Search results

Switzerland's major contribution to the shaping of neutrality as an institution of international law lies in its centuries-old practice & its international recognition. However, Swiss neutrality still conforms to the classical military/political conflict, since in the past, it proved to be a successful security/political instrument in the protection of independence & territorial integrity. In the contemporary international/global constellation, there is almost no room for a neutral stance due to the global interdependence within the international community & the collective security, on the one hand, & the new threats & dangers lacking a classical military dimension, on the other. All this is conducive to the solidarity & cooperation whose purpose is protection, which requires international security/political efforts in securing peace. The Swiss government is of the opinion that participation in a collective security system such as the UN does not run counter to its permanent neutrality, since the UN Charter forbids war & does not recognize it as a means of the international regulation of conflicts. Also, the UN Charter does not oblige member countries to participate in any coercive military measure. Finally, by the admittance of the permanently neutral Austria into the UN, the practice has proved that neutrality & the collective security are compatible. On several occasions, the Swiss have raised the issue of UN membership; in the 1986 referendum, the Swiss citizens voted against this proposal, while on 3 Mar 2000, they voted in favor of it; the only other country besides Switzerland not in the UN is the Vatican. 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

Game theory as a theory of interactive decision making formalizes the modeling of social processes by creating an analytical basis for analyzing decision making in circumstances of risks, & the actors' cooperation or noncooperation. The core concepts -- Nash & Stackelberg's equilibrium, stochastic & differential games, transferable utility, cooperative & noncooperative games -- illustrate the scope of issues in the international economy that are applicable to the game theory. The author analyzes several instances of game theory in the international economy: various national tariff policies & the creation of tariff unions; international cartels; extraction of the resources of joint property; coalitions; & international negotiations. The author presupposes a smattering of knowledge of the game theory technique; as far as possible, the analysis is carried out nontechnically. 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting assumption is that globalization institutionalizes new forms of governance, but that this does not diminish the significance of the national state. On the contrary, globalization forces the advanced industrial societies to find a new balance between calls for economic efficacy & expectations regarding social security. On the other hand, national states have avoided the impact of globalization primarily owing to the (1) institutional acclimatizing reserve of modern democracies, (2) development & application of new political governing instruments, & (3) intelligent usage of international cooperational pressures in favor of national political innovations. However, all this does not mean that the national state has gone through globalization unscathed. A new architecture of political governance has emerged, called by the author the transnational regimes of politics. They include, besides national states, international organizations such as the WTO, regional integrations (EU, NAFTA), as well as a variety of national & transnational interest groups & movements. The author concludes that the efficacy of the new forms of governance must not be overrated. Also, the basic problem today is the expansion of the areas lacking functional markets, successful national states, or global forms of governance. 45 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author gives a critical review of the perception of comparative politics in the programs of the Faculty of Political Science. The perception is based on the assumption that comparative politics is a subdiscipline of international politics. Contrary to this, the author claims that (1) comparative politics is not a subdiscipline of international politics but a separate discipline of political science in its own right that has gained academic legitimacy together with political theory & international & national politics; (2) both international & national politics can be the subject of comparative research; & (3) the methodology of research, not the subject matter, is essential for the definition of comparative politics. These premises are drawn from an outline of the theoretical & methodological evolution of this discipline & the account of its current state. The author uses these to highlight the academic & organizational problems of comparative politics in Croatia. 47 References. Adapted from the source document.