The right to liberty is a fundamental human right that must be protected for everyone regardless of immigration status and is established under international and regional European law. Another recognised human right is the right to asylum which is comprehensively protected by the Refugee Convention. These two human rights apply simultaneously within asylum detention, a measure fully depriving liberty. It is a measure that is widely imposed within the European asylum context. This thesis aims to analyse the asylum-seekers right to liberty standards under the international law and the Council of Europe and European Union law. It found that there is disparity between such standards, with the Council of Europe and European Union establishing considerably lesser right to liberty guarantees for asylum-seekers. This in direct conflict with the international standards. The overarching issue of this conflict appears to be the tension between the States sovereign right to control immigration and the individual's right to liberty as well as asylum. In an attempt to solve these conflicts, the adoption of ATD are proposed.
The right to liberty is a fundamental human right that must be protected for everyone regardless of immigration status and is established under international and regional European law. Another recognised human right is the right to asylum which is comprehensively protected by the Refugee Convention. These two human rights apply simultaneously within asylum detention, a measure fully depriving liberty. It is a measure that is widely imposed within the European asylum context. This thesis aims to analyse the asylum-seekers right to liberty standards under the international law and the Council of Europe and European Union law. It found that there is disparity between such standards, with the Council of Europe and European Union establishing considerably lesser right to liberty guarantees for asylum-seekers. This in direct conflict with the international standards. The overarching issue of this conflict appears to be the tension between the States sovereign right to control immigration and the individual's right to liberty as well as asylum. In an attempt to solve these conflicts, the adoption of ATD are proposed.
The object of the study was to introduce an innovative approach to the long-lasting theoretical discussion about the meaning and extent of political liberty in a modern democratic society. Our suggested way to explain why the democratic political order as such might give rise to considerable challenges for political liberty introduces the classical virtue of courage as a possible key explanatory factor underlying the major tensions that emerge between democracy and liberty. Such approach provides some new insights into the debate about the origins, limits, and political perspectives of modern democracies. The analysis starts by conceptualizing modern democracy as a political form which expresses a specific ethical idea about the natural equality of people. Generally, it means that egalitarianism is the founding idea and moral purpose of a democratic political system, which tends to develop into a modern type of representative government and civil society. The second part of our analysis emphasizes the fact that liberty is by nature a political fact achieved only by practical participation of an individual in public life, and which cannot be reduced to formal, legal, economic or moral categories. Liberty, being a principle of public action, requires the capacity of a person to risk his personal wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The third part of the analysis explains the crucial importance of the virtue of courage to the whole political life, as it is an ethical idea which aims at building such a character of a person that is capable and motivated to live an active public life. It is the virtue of courage that makes an individual morally fit and eager to practice liberty, as well as ready to defend it against any acts of despotism. Finally, the analysis assesses the diminishing role of courage due to the egalitarian public order of a democracy, resulting in adverse effects on liberty. The conclusions of the article highlight several points which are noted below. In a democratic society, courage loses its status as a virtue; thus, individuals become less capable and less motivated to live an active public life. Democracy rests on the principle that implies establishing and protecting the equality of its citizens, while the virtue of courage expresses an implicit distaste for egalitarianism and encourages people to strive for an ethically superior status than that of all the rest, i.e. it makes a clear hierarchical distinction between cowards, conformists, and heroes. That's why democracy banishes courage from its equality favouring public life, depriving it of its ethical status. The decline of this virtue makes the practice of liberty more complicated as individuals lose interest in risking their private wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The diminishing capacity and interest of citizens in democracy to live an active public life, while giving preference to social equality which requires no personal effort, is a major problem for political liberty. As people become indifferent to the pursuit of the common good, liberty becomes inactive, and the political community becomes less immune to various manifestations of despotism.
