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This issue features a total of 13 articles. The first four articles are part of a special section on "Intelligent agents in e-services", edited by Professors William K. Cheung and Jane Y. Hsu under the supervision of Professor Robert J. Kauffman. Summaries of articles appearing in the special section are provided in the guest editors' introduction. The following is a summary of the nine regular submission articles also published in this issue. The review of these articles was kindly coordinated by Professor Jae Kyu Lee, former Editor in Chief of ECRA. The general submission articles in this issue focus on adoption issues, looking in particular at e-commerce adoption in Asia. They offer new insights on adoption models, using data collected in Korea and Taiwan. They also discuss adoption challenges faced by small businesses in New Zealand, online grocery stores in Singapore, businesses in China, and online portals in developing countries such as Nepal. Other topics covered in this issue include pricing of e-government services, automated e-commerce bargaining technologies, and electronic payment solutions. The first two articles look at models derived from social psychology research to help predict people's adoption of Web technologies. In "A structural equation model of Internet acceptance in Korea", Byung Gon Kim, Soon Chang Park and Kyoung Jun Lee present and analyze a model of Internet adoption that integrates Ajzen and Fishbein's theory of reasoned action (TRA) and its extension by Davis in the technology acceptance model (TAM). The study was performed using data collected from 409 employees of 10 Korean companies spanning five industrial sectors. The authors' analysis indicates that perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use have an important influence on an individual's adoption of the Internet, whereas subjective norms, which reflect sensitivity to the opinions and expectations of colleagues, do not seem to be significant. In "Predicting consumer intentions to shop online: An empirical test of competing theories", Hsiu-Fen Lin compares the TAM model and two variations of the theory of planned behavior (TPB) to predict consumer intentions to shop online. The study is based on data collected from 297 Taiwanese customers of online bookstores. While all of the models provide good predictions of actual online shopping use, a variation of the TPB model with decomposed belief structures increases the explanatory power of behavioral intention and provides an improved method of predicting consumer intentions to shop online. Although developing countries could derive significant value from the Web, most have so far failed to reap many of its potential benefits. Research in this area has received scant attention. In "Barriers to e-commerce and competitive business models in developing countries: A case study", Nir Kshetri provides a review of barriers to e-commerce in developing countries and discusses the business model of a Nepal-based online provider, Thamel.com, as a source of insight for overcoming some of these barriers. In "Level of Internet use by Chinese businesses: A preliminary study", Xibao Zhang and Cynthia Moussi present results of a study of Internet adoption by Chinese businesses. Though it is preliminary in nature and based on a convenience sample of Chinese managers, the study suggests that China's emergence as a major exporting nation is prompting many of its businesses to tap into the Internet. Size seems to play an important role in determining whether a business is connected to the Internet. The study also reveals that Internet adoption in China extends to a broad range of activities. In particular, a number of respondents indicated that they participated in electronic marketplaces to reach international customers. In "The adoption of eCommerce communications and applications technologies in small businesses in New Zealand", Nabeel Al-Qirim studies the impact of factors adapted from the technology innovation literature on the adoption of e-commerce by SMEs in New Zealand. This includes distinguishing between the adoption of email, use of an intranet, use of an extranet and VPN technology, use of the Internet for EDI, and deployment of a public Web site. In their article titled "A comparative analysis of online grocery pricing in Singapore", Lydia Gan, Shujia He, Tingli Huang and Jiebin Tan compare the pricing strategies of online and brick-and-mortar grocery stores in Singapore. Contrary to what one might have expected, they find that the online stores have greater price dispersion than their brick-and-mortar counterparts. They also find that brick-and-mortar stores actually change prices more often than their online competitors and that price differences between online and brick-and-mortar stores are not statistically significant. In his article on "A framework for pricing government e-services", Craig L. Johnson looks at the broad range of services governments are making available online. He argues that governments should take a more principled approach to pricing their services, looking at demand elasticity to maximize overall consumer surplus. This would include segmenting e-services into government-to-citizen (G2C) and government-to-business (G2B) transactions, and determining e-service pricing schedules that reflect the demand elasticity associated with these different services. In "Bargaining strategy formulation with CRM for an e-commerce agent", C.-C. Henry Chan, Chi-Bin Cheng and Chih-Hsiung Hsu propose a dynamic online pricing mechanism. The mechanism is based on customized bargaining strategies that estimate the potential of individual customers and give larger discounts to those customers with a higher, long-term potential. The proposed solution uses fuzzy reasoning to adapt its bargaining strategy. Empirical results show that this approach is more efficient and results in greater customer satisfaction and loyalty than several competing strategies. In "A new electronic traveler's check scheme based on one-way hash function", Horng-Twu Liaw, Jiann-Fu Lin and Wei-Chen Wu propose a new electronic traveler's check system that uses a one-way hash function to improve efficiency and reduce costs. This new system is shown to effectively support both online and offline usage scenarios. We would like to take this opportunity to thank the special section editors and Professor Jae Kyu Lee for the high quality of their work and for their diligence. Many thanks also to the reviewers for the detailed feedback they provided to the authors, and to the authors for their willingness to improve their papers for publication.

