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The specificity of the Strasbourg judgments is versatile and concerns many different areas of social life that it is not possible to effectively adapt legal norms and apply their interpretation by one entity of public authority. It can be said with full conviction that the execution of judgments is a continuous process and will last as long as the European Court of Human Rights is functioning; surely it will not end with the completion of the most difficult cases. It is important for the national system for the protection of human rights to be very efficient in the context of the protection of human rights. If, however, there is a violation of the norms of international agreements, Poland must be effective in meeting obligations such as the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. There are two aspects involved in fulfilling obligations under international law arising from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The first one is the introduction of appropriate standards of respect for the rights and freedoms enshrined in the treaty, and the second one is the obligation to enforce judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of a stated infringement of the Convention. Both obligations must be carried out simultaneously by the state – which, as a party to the Convention, respects its provisions and fulfills the required international legal obligations. The subject of this paper is to present the powers and legitimacy of the body of the executive in Poland in connection with the execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. ; A especificidade dos acórdãos de Strasburg é versátil e diz respeito a muitas áreas diferentes da vida social, e não é possível adaptar eficazmente as normas jurídicas e aplicar suas interpretações por uma única entidade de autoridade pública. Pode-se dizer que a execução das sentenças é um processo contínuo e durará enquanto o Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos do Homem estiver em atividade; seguramente não terminará com a conclusão dos casos mais difíceis. É importante que o sistema nacional de proteção dos direitos humanos seja eficiente no contexto da proteção dos direitos humanos. Se, no entanto, houver violação das normas dos acordos internacionais, a Polônia deve ser eficaz no cumprimento de tais obrigações, como as sentenças da Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos. Existem dois aspectos envolvidos no cumprimento das obrigações decorrentes do direito internacional da Convenção Europeia para a Proteção dos Direitos Humanos e das Liberdades Fundamentais. A primeira é a introdução de padrões apropriados de respeito aos direitos e liberdades consagrados no tratado, e a segunda é a obrigação de executar sentenças da Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos no caso de uma violação declarada da Convenção. Ambas as obrigações devem ser cumpridas simultaneamente pelo Estado que, como parte da Convenção, respeita suas disposições e cumpre as obrigações legais internacionais exigidas. O tema deste artigo é apresentar os poderes e a legitimidade do órgão do Poder Executivo na Polônia em conexão com a execução das sentenças da Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos.

The creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) marks an important progress in international law. However, in order to become a relevant body the Court must rely on the cooperation of all its members & benefit from the help of the states that didn't subscribe to the Rome statute. In the post 9/11 context it is important to assess the impact of the new counter-terrorist agenda on the regular functioning of the Court: will it help or will it endanger the ICC professed goals? In this particular context, the United States' position is of the utmost importance. Adapted from the source document.

Raymond Aron's international and strategic thought is inextricably linked to his own critical philosophy of history, as he conceived it in the 1930s, after spending a period of time in Germany. Influenced by pacifist philosopher Alain, Aron is converted to realism, which is put to the test by the 20th century wars. It is not advisable, however, to associate Aron tout court to the strict Anglo-american realism of Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. Against the construction of a general theory of International Relations based on model-building, he is the harbinger of a historical sociology of Weberian inspiration, seeking to render the international scene intelligible in its peculiar complexity. Adapted from the source document.

The purpose of the article is to provide a theoretical basis for the application of judicial proceedings (judicializacao) in the foreign policy. The starting point is the classical conceptions of Locke & Montesquieu which conferred a great deal of discretion to the Executive for managing foreign relations, what was gradually counterbalanced by the Legislative & the Judiciary. Approaching the Brazilian literature on the expansion of judicial power to the politics & subsequent misrepresentations, the author tries to apply the concept to the foreign policy & analyses five cases of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. References. Adapted from the source document.

