In 2004 Lithuania implemented its two most important foreign policy goals -- became the member of the European Union & NATO. However, the country will now have to assert its status & position in the Euroatlantic community of liberal democracies. Lithuania faces an arguably more complex agenda, which has no clear end-goals or deadlines. The security challenges are difficult to identify & predict. The global & European strategic environment is best characterized by an ever-growing uncertainty: the transatlantic relations continue to be tense, Russia, paradoxically, is balancing between perspective of disintegration & re-emerging as an expansionist imperial power, & the European Union is under- going one of the most severe internal crisis in decades. At the same time, the major schools of international relations theory disagree on what to make out of the current world politics. Rationalist, neorealist authors tend to give alarmist, apocalyptic accounts of the future of the nation states if they despise the iron logic of geopolitics, whereas reflectivist, constructivist authors argue that the world is "what we make of it," & thus, can be changed. These two visions of international relations inevitably lead to different policy implications. The paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the authors address the current state of affairs in the two schools of international relations: rationalism (neorealism) & reflectivism (constructivism). In the second part, the authors interchangeably explore & compare the policy options that can be derived from the two different worldviews. The article concludes that international politics for a small state are more complex than either of the schools would suggest. Although the nature of the world politics is increasingly postmodern, a lot of actors still live in a modern world of geopolitics. Lithuanian decision makers will therefore have to "play" in accordance with postmodern rules when possible, but to remember geopolitics if necessary. Grounding their view on theoretical synthesis of constructivist & realist approaches to foreign policy, The authors asserts, that Lithuania's Euroatlantism should overshadow all other interests & problems of the society. The membership in the EU will have far reaching & long term consequences on Lithuanian society -- the same cannot be said about membership in NATO, or relations with the US. Lithuania must internalize the EU as a part of its corporate identity -- Lithuania is a part of Europe's collective identity. Therefore, Lithuanian political elite should cease to consider Europe as an object of Lithuanian foreign policy, rather it should become conscious itself as a subject of European policy contributing to its formation. Adapted from the source document.
This article examines the provisions of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation of Damage Resulting from the USSR Occupation (hereinafter -- the Law), which was adopted on 13 June 2000, in the light of customary rules of international law on state responsibility, as codified in the 2001 the UN International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter -- the ILC Draft Articles). The main aim of the article is to deal with the international legal grounds of the responsibility of the Russian Federation for the Soviet occupation of the Republic of Lithuania and, against this background, to identify the role of the Law. The ground of Russia's responsibility is an internationally wrongful act committed as the aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, which was started by the 15 June 1940 incursion by the Soviet armed forces & subsequently continued in the form of the illegal occupation of Lithuania until the restoration of Lithuania's independence on 11 March 1990, however, the illegal presence of the foreign forces on Lithuania's soil ended only in 1993. The fact of the 1940 Soviet aggression & illegal occupation of the Baltic States has been widely recognized by the international community, it was even acknowledged by the USSR & Russia in 1989-1991. Therefore there is no doubt that under international law from 1940-1990 the Republic of Lithuania had been an occupied State. That is why the illegal occupation with its consequences, as the breach of an international obligation not to resort to aggression having a continuing character, constitutes an objective element of an internationally wrongful act being the ground for Russia's responsibility. That also explains why the title of the Law refers to the occupation. Meanwhile the specific feature of subjective element is addressed in the preamble of the Law. That is the continuity of the Russian State & the corresponding identity of its international legal personality with the Soviet Union, which was claimed by Russia & generally recognized by the international community. Therefore under international law the Russian Federation is the State continuing the rights & obligations of the former USSR (ie., it is the same international legal person). Consequently, internationally wrongful acts of the latter, including the Soviet occupation of Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, should be attributable to the Russian Federation. Apart from the ground for Russia's responsibility, the issue of reparation is addressed in the article. In accordance with international law (the ILC Draft Article), the principle of full reparation should be applied to realize responsibility for an internationally wrongful act. The full reparation for the injury can be provided in the form of restitution, compensation & satisfaction, while any financially assessable damage should be covered by compensation when restitution is not practically possible. Responsibility for the Soviet occupation is the latter case. Therefore in this sense the Law concretizes the claim of Lithuania as it lays down the obligations