As we've pointed out before, the very idea behind the Broken Plate idea is, umm, broken. To the point that we'd have to conclude that actual adults seriously proposing this as a method of measurement have lost the plot to the point of requiring some of that care in the community stuff. From the PR email for today's report:"More healthy foods are over twice as expensive per calorie as less healthy foods"They are attempting to measure the costs of food by calorie count. They also claim that veggies or salads - say lettuce - are "healthy" foods and that potatoes and or rice are not. Which is how they gain their result that healthy foods are more expensive - per calorie, recall - than unhealthy.This is insane. Or, as we could also put it, knock our old Granny down with a wet feather. There really was a reason why she placed a balanced meal in front of us. A wodge of calories from some stodge - potatoes, bread, rice, whatever to be recipe and culturally conformant - and some meat, possibly soya, peas, eggs, for the protein and then some veggies or salad to give us the vitamins and micronutrients. Granny also knew that you didn't get your calories from the lettuce, nor the protein or the vitamins from the tatties. The idea was that the plateful fed across all those major nutrients by also including components from across the food groups. These people, now, today, are measuring the cost of lettuce by the calorie content. No, really, that is what they're doing.At which point we really should be doing some analysis as to who is displaying the insanity. Sure, there are always those wearing tin foil caps somewhere out there. But a healthy society manages to ignore - or tender mercifully to - them instead of taking their claims as a useful basis for government policy.These people are measuring the price of lettuce by the calorie content. Are they mad for saying it or us for listening?
Hey everybody! Its your old pal, "Dr. Nick" here (Simpsons heads will get that reference pretty easily). This episode features the return of Chairman Moe, your favorite Fully Automated regular guests. Last we heard from them, they were interviewing Keir Milburn on his book Generation Left (see Episode 19). This episode sees them returning to Fully Automated, for a long chat on Adam Curtis's recent documentary, Can't Get You Out of My Head. Yes, true enough, this is hardly the first time you'll have heard a discussion about this documentary in a podcast. But it is the first time you'll have heard it discussed quite like this. Here, we adopt a unique take on Curtis, reading him through the lens of an eclectic group of texts drawn from our own readings, over the last year or so. These include, tho by no means exclusively, Gilles Dauvé's Crisis and Communization, Thomas Frank's The People, No, and Marx and Engels's The German Ideology.
Our goal, as one quick whip put it on Twitter, is to "figure out what in the hell Curtis's politics are in 2021." In the end, we conclude that Curtis is an important and necessary commentator, but that he comes to some unhelpful conclusions. This, we think, can be attributed to his tendency to ignore the lessons of materialism and blame idealism for the flaws of the left. For us, Marx, Frank, and Dauvé can each bring something unique to the task of patching up the missing parts of Curtis's framework. Dauvé, despite his weird normative focus on localism and simplistic low-tech authenticity, provides perhaps the greatest insight into why only a materialist critique can work in our effort to assess the flaws of the contemporary left. Whereas, perhaps more controversially, Frank provides the antidote to Curtis's occasional tendency to fall into anti-populist cynicism.
I want to thank Chairman Moe (who are, in real life, Columbus OH-based independent scholars Charlie Umland and Jim Calder) for sharing his valuable time with us, and also Darren Latanick for so patiently indulging the Chairman's antics, and producing a great show for us.
We'll be back quite soon, with an interview with Sebastian Kaempf on MOOCs in Higher Ed. And then we have a number of other guests lined up, between now and the end of the year. Thanks for listening!
I recommend Evan Ellis' post at Global Americans on his recently completed year at the U.S. State Department Policy Planning Staff. He now returns to the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. It is a useful read both for its insider look and its discussion of "why does this matter?"Here is a key point:The problem is also compounded by the fundamental orientation of the State Department to tell our partners what we think and want, rather than listening to what they think and want. While seasoned diplomats know better in their personal interaction, I observed the balance of the work that came across my desk to be about "transmitting" rather than "receiving." Every high-level meeting involves the preparation of "talking points" seeking to advance an agenda, too seldom did they include questions about what our partners thought or needed.This echoes Lars Schoultz's In Their Own Best Interest, where he questions all "uplifting" aid, the effects of which are never measured. We can check boxes on delivery and execution, but not on whether it actually makes lives better. Making lives better requires starting with what our partners actually want. This has often been true, but is accentuated in the Trump era.In my own work, I did not see substantial evidence that the strategy and policy documents of each organization are actively used as guides to action by the other, beyond superficial references to fundamental documents such as the National Security Strategy. I also witnessed and participated in the drafting of some interagency documents, but beyond the somewhat useful exercise of meeting and coordinating about their wording, I did not perceive that the result meaningfully impacted the direction of either state or the other U.S. government entities involved.This is clearly a Trump administration problem, though past administrations were clearly not immune. Unlike the past, though, the essential problem now is that policy is made by tweet, with government agencies scrambling to interpret it just like the rest of us. How do you feel like you're doing something meaningful when the president ignores you?I appreciate these kinds of perspectives. As a side note, as he does not address it, I know a number of people who have moved from academia to policy making and back, and I know their view of of the relevance and accuracy of academic work changed dramatically. I have not felt great temptation to try the policy making world myself, even as I recognize that even in small doses it would make us better analysts. Subscribe in a reader
Hey everyone, and welcome to a very special episode of Fully Automated. Why so special? Well, because this is our first ever joint episode! We've teamed up with the Science Technology and Art in International Relations (or STAIR) section of ISA, for the first of what we hope will be a series of collaborations on the politics and economics of science and technology (and art!) in global affairs.
