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Međunarodni kazneni sud novo je međunarodno tijelo kojem je glavni cilj istraga i suđenje slučajeva genocida, ratnih zločina, te zločina protiv čovječnosti u zemljama članicama. Iako su Sjedinjene Američke Države u 2000. potpisale Rimski statut, međunarodnu povelju iz 1998. koja predstavlja osnovicu Međunarodnog kaznenog suda, Busheva vlada napravila je velik zaokret godinu dana kasnije, potpuno se ograđujući od svake ideje o suđenju Amerikancima izvan zemlje. Tekst analizira glavne argumente američke vanjske politike povezane s Međunarodnim kaznenim sudom, od navodne pristranosti Suda, te odnosa između Suda i Ujedinjenih naroda, pa sve do pitanja američkog suvereniteta. Također, ponuđena je i međunarodnopravna politička kritika nedavnih poteza američke vlade, koji štete i američkim nacionalnim interesima, i međunarodnoj sigurnosti. ; The International Criminal Court is a new international body constituted with the aim of prosecuting and trying cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Although in 2000 the United States signed the 1998 Rome Statute, which is the foundation of the International Criminal Court, the Bush Administration took a radically different position the following year, protecting itself from any idea of trying American citizens abroad. This text analyses the main U.S. foreign policy arguments pertaining to the ICC, from the alleged impartiality of the Court and the relationship between the Court and the United Nations, to the question of American sovereignty. In addition, the text offers an international legal and political critique of the recent U.S. policy actions, which harmed both American national interests, as well as international security.

Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.