of the Government of Lithuania to calculate the damage & seek its compensation from Russia. In conformity with the principle of full reparation, the provisions of the Law require to calculate the damage for all period of the Soviet occupation as well as to cover all types of financially assessable damage. The third main issue addressed in this article is admissibility of a claim for reparation, ie., the procedural requirements to be observed by the injured State invoking an international responsibility of other State. The main requirement, as follows from Art. 43 of the ILC Draft Articles, is that the injured State should give a timely & proper notice of its claim to the State responsible for an internationally wrongful act; the claim is admissible when it is waived by the injured State or it can be inadmissible when it is not maintained. However, a mere lapse of time without a claim is being resolved, including delay in its prosecution due to refusal of the respondent State, cannot result in loss of the right of the injured State to invoke responsibility. In this regard the Law is a unilateral act of the State of Lithuania which formulates & concretizes the claim for Russia's responsibility. The form of this act was determined by Lithuanian national rather than international law as the former requires that any compulsory rules or instructions for the Government can be laid down by the Seimas (the Parliament) only in the form of (statutory) law. As it is clear from the preamble of the Law, in continuing & consolidating the previous Lithuanian acts invoking Russia's responsibility the Law demonstrates that the claim for responsibility has been raised without any unreasonable delay a long time ago (the first time Lithuania declared about its claim for reparation in 1991) & Russia is aware of that claim from the very beginning. In such a manner the Law also proves a consistent & unchanging position of Lithuania with regard to Russia's responsibility. Therefore, the Law evidences that the claim of Lithuania remains admissible although still being unresolved & notwithstanding that Russia is rejecting it. Under international law the injured State has the right to waive its claim for responsibility of another State. National law may, however, restrict that right in setting up appropriate duties for the authorities of the injured State. In this regard it follows from the preamble of the Law that under Lithuanian constitutional law no State organ or official can declare a waiver of the claim for Russia's responsibility because the Law is based on & aims at implementation of the corresponding decision by the 14 June 1992 national referendum that demanded to seek reparation for the Soviet occupation. Therefore, the waiver can be declared only by other referendum as well as without a referendum the Seimas cannot abolish the provisions of the Law requiring to seek a compensation (such kind of action could amount to the waiver in the sense of Art. 45(a) of the ILC Draft Articles). To keep the claim for responsibility of another State admissible & valid, when it is being unresolved a long time, the injured State should do everything it can reasonably do to maintain the claim. Otherwise it can be questioned, whether the right to invoke responsibility is lost due to conduct of the injured State in the sense of Art. 45(b) of the ILC Draft Articles. Therefore, to avoid similar doubts the Law obliged the Government to seek constantly the compensation for the damage caused by the Soviet occupation. Since Russia used to reject Lithuania's initiatives to conduct negotiations on the matter & any other way of settlement is not available without Russia's consent, it can be stated that as yet, in particular due to the Law, the conduct of Lithuania has not raised any serious doubts with regard to validity of its claim for compensation. Obviously such doubts would be serious if any kind of moratorium on the claim had been announced. To sum it up, it can be concluded that the Law is based on & is consistent with the rules of international law. It also implements the international legal requirements for the proper declaration & maintenance of the claim for reparation. Therefore both under international law & under Lithuanian constitutional law the Law has been necessary to consolidate & consistently maintain the claim to Russia for the compensation of the damages caused by the Soviet occupation. Lastly, it should be noted that a proper settlement of the problem of Russia's responsibility for the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is not a question of self-interest for Lithuania & it should pursue the claim for compensation not only due to the decision by the 14 June 1992 referendum. Not accidentally Art. 1 of the ILC Draft Articles refers that "every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State." It is also not accidentally that the preamble of the 1991 Treaty between Lithuania & Russia states that mutual confidence between the people of both Parties is hard to achieve without elimination of the consequences of the Soviet annexation of Lithuania. Like for national law, rule of law & justice cannot be established without realization & inevitability of responsibility for grave breaches of international law. Therefore the realization of responsibility for the 1940 aggression against the Baltic States & its consequences would undoubtedly contribute to general prevention of such grave breaches as well as would assure that similar tragic events never happen again in the history of Lithuania. Such kind of prevention should be at the focus of attention of the whole international community rather than only Lithuania & the other two Baltic States, since a prohibition of aggression is a long-standing rule of jus cogens character & obligation erga omnes towards international community. Adapted from the source document.
Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible -- that "to every one who has will more be given" -- this article starts with observation that weaker parties can & do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old & answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power -- one of the most complex & difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualize it. Detaching the notion of power from resources, in this article power is associated to the structure of negotiation, comprising of number of parties, interests, resisting points & possible zone of agreements, thus leaving the concept of power open to much more detail & accurate analysis. Having said that the structural analysis does not renounce the importance of resources all in all since every negotiation begins with a certain distribution of actor characteristics that are given. However, important are only the issue related characteristics. Moreover, as the structural model of analysis demonstrates, power is not a constant. The structural characteristics can be "photographed" at the beginning but may change during the process. In addition, the structure may be manipulated that in turn indicates that power is also a matter of perception. Perception mediates objective negotiating structure, although reality imposes certain limits on the implication of perceptions. The structural model of analysis permits to make the following propositions about power. The lower value that a party to a negotiation assigns to its resistance point, the less power it will have, because: The more it will perceive a negotiated agreement primary in terms of the gains it offers over the non-agreement alternative as well as other factors that shape the resistance point; The more risk averse it will be to achieve those gains; The more willing it will be to make concessions. Conversely, the higher value that a party to a negotiation assigns to its resistance point, the more power it will have, because: The more it will perceive a negotiated agreement primary in terms of the loss it entails as compared to the non-agreement alternative and other factors that shape the resistance point; The more risk seeking it will be to avoid those losses; The more it will be to withhold concessions. Adapted from the source document.
This article aims to draw the attention to a field that has been widely acknowledged worldwide but can be considered as rather new in Lithuania -- to the methods of foresighting & future studies. Foresighting can serve as a supplement to analytic research & can be applied as a significant methodological instrument in numerous fields of political science. Authors state that foresighting is particularly relevant to the research of international relations. As actors of the international system are competing for power & attempting to formulate strategies to expand their power, foresighting & construction of future scenarios becomes an inherent part of the strategic processes. A scenario constructing process & examples are presented in the article. Adapted from the source document.
The end of the Cold War showed the geostrategical transformation of the world. We could see how relations between great powers became more ethical. The main subject of the analysis is the ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. Nowadays ethical problems became more important when we see so many crises, wars, & attacks of terrorists in different places of all over the world. Especially after September 11,' 2001, international terrorism became the most threatening problem for all states. Thus, states of different geostrategy have to collaborate to reach international security. The article aims to discuss how to administrate international relations due to reach the consensus in more ethical-moral way between states with different geostrategy. The work consists of five parts, in which are discussed various aspects of ethical problems in realization of foreign policy. The analysis of different geostrategical models lets to envisage possibilities of the formation of more common global geostrategical model in the 21st century. Bargains between the greatest powers (G8) attest to the ethical reality of global policy. All states understand that security is a very important condition of reform & progress, which could be reached through the common efforts of all states. Adapted from the source document.
The paper deals with the specific features of the construction of an international identity by the EU & Lithuania. We do this by comparing the narrative of "Normative Power Europe" to that of "Lithuania, the regional center." The term "Normative Power Europe," though in use for some two years, still has no clear-cut place in the studies of European integration. So in the paper we first try to explicate its content by drawing a contrast with the more familiar concept of "civil power." We show that the term is an attempt at a new conceptualization of a problem that has been on the agenda of constructivist international relations studies for some time already, namely, that of the power of ideas in international politics. "Normative Power Europe" is defined as a discursive practice, as a narrative shaping the EU as a unique political institution which, by realizing itself via free exchange of ideas & opinions, is capable of changing the "normalcy" perception in international relations. In the EU political discourse the identity of EU as a normative power is constructed via the contrast of EU/USA politics, with America conceived as Europe's "Other." Next, in analyzing Lithuania's foreign politics in the context of the EU New Neighborhood Policy, we draw the parallels in the narratives made use of in constructing the identities of EU & Lithuania. A brief examination of the narrative "Lithuania, the regional center" shows its similarity to the narrative of "Normative Power Europe." First, the "Normative Power Europe" & the "Lithuania, the regional center" are both discursive constructions of their international identity. Second, both narratives are promoting a normative model, based on similar values & principles. Third, in both narratives regionalization is held a major instrument in spreading the values conducive to the creation of a common identity. Finally, both narratives perceive the common regional identity as a major security guarantee. The conclusion is that the narrative of "Lithuania, the regional center" is merely a nationalist replica of the "Normative Power Europe," with some peculiarities to be explained by differences in historical context & Lithuania's specifics in domestic politics. These are mainly due to Lithuania's attempt at reconciling her nation state identity & the ambitions of an active actor of the EU Common Foreign & Security Policy. Adapted from the source document.