Joining me as a co-host on this episode is Stéphanie Perazzone, who graduated recently with a PhD in International Relations and Political Science at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva (IHEID). Stéphanie is a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Development Policy (IOB), the University of Antwerp. She is working on a Swiss National Science Foundation-funded research project entitled "Localizing International Security Sector Reform; A Micro-Sociology of Policing in Urban Congo." She is also the Communications Officer for STAIR.
Our guest for this episode is Anna Leander, the winner of the 2018 STAIR 'Transversal Acts' Distinguished Scholar Award. Anna is Professor of International Relations at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, with part-time positions also at the Copenhagen Business School. She is known primarily for her contributions to the development of practice theoretical approaches to International Relations and for her work on the politics of commercializing military/security matters. According to her bio, she is "focused on the material politics of commercial security technologies with special emphasis on their aesthetic and affective dimensions."
In the interview, Stéphanie and I invite Anna to reflect on a number of the topics she has taken on, in the course of her career. One question of interest is the influence of Pierre Bourdieu on her thinking, especially concerning the role of symbolic power in reproducing systems of political violence, and the political value of reflexivity as a precursor of resistance. We also ask her about her work on the increasingly overlapping relationship between the commercial and the technological, and her thoughts on methodology in relation to studying this and other recent trends and developments in the security world.
Listeners interested in following up on Anna's work might want to check out some of the following articles, which all get discussed to some extent in the interview:
The Paradoxical Impunity of Private Military Companies: Authority and the Limits to Legal Accountability. Security Dialogue, 41(5), 467–490. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010610382108 Ethnographic Contributions to Method Development: "Strong Objectivity" in Security Studies, International Studies Perspectives, Volume 17, Issue 4, November 2016, Pages 462–475, https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekv021 The politics of whitelisting: Regulatory work and topologies in commercial security. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 34(1), 48–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775815616971
Thanks for listening. As ever, if you have any feedback, you are welcome to connect with us on Twitter @occupyirtheory. And the STAIR section can be reached @STAIRISA
Last week's awful speech set me on edge immediately. The first words about handouts were a signal, but the thing that confirmed that the talk would be awful was Maisonneuve invocation of "woke." Whenever I hear anyone tossing around that word contemptuously, I immediately code that person as not worth listening to. Why?To be clear, woke refers to folks who have become aware of the historical legacies of discrimination and the present-day implications. That's pretty much it, that woke people understand that there is and has been significant discrimination. That's it. To be anti-woke, which many folks on the right are now so proud of, means denying that discrimination happened and/or it has made an impact on today. Of course, it is more complicated than that--it can mean being opposed to the measures used to address the remedial efforts aimed at reducing discrimination and compensating for its impact. The classic case of this maybe opposing affirmative action as it may be seen as unfair to white men, and the opponents usually say that such measures are unfair as it means that those who are more meritorious are being denied opportunities due to the sins of their fathers. There is a lot built into that including the notion that today's procedures would be otherwise focused entirely on merit if not for considerations of race, ethnicity, gender, etc.The reality of today's politics is that when one loudly proclaims that one is anti-woke, one is doing one of two things (or both):a) one is signaling to one's white, male, "Christian" supporters that one is with them, an enthusiastic supporter of some past status quo (real or imagined) where the woke folks were kept in their place; folks, including myself, refer to this as vice-signaling. b) one is actually one of these folks who are actually an enthusiastic supporter of some past reality (fake or real) where the uppity folks knew better and that one could discriminate, harass and do more without being called out for it.I tend to think Ted Cruz, for instance, is in the first category--that he does not really believe anything but wants power and signals being anti-woke to appeal to his racist, homophobic, xenophobic, misogynist supporters. That does not make these folks better even if they don't believe in the hate they are inciting--it makes them just as bad as the genuine article as they are inciting and providing comfort for them. Vice signaling is dangerous and awful and should be called out.Is this cancellation? No, free speech means one has the right to engage in vice-signaling, but it also means that others have the right to call it out for what it is. Maisonneuve got more than just a right to speak last week--he got to have a platform to do it. And he abused it. And I have the right to call him out as does everyone else who considers his speech to be awful, intolerant, and retrograde.
