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Centre of Excellence (CoE) is a politically initiated financing scheme from the Research Council in Norway aiming for long term, high quality and innovative research, contributing towards solving the big challenges of our society. Two evaluations conclude that this scheme is a success. These evaluations does not however pay much attention to the role of the administration in that regard. This master-thesis investigate how administrative leaders in the CoE contribute towards goal achievement. This has not previously been studied. For the data collection individual interviews was chosen, because they provide an open and investigative approach, well suited to gather relevant information. The analysis are based on organizational theory for public organizations, theories about organization types and previous research regarding the role of administrative personnel in research and higher education. The administrative leaders in CoE work in the interface between academic work and administration. My research shows that most of them have an academic background. They are highly educated, on master or PhD level, and some have research experience beyond that. Most of them have relevant work experience with a good overview of how the research and university systems work. The administrative leaders can further be recognised by their ability to create a good work environment and their social integration skills. This is very important in CoE, not the least because the centres depends heavily on recruitment of international research staff. In this regard good language skills and intercultural competence are also important. These leaders contribute to goal achievement through relieving the researchers and facilitating research related tasks, like conferences and meeting places, and haveing a good overview and ensure internal and external information flow. They also organize social activities and function as a central hub or connector. The administrative leader role demands a mix of knowledge and competencies, resembling the role of the classic middle range leader in the professional bureaucracy of today. With a great variety of different assignments coupled with being a connector for tasks and functions, both vertical and horizontal in the organization. In addition the administrative leader in a CoE also works close with the research leaders and the research activities at the centre. CoE are organized as time-limited projects with high demands and expectations. My study shows that the administration apparatus in CoE is important for goal achievement, but also that it is necessary with one 100% administrative leader or coordinator in a CoE, in order to take care of and coordinate the interests of the centre, both internally and in relation to the host institution. These CoE administrative leaders are a highly selected group regarding qualifications and background, which is something to be aware of when planning these kinds of research units, but also concerning the status- and role of administrative research personnel in general. ; publishedVersion

Hvordan håndterer Norge sin militæraktivisme og sitt NATO-medlemskap når landet vil presentere seg selv som en fredsnasjon? Problemstillingen ble aktuell i det norske utenriksdepartementets nylige kampanje for å få Norge valgt inn i FNs sikkerhetsråd, hvor ideen om Norge som fredsnasjon stod sentralt. I denne artikkelen bruker vi nasjonsbranding som et analytisk rammeverk for å forstå hvordan Norge bygget opp sin kampanje som fredsnasjon og håndterte det konkurrerende narrativet om sin rolle i krig. Som et sekundærfokus ser vi også på hvordan Norges to konkurrenter, Irland og Canada, fremstilte seg på disse to dimensjonene – som er av særinteresse da Irland ikke er NATO-medlem. For å utforske disse spørsmålene analyserer vi taler og tekster fra det norske diplomatiet og regjeringen vedrørende kampanjen, samt ser på kampanjematerialet til de tre landene. Gitt at de tre landenes profil er påfallende lik, fant vi at alle måtte forsøke å finne en måte å brande seg på som uttrykket ens særtrekk og høynet ens relevans i sammenligning med de to andre landene. I analysen av Norge ser vi at militæraktivisme stadig ble hvisket ut i løpet av den norske kampanjen og at andre tematikker ble brukt i brandingen – som for eksempel likestilling og bidrag til internasjonal utvikling. Dette skulle dermed skulle legitimere ideen om fredsnasjonen Norge, et land som alle andre kan stole på.
Abstract in English:Military Activism Branded as Peace Activism? Norway's Campaign for a Seat on the UN Security CouncilIn seeking to present itself as a peace nation, how has Norway sought to address its military activism and NATO membership? This tension was apparent in Norway's recent campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council, where the idea of the country as a peace nation stood central. Using nation branding as an analytical framework, we ask how Norway built and sustained this peace narrative and managed the competing narrative of its role in controversial armed conflicts. As a secondary focus, we ask how Norway's two competitors, Ireland and Canada, presented themselves on these two axes of peace and military activism. Ireland posed a particular threat as it is not a NATO member. To explore these questions, we analyse speeches and texts from Norwegian officials regarding the campaign and examine the official campaign material from all three countries. Given that the image of all three countries was generally similar, we find that each country sought to find unique ways to brand themselves as well as countering the few specific advantages of the others. In the case of Norway, we find that during the campaign the country's military activism was downplayed and other themes were foregrounded in the branding, such as gender equality and international development cooperation. This would legitimate the idea of Norway as a peace nation, a reliable partner that all states could trust.