This article is devoted to the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) as a method of the European Union (EU) governance. First, the article presents the method, its characteristics & the rationale behind its application in the EU. This is followed by an analytical framework, which includes the factors of EU & national level (independent variables), influence mechanisms of the OMC as well as public policy & institutional change (dependent variables). This analytical framework was used for structuring & summarizing the results of the OMC research in Lithuania. The main conclusion of this article is that the OMC is not effective in Lithuania due to its weak mechanisms of influence. Although according to its definition the OMC is attributable to "soft" forms of governance, its inadequate application reduces its effectiveness in Lithuania. These factors constrain the implementation of necessary reforms in Lithuania & reduce its contribution to economic growth & employment of the EU. Adapted from the source document.
The primary aim of this article is to analyze how the interpretation of "universal" geopolitical ideas, especially those related to images of US power, depend on national, publishing & rhetorical interests. By comparing various predominant intellectual stances, one can see that even after the end of the Cold War its' rhetorical tropes still propel further disputes. As a result, national interests & ambitions of some politicians merge & the lines between political realism & ideologies become blurred. For example, phrases such as "the new world order," but even more often, "the new world disorder" are used indiscriminately in hundreds of titles promising accounts of the international system & its events. Thus instead of seeing rhetoric & reality as mutually exclusive opposites (which happens whenever the rhetoric is relegated to the field of myths & lies), new studies of the Cold War now generally recognize the rhetorical component of reality. This article uses Pierre Bourdieu's concept of "cultural fields" & his theoretical focus on the international circulation of ideas to discuss the rhetoric of "soft power.". Adapted from the source document.
Security studies have survived a lot of transformations. Like any other social theory, security studies have gone through a number of consecutive development stages: the dominance of traditional theories (realism/neorealism), the rise of critical & discourse approaches as well as the attempts to modify the traditional theories & methodological frameworks & to search for the synthetic or universal theoretic models. Author reviews how the security studies developed in the last few decades. Further attention is devoted to the attempts of Barry Buzan to provide for a compromised frameworks for security analysis in his works People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (1991), & Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998). The first work was an attempt to sum up the most valuable inputs for a widening security agenda; it includes the new aspects of security (economic, political, social & ecological), acknowledging that a state can be one of the many other subjects in the security studies. The greatest value of this work is a model of sectorization of security studies -- analytical proposition to classify threats by sectors. The second framework for analysis seeks to preserve the use of the security sectors' concept. However B. Buzan, 0. Waever & J. de Wilde propose to include a discursive theory of securitization into the framework. Authors suggest that security is not an objective condition -- it is about presenting issues as existential threats that require emergency measures. Some critiques (eg. J. Eriksson) argue, theories of securitization & sectonzation are incompatible in methodological meaning. The author of this article gives some suggestions that a model of sectorization of security studies should be supplemented by a new sector -- the communication sector. This expansion of the model could help fill some gaps left in the B. Buzan model -- i.e. the way threats emerge, the reason why one threat is considered differently from the other one as well as why they enjoy a specific influence on the other security sectors. 3 Schemas. Adapted from the source document.
In this article I analyzed one of the goals of the 2004-2006 EU Cohesion policy reform -- to adjust the Cohesion policy to the new reality: increased development disparities inside the Union after Enlargement. I argue that despite big changes caused by Enlargement the Commission with its reform proposal of 2004 in principle did not try to reform anything, while decision on Cohesion policy reform taken by the European Council in the end of 2005, which finalized two years of Member States discussions, just slightly improved the situation. Cohesion policy reform of 2004-2006 actually did not reform this policy, because increased development disparities in the EU were overshadowed by indirect factor of Enlargement -- its costs to the EU-15. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of this article is to review & evaluate the condition & the development perspectives of the relations between the EU & its Eastern neighbors. The problem is analyzed in the context of the recent discussion on the "Broader Europe" concept. The current dominant model of the relations between the EU & Eastern Europe countries is described in the article using the "circular discourse" & "circular interaction" terms. This article is aimed to reveal the initial theoretical & geo/political preconditions that helped this model to become the dominant theoretical & practical approach in the field of EU -- East Europe relations, to uncover the logics of its functioning & the implications of its realization to Lithuania & the other new EU member states. Adapted from the source document.