¿Qué es la responsabilidad del superior jerárquico? ¿Cuáles son las obligaciones de un comandante militar en campo? Desde Yamashita (1945) hasta la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) con Bemba Gombo (2016), de jure o de facto, la CPI con Bemba Gombo equiparó las obligaciones de los comandantes militares de ejércitos regulares a las de aquéllos comandantes de fuerzas armadas de facto. Los criterios de responsabilidad que identificó fueron: el nivel de conocimiento del comandante de lo que sus hombres hicieron, hacen o están por hacer; las medidas razonables que tomó o está por tomar, a fin de prevenir y/o reprimir los crímenes; el control efectivo que ejerce, ejerció o puede ejercer, a fin de evitar la comisión del injusto, y si notificó o no a las autoridades competentes de lo que sucedió o está por suceder; lo anterior hace parte de los estándares que miden las obligaciones de los superiores jerárquicos militares y también civiles. La actuación del comandante no se asume a priori, sino que se analiza in concreto (SPI III CPI Bemba Gombo, 2016). Bemba Gombo como Yamashita fueron condenados por no haber ejercido sus obligaciones como comandantes militares. Los criterios de conocimiento en cada uno fue distinto. En el caso de Yamashita se aplicó el hubiere debido saber por los partes que recibió y lo colosal de los crímenes, mientras que en el de Bemba Gombo la SPI III de la CPI (2016) aplicó el actual knowledge, ya que él sabía o supo, encontrándolo culpable porque no hizo genuinamente nada para prevenir y/o reprimir los crímenes de sus tropas. Respecto a la evaluación de los criterios de prevención y notificación en el artículo 28 la SA de la CPI (2018), en un fallo que nació controvertido, revertió la sentencia de la SPI III (2016) al considerar que esta última incurrió en errores de hecho y de derecho así como de procedimiento en el artículo 28 y 74 (2). ; What does criminal liability of superiors mean? What are the obligations of a military commander in the field? This is a review from Yamashita (1945) to the International Criminal Court (icc) with Bemba Gombo (2016). De jure or de facto, the icc with Bemba Gombo equated the obligations of military commanders of regular armies with those de facto commanders. Modes of liability: the level of knowledge of the commander of what his men did, do, or are about to do; the reasonable steps he has taken or is about to take to prevent and/or suppress the crimes; the effective control exercised or that may be exercised to avoid the commission of the unjust; whether or not he notified the competent authorities of what happened, or is about to happen. The modes of liability constitute the standards that measure the obligations of the hierarchical superiors whether military or civilians. The action of the commander is not assumed a priori, it is analysed in concreto (icc TC III Bemba Gombo, 2016). Bemba Gombo as Yamashita, were convicted for not having exercised their duties as military commanders. The knowledge standard in each one was different. In Yamashita the must have known was applied because he knew by the reports he received and the colossal dimensions of the crimes. In Bemba Gombo the icc applied the actual knowledge standard, he knew or knew, finding him guilty because he did nothing to prevent and/or repress the crimes of his troops. ; O que é a responsabilidade do superior hierárquico? Quais são as obrigações de umcomandante militar em campo? Desde Yamashita (1945) até a Corte Penal Internacional(CPI) com Bemba Gombo (2016). De jure o de facto, a CPI com BembaGombo equiparou as obrigações dos comandantes militares de exercícios regularesa aqueles comandantes de forças armadas de facto. Os critérios de responsabilidade:o nível de conhecimento do comandante do que seus homens fizeram, fazem ou vãoa fazer; as medidas razoáveis que tomou ou está por tomar com o fim de prevenire/ou reprimir os crimes; o controle efetivo que exerce ou exerceu ou pode exercercom o objetivo de evitar a comissão do injusto; se notificou ou não às autoridadescompetentes do que aconteceu, ou está por acontecer, constituem-se nos standardsque medem as obrigações dos superiores hierárquicos militares e também civis. Aatuação do comandante não assume a priori, analisa-se in concreto (SPI III CPIBemba Gombo, 2016). Bemba Gombo como Yamashita foram condenados por nãoter exercido suas obrigações como comandantes militares. Os critérios de conhecimentoem cada um foi diferente. Em Yamashita se aplicou o tivesse devido saber pelaspartes que recebeu e o colossal dos crimes. Em Bemba Gombo a CPI aplicou o actualknowledge, ele sabia ou soube, encontrando-o culpável porque não fez genuinamentenada para prevenir e/ou reprimir os crimes de suas tropas."

