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The liberal state, it has been argued, must be neutral between different conceptions of the good. Honoring individual autonomy & embodying ideals such as fairness & impartiality, the doctrine of state neutrality is intuitively appealing. Working as a restraint for state actions it is however problematic. In this paper, a possible solution to this predicament is outlined. Drawing on the distinction between liberty & what gives worth to liberty, it is argued that we must never accept non-neutral restrictions of liberty itself, but may pursue non-neutral policies affecting the distribution of what gives worth to liberty & may impose taxes funding non-neutral state actions, although such taxation inevitable limits the worth of our liberty. It is suggested that we, by adopting such a policy of limited state perfectionism, can recognize the right to individual autonomy without having to restrain the state from doing the good it can. References. Adapted from the source document.

The United States of America and France are states that have much in common. The USA has the greatest political, economic and military power in the world, and France held this position before the Second World War. Both, the Unites States and France, were the sources of democratic values in the eighteenth century. Currently the two countries have the same values and objectives for the world community: defence of human rights, promotion of democracy, maintenance of international stability and peace, fight against terrorism. However, France has always opposed the United States on one issue or other. It may be in the realm of international diplomacy, where one can discern a distinct distaste for America's oftproclaimed sole-superpower status, or on matters of culture, where France is always the first to denounce American "cultural imperialism." Lately, Franco – American friction has manifested itself most visibly in the UN Security Council over the Iraq war. Both countries realized the necessity to disarm Iraq yet France opposed the resolution authorizing the war against Iraq. France's antipathy to war, pessimism to crate stability in Iraq and refusal to recognize the leadership of the United States can be conceived as the reasons of the opposition. France is no longer the superpower that it was, and that leads to a strategic difference in how the two countries pursue their goals. [.].

The United States of America and France are states that have much in common. The USA has the greatest political, economic and military power in the world, and France held this position before the Second World War. Both, the Unites States and France, were the sources of democratic values in the eighteenth century. Currently the two countries have the same values and objectives for the world community: defence of human rights, promotion of democracy, maintenance of international stability and peace, fight against terrorism. However, France has always opposed the United States on one issue or other. It may be in the realm of international diplomacy, where one can discern a distinct distaste for America's oftproclaimed sole-superpower status, or on matters of culture, where France is always the first to denounce American "cultural imperialism." Lately, Franco – American friction has manifested itself most visibly in the UN Security Council over the Iraq war. Both countries realized the necessity to disarm Iraq yet France opposed the resolution authorizing the war against Iraq. France's antipathy to war, pessimism to crate stability in Iraq and refusal to recognize the leadership of the United States can be conceived as the reasons of the opposition. France is no longer the superpower that it was, and that leads to a strategic difference in how the two countries pursue their goals. [.].

The United States of America and France are states that have much in common. The USA has the greatest political, economic and military power in the world, and France held this position before the Second World War. Both, the Unites States and France, were the sources of democratic values in the eighteenth century. Currently the two countries have the same values and objectives for the world community: defence of human rights, promotion of democracy, maintenance of international stability and peace, fight against terrorism. However, France has always opposed the United States on one issue or other. It may be in the realm of international diplomacy, where one can discern a distinct distaste for America's oftproclaimed sole-superpower status, or on matters of culture, where France is always the first to denounce American "cultural imperialism." Lately, Franco – American friction has manifested itself most visibly in the UN Security Council over the Iraq war. Both countries realized the necessity to disarm Iraq yet France opposed the resolution authorizing the war against Iraq. France's antipathy to war, pessimism to crate stability in Iraq and refusal to recognize the leadership of the United States can be conceived as the reasons of the opposition. France is no longer the superpower that it was, and that leads to a strategic difference in how the two countries pursue their goals. [.].

The 'socioenvironmental state' conceptualisation probes how contested, shifting, emergent boundaries of the state contain the possibilities for transformative change in the Anthropocene. The paper outlines a research programme capable of addressing the questions: who becomes authorised to govern change, who is required to make changes on the ground, and what subjectivities and pathways emerge in the context of rapid rate change? The conceptualisation unpacks three boundaries: state– society, its socionatural emergence, and the relationships between boundary-making and belonging to address these questions and better account for the successes and failures of attempts at governing an uncertain, rapidly changing world. In this analysis, 'environmental change' arises as a stochastic, relational becoming – ecologies and resources are emergent with the social-politics of governing them – suggesting that more analytical attention is required on how 'environmental challenges' and their 'drivers of change' are conceived and delimited. Together, these theoretical insights help reveal the way that the micro-politics of local resource use and the contradictory acceptance and refusals of authority and subjection are not only products of, but also productive of, larger scale political economies, socionatures, governance, and political struggles. The aim is to contribute towards a reimagination of political authority that begins to capture the complex interplay between our attempts at governing a changing world and the inadvertent authorisations, inclusions, and exclusions that we produce in those efforts. The paper partially illustrates the conceptual ideas with an account of forestry and climate change in Nepal. In a context wherein programmes to govern resources have become of global concern, probing the implications of these points is crucial. It is not only that states govern resources with particular consequences for 'environmental change' or 'sustainability', but also that the act of governing resources (re)produces the socioenvironmental boundaries of the state with profound implications for how future transformations can unfold.

Presents an upcoming research that focuses on building a theory on how states relate to emigrating people, how states are organized outside their territories, and how the emigrating people relate to their country of origin. The project will focus on countries in the Middle East with an emphasis on Turkey, Syria and Algeria. L. Pitkaniemi

Is it really meaningful to talk about "good" science? We hesitate. We desire good (state) science stumbling near a positivist scientific view. We wish for political science theory -- and practice as much as possible to emulate natural science theory and methodology -- to be objective, to look for hard facts, causal relationships, universal laws, and by using the "right" methods to reach the "right" or "true" knowledge and thus make us the "real" knowledge producers. At the same time we believe it is important to keep the discussion on good science not only alive but also always ongoing. Perhaps this is an ongoing discussion about our research efforts and research ideals of what constitutes good science? It is our guiding principle when we formulated the following manifesto for the good of science. Adapted from the source document.

Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are nation-states that have all of the essential attributes of modern statehood. At first they had established themselves as ethnocultural nation-states, later lost their independence and then reemerged straight into the world which was hardly influenced by globalization and regional integration. The principle of "one nation, one language, one culture, one state" was already ideologically obsolete in modern discourse, however this was the basic principle on which the Baltic States were created. The nation-state in this thesis will be understood not only as territorial-political entity, but also as a social actor which puts efforts in political community building and reproducing it. In order to achieve these goals nation-state uses various institutional mechanisms; invokes legal remedies and arguments of inward values. Constructivist approach can help to investigate the processes of political community building in the Baltic States and to identify substantial fields of politics that determine the perception of political community. This also allows comparing them in a broader perspective – with "ideal types" of nation-state that appeared in the West. History, language and citizenship – these are the attributes that provide the political communities of the Baltic States with content and form; therefore the comparison of the policies towards those attributes indicates differences which determine different models of political community-shaping in the Baltic States. Latvian and Estonian models resemble the "German" type of nation-state, while Lithuanian model seems to go through the transformation – recedes from historically closest "German" model and approaches "French" type of nation-state. Such tendencies are determined by cultural experiences, ethnic composition and by giving importance to a particular historical heritage.