The object of the study was to introduce an innovative approach to the long-lasting theoretical discussion about the meaning and extent of political liberty in a modern democratic society. Our suggested way to explain why the democratic political order as such might give rise to considerable challenges for political liberty introduces the classical virtue of courage as a possible key explanatory factor underlying the major tensions that emerge between democracy and liberty. Such approach provides some new insights into the debate about the origins, limits, and political perspectives of modern democracies. The analysis starts by conceptualizing modern democracy as a political form which expresses a specific ethical idea about the natural equality of people. Generally, it means that egalitarianism is the founding idea and moral purpose of a democratic political system, which tends to develop into a modern type of representative government and civil society. The second part of our analysis emphasizes the fact that liberty is by nature a political fact achieved only by practical participation of an individual in public life, and which cannot be reduced to formal, legal, economic or moral categories. Liberty, being a principle of public action, requires the capacity of a person to risk his personal wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The third part of the analysis explains the crucial importance of the virtue of courage to the whole political life, as it is an ethical idea which aims at building such a character of a person that is capable and motivated to live an active public life. It is the virtue of courage that makes an individual morally fit and eager to practice liberty, as well as ready to defend it against any acts of despotism. Finally, the analysis assesses the diminishing role of courage due to the egalitarian public order of a democracy, resulting in adverse effects on liberty. The conclusions of the article highlight several points which are noted below. In a democratic society, courage loses its status as a virtue; thus, individuals become less capable and less motivated to live an active public life. Democracy rests on the principle that implies establishing and protecting the equality of its citizens, while the virtue of courage expresses an implicit distaste for egalitarianism and encourages people to strive for an ethically superior status than that of all the rest, i.e. it makes a clear hierarchical distinction between cowards, conformists, and heroes. That's why democracy banishes courage from its equality favouring public life, depriving it of its ethical status. The decline of this virtue makes the practice of liberty more complicated as individuals lose interest in risking their private wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The diminishing capacity and interest of citizens in democracy to live an active public life, while giving preference to social equality which requires no personal effort, is a major problem for political liberty. As people become indifferent to the pursuit of the common good, liberty becomes inactive, and the political community becomes less immune to various manifestations of despotism.
The object of the study was to introduce an innovative approach to the long-lasting theoretical discussion about the meaning and extent of political liberty in a modern democratic society. Our suggested way to explain why the democratic political order as such might give rise to considerable challenges for political liberty introduces the classical virtue of courage as a possible key explanatory factor underlying the major tensions that emerge between democracy and liberty. Such approach provides some new insights into the debate about the origins, limits, and political perspectives of modern democracies. The analysis starts by conceptualizing modern democracy as a political form which expresses a specific ethical idea about the natural equality of people. Generally, it means that egalitarianism is the founding idea and moral purpose of a democratic political system, which tends to develop into a modern type of representative government and civil society. The second part of our analysis emphasizes the fact that liberty is by nature a political fact achieved only by practical participation of an individual in public life, and which cannot be reduced to formal, legal, economic or moral categories. Liberty, being a principle of public action, requires the capacity of a person to risk his personal wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The third part of the analysis explains the crucial importance of the virtue of courage to the whole political life, as it is an ethical idea which aims at building such a character of a person that is capable and motivated to live an active public life. It is the virtue of courage that makes an individual morally fit and eager to practice liberty, as well as ready to defend it against any acts of despotism. Finally, the analysis assesses the diminishing role of courage due to the egalitarian public order of a democracy, resulting in adverse effects on liberty. The conclusions of the article highlight several points which are noted below. In a democratic society, courage loses its status as a virtue; thus, individuals become less capable and less motivated to live an active public life. Democracy rests on the principle that implies establishing and protecting the equality of its citizens, while the virtue of courage expresses an implicit distaste for egalitarianism and encourages people to strive for an ethically superior status than that of all the rest, i.e. it makes a clear hierarchical distinction between cowards, conformists, and heroes. That's why democracy banishes courage from its equality favouring public life, depriving it of its ethical status. The decline of this virtue makes the practice of liberty more complicated as individuals lose interest in risking their private wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The diminishing capacity and interest of citizens in democracy to live an active public life, while giving preference to social equality which requires no personal effort, is a major problem for political liberty. As people become indifferent to the pursuit of the common good, liberty becomes inactive, and the political community becomes less immune to various manifestations of despotism.
