Yugoslav authorities at the end of the war and in the immediate post-war period.
Raspravljajući o porijeklu hrvatske nacije, autor u prvom dijelu odbacuje tvrdnju da se ona razvijala kao tzv. "jezična nacija". Također osporava gledište da je u tome bitnu ulogu imalo jugoslavenstvo. Zatim pokazuje da je hrvatska nacija nastala u procesu međusobnih interakcija socijalnih i povijesnih vrijednosti, koje su napokon odredile njezinu individualnost spram svake druge zajednice na cjelokupnom prostoru Srednje i Jugoistočne Europe. Sve je to autor dokazao u drugom dijelu rasprave, gdje analizira hrvatski nacionalno-politički program, koji je nastao za revolucije 1848/49. godine. U njemu su hrvatski liberali i demokrati jasno odredili individualnost hrvatske nacije i hrvatske države (ujedinjene Trojedne Kraljevine Hrvatske), i to kao jedinstvene, samostalne i autonomne moderne države u sklopu konfederalnog političkoga i društvenog sustava Srednje Europe (austrijske konfederacije). ; In the present paper the author deals with the origin and development of Croatian nation, and creation of the modern Croatian state (Tripartite Kingdom of Croatia) in the first half of the 19th century, especially during the 1848/49 revolution, at several levels: idea about nation, ideology, political and social programmes, political actions, institutions, and political community. If considered from the point of view of new socio-political processes, when transformation of a people into a modern national-political community takes place, we can see that Slavic peoples in the middle and south-eastern Europe formed multinational states, but followed some quite clear courses: formation of individual ethnic and national communities within a plural social system. Being aware of these historical processes, at the time of formation of their own national communities, these Slavic peoples (according to the level of their social and political organizations), especially in 1848, asked for a change of traditional societies and reorganization of the existing empires, not only by the language national principle, but also by the principle of sovereignty, policy of federalism and confederalism and the principles of international law and international agreement. All this should have made possible formation of essentially new political communities: individual national states within equal and democratic multinational communities, but within a new middle-class society. However, considered from the point of view of formation of the identity and individuality of Croatian nation, which is the subject of this paper, it is indisputable that Croatian national political programme and programme of confederalism as well as legal principles compatible with them (like natural and national laws, Croatian historical and constitutional laws, international law and international agreements), which were the values Croatian politicians based their national policy on since 1848, had the essential influence on the explicit quality of Croatian national-political individuality, and thus, looking historically, on the integration of Croatian nation and creation of Croatian political and state community (the united State of Croatia). The subject and vey complex structure of that political programme had an impact onto clear definition of Croatian national-political community (the united Tripartite Kingdom of Croatia) in relation to other political communities in such a multinational state as it was the Habsburg Monarchy. And that state, in their eyes should have been formed (within the new middle-class society, and a democratic and parliamentary system) on confederal basis, by means of international agreements between quite equal ethnic/national states: within the middle European Austrian confederation. In any case, Croatian nation (if we consider its national integrative processes in terms of events, in terms of idea and ideology and/or in terms of ethnic identity) was not formed nor developed as solely the so-called "language nation", as historiography would like it. For, neither is ethnos (not even ethnic community, or people, or nation, or ethnic identity) only a language-cultural category, nor the Croatian politicians and reformers took only language and culture to determine Croatian people and nation. On the contrary, Croatian nation was formed in the process of interactions of social and historical values which defined its individuality in relation to any other community on the whole area of middle and south-eastern Europe. Also, Croatian nation was not formed only as a natural community (determined by natural conditions of work and society and genealogic structure, i. e. determined by undefined Slavic union and/or undefined Slavic ethnic identity), but, in the course of processes of modernization, it was formed first of all as a historical community, based on group institutions of its own historical community. In other words, Croatian nation was formed on its own cultural, political, state and public-law traditions. It is quite clear that in this process neither Slavism, nor Illyrism, nor Yugoslavism had any role more important that the secondary one, not even for the definition of any particular ethnic identity. Illyrism and Yugoslavism had declarative ideological meaning, expressed through the idea of still non-existing community. On the contrary, Croatianism (as a national principle, as a community and as a legal, state and political system) was an expression of existence of Croatian community as reality. Thus, if we want to discuss the integration of Croatian nation and formation of Croatian political community, i. e. the united State of Croatia, we should realize that these processes were influenced by numerous values and structures, especially spiritual-cultural, political, economic, legal and social. However, the importance of political system and all its substructures – political action, political organization of the community, political programme and formation of a modern national state — should also be noted. Formation of Croatian political and state community, which was clearly stated in the Croatian national and political programme of 1848/49, assumed: 1) associating the segments of Croatian people into one political people, within one integral Croatian political community; 2) uniting of all Croatian provinces into one united Croatian state (Tripartite Kingdom of Croatia, Dreieiniges Koenigreich Kroatien). And these were the most important determinants which led to the political homogeneity and formation of Croatian nation and Croatian modern state.
