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Regional human rights courts in Europe and the Americas came into being in the wake of World War II. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) were established in order to adjudicate on alleged violations of the rights of individuals. Yet, since their inception these courts have also influenced other areas of international law. A part from their impact on general international law, their case law has had significant spill over effects on international criminal law, international refugee law, international environmental law, the law of armed conflicts, and the law of the sea.

The Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS Court) is an increasingly active and bold adjudicator of human rights. Since acquiring jurisdiction over human rights complaints in 2005, theECOWASCourt has issued numerous decisions condemning human rights violations by the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (Community). Among this Court's path-breaking cases are judgments against Niger for condoning modern forms of slavery and against Nigeria for impeding the right to free basic education for all children. TheECOWASCourt also has broad access and standing rules that permit individuals and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to bypass national courts and file suits directly with the Court. Although the Court is generally careful in the proof that it requires of complainants and in the remedies that it demands of governments, it has not shied away from politically courageous decisions, such as rulings against the Gambia for the torture of journalists and against Nigeria for failing to regulate multinational companies that have degraded the environment of the oil-rich Niger Delta.

AbstractCritics challenge international courts for their interference with domestic democratic processes and alleged violations of rule of law standards: they claim that these guardians of the rule of law are not well guarded themselves. These concerns should not be dismissed too quickly as mere disgruntled venting by populist politicians. This article focuses on regional human rights courts and argues that the same interests and values that justify rule of law standards of impartiality, independence and accountability domestically also justify similar standards for international courts. Focusing on the European Court of Human Rights and its doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the article demonstrates how this doctrine may contribute to fulfilling the rule of law but at the same time may also endanger it. This requires changes to the doctrine to ensure that the core rule of law standards of predictability and protection against arbitrary discretion are respected.

The article raises and examines the problem of the possibility of Russia's participation in one of the future regional international human rights courts, which has matured after the termination of the Russian Federation's membership in the European Court of Human Rights. The author considers the following options: the Court of Human Rights in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Court of Human Rights of the Union State of Belarus – Russia, the Asian Court of Human Rights (on the legal platform of the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions), etc. Being sure that Russia cannot be a member of two or more international human rights courts at the same time, the author justifies the need for States intending to create an International Human Rights Court to develop and adopt an appropriate international human rights act. Only by focusing and relying on this act, the International Court of Human Rights will be able to determine whether the rights of a person who has applied to the Court have been violated and make an appropriate ruling.

Examines the phenomenon of avoidance by the courts of human rights norms defensively invoked by a litigant, in treaties to which the US is a party.

Abstract
In recent times, instances of contestation against the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have made headlines, and, in many of these cases, domestic courts have played a role by refusing to follow the human rights courts or even declaring their judgments to be unconstitutional. This article undertakes an in-depth analysis of these instances of judicial resistance and puts them into context. This shows that domestic courts, even though originally not having been allocated this role, have become important 'compliance partners' of the human rights courts and now play an important and autonomous role in the implementation of their judgments. At the same time, they act as 'gatekeepers' and limit their effects in the domestic order. Recent cases even suggest a turn to a less open and more national self-perception of domestic courts. While this reflects to some extent the multiple – and sometimes conflicting – roles domestic courts perform at the intersection of legal orders, the article argues that the open and flexible stance many domestic courts take when faced with international judgments is better suited to cope with the complex and plural legal reality than systematically judging anew on matters already decided by the human rights courts.

SummaryThe aim of the European Court of Human Rights is to bring about a situation in which individuals are able to get effective guarantees of their rights within their national legal systems. With this in mind, the author reviews some of the recent developments in cases before the court relating to evolutionary interpretation of the provisions of the convention, the role of the separation of powers in ensuring the protection of freedoms under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the notion of human dignity within the convention framework. The author also considers the growing case load before the court and the need for reform and concludes by pointing out that the European system is the most effective international system yet for securing human rights protection.

Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)1provides that the International Criminal Court must consider 'internationally recognized human rights' in its interpretation and application of applicable law. This article highlights the difficulty of meaningfully interpreting this reference to 'internationally recognized human rights' in accordance with the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation. These interpretative difficulties lead the article to adopt a practical focus, examining the initial jurisprudence of the Court utilizing this aspect of article 21(3), concluding that although such jurisprudence reveals a number of shortcomings, the provision's tremendous potential as a tool of evolution and innovation is evident.