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Intro -- Contents / Matière -- Les processus canadien et communautaire de négociation des traités, la Société civile et le Principe démocratique: Leçons à tirer de la Communauté européenne -- Summary and Sommaire -- Weaving a Tangled Web: Hape and the Obfuscation of Canadian Reception Law -- Sommaire and Summary -- La responsabilité internationale d'État pour le fait d'entreprises militaires privées -- Summary and Sommaire -- The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced Marriage: Providing Clarity or Confusion? -- Sommaire and Summary -- L'incorporation de la coutume internationale en common law canadienne -- Summary and Sommaire -- State Immunity, State Atrocities, and Civil Justice in the Modern Era of International Law -- Sommaire and Summary -- Notes and Comments / Notes et commentaires -- Canada and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: Prime Minister Chrétien's Gloss on the UN Charter Principles on the Use of Force -- Sommaire and Summary -- Le processus d'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union européenne: Le rôle déterminant des critères politiques de Copenhague -- Summary and Sommaire -- John Peters Humphrey: Canadian Nationalist and World Government Advocate -- Sommaire and Summary -- Chronique de Droit international économique en 2006 / Digest of International Economic Law in 2006 -- Commerce -- Le Canada et le système financier international en 2006 -- Investissement -- Canadian Practice in International Law / Pratique canadienne en matière de droit international -- At the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2006-7 / Au ministère des Affaires étrangères et Commerce international en 2006-7 -- Parliamentary Declarations in 2006-7 / Déclarations parlementaires en 2006-7 -- Treaty Action Taken by Canada in 2006 / Mesures prises par le Canada en matière de traités en 2006 -- Cases / Jurisprudence.

The current banking crisis has highlighted the fragility of the international finance system and the extent to which current system safeguards such as IMF action fall short. Envisioning a fuller banking security system leads naturally to the proposal for an international deposit insurance system based on risk‐based premiums. This proposal is outlined here as a replacement for ad hoc action by national governments and the IMF that is designed to avoid moral hazard while providing an efficient means to international banking security as part of our global financial architecture.

Representative governments under-invest in public goods that provide insurance against risk, The combination of inequality and risk aversion guarantees that the payoffs to insurance are skewed, so the median voter prefers a sub-optimally low level of investment. The problem is exacerbated by supermajority requirements or the need for international coordination. This accounts for some of the characteristic shortcomings of domestic public policy and represents an important obstacle to international cooperation. The argument is illustrated with reference to the Kyoto Protocol and the International Monetary Fund. The argument implies that delegation to international organizations with risk-averse preferences may be welfare enhancing.