The object of the study was to introduce an innovative approach to the long-lasting theoretical discussion about the meaning and extent of political liberty in a modern democratic society. Our suggested way to explain why the democratic political order as such might give rise to considerable challenges for political liberty introduces the classical virtue of courage as a possible key explanatory factor underlying the major tensions that emerge between democracy and liberty. Such approach provides some new insights into the debate about the origins, limits, and political perspectives of modern democracies. The analysis starts by conceptualizing modern democracy as a political form which expresses a specific ethical idea about the natural equality of people. Generally, it means that egalitarianism is the founding idea and moral purpose of a democratic political system, which tends to develop into a modern type of representative government and civil society. The second part of our analysis emphasizes the fact that liberty is by nature a political fact achieved only by practical participation of an individual in public life, and which cannot be reduced to formal, legal, economic or moral categories. Liberty, being a principle of public action, requires the capacity of a person to risk his personal wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The third part of the analysis explains the crucial importance of the virtue of courage to the whole political life, as it is an ethical idea which aims at building such a character of a person that is capable and motivated to live an active public life. It is the virtue of courage that makes an individual morally fit and eager to practice liberty, as well as ready to defend it against any acts of despotism. Finally, the analysis assesses the diminishing role of courage due to the egalitarian public order of a democracy, resulting in adverse effects on liberty. The conclusions of the article highlight several points which are noted below. In a democratic society, courage loses its status as a virtue; thus, individuals become less capable and less motivated to live an active public life. Democracy rests on the principle that implies establishing and protecting the equality of its citizens, while the virtue of courage expresses an implicit distaste for egalitarianism and encourages people to strive for an ethically superior status than that of all the rest, i.e. it makes a clear hierarchical distinction between cowards, conformists, and heroes. That's why democracy banishes courage from its equality favouring public life, depriving it of its ethical status. The decline of this virtue makes the practice of liberty more complicated as individuals lose interest in risking their private wealth and safety for the sake of the common good. The diminishing capacity and interest of citizens in democracy to live an active public life, while giving preference to social equality which requires no personal effort, is a major problem for political liberty. As people become indifferent to the pursuit of the common good, liberty becomes inactive, and the political community becomes less immune to various manifestations of despotism.
This investigatative paper reveals the research steps of Rytis Beiga Costume design master's degree programme. The research is developed by three aspcets: Martin Heidegger's outlook of essence, liberty and tool, which reveals famous fashion design creation tools as well as individual creative work and its objects. Axis of the reseach – to disclose and to recognize the tool of creation. Inspiration is expressed intuetively wthin the work of creation - sketches of military equipment, aircraft black box – allowed to create original tools of creation – the siluette of a black box and recognition of a colour black as 'the absence of light'. Furthermore, with reference to the theory, it is aimed to reveal that a tool can form result desginer's creative hand, therefore making it identifiable. In addition, a critical approach was revealed by the historical study of recognizability of the fashion design's creative tool, covering the whole epoch (from the 20th century 2nd-5th decade, to the 21st century 1st decade and up until today). It was concluded that anything can be a creative tool. The creative, practical and theoretical findings are combined and revealed in the women's clothing collection Black Box Label.
This investigatative paper reveals the research steps of Rytis Beiga Costume design master's degree programme. The research is developed by three aspcets: Martin Heidegger's outlook of essence, liberty and tool, which reveals famous fashion design creation tools as well as individual creative work and its objects. Axis of the reseach – to disclose and to recognize the tool of creation. Inspiration is expressed intuetively wthin the work of creation - sketches of military equipment, aircraft black box – allowed to create original tools of creation – the siluette of a black box and recognition of a colour black as 'the absence of light'. Furthermore, with reference to the theory, it is aimed to reveal that a tool can form result desginer's creative hand, therefore making it identifiable. In addition, a critical approach was revealed by the historical study of recognizability of the fashion design's creative tool, covering the whole epoch (from the 20th century 2nd-5th decade, to the 21st century 1st decade and up until today). It was concluded that anything can be a creative tool. The creative, practical and theoretical findings are combined and revealed in the women's clothing collection Black Box Label.