Den norske debatten om kinesiske investeringer og sikkerhet har gjennomgått et betydelig taktskifte på få år. Fra en situasjon hvor det i liten grad var en debatt, og hvor kritiske røster i hovedsak angikk bekymringer om arbeidsmiljøutfordringer, har kinesisk næringsvirksomhet i Norge nå også blitt en del av den sikkerhetspolitiske debattsfæren. To særtrekk gjør det norske eksempelet til en spesielt interessant studie av de fellesnordiske spørsmålsstillingene diskutert i denne Fokusspalten. Norsk økonomi har tjent særegent godt på det kinesiske veksteventyret, men Norge har også stått i en særegent vanskelig politisk stilling overfor Kina gjennom det siste tiåret. Kontrasten mellom disse to faktorene har stått sentralt i norsk Kina-debatt. Ikke desto mindre har den norske offentlige debatten rundt kinesiske investeringer vært relativt positiv. Dette har blant annet vært drevet frem av gode erfaringer blant norske selskaper som har blitt kjøpt opp av kinesiske partnere. Den offentlige samtalen har dog i nyere tid begynt å relatere til spørsmålet gjennom en politisk og sikkerhetsmessig vinkling. Dette er et taktskifte som ikke skyldes hendelser knyttet til eksisterende kinesisk aktivitet i Norge, men heller en norsk gjenspeiling av bredere globale og regionale trender. Huaweis rolle i den kommende utbyggingen av 5G-nettverket har vært et spesielt viktig bindeledd til denne internasjonale opinionsdreiningen.
Abstract in English:Norway's Debate about Chinese Investments: From Benevolence to CautionThe debate in Norway regarding security concerns related to Chinese investments has seen a notable change in character over a short period of time. From a situation where there was little discernible debate at all, and where negative coverage of Chinese investment flows were mainly concerned with working environment issues, Chinese capital flows to Norway have now also become part of the debate on national security. Two particularities make the case of Norway especially interesting with regards to the broader Nordic debates over the issues discussed in this Fokus section. The Norwegian economy has been particularly well placed to benefit from the extraordinary Chinese economic growth, but Norway has also been in a particularly problematic political position towards China over the last decade. The contrast between these two factors has been a structuring trait of the Norwegian China debate. Nevertheless, the Norwegian public debate on China has been relatively positive over a long period of time. This has been given impetus by the positive experiences reported from the Norwegian enterprises that have been the target of Chinese acquisitions. However, lately, the public debate has increasingly come to regard the issue also through a political and security-related lens. This changing character is not due to specific events concerning Chinese activities in Norway, as much as being a reflection of broader regional and global trends. The question of Huawei's role in the coming construction of the 5G network has been a particularly important driver in this regard, as well as conductive link to the international change in opinion.

Artikkelen ser på mulighetene og utfordringene med avskrekking som strategisk tilnærming til det stadig viktigere cyberdomenet, fra et småstatsperspektiv. Forfatterne argumenterer for at det er essensielt å opprette og ansvarliggjøre en multinasjonal og multidepartemental/-sektoriell cyberorganisasjon for at reell cyberavskrekking skal være mulig å generere.
Innledningsvis beskriver artikkelen den klassiske og utvidete oppfatningen av avskrekking, og hvilke kriterier som må ligge til grunn for å kunne oppnå avskrekkende effekt: kapasitet, kredibilitet og evnen til å kommunisere effektivt. Sett fra et globalt sikkerhetsperspektiv har muligheten til å generere avskrekkende effekt vært med på å forme verden, spesielt i perioden 1945 til 1990. Kompleksiteten i sikkerhetssektoren har imidlertid økt signifikant siden da, mye grunnet økt global konnektivitet og fremveksten av cyberdomenet.
Artikkelen diskuterer hvordan kriteriene for avskrekking utfordres når strategien skal appliseres i cyberdomenet, med fokus på problemene knyttet til antallet aktører/vektorer, ulike motiver for handlinger, manglende felles grunnlag som utgangspunkt for å adressere utfordringene, og forskjellig oppfatning omkring attribusjon og proporsjonalitetsprinsippet. Forfatterne fremholder at disse utfordringene gjør det vanskeligere, men desto viktigere å identifisere hvordan man kan generere avskrekking i cyberdomenet – spesielt for høyteknologiske småstater, som Norge. Å håndtere dette på en god måte forutsetter at man ser på bredden av avskrekkingsteori i sammenheng over tid, og småstater må erkjenne sine svakheter og spille på sine styrker. Anbefalingene som fremlegges, er åpningstrekk som gjør nettopp dette, og som samtidig bereder grunnen for å dra veksler på komplementære effekter av ulike dimensjoner ved avskrekkingststrategi på lengre sikt.
Abstract in English
This article explores the possibilities and challenges associated with deterrence as strategy in the increasingly significant cyber-domain, from a small state perspective. The authors argue that genuine cyber-deterrence is contingent upon the creation of an accountable cyberorganization, with a multinational and multi-departmental/sectorial composition.
The article addresses classical and broader deterrence, and the criterions that must be met in order to successfully deter; capability, credibility, and the ability to communicate effectively. From a global perspective, the ability to generate effective deterrence has been key to shape the international security landscape in the period from 1945 to 1990. However, the complexity of the security sector has increased significantly since then – much due to the seemingly ever-growing global connectedness and the emergence of the cyber-domain.