This paper suggests that "scenario building" offers methodology for understanding the forces which are crucial for ESDP development. Author analyzes such driving forces of ESDP as EU integration tendencies, threats & demands on crises management operations, defense potency & NATO transformation success, as well as the US attitude towards ESDP. After the driving forces are examined, four scenarios are constructed: creation of European security & defense union, integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation, ESDP as a project of "core" states, & ESDP as capabilities & operations of "coalition of willing." All this is done in order to find a scenario, which is most suitable for the small states of the EU. Almost all of them are participating in the activities of ESDP, however, their interests & arguments are different. At last three groups of small EU states may be recognized regarding the European security & role in international sphere. Their preferences mostly depend on the leaders in each scenario: pro-European eurocontinentalists support France & Germany & euroatlantists support those scenarios, where UK is leading. Traditionally "neutral" countries seek the realization of scenarios, which would enhance their structural power inside the EU. So, none of the approached scenarios is supported by the majority of the small EU states. For Lithuania most appropriate, of course, is the one, which withholds the US in Europe. No doubt, this is scenario of integration of ESDP into the broader system of euroatlantic cooperation. Adapted from the source document.
The concept of deterrence is widely used in social sciences. In general literature this means prevention of someone's actions by threatening to impose sanctions. In the area of strategy, deterrence means preventing states to act in a way that is not acceptable to others. According to deterrence theory, wars or aggressions to be prevented by threatening a potential aggressor with retaliation destructive & credible enough to outweigh any benefit the potential aggressor could expect to gain. The concept of deterrence came to prominence with the appearance of nuclear weapons, precisely because they made it possible for a state under attack to do great harm to the attacker even without really defending itself. This requirement becomes difficult to fulfill when we consider non-nuclear powers. They do not enjoy military capabilities to strike their enemies in retaliation without carrying defense. Nuclear have-not may only threaten her adversaries with a high level of resistance. This articles addresses deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers that do not possess retaliatory capabilities but only are capable to threaten their adversaries with a level of destruction higher than the value of objectives sought. The logic of deterrence strategy formulates two main requirements for it to be effective. First is a sufficient capability to carry out the defense actions. The second is ability to impress enemy leaders of their intentions without provoking a preventive or pre-emptive strike out of fear. Effective deterrence strategies of small non-nuclear powers suffer from serious weaknesses that are embedded into the logic of this strategy. First of all, successful deterrence strategy of small non-nuclear powers requires more than ability to impose costs using conventional means. An adversary must be sufficiently convinced that the state will use its defensive capabilities. The greater a state's defensive capability, the less its adversary can hurt it, & the more likely it may use its punitive capabilities on its adversary. Secondly, intelligence communities long have known, policy makers have a way of resisting unwelcome information & advice. Often, national intelligence communities are entirely as culturally blind, not to mention ignorant in other ways, as are their political & military masters. Risk of a mistake when attacking a nonnuclear country is smaller then attacking a nuclear one. When employed by alliances, such as NATO, conventional deterrence also must face a number of additional problems. It requires a large & credible power projection capability because of the simple facts of geography. To operate large expeditionary forces requires an overseas base network & a forcible entry capability. Effective defense demands a large standing force structure, & technological superiority, to assure the success of conventional campaigns. Such complex, capable, & large forces prove to be very costly. Small non-nuclear powers may enhance deterrence using different strategies. Most importantly by making it plain through prior security agreements that aggressors will be severely for punished by the international community, whether or not their invasions are successful. The punishments could be military (including counter-value attacks or asymmetrical threats), political (pariah-state status), & economic (isolation), but they should be certain & tough, even if not perfectly enforced. For example, the European Union may seriously punish aggression from the East using economical measures such as sanctions, boycotts, exclusion from "clubs," etc. Conventional capabilities of small non-nuclear powers is also benefiting from significant improvements in the technology of conventional weapons, notably in accuracy, stealth, intelligence, & information support. Nor does the current theory of conventional deterrence require that conventional weapons be as powerful, destructive, or fearful as nuclear weapons. Growing military strength & asymmetrical capabilities significantly contributes to the psychological credibility of deterrence. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of the article is to disclose a possible view held by Kant towards the solution of the KOnigsberg problem after World War II. Philosophers of today usually show little interest in discussing the so-called "Kaliningrad puzzle." This is a certain misunderstanding. As one of the most outstanding representatives of the idealistic paradigm of international relations, Kant can be treated as a full-fledged participant of the discussions on the future of the Kaliningrad region. His political philosophy contributes towards a better understanding of certain important aspects related to the Kaliningrad problem. Kant would strongly criticize the decisions made at the Potsdam conference. The above decisions contradict his understanding of international relations. However, Kant would not demand an urgent solution to the Kaliningrad problem. His flexibility is worthy of the respect shown by the realpolitik supporters. On the other hand, Kant did not have the slightest doubt as to the necessity of amending the injustice of improper political decisions. The European future of the Kaliningrad region is first & foremost related to the ability of the population to enforce the political principles formulated by Kant -- the freedom of the citizens, the rule of law & the equality of every single citizen under the law. This seems to be the most topical message made by Kant to the present day population of his native town. The Kaliningrad region of today has failed to justify the requirements of civil society. It reminds one more of a hostage to the central power. From the perspective of Kant's political philosophy, one could state that the Kaliningrad region has not yet used the opportunity to become an association of free citizens. This is the only trustworthy way for this hostage of international politics of the 20th century to become part of cultural & political life within the unifying Europe. Adapted from the source document.