This investigatative paper reveals the research steps of Rytis Beiga Costume design master's degree programme. The research is developed by three aspcets: Martin Heidegger's outlook of essence, liberty and tool, which reveals famous fashion design creation tools as well as individual creative work and its objects. Axis of the reseach – to disclose and to recognize the tool of creation. Inspiration is expressed intuetively wthin the work of creation - sketches of military equipment, aircraft black box – allowed to create original tools of creation – the siluette of a black box and recognition of a colour black as 'the absence of light'. Furthermore, with reference to the theory, it is aimed to reveal that a tool can form result desginer's creative hand, therefore making it identifiable. In addition, a critical approach was revealed by the historical study of recognizability of the fashion design's creative tool, covering the whole epoch (from the 20th century 2nd-5th decade, to the 21st century 1st decade and up until today). It was concluded that anything can be a creative tool. The creative, practical and theoretical findings are combined and revealed in the women's clothing collection Black Box Label.
The evaluation of liberty and equality from the point of view of justice and at the same time the problem of this work arises from the gaps in the political philosophy of liberalism. Given that liberalism is perceived as a political system that prioritizes individual liberty, the question can be asked whether the same philosophical tradition can offer solutions to the problems posed by that liberty? Liberal theorists have not fully explained how a just society can be created without ensuring certain conditions of equality in its basic structure. The aim of this thesis is to answer the question, can justice really be understood as the compatibility of the principles of liberty and equality? To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set: first, to single out the arguments for the compatibility of liberty and equality by analyzing the texts of political philosophy. Second, to highlight the critical arguments regarding the concept of compatibility of liberty and equality. Third, compare the arguments set out in the first two tasks, thus distinguishing between the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of justice as a compatibility between liberty and equality. The aim was achieved by the method of theoretical analysis of the works of political philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Finally, it is concluded that the two principles of justice proposed by Rawls can help to undo some of the decisive inequitable distribution of resources in the past by ensuring that both the principles of liberty and equality function in society. It is argued that the idea of the need for equality, in accordance with the principle of liberty, can be rejected only by formulating and presenting a very clear, well-founded and developed moral theory of property rectification (correction of injustice), which Nozick failed to formulate.
The evaluation of liberty and equality from the point of view of justice and at the same time the problem of this work arises from the gaps in the political philosophy of liberalism. Given that liberalism is perceived as a political system that prioritizes individual liberty, the question can be asked whether the same philosophical tradition can offer solutions to the problems posed by that liberty? Liberal theorists have not fully explained how a just society can be created without ensuring certain conditions of equality in its basic structure. The aim of this thesis is to answer the question, can justice really be understood as the compatibility of the principles of liberty and equality? To achieve this goal, the following tasks were set: first, to single out the arguments for the compatibility of liberty and equality by analyzing the texts of political philosophy. Second, to highlight the critical arguments regarding the concept of compatibility of liberty and equality. Third, compare the arguments set out in the first two tasks, thus distinguishing between the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of justice as a compatibility between liberty and equality. The aim was achieved by the method of theoretical analysis of the works of political philosophers John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Finally, it is concluded that the two principles of justice proposed by Rawls can help to undo some of the decisive inequitable distribution of resources in the past by ensuring that both the principles of liberty and equality function in society. It is argued that the idea of the need for equality, in accordance with the principle of liberty, can be rejected only by formulating and presenting a very clear, well-founded and developed moral theory of property rectification (correction of injustice), which Nozick failed to formulate.
Although the need of freedom is definite, the concept of individual freedom, while being interpreted with legal terms, causes not only theoretical, but also practical problems. The observed two extremes of freedom are defined as any human self-expression as well as the license, where the state power is generally attributed to disregard personal freedom. In this article the freedom of expression and state enforcement jurisdiction dichotomy are addressed by discussing positive and negative conceptions of freedom and the relationship between the interpretations of political liberalism and Kant and Hegel's philosophies. This paper aims to prove that the positive liberty is the assumption of the negative liberty. The paper based on Hegel's philosophy shows that freedom is the characteristic of human nature to seek identity. It is also argued that human identity can take many forms and, therefore, a person has a number of inherent rights and liberties. It is human psycho-physical identity that provides the right to life and health care; human creative identity, providing the right to privacy and freedom of occupation; human moral identity, which provides the right of dignity, and the moral autonomy of person's social and political identity, providing the political and social rights and freedoms. This article concludes that while a person uses the given rights with integrity and the state is limiting people's arbitrariness, there is no conflict between the freedom and state violation.