Fast economic growth - in excess of 5% per year - continues in most New EU Member States (NMS). Growth in Bulgaria and Romania (which joined the EU on 1 January 2007) was also accelerating throughout 2006. Everywhere, except Hungary, GDP growth has been driven predominantly by domestic demand. External trade, which significantly boosted GDP growth in a number of NMS in 2005, has been losing significance and continues to be a drag on growth in Bulgaria and Romania. wiiw growth forecasts of the GDP in individual NMS in 2007 and 2008 are looking very good. It is expected that household consumption will continue to rise strongly. Rising employment and wages (strengthening under the impact of emerging labour shortages) will be supportive. Rising remittances of migrant workers would be adding to fast rising consumer spending. Gross fixed capital investment is expected to remain strong in most NMS. With the exception of Hungary, fiscal policies will not interfere with real growth. The slight deceleration of growth in the EU-15 expected in 2007 is not likely to restrict the growth of both NMS exports and their overall GDP too much as further gains on industrial unit labour costs are expected. Given the ongoing structural changes and quality improvements in production and exports, the NMS should continue to gain market shares even despite further currency appreciation. However, growth in imports responding to growing domestic demand will be reducing the contribution of trade to GDP growth. This contribution is likely to be negative in the 'old' NMS, but small. In Bulgaria and Romania, the contributions of external trade to growth will be negative and large. Unlike the 'old' NMS, these two countries will be running very high current account deficits and rely on rising private foreign debt in order to finance consumption and investments. The risk of making big errors in growth forecasts for the 'old' NMS is fairly low. Their fundamentals are nowadays much sounder than in the past (Hungary being temporarily an exception). The rates of inflation are quite low and firmly under control. Interest rate differentials vs. the major international currencies are also low, falling, or even negative. Incentives for potentially destabilizing speculative capital inflows (and outflows) are therefore weak. Nominal currency appreciation is likely to continue, signifying the NMS' economic strength rather than potential weakness. The estimates of GDP growth rates for Bulgaria and Romania may be less certain. Both countries are growing turbulently. But, as in the Baltic countries, their growth is to a large extent induced by booming household consumption which is credit-driven and fed by excessive imports. Yet the experience of the Baltic countries indicates that such a type of growth can go on for a very long time. However, there are many examples of such debt-financed expansions coming to a rather sticky end. Thus, it might come as no surprise were the rising debt burden to put a lid on further expansion in Bulgaria and Romania. The Balkan economies continue to grow despite political risks and external shocks. Consumption is the main source of growth, with investments also increasingly contributing. High exports are accompanied by high imports and external balances remain strongly negative. Price and exchange rate stability, however, remain manageable because of strong growth of productivity and downward pressure on wages from excess supply of labour. The expectation of sustained growth is supporting growth of foreign investments in privatized assets but also increasingly in green-field projects. Fast rising prices of assets and declining interest rates due to strong credit expansion are proving worrisome for the central banks, which fear asset bubbles and weaknesses in the banking sector. These challenges are met with a tightening of monetary policy, which has led to some moderation of growth rates. Overall prospects are positive for growth and stability in the short and medium run. The main risks to positive expectations emanate from remaining political problems and from doubts about the process of EU integration and accession. The major political risk is connected with the upcoming decision on the Kosovo status. If that risk is managed well and if other political problems are addressed that will make it possible for all the countries in the region to either sign association agreements with the EU or continue or start negotiations on membership in the EU, rather positive economic news should be coming out steadily from the Balkans. That would also help the region to address the serious social risks, especially those connected with high or very high unemployment. Overall, prospects for growth are good in the short and medium run and prospects for stability are risky in the short run and good in the medium run. The region as a whole should be included in the EU by 2015, except perhaps for Kosovo and Turkey. Russian economic growth was once more over 6% in 2006, the cumulated GDP has increased by more than 40% since 2000. GDP growth is driven by the surging private consumption, recently also by investments. Owing to sluggish exports and booming imports, the contribution of real net exports to GDP growth has been negative already since 2003. The economic outlook remains positive with both consumption and investments (including FDI) growing rapidly. However, wiiw expects growth to settle between 5% and 6% in the coming years. With more oil and gas money as well as power consolidation at home, Russia's self confidence will grow further. In Ukraine, GDP growth accelerated markedly in 2006; macroeconomic imbalances were largely avoided and the 'gas price shock' reasonably well digested. Foreign debt increased by some 25%, reaching 47% of GDP by the end of the year - mainly caused by the banking sector's rapidly growing external borrowing, possibly associated with the growing presence of foreign banks. Inflation apart, the country's short-term economic outlook is good. In 2007 2008 we expect economic growth close to 6%. Despite the persistent stand-off between the president and the prime minister, the country is now living through a period of its greatest political stability since the 'orange revolution'. In China, GDP grew by 10.7%, driven by investment and an exploding trade surplus but supported by private consumption as well. For 2007-08, prospects remain good but a slight deceleration of growth may occur, due to a certain slowing down of investment and measures to contain the trade surplus.