The aim of the article was to explore the Agreement on the Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1999 (hereinafter referred to as an A-CFE) & its positive/negative implications for the NATO-Russian relations. The A-CFE, considered to be a cornerstone of the European security paving the way to a greater conventional stability on the continent, has not entered into force for political & geo-strategic reasons. Moreover, A-CFE aims at establishing a stable & balanced overall level of conventional armed forces between NATO & Russia in Europe, thus solving NATO enlargement & security dilemmas, the bone of contention between NATO & Russia. The main question the article dealt with was whether the A-CFE could stabilize NATO-Russian relations in the anarchical international system facing the dynamics of balance of power. The article focused on analyzing conventional arms control influence on NATO-Russian interaction; a heavy emphasis was placed on A-CFE functionality to solve security dilemma problems in light of NATO enlargement, hypothetical NATO-Russian conflict, & NATO-Russian level of conventional armed forces in Europe. What's more, a concrete case -- the Baltic States possible membership in A-CFE & its influence on NATO-Russian relations has been analyzed in the context of military power disparities & geo-strategic position of the Eastern Baltic sub-region. Having analyzed it accordingly, the following conclusion has been made: A-CFE Treaty of actual text would not properly stabilize NATO-Russian relations due to the reaction of national units to the on-going redistribution of military power & the dynamic of military balance. If not revised, A-CFE will amount to a "sunset Treaty" while remaining an instrument of political process. This assumption emerges from the following factors: 1. A-CFE has asymmetrically imposed the ceilings of conventional arms in favor of Russia, reducing U.S. Army quota in Europe & setting strict limits on keeping foreign military forces on a permanent basis; new NATO members are obliged not to increase the ceilings whereas Russia's limits rise to the Flanks. 2. Asymmetrical distribution of power imposed by A-CFE has decreased NATO operational capabilities to respond to Russian offensive/defensive attacks. NATO forces have been reduced in NATO-Russian border sub-regions, which might become a conflict zone. 3. The first wave of NATO enlargement was set in a frame of arms control thus solving the security dilemma of Russia, whereas the second wave diverted the distribution of power & required a new response from arms control. With the second wave including the Baltic States, NATO has significantly improved its geo-strategic positions as a result of the possibility of establishing an offensive front against Russia from the Baltic States in which conventional arms control does not apply. 4. The Baltic States' membership in the A-CFE has had implications for its own national security could be evaluated from perspectives of defensive & offensive realism. In the world of the offensive realism, the Baltic States should avoid entering the A-CFE with low ceilings, as Russia proposed, which would diminish Baltic States' national security. On the other hand, the Baltic States are supposed to evaluate a negative effect of the security dilemma, according to defensive realists. Large & flexible ceilings the Baltics may negatively affect Russian security & it could start increasing the weapons. The Baltic States would lose the arms race with Russia due to the lack of economic recourses. 5. The research suggests two ways to revise the A-CFE to solve the security dilemma of both Russia & the Baltic States: (1) to set ceilings for the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region (at the present time, Russia's commitments in Kaliningrad & Pskov are the political ones); (2) to add the whole Eastern Baltic sub-region to Central European stability zone using the formula national ceilings = territorial ceiling. 5 Lenteles. Adapted from the source document.