Although the need of freedom is definite, the concept of individual freedom, while being interpreted with legal terms, causes not only theoretical, but also practical problems. The observed two extremes of freedom are defined as any human self-expression as well as the license, where the state power is generally attributed to disregard personal freedom. In this article the freedom of expression and state enforcement jurisdiction dichotomy are addressed by discussing positive and negative conceptions of freedom and the relationship between the interpretations of political liberalism and Kant and Hegel's philosophies. This paper aims to prove that the positive liberty is the assumption of the negative liberty. The paper based on Hegel's philosophy shows that freedom is the characteristic of human nature to seek identity. It is also argued that human identity can take many forms and, therefore, a person has a number of inherent rights and liberties. It is human psycho-physical identity that provides the right to life and health care; human creative identity, providing the right to privacy and freedom of occupation; human moral identity, which provides the right of dignity, and the moral autonomy of person's social and political identity, providing the political and social rights and freedoms. This article concludes that while a person uses the given rights with integrity and the state is limiting people's arbitrariness, there is no conflict between the freedom and state violation.
The topic of the article is the problem of the dualism of positive & negative liberty, presented in Isaiah Berlin's doctrine of agonical liberalism. This problem is analyzed in the context of liberal discussion basing on "agonical deconstruction" as an interpretative strategy that allows discovering definite conceptual limits (for example, "basic liberty"). The article attempts to answer the question whether (and if yes, to what extent) pluralism referring to particularism of objectives & values is capable of harmonizing (collocating) with liberalism, which presupposes, one way or another, universalism of values. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnio tikslas yra naujai pazvelgti i politines laisves principo mo-dernioje demokratijoje problema, iskylancia pilieciu konformizmo ir abejin-gumo viesajam gyvenimui pavidalu. Musu siulomas analitinis budas - tai laisves problema suvokti ir nagrineti moderniuju laiku mastytoju adaptuotu klasikines drasos dorybes aspektu. Viesojo gyvenimo nuosmukio demokrati-joje aiskinimai paprastai susitelkia i politiniu instituciju, atstovavimo mecha-nizmu arba pilietines visuomenes ugdymo klausimus, taciau retai reiksminga demesi skiria pilieciu kasdieniu paprociu ir dorybiu veiksniui. Nematant de-mokratijos kaip unikalaus, socialines lygybes idealu gristo paprociu tinklo, sunku deramai ivertinti reiksmingus sios santvarkos priestaravimus politi-nes laisves principui, ir del to isvados apie konformizmo reiskinio priezastis buna negalutines. Drasos dorybe yra patogus analitinis irankis, leidziantis taikliai ir spalvingai pamatyti demokratijai budingu etiniu prielaidu santyki su politines laisves principa palaikanciomis prielaidomis. Musu straipsnyje pasitelktas ziurejimo i laisves problema demokratineje santvarkoje budas lei-dzia tiketis nestandartiniu isvadu apie konformizmo reiskinio priezastis The purpose of this article is to offer a new approach to the issue of conformism and political apathy in modern democratic societies, which indicates an implicit tension between democracy as a political form and the principle of political liberty. What we attempt to do in the article is to bring the issue onto the grounds of classical and modern ethics by introducing the virtue of courage as an analytical concept. The article argues that the virtue of courage and the morals it implicates are the key to understanding how democratic ethics interferes with the ones sustaining an active civic life and liberty, a process which gives rise to the problem of conformism. Such approach allows us to view and interpret the issue of liberty in a democracy not only as a technical issue of governance or representation, but also as a worrying indication of a decline of the political significance of liberty itself. Adapted from the source document.