The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century's financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that market, which should be compared with other markets on similar concrete grounds. ; L'histoire financière explique souvent le succès de Londres comme marché financier dominant au 19ème siècle par les microstructures efficaces de la Bourse de Londres (LSE). Le LSE se caractérise en particulier par une faible régulation, l'entrée libre des opérateurs, ce qui permettrait de réduire les coûts de transaction, d'accroître la liquidité et la diversification, attirant à la fois émetteurs et investisseurs. Nous montrons que les microstructures londoniennes ne sont pas nécessairement optimales et que des microstructures très différentes ont permis le succès de la Bourse de Paris, loin de l'idée reçue selon laquelle cette place aurait été victime d'un interventionnisme inefficace ou d'un monopole hostile à toute innovation. Nous étudions en détail l'organisation du Parquet parisien et ses complémentarités avec la Coulisse, le marché libre et les opérations des banques. Nous montrons qu'une telle organisation multi-polaire était efficace car elle permettait une spécialisation des agents (aussi bien intermédiaires qu'émetteurs et investisseurs) et des complémentarités qui permettaient au marché de joindre développement et stabilité. Grâce à l'usage des archives de la Bourse de Paris, nous pouvons construire des données sur les volumes échangés, les prix des charges, les coûts de transaction et les risques qui permettront à ce débat de prendre un tour plus empirique que jusqu'à présent.

The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century's financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that market, which should be compared with other markets on similar concrete grounds. ; L'histoire financière explique souvent le succès de Londres comme marché financier dominant au 19ème siècle par les microstructures efficaces de la Bourse de Londres (LSE). Le LSE se caractérise en particulier par une faible régulation, l'entrée libre des opérateurs, ce qui permettrait de réduire les coûts de transaction, d'accroître la liquidité et la diversification, attirant à la fois émetteurs et investisseurs. Nous montrons que les microstructures londoniennes ne sont pas nécessairement optimales et que des microstructures très différentes ont permis le succès de la Bourse de Paris, loin de l'idée reçue selon laquelle cette place aurait été victime d'un interventionnisme inefficace ou d'un monopole hostile à toute innovation. Nous étudions en détail l'organisation du Parquet parisien et ses complémentarités avec la Coulisse, le marché libre et les opérations des banques. Nous montrons qu'une telle organisation multi-polaire était efficace car elle permettait une spécialisation des agents (aussi bien intermédiaires qu'émetteurs et investisseurs) et des complémentarités qui permettaient au marché de joindre développement et stabilité. Grâce à l'usage des archives de la Bourse de Paris, nous pouvons construire des données sur les volumes échangés, les prix des charges, les coûts de transaction et les risques qui permettront à ce débat de prendre un tour plus empirique que jusqu'à présent.

The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century's financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that ...

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century's financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that market, which should be compared with other markets on similar concrete grounds. ; L'histoire financière explique souvent le succès de Londres comme marché financier dominant au 19ème siècle par les microstructures efficaces de la Bourse de Londres (LSE). Le LSE se caractérise en particulier par une faible régulation, l'entrée libre des opérateurs, ce qui permettrait de réduire les coûts de transaction, d'accroître la liquidité et la diversification, attirant à la fois émetteurs et investisseurs. Nous montrons que les microstructures londoniennes ne sont pas nécessairement optimales et que des microstructures très différentes ont permis le succès de la Bourse de Paris, loin de l'idée reçue selon laquelle cette place aurait été victime d'un interventionnisme inefficace ou d'un monopole hostile à toute innovation. Nous étudions en détail l'organisation du Parquet parisien et ses complémentarités avec la Coulisse, le marché libre et les opérations des banques. Nous montrons qu'une telle organisation multi-polaire était efficace car elle permettait une spécialisation des agents (aussi bien intermédiaires qu'émetteurs et investisseurs) et des complémentarités qui permettaient au marché de joindre développement et stabilité. Grâce à l'usage des archives de la Bourse de Paris, nous pouvons construire des données sur les volumes échangés, les prix des charges, les coûts de transaction et les risques qui permettront à ce débat de prendre un tour plus empirique que jusqu'à présent.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century's financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that market, which should be compared with other markets on similar concrete grounds. ; L'histoire financière explique souvent le succès de Londres comme marché financier dominant au 19ème siècle par les microstructures efficaces de la Bourse de Londres (LSE). Le LSE se caractérise en particulier par une faible régulation, l'entrée libre des opérateurs, ce qui permettrait de réduire les coûts de transaction, d'accroître la liquidité et la diversification, attirant à la fois émetteurs et investisseurs. Nous montrons que les microstructures londoniennes ne sont pas nécessairement optimales et que des microstructures très différentes ont permis le succès de la Bourse de Paris, loin de l'idée reçue selon laquelle cette place aurait été victime d'un interventionnisme inefficace ou d'un monopole hostile à toute innovation. Nous étudions en détail l'organisation du Parquet parisien et ses complémentarités avec la Coulisse, le marché libre et les opérations des banques. Nous montrons qu'une telle organisation multi-polaire était efficace car elle permettait une spécialisation des agents (aussi bien intermédiaires qu'émetteurs et investisseurs) et des complémentarités qui permettaient au marché de joindre développement et stabilité. Grâce à l'usage des archives de la Bourse de Paris, nous pouvons construire des données sur les volumes échangés, les prix des charges, les coûts de transaction et les risques qui permettront à ce débat de prendre un tour plus empirique que jusqu'à présent.

