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A CRITICAL REEXAMINATION OF PREVALENT ASSUMPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE IS PRESENTED. THE TRADITIONAL MODEL OF THE INTERSTATE SYSTEM, WHICH GIVES THE NATIONSTATE A PROMINENT PLACE AS ACTOR & UNIT OF ANALYSIS & CONCEIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AS A COLLECTIVITY OF STATES AIMING AT EQUILIBRIUM, HAS BEEN GENERALLY ACCEPTED BY SCHOLARS (IE BALANCE OF POWER THEORY). DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL REALITY SEEM TO CONTRADICT THESE ASSUMPTIONS. THEY ARE SUMMARIZED IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE 'NUCLEAR AGE' & THE 'TRANSNATIONAL SYSTEM' & COMBINED IN THE NOTION OF INTERDEPENDENCE CHARACTERIZING THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. THESE DEVELOPMENTS POINT TO THE INCREASING CONVERGENCE OF RATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. IN RECENT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE, THE TRADITIONAL HORIZONTAL, TERRITORIALLY-BASED ORGANIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS CONTRASTED WITH ITS INCREASINGLY VERTICAL, TRANSNATIONAL CHARACTER, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME THE EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IS SUPERSEDED BY A VIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM BASED ON RELATIONS OF DOMINANCE & SUPREMACY. THESE NEW INSIGHTS ARE COMBINED IN A MODEL OF A WORLD POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT IS GLOBAL IN ITS GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSION. HA.

International bureaucracy is a phenomenon peculiar to our time, but it is difficult to study: From the outside, studies remain superficial; from the inside, they can become biased. However, certain qualities of this bur'cy appear when we study the civil servants (CS's) of the various European states. Characteristic (1) is the diversity of the various groups of CS's. Each org acts independently; some CS's like those of the CECA, have legal status, while others are hired on a contractual basis. There is also diversity in treatment, in pensions, in conditions of service, & it is impossible to move from one org to another. Characteristic (2) is the uncertainty of the recruitment process: some subordinate positions & important posts are filled in advance; there is also direct recruitment at every level of employment with a consequent risk of cooptation. Furthermore, these civil servants must belong, in a predetermined proportion, to the countries of the various member nations, which of course creates difficulties of all kinds. Finally, it must be recognised that the role of this bur'cy is ill-defined. Psychol'ly, European CS's are in a difficult situation. They feel that they are uprooted, far from the country of their origin, and not part of an established hierarchical framework. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

Pleading for an `International Institute on Wars', whose task would be to study the cause of conflicts & to attempt to prevent such conflicts, this article was written in French in a Belgian periodical: The Army--The Nation. The authors begin with the fact that war has been studied very little, which is a result of mans' familiartity with such a phenomenon. There is the impression that war depends solely on the arbitrary will of men, & finally, there is the illusion that we are in no danger of it. Neither the philosophers nor the sociol's who have actually studied war have been able to explain its power. The jurists, in fighting against war & in seeking to create an international order, actually encourage war by making war one of the perogatives of all sovereign states. Has Bertrand de Jouvenel discovered the solution which holds that war is connected to power? The establishment of an institute is as wise, as it is urgent to support the role of defensive military alliances such as NATO which, to guard against war, bestirs us to arm ourselves. Tr by J. A. Broussard from IPSA.

Majority rule has various applications. In parliamentary theory, it intervenes at the level of relations between assembly & gov, & again, in elections. We find it in democratic theory where the majority of the people must approve decisions of the constitutional organs. Finally, it is employed in the decisionmaking process of the assemblies, & it is this aspect which forms the object of the present study. Since antiquity the majority principle has been generally observed in the decisions of deliberating bodies; but it was not until the 16th cent that it triumphed in England & France. In Switzerland up to the 16th cent majority rule was in effect, disappeared for a while, & then reappeared after the transition from confederation to federation. In Holland, majority rule was applied with certain restrictions from the 16th cent on. Poland had the 'liberum veto' up to the beginning of the 19th cent. From a theoretical viewpoint, the jurists of the Middle Ages based their justification of majority rule on an old Roman adage, & Canon Law has also made an important contribution to this doctrine. The authors of the 18th cent elaborated a legal theory based on rational fictions & on the doctrine of the Social Contract in particular. Among the moderns, 3 principal schools can be distinguished: those who, with Duguit, give a utilitarian basis to the principle, those who see in it a sublimated power, particularly sociol'ts, & finally the theoreticians who accept the principle for ethical reasons. The problem has increased in importance with the existence of international org's where at present, the majority principle is applied only exceptionally. (Translated by Z. Dana from IPSA).