As Croatia prepares for membership in the EU (most likely in 2013), its foreign policy is in a need of re-conceptualisation. In the first 20 years of its independence (declared in 1991), Croatian foreign policy has been through three different phases. Each of them was focused on one single objective. The three objectives that have marked three distinguished phases of Croatian foreign policy were: 1) international recognition of its statehood; 2) territorial re-integration and 3) membership in NATO and the EU. When (and if) it joins the EU, the country will have to change its single-objective based foreign policy for a multiple-objectives foreign policy approach. It will have to take into consideration a whole set of new issues, some of which will be global in character. In addition, it will need to harmonise its own priorities with those of other EU member-states. The article focuses on options that are available to foreign-policy decision-makers when they wish to re-orientate the foreign policy of a country. In particular, the author looks at the options available to small states and small powers. The outcome of the process will be influenced by the size and ambitions of the country, as well as by internal political and ideological dynamics in Croatian politics, which would need to become better harmonised with political trends in the EU. The author approaches foreign policy decision-making as a dynamic process in which ideas and values matter. For that reason, he focuses not only on interaction between states but also interaction between three main party families within the European context: 1) Liberals, 2) Conservatives and 3) Socialists. In particular, he looks at the differences they have on two main issues for the future of the EU: 1) further enlargement of the EU and 2) global ambitions of the EU. The article is drawing on contemporary literature on foreign policy of small states and small powers. It argues that Croatia needs more strategic thinking in order to make best use of new opportunities. Adapted from the source document.
As Croatia prepares for membership in the EU (most likely in 2013), its foreign policy is in a need of re-conceptualisation. In the first 20 years of its independence (declared in 1991), Croatian foreign policy has been through three different phases. Each of them was focused on one single objective. The three objectives that have marked three distinguished phases of Croatian foreign policy were: 1) international recognition of its statehood; 2) territorial re-integration and 3) membership in NATO and the EU. When (and if) it joins the EU, the country will have to change its single-objective based foreign policy for a multiple-objectives foreign policy approach. It will have to take into consideration a whole set of new issues, some of which will be global in character. In addition, it will need to harmonise its own priorities with those of other EU member-states. The article focuses on options that are available to foreign-policy decision-makers when they wish to re-orientate the foreign policy of a country. In particular, the author looks at the options available to small states and small powers. The outcome of the process will be influenced by the size and ambitions of the country, as well as by internal political and ideological dynamics in Croatian politics, which would need to become better harmonised with political trends in the EU. The author approaches foreign policy decision-making as a dynamic process in which ideas and values matter. For that reason, he focuses not only on interaction between states but also interaction between three main party families within the European context: 1) Liberals, 2) Conservatives and 3) Socialists. In particular, he looks at the differences they have on two main issues for the future of the EU: 1) further enlargement of the EU and 2) global ambitions of the EU. The article is drawing on contemporary literature on foreign policy of small states and small powers. It argues that Croatia needs more strategic thinking in order to make best use of new opportunities. Adapted from the source document.
Dugo je vremena koncept suvereniteta smatran kamenom temeljcem domaćeg i međunarodnog prava te političke misli. Koncepcija suvereniteta blisko je povezana s koncepcijom države. Bilo je to »normalno« stanje države, u kojem ona ima vrhovnu ili konačnu vlast u unutarnjim političkim i pravnim pitanjima, a svojstvo neovisnosti prema drugim državama. Međunarodnu zajednicu činile su ravnopravne i neovisne države. Danas, na početku 21. stoljeća, koncept suvereniteta izložen je mnogim izazovima, od kojih je najznačajniji proces globalizacije koji je doveo do sve veće međupovezanosti ljudi širom svijeta vidljive na svim poljima: političkim, vojnim, ekonomskim, kulturnim i pravnim. U ovom radu usredotočit ćemo se na pitanje kako globalizacija utječe na državni suverenitet te da ti pregled argumenata korištenih u novijoj literaturi. ; The concept of sovereignty was for a long time considered as one of the cornerstones of national and international law, and of political thought. The concept of sovereignty was closely connected with the concept of the state. It was a »normal« situation of a country where it had supreme or final power in political and legal matters in its domestic affairs, while at the same time it was independent in relation to all other countries. The international community used to consist of equal and independent states. At the beginning of the 21st century, the concept of sovereignty is faced with many challenges, both in theory and in practice. What happens within a country's territory and to its inhabitants is now less a consequence of national politics than the result of international circumstances – the difference between internal and foreign affairs is becoming increasingly vague. Several processes are happening simultaneously: globalisation (the development of information and communication technology; increase in foreign investments, the development of multinational corporations, and strengthening of the international economic and trade organisations' role), the process of European integration, the development of international protection of human rights (the development of cogent rules of international law, humanitarian interventions, the role of transnational non- governmental organisations), and the phenomenon of »failed states«. All the above mentioned has created a need to redefine the concept of sovereignty.