The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century's financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that ...

This paper aims at giving an explanation of the changes in the number of bankruptcies during the second part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th. We wonder in particular whether changes in bankruptcy law, which are substantial during the period, suffice to explain the rise in the proportion of bankrupted firms. We first describe the main features and changes of French insolvency law and show that they contradict the evolution observed at the aggregate level. We then show that existing statistics, which include a regional dimension, allow for a better test of the impact of legal changes. We show that some legal changes had a significant impact, but not all. We also observe that regional variations in bankruptcies are huge and do not correspond to French economic geography, but may rather be understood as a diffusion process from the Paris Court towards the provinces. The major differences among regions also suggest that, even in a civil law country, the letter the law is much less important than local practices.

The literature in financial history usually considers London as the only centre of the late 19th century's financial globalization, and explains it at least in part by the efficient microstructure (organization) of the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is characterized as having been a little regulated market, where entry was easy both for traders and issuers [Michie (1998), Neal (2004), White (2006)]. The LSE microstructure is also considered as the natural and optimal one by much of the theoretical literature on stock markets, which argues that free entry decreases transaction costs and increases both liquidity and diversification, resulting in economies of scale attracting traders, issuers and buyers. Our paper tries to explain why the Paris Bourse was able to be so successful in spite of the supposedly inefficient monopoly and regulations that the State imposed it. We focus on the fact that the Paris market actually included several different market places: the Parquet (the official Bourse, organized by the agents de change), the Coulisse, the Marché libre, and inter-bank direct operations. We argue that this multi-polar organization, was efficient, relying on the specialization it allowed, and the complementarities it helped develop among markets. We incorporate in the discussion the recent theoretical literature that shows that no single market can satisfy the heterogeneous preferences of all issuers and investors, so that a multi-polar organization can be a superior solution. We demonstrate our claim by looking not only at the rules but also at the actual functioning of the Parquet thanks to its archives which we recently classified. These archives also allow us to build new statistical series which permit evaluating the performances of the Parquet during the 19th century: volumes traded, seat prices, transaction costs, and operational risks. If one supposes that the Parquet was the least efficient segment of the Parisian market, this will provide us with a lower bound for the global efficiency of that market, which should be compared with other markets on similar concrete grounds. ; L'histoire financière explique souvent le succès de Londres comme marché financier dominant au 19ème siècle par les microstructures efficaces de la Bourse de Londres (LSE). Le LSE se caractérise en particulier par une faible régulation, l'entrée libre des opérateurs, ce qui permettrait de réduire les coûts de transaction, d'accroître la liquidité et la diversification, attirant à la fois émetteurs et investisseurs. Nous montrons que les microstructures londoniennes ne sont pas nécessairement optimales et que des microstructures très différentes ont permis le succès de la Bourse de Paris, loin de l'idée reçue selon laquelle cette place aurait été victime d'un interventionnisme inefficace ou d'un monopole hostile à toute innovation. Nous étudions en détail l'organisation du Parquet parisien et ses complémentarités avec la Coulisse, le marché libre et les opérations des banques. Nous montrons qu'une telle organisation multi-polaire était efficace car elle permettait une spécialisation des agents (aussi bien intermédiaires qu'émetteurs et investisseurs) et des complémentarités qui permettaient au marché de joindre développement et stabilité. Grâce à l'usage des archives de la Bourse de Paris, nous pouvons construire des données sur les volumes échangés, les prix des charges, les coûts de transaction et les risques qui permettront à ce débat de prendre un tour plus empirique que jusqu'à présent.