VARIOUS EXPLICIT MARXIAN THEORIES ARE CURRENT ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR TO BE EXPECTED OF POOR PEASANTS IN THE THIRD WORLD. IN CHILE, IN 1970, PEASANTS DID GET A CHANCE TO VOTE A GOVERNMENT INTO POWER THAT HAD PROMISED TO TAKE THE COUNTRY ALONG THE ROAD TO SOCIALISM. USING UNITS AS THE MORE AGRARIAN MUNICIPALITIES OF CHILE, AN ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WAS CARRIED OUT. PEASANTS DID NOT VOTE AS A BLOC, BUT ACCORDING TO THEIR POSITION IN THE PRODUCTIVE PROCESS AS INDEPENDENT OWNERS, TENANTS, FIXED, OR TEMPORAL WAGE EARNERS. EACH OF THE 3 PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES APPEARS TO HAVE FOUND A PARTICULAR STRUCTURAL NICHE IN THE CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE. FOR ALLENDE, THIS NICHE IS CHARACTERIZED BY IRRIGATED PLANTATION TYPE AGRICULTURE, THAT MAKES USE OF TEMPORAL WAGE LABOR PROVIDED BY MINIFUNDIA. THE SYNDICAL POLICIES OF THE FREI GOVERNMENT MAY HAVE BENEFITED THE CANDIDATE OF THE GOVERNING PARTY, BUT NOT ITS LAND REFORM POLICY. 7 TABLES. HA.

DUTCH POLITICAL SCIENTISTS RECOMMEND THE USE OF D. EASTON'S FORMULATION OF THE 'AUTHORITATIVE ALLOCATION OF VALUES' BUT DO NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC WAY IN WHICH HE DEFINES THE CONCEPT OF AUTHORITY. HE EMPHASIZES THAT AUTHORITY PERTAINS TO THE FACT OF COMPLIANCE, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE REASONS FOR IT. AUTHORITY MAY BE BASED ON COERCION. IT MAY BE LEGITIMATE, BUT IT MAY BE NONLEGITIMATE (COERCIVE) AS WELL. THE 'AUTHORITATIVE ALLOCATION OF VALUES' REFERS TO THE BINDING CHARACTER OF THE OUTPUTS OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. WE ARE BOUND TO COMPLY, WHETHER WE WANT IT OR NOT. EASTON PAYS CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE INPUT OF SUPPORT IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. WE ARE LENDING SUPPORT TO THE POWER HOLDERS, EVEN WHEN WE ARE COMPLYING UNDER THE THREAT OF SEVERE DEPRIVATIONS. THE RELATIVE F OF COMPLIANCE IS INTRODUCED AS AN ESSENTIAL VARIABLE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. THIS RELATIVE F MAY BE RELATIVE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY TO REQUIRE A RESERVOIR OF DIFFUSE SUPPORT (IE LEGITIMACY). WHEN EASTON DOES START BACK FROM THE IDEA THAT COERCION MAY GUARANTEE THE PERSISTENCE OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM, THIS IS A RATHER SHAKEY STEP. EASTON SEEMS SET AGAINST THE APPLICATION OF 'UNDEMOCRATIC' INSTRUMENTS. SUCH ANTIPATHY AS TO COERCIVE MEANS OF COMPLIANCE DOES NOT FIT WITH HIS REMARKS ON THE PLACE OF AUTHORITY IN THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK. AS FOR THE CRUCIAL FORMULATION OF THE 'AUTHORITATIVE ALLOCATION OF VALUES', IT IS POSSIBLE TO ANALYZE TESTS OF STRENGTH, REVOLUTIONS, TERRORISM, & DESPOTISM. THE APPROACH IS FAIRLY DYNAMIC. TODAY'S POWER-HOLDERS MAY BE TOMORROW'S POWERLESS; THE 'AUTHORITIES' HAVE THE CAPACITY TO ORDER OTHERS, NEITHER MORE NOR LESS. HA.

