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"Dieser Artikel analysiert die institutionelle Form der internationalen
Kooperation zur Vermeidung von Doppelbesteuerung. Es wird argumentiert,
dass das Doppelbesteuerungsproblem als ein Koordinationsspiel mit
Verteilungskonflikt verstanden werden kann. Die Verteilung der Steuereinnahmen
hängt von der Asymmetrie der Investitionsflüsse zwischen den
vertragsschließenden Staaten ab. Da diese Investitionspositionen notwendigerweise
paarweise variieren, können die Verteilungsinteressen der
Staaten am besten in bilateralen Verhandlungen aufeinander abgestimmt
werden. Weil es außerdem bei bilateralen Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen
keine Externalitäten gibt, sind solche Verträge auch durchsetzbar. Trotzdem
gibt es Bedarf für eine multilaterale Organisation, die Informationen
und gemeinsame Praktiken in Form eines Modellabkommens verbreitet.
Das Modellabkommen dient als Fokalpunkt für die bilateralen Verhandlungen.
Die strategische Struktur als Koordinationsspiel kann außerdem
erklären, warum die Institutionen der Doppelbesteuerungsvermeidung
nicht mit Durchsetzungskapazitäten ausgestattet sind. Das sogenannte
Verständigungsverfahren zur Beilegung von Vertragsstreitigkeiten dient
vielmehr als Instrument zur Bearbeitung des Problems unvollständiger
Verträge." (Autorenreferat)

This special issue seeks to move forward the development of an empirical research agenda that takes seriously the complexity of how international organizations (IOs) function and the need to study that complexity at all levels of analysis by using robust research tools. We advocate for a broad empirical research approach that molds and sharpens theories about IOs by conducting systematic tests in large-sample environments. Two themes create a common thread throughout this issue. First, shifting the focus from whether IOs matter to how they work requires acknowledgment of the contingency of cause and effect. A second common thread lies in the authors' treatment of IO membership as an aggregate phenomenon—that is, as a set of institutions and relationships evolving over time and with many members rather than as a single organization.

APSA international membership by country and upcoming international
events.

APSA international membership by country and upcoming international
events.

Introduction -- Surfaces of inscription -- Theory of risk -- Theory of regulation -- Regulating risk -- The political arena -- Conclusion

Upcoming international events.

Approximately 80% of the volume of exports of major conventional weapons for the period 2003-2007 were accounted for by the five largest suppliers -- the USA, Russia, Germany, France and the UK. Although these five suppliers are likely to continue to account for an overwhelmingly large share of international arms transfers, concerns were expressed in 2007 regarding the export prospects for French and Russian major conventional weapons. Asia, Europe and the Middle East continued to be the largest recipient regions for the period 2003-2007. The largest recipient countries were China, India, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Greece and South Korea. However, 2007 gave the first signs of a potentially significant change among the largest recipients, with decreased deliveries to and orders by China. The largest suppliers to Asia and the Middle East will continue to engage in intense competition for export orders, with Libya and Saudi Arabia likely to become large recipients once again. SIPRI data show the volume of international arms transfers to South America in the period 2003-2007 to be 47% higher than in 1998-2002. Despite attention-grabbing headlines and some evidence of competitive behaviour (e.g. the nature and timing of acquisitions by Brazil, Columbia and Venezuela), it seems unlikely that South America is in the midst of a classically defined arms race. Acquisitions have been primarily motivated by efforts to replace or upgrade military inventories in order to maintain existing capabilities; to respond to predominantly domestic security threats; to strengthen ties with supplier governments; to enhance domestic arms industry capability; or to bolster regional or international profile. Arms suppliers meet the demand for weapons that a conflict creates for a number of reasons: to gain political and economic influence, to substitute for an interested external party's direct military presence and to meet the powerful economic pressures to sell arms. The international transfer of arms to conflict zones in Afghanistan and Sudan illustrates a number of related tendencies. First, UN arms embargoes imposed on armed non-state actors have thus far failed to stop their arms acquisitions. Second, major arms suppliers have been willing to show their support for the government in a conflict zone by directly supplying it with arms. Third, internationally sanctioned peacekeeping operations often struggle to obtain suitable arms and military equipment. Adapted from the source document.