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Cet article vise à questionner le diagnostic fréquemment avancé de « dépolitisation » de la régulation internationale assurée par les organisations internationales (OI), thème qui a rarement fait l'objet d'une réflexion approfondie. Basée sur une revue de la littérature de sociologie, de science politique et d'anthropologie relative aux OI, la démarche consiste donc à systématiser la réflexion sur la dialectique politisation/dépolitisation dans les OI. Les principaux vecteurs de la dépolitisation sont identifiés : le recours au registre éthique et normatif, la neutralisation politique de leur discours, et la mobilisation d'une expertise multiforme à des fins d'autolégitimation apolitique. Sont également analysées les contraintes qui jouent en faveur de la dépolitisation de l'action des OI : contraintes décisionnelles et diplomatiques liées à la structure intergouvernementale de leurs instances de décision, contraintes administratives et culturelles inhérentes à la bureaucratie des OI. Enfin, le concept de dépolitisation est discuté pour ses insuffisances : son incapacité à rendre compte du discours politisé de certaines OI et des effets de politisation ou de repolitisation induits aussi bien par les normes éthiques véhiculées que par l'expertise mobilisée.

Insists both on the unavoidable interrelation of the disciplines of International Law & International Relations & the problematic nature of combining a critical standpoint with the necessity of decompartmentalizing these fields of study heretofore regarded as separate. The idea of a 'constituent relationship' between the two is presented is presented as the basis of a future reconceptualization for researchers. This new approach would be both critical & holistic. In addition, suggests theories of problem resolution may indicate modes of emancipating these disciplines from familiar restraints, although states an awareness that problem solving techniques themselves are misleadingly presented as simple tools when they involve unexamined assumptions of their own. Due to current statistical methods, the tendency is to do a cost-benefit analysis of the growing institutionalization of international law, focusing on what this or that agent can gain in the way of information or conflict resolution. Some limit this analysis to states; others factor in special interest groups. But the big, unanswered question in research is the two disciplines' interrelation in the problematics of international dynamics. In this regard, a major problem is the predetermined, often binary, rational categories because they make it difficult to deal with the specificity of contemporary problems. Examples given include such oppositions as legal/illegal, stable/anarchic, economic/political, public/private, all categories that do not allow for all possible variables. Two important heuristic dimensions in the future: recognizing that structures & dynamics of international power do not exist apart from the judicial relationships that crystallize & institutionalize them. Law in general & international law in particular cannot be reduced to the 'will' of nations or the idea of 'national interests.' Neither can economics be factored out. Terminology is also an issue because new categories of analysis are needed. References. R. Ruffin

Paris as the capital of France and an international city; esprit, history, the arts, intellectual life, city form and planning, environment, financial services, economic role, innovation and research; 9 articles and 3 interviews.

About the International Monetary System, by Benjamin J. Cohen
The outlook for the world financial system is clouded by a variety of problems - volatility of floating exchange rates, inefficient management of the multiple-reserve-asset standard, the massive burden of balance-of-payments financing. No doubt it would be excessively pessimistic, not to say alarmist, to predict outright collapse: the system has shown considerable resiliency, after all, in recent years. The potential for improvement exists in our international monetary arrangements, but it is not infinite. The system could be better managed, both efficiency and consistency could be promoted. Why not begin? But nothing can ensure that monetary relations will always remain stable and free of policy conflict. So long as there will be politically sovereign states and formally independent national currencies, there will be international monetary problems.