Dugo je vremena koncept suvereniteta smatran kamenom temeljcem domaćeg i međunarodnog prava te političke misli. Koncepcija suvereniteta blisko je povezana s koncepcijom države. Bilo je to »normalno« stanje države, u kojem ona ima vrhovnu ili konačnu vlast u unutarnjim političkim i pravnim pitanjima, a svojstvo neovisnosti prema drugim državama. Međunarodnu zajednicu činile su ravnopravne i neovisne države. Danas, na početku 21. stoljeća, koncept suvereniteta izložen je mnogim izazovima, od kojih je najznačajniji proces globalizacije koji je doveo do sve veće međupovezanos- ti ljudi širom svijeta vidljive na svim poljima: političkim, vojnim, ekonomskim, kulturnim i pravnim. U ovom radu usredotočit ćemo se na pitanje kako globalizacija utječe na državni suverenitet te dati pregled argumenata korištenih u novijoj literaturi. ; The concept of sovereignty was for a long time considered as one of the corner- stones of national and international law, and of political thought. The concept of sovereignty was closely connected with the concept of the state. It was a »normal« situation of a country where it had supreme or final power in political and legal matters in its domestic affairs, while at the same time it was independent in relation to all other countries. The international community used to consist of equal and independent States. At the beginning of the 21st Century, the concept of sovereignty is faced with many challenges, both in theory and in practice. What happens within a country's territory and to its inhabitants is now less a consequence of national politics than the result of international circumstances - the difference between internal and foreign affairs is becoming increasingly vague. Several processes are happening simultaneously: globalisation (the development of information and communication technology; increase in foreign Investments, the development of multinational corporations, and strengthening of the international economic and trade organisations' role), the process of European integration, the development of international protection of human rights (the development of cogent rules of international law, humanitarian interventions, the role of transnational non/governmental organisations), and the phenomenon of »failed States«. All the above mentioned has created a need to redefine the concept of sovereignty.
The article opens with an introduction to the key aspects of the globalization debates and their controversies, while it later deals with the crisis of the national model of citizenship. Since the 1990's the debate is between the advocates of two conflicting theses. According to the first camp of authors, citizenship has proven resistant to the globalization changes in the economic, political and cultural sphere, and even capable of revival. On the other side, it has been argued that the identity of a person, as a member of a national community, was gradually separated from its human and civil rights. That led to the establishment of a 'postnational model of membership' -- individual and group rights independent of citizenship. According to the second camp, the nation state was fundamentally transformed and it has become an instrument for implementation of the international conventions and norms of human rights understood as personal instead of citizenship rights. There are also attempts to reconcile the two standpoints. These authors recognize the challenges to the conventional national mode of citizenship, but argue that the processes of citizenship transformation are primarily an internal issue for the liberal democracies. Some authors try to step out of the narrow and exclusive conceptual frameworks of the nation state and postnational membership, attempting to explain the conflicting transformation processes of citizenship rights. There are also proposals for new concepts of citizenship -- a multicultural and a supranational, for example -- as a response to the challenges of globalization and international migration. Finally, postmodern writers talk about postmodern or a cosmopolitan citizenship that is not immediately tied to the nation-state. Adapted from the source document.
The article opens with an introduction to the key aspects of the globalization debates and their controversies, while it later deals with the crisis of the national model of citizenship. Since the 1990's the debate is between the advocates of two conflicting theses. According to the first camp of authors, citizenship has proven resistant to the globalization changes in the economic, political and cultural sphere, and even capable of revival. On the other side, it has been argued that the identity of a person, as a member of a national community, was gradually separated from its human and civil rights. That led to the establishment of a 'postnational model of membership' -- individual and group rights independent of citizenship. According to the second camp, the nation state was fundamentally transformed and it has become an instrument for implementation of the international conventions and norms of human rights understood as personal instead of citizenship rights. There are also attempts to reconcile the two standpoints. These authors recognize the challenges to the conventional national mode of citizenship, but argue that the processes of citizenship transformation are primarily an internal issue for the liberal democracies. Some authors try to step out of the narrow and exclusive conceptual frameworks of the nation state and postnational membership, attempting to explain the conflicting transformation processes of citizenship rights. There are also proposals for new concepts of citizenship -- a multicultural and a supranational, for example -- as a response to the challenges of globalization and international migration. Finally, postmodern writers talk about postmodern or a cosmopolitan citizenship that is not immediately tied to the nation-state. Adapted from the source document.