A SECONDARY ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA COLLECTED BY THE NEDERLANDS INSTIT VOOR PUBLIEKE OPINIE EN HET MARKTONDERZOEK (NIPO) IN CONNECTION WITH THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 1970-1980, STUDIES THE ATTITUDES TOWARD & THE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN THE NETHERLANDS. OPERATIONALIZATION OF THIS PROBLEM SHOULD INCLUDE AN EXAMINATION OF THE AIMS OF DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRATEGY (IN THIS CASE THE AIMS OF RESOLUTION 2626 (XXV), ACCEPTED AT THE 25TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UN). IT SHOULD INCLUDE A STUDY OF CONCRETE POLICY OR SOME ALTERNATIVE FOR ACHIEVING THESE ENDS. IN SUCH A WAY WE MIGHT EXAMINE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT & ATTITUDES TOWARD CONCRETE ITEMS OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY. 2 CLUSTERS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION WERE FOUND: A COSMOPOLITAN ORIENTATION & A CHARITABLE ONE; THE FORMER PROVED POSITIVELY RELATED WITH KNOWLEDGE. THIS POSITIVE RELATION IS ONLY A STOCHASTIC ONE & INDICATES A PROBABILITY, NOT A CAUSALITY. OTHER BACKGROUND VARIABLES WERE EXAMINED TO ILLUMINATE THE REMAINING NECESSARY CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE FOR A COSMOPOLITAN ORIENTATION. 16 TABLES, 1 FIGURE. HA.

SOCIAL CONFLICTS ARE THE MOTOR OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS & POINT TO A DESIRE OR STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL CHANGES. THESE CHANGES ARE SUBSEQUENTLY REALIZED IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS, & THE RESULTS LAID DOWN IN THE LAW. DISPROPORTIONAL POSITIONAL CHANGES OF ACTORS WITHIN A SOCIAL SYSTEM BRING ABOUT CONFLICTS. POSITIONS ARE TIED TO VALUE DISTRIBUTIONS, THUS DISPROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF VALUES LEAD TO CONFLICTS. A SECOND APPROACH MAY BE FOLLOWED, VIZ, THE UTILITY-THEORETICAL OR THE SATISFACTION-THEORETICAL APPROACH. THIS APPROACH DEALS WITH AN ANALYSIS OF UTILITY-FUNCTIONS OF ACTORS, CONFLICT BEING DEFINED AS A POSITION ON THE SATISFACTION-SCALE. 2 FIGURES. MODIFIED HA.

TYPICAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NETHERLANDS IS THAT CONFLICTS ARE QUICKLY POLITICIZED. EITHER AN EXISTING POLITICAL PARTY MAKES ITSELF A MOUTH-PIECE OF ONE OF THE GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT, OR ONE OF THESE GROUPS FORMS A NEW PARTY. THE LATTER SOLUTION IS FAVORED BY THE EXISTING ELECTORAL SYSTEM, THAT GUARANTEES EASY ACCESS FOR NEW PARTIES TO PARLIAMENT. VARIOUS NEW PARTIES HAVE EMERGED IN THIS WAY, HAVE ATTRACTED MANY VOTERS, BUT HAVE LOST THEM AFTER A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD WITHOUT HAVING REACHED THE GOAL AT WHICH THEY AIMED. OPINION-RESEARCH MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE SHARPNESS OF A NUMBER OF CONTROVERSIES HAS INCREASED IN THE COURSE OF TIME. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE PERCEPTION OF THE OPPOSITION OF EMPLOYEES TO EMPLOYERS. THE DUTCH POLITICAL SYSTEM CANNOT BE DENIED FLEXIBILITY IN THE HANDLING OF CONFLICTS. WITH AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF CONFLICTS, THIS FLEXIBILITY MAY BE LOST IF THE INFLUENCE OF PARLIAMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT INCREASED AT THE SAME TIME & IF NO STRUCTURAL CHANGES ARE INTRODUCED INTO THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYERS & EMPLOYEES. HA.

