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The ultimate goal of game theory is to provide a theoretical model for strategic situations' analysis, i.e. for situations where one actor's choice depends on the behavior of other players in the game. As a concept, game theory is also applicable to the legal context. Legal dialectics and processes are often conducted in some form of strategic interactions. Game theory is a way to see how legal rules affect particular actors' behavior. International Economic Law has its own dynamics which makes the process similar to the analysis through the game theoretical tools. Therefore, the rules of international law are considered as the rules of the game that are taking place among different actors. Game theoretical considerations clarify the substance of the interaction and cooperation of players involved (states, international organizations and other actors). Game theory provides a basis for normative analysis of the issue of implementation of the rules of international law and improves understanding of those rules. The topic of the paper is the application of the game theory in the context of the legal framework established by the World Trade Organization. The member states' dilemma between using the advantages and liberalization options provided by the WTO on the one hand, and joining the regional trade agreements, on the other one, is strategic by nature. Therefore, game theory can contribute to understanding and resolving, using the game of 'prisoner's dilemma' as a model. It is the game which clearly shows that a group of rational egoists can end up worse than a group of actors that acts prima facie contrary to their own interests. 'Prisoner's dilemma' demonstrates why society and law has the need for coordination as well as mechanisms for co-operation. WTO member states put emphasis on the process of liberalization conducted in the framework of regional trade agreements (RTAs); at the same time, their participation in WTO negotiations is not effective and efficient enough to make a breakthrough in the multilateral framework. A solution of the game for Member States is not to cooperate: i. e, liberalization is primarily achieved through regional agreements rather than within the WTO. The rational decision of the Member States (opting for a regional approach) has resulted in a suboptimal result, which is a basic characteristic of the game model based on a prisoner's dilemma: in this case, the optimal solution would be cooperation through a multilateral framework (World Trade Organization).

Political parties are an indispensable factor in any modern parliamentary democracy. It would be impossible to parliamentary democracy to function properly without them. Political parties are a constitutional category and they have to act in accordance with constitution, but due to their importance it is already observed that sometimes they go beyond constitution. Each country should find its own way in order to face that challenge. Germany is a good example for that, by giving political parties the freedom to act on the basis of the provisions of the Basic Law, but with the care that the entire system does not endanger itself. That could be seen in three examples. First example is the relationship between the parliamentary group as the emanation of political parties in parliament and deputies. Second example is banning of anti-constitutional political parties. Third example is the election process of judges of the Constitutional Court. The paper concludes that it is necessary to find an ideal formula for the freedom of their actions, according to which political parties are allowed to perform any action that is beneficial to the constitutional order, while not all of them are forbidden, but only the actions that have a devastating effect on the system as a whole.

The modern state administration and its bodies and special organizations should act in the field of the rule of law. It is a term that originates from the Anglo-Saxon legal world, but it is also a category and a principle of the Constitution of Serbia from 2006. The paper points out the different understandings of the rule of law and briefly looks at the position of the administration or the phase in its historical course until its subsumption under the principle of legality. In Serbia, state administration bodies consist of ministries, administrative bodies within the ministry and special organizations. Administrative or special organizations are formed by the state in order to perform professional and related administrative tasks. In order to permanently and unhinderedly perform the professional work of these organizations, they can act authoritatively. Special organizations have numerous and diverse administrative powers. The paper points out both the similarities and differences of special organizations in relation to administrative bodies. A review of the activities and organizational structure of all special organizations (secretariats, institutes, directorates and one center) established by the Law on Ministries from 2020 was performed. It was also pointed out that all institutes: the Republic Institute of Statistics, the Republic Hydrometeorological Institute, the Republic Geodetic Institute and the Intellectual Property Institute are special organizations that provide services to interested parties. In one part of the final considerations, the author states that for special organizations (as part of the state administration) it could be concluded that they really operate in the field of rule of law as an order with positive properties as characterized by the Constitution, it is necessary to strictly respect the principles organization of state administration prescribed by the Law on State Administration: independence and legality; expertise, impartiality and political neutrality, effectiveness in exercising the rights of the parties, proportionality and respect for the parties; publicity of work. ; Published

On ancient Hindu law

Using the contemporary system theories, the author primarily points to the asymmetry of the constitutional law and the political processes it so rarely regulates. Then he goes on to analyse the historical process of separating the custom law, oral law and written law, of the court and the courtroom, the law and the constitution, the constitution and its interpretation, the constitution's interpretation and the constitutional theory, and concludes his study with a description of the difference between constitution and democracy in the postmodern categorial optics. (SOI : PM: S. 45)