The article further explores and discusses how the criteria for effective deterrence is tested when applied to the cyber-domain, with emphasis on the problems associated with the number of actors/vectors, varying motives for actions, the lack of a shared conceptual foundation as a basis to address the challenges, and differing opinions concerning attribution and proportionality. The authors argue that these problems make it difficult, but thus the more important to identify how to generate effective deterrence in the cyber-domain – especially for high-tech small states such as Norway. Effective management of the problem-complex requires exploration of the whole range of deterrence theory over time, and small states must recognize their inherent weaknesses and play to their strengths. The recommendation put forth here is an initial move which allows just that, and which at the same time sets the stage for more elaborate strategies that exploit the complementary effects of different dimensions of and approaches to deterrence.

Norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk har ligget ganske fast frem til i dag. På 2020-tallet, i det avgjørende tiåret for klimapolitikken, blir imidlertid den norske linjen utfordret. Det skyldes at en nasjonal forutsetning som hittil har vært Norges fremste styrke, nemlig det fornybare kraftsystemet, ikke lenger opplagt kan ivareta den samme funksjonen i norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk. Det fornybare kraftsystemet og en aktiv utenrikspolitikk for fleksible ordninger i internasjonalt klimasamarbeid har ivaretatt den norske legitimiteten. Fremover vil derimot kravene til hva klimapolitikken skal levere skjerpes kraftig, når elektrifisering og industriell omstilling skal bidra til å nå klimamålene. En energiomstilling som svarer til ambisjonsnivået i klimapolitikken, vil bety at klima-utenrikspolitikken må balansere flere hensyn enn tidligere. Ingenting ved klimapolitikken er lenger kun innenrikspolitikk.
Nordsjøen står overfor en storstilt havvindutbygging. Uavhengig av hva Norge gjør vil europeisk havvindsutbygging dreie Europa i retning av økt gjensidig avhengighet, både fysisk i form av grenseoverskridende infrastruktur, og regulatorisk, gjennom felles regler for salg av kraft over landegrenser. Jo mer omfattende det grønne skiftet blir, jo tydeligere blir det at norsk og europeisk energiomstilling henger sammen, og at denne gjensidig avhengige energiomstillingen er av de aller viktigste komponentene i Norge og andre staters klimapolitikk. Denne omstillingen trigger imidlertid sterke suverenitetsimpulser i mange norske politiske partier. En storstilt norsk havvindutbygging reiser kontroversielle spørsmål om finansiering, ilandføring og kabelforbindelser, som alle med betydelig sannsynlighet åpner for vanskelige politiske dragkamper. Energiomstilling er nå en helt nødvendig del av en videreutviklet norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk. Det innebærer en utenrikspolitikk som utfordrer norsk suverenitet i langt større grad enn tidligere. Det beveger norsk klima-utenrikspolitikk potensielt fra kontinuitet og konsensus til uenighet og strid.
Abstract in English:Power Shortage on the Horizon: Norwegian Climate Foreign Policy from Consensus to Conflict?Until recently, Norwegian climate foreign policy has been relatively consensual. In the 2020s – the decisive decade for climate politics – the Norwegian stance is however being challenged. This is because a national precondition that until now has been Norway's foremost strength, i.e., the renewable power system, can no longer uphold the same function in Norwegian climate foreign policy. The renewable power system and an active foreign policy emphasizing flexible mechanisms in international climate cooperation have preserved the legitimacy of Norwegian climate policies. However, in the future, climate policies will face dramatically sharpened demands, as reaching the climate goals will now also depend on electrification and industrial change. An energy transition that corresponds to the upgraded climate policy ambitions implies a climate foreign policy that needs to balance more concerns than in the past. There is now no element of climate policy that is domestic politics only.
The North Sea is facing a major offshore wind power expansion. Irrespective of what Norway decides, a European offshore expansion will move Europe towards greater mutual interdependence, both physically in terms of border-crossing infrastructure, and regulatory, through common rules and regulations for the sale of power across national borders. The more extensive the green energy transition becomes, the more obvious it is that Norwegian and European energy transitions are connected, and that this mutually interdependent energy transition constitutes one of the most important components of the climate policies of Norway and other states. This transition, however, triggers strong sovereignty impulses in many Norwegian political parties. A major Norwegian offshore wind power expansion raises controversial questions about financing, how and where to connect the wind parks to the grid, and subsea cable connections. There is a considerable likelihood that Norwegian offshore wind policy will be characterized by major political tugs-of-war. Energy transition is now a completely necessary part of the development of Norwegian climate foreign policy. This implies a foreign policy that challenges Norwegian sovereignty to a far greater extent than before, which potentially moves Norwegian climate foreign policy from continuity and consensus to disagreement and strife.