What does criminal liability of superiors mean? What are the obligations of a military commander in the field? This is a review from Yamashita (1945) to the International Criminal Court (icc) with Bemba Gombo (2016). De jure or de facto, the icc with Bemba Gombo equated the obligations of military commanders of regular armies with those de facto commanders. Modes of liability: the level of knowledge of the commander of what his men did, do, or are about to do; the reasonable steps he has taken or is about to take to prevent and/or suppress the crimes; the effective control exercised or that may be exercised to avoid the commission of the unjust; whether or not he notified the competent authorities of what happened, or is about to happen. The modes of liability constitute the standards that measure the obligations of the hierarchical superiors whether military or civilians. The action of the commander is not assumed a priori, it is analysed in concreto (icc TC III Bemba Gombo, 2016). Bemba Gombo as Yamashita, were convicted for not having exercised their duties as military commanders. The knowledge standard in each one was different. In Yamashita the must have known was applied because he knew by the reports he received and the colossal dimensions of the crimes. In Bemba Gombo the icc applied the actual knowledge standard, he knew or knew, finding him guilty because he did nothing to prevent and/or repress the crimes of his troops. ; ¿Qué es la responsabilidad del superior jerárquico? ¿Cuáles son las obligaciones de un comandante militar en campo? Desde Yamashita (1945) hasta la Corte Penal Internacional (CPI) con Bemba Gombo (2016), de jure o de facto, la CPI con Bemba Gombo equiparó las obligaciones de los comandantes militares de ejércitos regulares a las de aquéllos comandantes de fuerzas armadas de facto. Los criterios de responsabilidad que identificó fueron: el nivel de conocimiento del comandante de lo que sus hombres hicieron, hacen o están por hacer; las medidas razonables que tomó o está por tomar, a fin de prevenir y/o reprimir los crímenes; el control efectivo que ejerce, ejerció o puede ejercer, a fin de evitar la comisión del injusto, y si notificó o no a las autoridades competentes de lo que sucedió o está por suceder; lo anterior hace parte de los estándares que miden las obligaciones de los superiores jerárquicos militares y también civiles. La actuación del comandante no se asume a priori, sino que se analiza in concreto (SPI III CPI Bemba Gombo, 2016). Bemba Gombo como Yamashita fueron condenados por no haber ejercido sus obligaciones como comandantes militares. Los criterios de conocimiento en cada uno fue distinto. En el caso de Yamashita se aplicó el hubiere debido saber por los partes que recibió y lo colosal de los crímenes, mientras que en el de Bemba Gombo la SPI III de la CPI (2016) aplicó el actual knowledge, ya que él sabía o supo, encontrándolo culpable porque no hizo genuinamente nada para prevenir y/o reprimir los crímenes de sus tropas. Respecto a la evaluación de los criterios de prevención y notificación en el artículo 28 la SA de la CPI (2018), en un fallo que nació controvertido, revertió la sentencia de la SPI III (2016) al considerar que esta última incurrió en errores de hecho y de derecho así como de procedimiento en el artículo 28 y 74 (2). ; O que é a responsabilidade do superior hierárquico? Quais são as obrigações de umcomandante militar em campo? Desde Yamashita (1945) até a Corte Penal Internacional(CPI) com Bemba Gombo (2016). De jure o de facto, a CPI com BembaGombo equiparou as obrigações dos comandantes militares de exercícios regularesa aqueles comandantes de forças armadas de facto. Os critérios de responsabilidade:o nível de conhecimento do comandante do que seus homens fizeram, fazem ou vãoa fazer; as medidas razoáveis que tomou ou está por tomar com o fim de prevenire/ou reprimir os crimes; o controle efetivo que exerce ou exerceu ou pode exercercom o objetivo de evitar a comissão do injusto; se notificou ou não às autoridadescompetentes do que aconteceu, ou está por acontecer, constituem-se nos standardsque medem as obrigações dos superiores hierárquicos militares e também civis. Aatuação do comandante não assume a priori, analisa-se in concreto (SPI III CPIBemba Gombo, 2016). Bemba Gombo como Yamashita foram condenados por nãoter exercido suas obrigações como comandantes militares. Os critérios de conhecimentoem cada um foi diferente. Em Yamashita se aplicou o tivesse devido saber pelaspartes que recebeu e o colossal dos crimes. Em Bemba Gombo a CPI aplicou o actualknowledge, ele sabia ou soube, encontrando-o culpável porque não fez genuinamentenada para prevenir e/ou reprimir os crimes de suas tropas.

The main objective of this work is to analyze how the Brazilian Supreme Audit Institution (Tribunal de Contas da União - TCU) has been acting in the policy making of the federal public administration. It seeks to highlight that in addition to the classic functions of a court of accounts that oversees governmental acts, there has been an expansion of performance aimed at evaluating the performance and implementation of public programs and policies. The text highlights that there are several factors that affect this change in trajectory that gives the Court's operational audits a prominent place alongside those that are more focused on the analysis of legal and formal compliance. The international literature highlights that changes in the roles of the courts of accounts have been deepening in several countries. A second group of factors considers the so-called "good practices": experiences of countries taken as examples (especially the United States and England) and international organizations that disseminate ways of acting (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD, International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions - Intosai, United Nations - UN and World Bank). The research analyzes the Court's organizational structure, such as salaries and schooling of civil servants, in which it finds that both are higher than the average for the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary branches. The investigation examines how the official documents of the TCU appropriate the international debate, and the support on the Federal Constitution, which underlies the expansionism of its actions. This debate upholds the analysis of three empirical evidence capable of discussing this argument. Initially, backed on audit database created after a search on the court's website. Operational audits were identified that, since 2005, have been expanding TCU's performance in several public policies. Also were analyzed the Inspection Reports on Government Policies and Programs and Systemic Inspection Reports. Since 2005, there has been a significant expansion of audits aimed at evaluating public policies. In order to thicken the research, interviews were carried out with six TCU external control departments, aiming to present how this kind of acting is institutionally justified. The comparison with the literature, the document analysis that underlies this form of action, the alignment with the international "epistemic community" and the features of its organizational structure allow us to understand how external control justifies and validates its activities into the policy making of public administration. The conclusions summarize this process within the scope of public management and its managerial and political effects. Research agendas are suggested seeking to increase this incipient field of study in the areas of public administration and political science in Brazil.