THE CONCEPT OF LOCAL POLITICAL CONFLICT PRESUPPOSES LOCAL ISSUES OR CONTROVERSIES THAT CAN BE SETTLED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES. LOCAL AUTHORITIES ARE INVOLVED IN VIOLENT CONFLICT BECAUSE RIOTS DO HAPPEN SOMEWHERE, VIZ ON THE TERRITORY OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONFLICT IS ABOUT LOCAL ISSUES. THE OBJECTIVES OF ACTION HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CONFLICT IS A LOCAL ONE. THE OBJECTIONS OF AN ACTION CAN BE THE CHANGE OF LOCAL POWER HOLDERS OR A CHANGE OF THEIR POLICIES. REPLACEMENT OF LOCAL OFFICIALS BY LOCAL ACTION IN THE DUTCH SITUATION IS NOT SO OBVIOUS. IN MOST CASES A DECISION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IS REQUIRED, EG THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW MAYOR. BY-ELECTIONS FOR POLITICAL REASONS HAVE NEVER OCCURRED. WHAT HAS HAPPENED IS THE PUTTING ASIDE OF A LOCAL COUNCIL & APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSIONER BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. IN MANY CASES LOCAL AUTHORITIES MUST HAVE COOPERATION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO REALIZE PLANS OF IMPORTANCE, AT LEAST FINANCIALLY. EVEN WHERE THIS PROBLEM DOES NOT EXIST, A LOCAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT DEVIATE TOO MUCH FROM NATIONAL POLICIES. LOCAL REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE IS NOT POSSIBLE BECAUSE IT IS SUBORDINATE GOVERNMENT. LOCAL CONFLICT CANNOT CHANGE '1ST ORDER POLITICS' (POLICIES) OR '2ND ORDER POLITICS' (POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS) VERY FAR; THE LIMITS ARE TO BE FOUND IN THE NATIONAL SYSTEM. RECENTLY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO CHANGE THE WAY (PROPORTIONALLY TO THE STRENGTH OF ALL POSSIBLE PARTIES IN THE COUNCILS) THAT PROVINCIAL BOARDS OF ALDERMAN ARE TRADITIONALLY COMPOSED. THOUGH THIS PROCEDURE MIGHT BE REASONED AS A POLITIZATION OF LOCAL & PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT, THE MAIN EFFECT WILL BE TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF CANDIDATES IN COMPETITION FOR SEATS. HA.

THE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN VOTING BEHAVIOR IS OFTEN BASED UPON RECALL DATA. THE NOTE OF RELIABILITY OF THIS TYPE OF DATA IS QUESTIONED. RECALL DATA UNDERESTIMATE THE NUMBER OF CHANGES IN PARTY CHOICE. NO EVIDENCE HAS BEEN FOUND THAT THE USE OF RECALL DATA HAS ANY CONSEQUENCES FOR THE STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STABILITY OF PARTY CHOICE & SUCH VARIABLES AS POLITICAL INTEREST, POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, & EDUCATION. THE ANALYSIS OF THE RELIABILITY OF QUESTIONS ON TURN-OUT IS NOT CONCLUSIVE. THERE ARE VERY STRONG INDICATIONS THAT IN EACH ELECTION STUDY NONVOTERS GIVE LESS RELIABLE ANSWERS THAN VOTERS. THIS UNRELIABILITY IS ESPECIALLY HIGH WHEN RECALL DATA ARE USED. 11 TABLES. HA.

