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The subject of this study is the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the Security Council in the period 1946 2000. Because of their right of veto the cooperation of the permanent members has a significant influence on the functioning of the Council. The most important aspects of the cooperation that were investigated are the intensity of the cooperation and the ef-fectiveness of this cooperation in preventing and ending wars. To investigate these aspects, for both the intensity and the effectiveness measuring instruments were constructed. These measuring instruments were based on comprehensive sets of so-called 'leading indicators' and statistical methods and techniques. The intensity of the cooperation increased gradually from 1946 until 1990 (the end of the Cold War). Then it started to increase rapidly until 1996. From 1996 a slight decrease can be discer-ned. The strong increase in the strategic cooperation of the permanent members in the security Council can be established in all the majors forms of cooperation in the Council: the numbers of adopted strategic resolutions and presidential statements, the numbers of employed means (like peacekeeping missions and enforcement actions) and the amounts of money that were spent on peacekeeping activities. Further it was established that the response times of the Council regarding potential and waged wars dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War. The effectiveness of the cooperation of the permanent members in the Council was, insofar this was measurable with the applied method, not good for many years, but after the Cold War a clear improvement can be discerned. This goes for the prevention of wars, as well as for post war peacebuilding and the ending of wars. Also the numbers of potential and waged wars in which the Council not intervened dropped significantly since the end of the Cold War, as well as the use of vetoes. The large number of potential and waged wars in which the Council did not intervene during the Cold War was nearly exclusively caused by 'non decisions' (the non placing of wars on the agenda), and not by the use of vetoes by permanent members, as is often assumed in literature. Further, a comparison of two phase classifications of the Cold War showed that the great powers, even when there are great tensions among them, are prepared to cooperate in the Security Council to resolve strategic matters, if they consider this in their interest. Analyses of the adopted strategic resolutions during the Cold War revealed that cooperation here was nearly exclusively limited to issues that were not core issues of the Cold War. From this it can be concluded that cooperation against third party states was a basis of cooperation of the great powers in the Security Council. Finally, the results of this study show clearly that the Security Council was regarded and used to a large extent by the permanent members in the period 1946 2000 as an instrument of foreign policy to pursue their national interests, and not as an instrument of the world community to prevent and end wars.

'Will the Netherlands be defended?' The debate about NATO's main lines of defence at the beginning of the 1950sAt the beginning of the 1950s, the Netherlands would not have been able to defend itself in the event of a Soviet attack. Despite the fact that NATO, under the leadership of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, and later General Ridgway, was in the process of rapidly building up its defences, it was still incapable of conducting a forward defence. The pivotal political and military issue in the short term centred on one question: Which areas in Western Europe could and should be kept and which not? Answers to this question exposed conflicting national interests and points of view, particularly those of the Dutch and the French. As it was taking a considerably long time to build up the Netherlands' defences, the Dutch government had very few trump cards to add weight to its demands. Indeed, in the summer of 1952, when Parliament asked to be given a precise account of how the Dutch defences were progressing, the government was practically boxed into a corner.

Public administration; Political science - Democratie door interventie gaat over één van de meest actuele en controversiële aspecten van de hedendaagse internationale politiek: bemoeienis met de binnenlandse aangelegenheden van staten om democratische ontwikkeling in gang te zetten, te versterken of te verdedigen. Internationale democratiebevordering is omstreden. Hebben wij het recht en de mogelijkheid om ons in naam van ons idee van democratie te bemoeien met de politieke aangelegenheden van andere staten? De voortdurende problemen in landen als Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan en Irak geven aan dat internationaal ingrijpen, zelfs internationale militaire aanwezigheid, geen enkele garantie biedt op stabiliteit, laat staan op democratische ontwikkeling. In Democratie door interventie komen de argumenten voor en tegen internationale democratiebevordering (met of zonder inzet van militairen) aan de orde.