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Du point de vue des grands blocs économiques tels que l'Europe, le Japon et les Etats-
Unis, l'Afrique ne joue plus aucun rôle significatif. Son déclin est visible non seulement à la
faible part qu'elle a dans le commerce extérieur, mais surtout au niveau extrêmement faible de l'investissement extérieur direct. Même en tant que marché, l'Afrique ne présente
pratiquement pas d'intérêt en raison de son faible revenu par habitant. L'Afrique fait partie des Etats du groupe ACP (Afrique-Caraïbes-Pacifique) qui, depuis 1975, sont liés par des liens de coopération à la Communauté européenne dans le cadre de la convention de Lomé. Dans cette contribution, je vais examiner deux aspects de la convention de Lomé : les relations commerciales et le système préférentiel de Lomé (y compris les résultats des accords de l'Uruguay Round) et les systèmes de subventions du Stabex et du Sysmin (pour les produits agricoles et miniers).

Attendu que de nombreux investisseurs s'arrachent les terres agricoles dans le monde entier, il est difficile de savoir qui s'implique dans quelle entreprise et quels pourraient en être les effets sur les populations locales. Une base de données internationale fait la lumière sur cette situation confuse.

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term (2020 and 2025) because the law does not apply retroactively. The first local elections since more than 30 years resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Grand expectations of the opposition which had hoped for a fundamental change at least at the grass-roots were again dashed. The human rights situation sharply deteriorated due to growing political and social tensions related to the prospects of the head of state running for a fourth term. Islamist terrorist violence spread from Mali to the northern frontier region of Togo. The autonomous deep-water port of Lomé developed as a growth pole and hub for the sub-region. China became the major partner beside the established partners the EU, France and Germany. The informal sector still dominated the economy. Economic freedom remained with the overall status 'mostly unfree'.

This article addresses the problems associated with aircraft noise with or without pilots. It asks whether the administrative measures taken by France and the United Arab Emirates are sufficient and efficient to combat noise pollution. It examines the aeronautical preventive measures, as well as those related to urbanism, before discussing remedial measures for aircraft noise. This article finds that the administrative measures taken by the UAE, in comparison to those of France, are insufficient and ineffective. One of the reasons is that the preventative and suppressive measures reflect the transversal nature of noise: they are both national and international regulations, but they are not homogenous, unitary and structured.
Legislative policies, taking into account expert suggestions and opinions, must emerge in the UAE by following the recommendations on the protection of the environment of international institutions, such as ICAO. Thus, the mitigation measures would be used to redistribute aircraft noise to diminish its impact on the most sensitive areas. This article recommends measures such as modifying runways, as well as routes, and special manoeuvres to reduce noise during take-off and approach.

Throughout the year the controversial legislative elections dominated the political landscape. Huge anti-government demonstrations that called in vain for political alternance. The legislative elections of 20 December 2018, boycotted by the major opposition parties, resulted in an easy victory of the ruling party, however without the expected constitutional amendment majority. Therefore, the prime minister and his cabinet were replaced. The local elections, crucial for democratization at the grass-roots, but postponed time and again since 1987, were again postponed in December 2018 sine die. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum. Public investment in infrastructure (e. g. roads, harbour) and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. Moreover, money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. Unemployment and lacking political change caused increasing migration.

Controversial constitutional and institutional reforms voted in May 2019 in parliament opened the way for President Gnassingbé to stand for a fourth and fifth term because the law does not apply retroactively. In February 2020, the President won again the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in March and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved, but remains poor. Yet, the international community followed a 'laissez faire' approach in the interests of regional stability. The economy dropped into recession due to the worldwide economic negative effects of the corona-crisis. The democracy index of the Economic Intelligence Unit, London, still rated Togo as an 'authoritarian regime'.

The Gnassingbé clan has ruled the country since 1967. The demand for political alternance, constituted the major contentious issue between the government and the challengers of the Gnassingbé regime throughout the survey period. The first local elections since more than 30 years took finally place on 30 June 2019 and resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Shortly afterwards, in February 2020, the President won also the disputed presidential elections and thus consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in April 2020 and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved but remains poor. Despite undeniable improvements to the framework and appearance of the regime's key institutions during the review period, democracy remains far from complete. However, the international community, notably Togo's African peers, the AU and ECOWAS, followed a 'laissez-faire' approach in the interests of regional stability and their national interests in dealing with Togo. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum (before Corona). Public investment in infrastructure and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. However, growth remains vulnerable to external shocks and the climate and has not been inclusive. Moreover, it was overshadowed by increasing inter-personal and regional inequality as well as an increase in extreme poverty. Money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. Nevertheless, the business climate improved considerably.

Contrary to the positive perception of protected areas constructed by political entities as mechanisms for protecting biodiversity put under pressure by the demographic growth of populations and their needs, they have gradually revealed themeselves as areas of turbulence where insecure dynamics proliferate, ie ecosystems that escape state regulation and impact the security of surrounding localities. Protected areas in northern regions of Cameroon have thus contributed to the sustainable dissemination of vectors of crime and others forms of security threats. The question is therefore to know in what way protected areas constitute a security threat and how has the state reacted to the situation in the northern regions of Cameroun? The hypothesis defended is to show that protected areas are islands of cross-border insecurity, hence the process of state security.