THEORY FORMATION IN POLITICAL SCIENCE HAS HEADED TOWARD A "NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY" WITHIN WHICH 4 CLUSTERS ARE DISTINGUISHED: (1) 'SPATIAL MODELS OF PARTY COMPETITION', (2) THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, (3) THEORIES OF ALLOCATION OF VALUES, UNDER SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER, IE COALITION THEORIES, BARGAINING THEORIES & REINTERPRETATIONS OF DUOPOLY THEORIES, & (4) THEORIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR. THE 4 CLUSTERS ARE THE RESULT OF THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL SCIENCE & ECONOMICS. THE SIMILARITY IN THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF THE 4 CATEGORIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE WITH THE CORRESPONDING THEORIES IN MICROECONOMICS, WELFARE ECONOMICS, & PUBLIC ECONOMICS CONSISTS OF THESE ELEMENTS: (A) THE PREPONDERANCE OF A DEDUCTIVE (VS INDUCTIVE) STRATEGY OF THEORY BUILDING, (B) THE 2 PREMISES OF INDIVIDUALISM & GOAL-ORIENTED BEHAVIOR, (C) PREOCCUPATION WITH VARIOUS CORRESPONDING AMENDMENTS ON ASSUMPTIONS IN THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERFECT COMPETITION, & (D) THE THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR AS BASED ON THE AMENDMENT OF THE ASSUMPTION OF PERFECT & COSTLESS INFORMATION & THE HOLISTIC ('UNITARY ACTOR') OF DECISION-MAKING IN THE THEORY OF THE FIRM. MODIFIED HA.

NEXT TO THE PARTY ELITE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, THERE ARE SEVERAL POLICY ELITES IN THE USSR. THEY CONSIST OF OFFICIALS IN EVERY FIELD OF POLICY & HAVE THEIR BASIS OF POWER IN THE RESOURCES THAT ARE ALLOCATED IN THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET. MOST RESOURCES FLOW TO THE ECONOMY, THE SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL SECTOR, THE MILITARY, & THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS. ELITES IN THESE SECTORS CAN BE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS. THE PARTY ELITE MAKES ALL LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS, IT CAN REGULATE THE RECRUITMENT OF NEW MEMBERS INTO THESE POLICY ELITES & IT CAN CALL THE ELITES TO ACCOUNT BY PERMITTING PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF POLICY DECISIONS. POLICY ELITES HAVE MORE INFLUENCE IN POLICY-MAKING WHEN THEY HAVE MORE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE POLITBURO & THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THEIR REPRESENTATION HAS GROWN SINCE 1953--IRREGULARLY--BUT THE PARTY ELITE STILL HAS THE MAJORITY IN THESE PARTY ORGANS. POLICY ELITES HAVE INFLUENCE AS THERE IS A CONSTANT FLOW OF THEIR MEMBERS INTO THE PARTY ELITE. THIS MAKES THE PARTY ELITE LESS COHERENT & CAUSES MORE INTERNAL DISPUTES. YET THE POLICY ELITES ARE NOT CONTENT WITH POSSIBILITIES TO INFLUENCE POLICY MAKING; THEY ARE IN OPPOSITION TO THE PARTY ELITE THAT DOES NOT WANT TO GIVE THEM MORE INFLUENCE, ESPECIALLY IN LONG-TERM POLICY DECISIONS. HA.

In order to study the problem of income inequality it is necessary to define the situation of income equality & to define the concept of deviation from that situation. It is possible to define equality as a situation in which the relationships between incomes correspond to the rule x1 : x2....: xn = 1:1...: 1 (xi being the income of person i), & as a situation in which this relationship satisfies the rule xi -- xj = 0 for all pairs i, j out of the pop. The choice of the definition leads to diff standards of income inequality; in the 1st case, income inequality is measured relatively, in the 2nd it is measured absolutely. The choice of definition must be based on whether people perceive income diff's relatively or absolutely: the position is taken here that people perceive income diff's in relative terms. Inequality is measured as 0 = s/ X, s being the standard deviation. Analogous to the analysis of variance this standard allows for unraveling the total inequality into a part that can be explained by inequality between (soc & econ) groups, & a part that can be explained by inequality that exists within groups. Such an unraveling is an essential condition for gov'al & union policies aimed at levelling the existing income inequality. An examination of the extent to which incomes are unequally distributed in the Netherlands & an evaluation of gov'al & union policies viewed in light of the desirability of decreasing the income inequality are also undertaken. Appendix 1 contains formulas by which income inequality can be studied horizontally & vertically. In Appendix 2 a hyp states the relationship between the amount of power & the willingness to use that power a group possesses on the one hand & the share the group will get in the nat'l income on the other hand. Modified HA.