Hello friends! We are back with another great episode of Fully Automated. In this episode, we step back a little bit from the grander political themes that we are usually preoccupied with, to do an episode on the pedagogical possibilities (and challenges) presented by contemporary technology.
When it comes to online teaching in the discipline of International Relations, there are very few that can claim to have the experience or insight of Dr. Sebastian Kaempf. Senior Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the School of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland (Australia), Kaempf is a scholar of global media politics, focusing on the impact of changing media technologies on contemporary conflicts. He is also is the producer (with UQx and edX.com) and convenor of 'MediaWarX', one of UQ's Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), and probably one of the largest political science MOOCs in the world.
For some, MOOCs seem to represent a sort of ultimate form of "democratized" education whereas, for others, they seem to herald the dawn of a new dystopian age. For Kaempf, now a longtime veteran of online teaching, its important to bring some nuance to this conversation. Pedagogy can make a difference. And, as you'll hear in this conversation, Kaempf and his partners at UQ put a lot of thought and material resources into their approach, pushing the medium to the very edge of what it can accomplish.
Here then, Kaempf discusses the minutiae of how he and his colleagues actually built and delivered the course. On the one hand, they avoided the traditional lecture form in favor of what they call "spaced learning" — because research shows that human beings kind of struggle to concentrate that long. On the other, and in a break with the usual stereotype of dry pre-recorded lectures, a central theme of MediaWarX is the seriousness with which they approached the class as a kind of media production. So, for example, portions of the course are presented in a kind of 'road movie' or documentary style, blending diverse archival footage with on-site discussions from locations all around the world, and interviews with well-known academics and experts (including Glenn Greenwald!).
We'll also hear Seb discuss the ethos of "Hacktivism" that he tries to bring to his online teaching. Thus, he uses discovery assignments to teach about everything from how search algorithms work, to how we are addicted to being online, to the power of big data and surveillance. In this way, the course develops a kind of "crowd sourced" content.
Finally, I ask Sebastian about Covid, and where and how it has changed the fate of MOOCs and online instruction in general. After 18 months of more or less totally online instruction, how does his experience of working with, and thinking about, MOOCs effect his perception of the future of online education in a post-pandemic world?
Sebastian Kaempf can be found on Twitter @SebKaempf and his podcast, Higher Ed Heroes, can be found on all leading podcast apps. And his International Studies Perspectives article with Carrie Finn, discussed in the interview, can be located here:
Thanks for listening. Next episode, we go to Korea to visit the crew from the podcast Red Star over Asia. And in the next episode after that, we will be chatting with Christine Louis Dit Sully.
With the inauguration of Joe Biden just around the corner, many are pondering what new approaches his team might bring to US foreign policy. Despite President Trump's penchant for bombast and bellicose rhetoric, it can't be gainsaid that his reign has been more or less dovish in comparison to those of his more recent predecessors. One huge exception to this rule, of course, has been Iran.
Early 2020 US forces assassinated the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. Then, in November 2020, we saw the assassination of military scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh — a hit apparently green lit by Trump himself. In response to this latest provocation, the Iranian parliament introduced a law that will require Biden to renew the Iranian nuclear deal, or JCPOA, effectively within a month of taking office. The law also requires Iran to produce at least 120 kg of 20-percent enriched uranium annually. What does it all mean? On the one hand, as former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter has been arguing, Iran's response has been remarkably calm. The amount of higher enriched fuel to be produced is still very low, arguably not for military purposes, and is "in conformity" with the limits proscribed under the JCPOA. Nevertheless, as Ryan Grimm reports, even on the way out the door, the Trump Administration has been plotting military strikes against Iran.
To discuss the current situation, and the release of their new co-authored book, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis': Theoretical Approaches (Lexington: 2020), our guests for this episode are Drs. Hal Tagma and Paul Lenze Jr. Tagma is Assistant Professor at the Department Politics and International Affairs, at Northern Arizona University, where he teaches Middle Eastern politics, the political economy of international conflict, and critical approaches to international relations theory. Lenze Jr is Senior Lecturer in Politics, also at Northern Arizona University. He teaches International Relations and Comparative Politics with a focus on Civil-Military Relations, Middle East politics, and US National Security. Lenze can be reached on Twitter @DrPaulELenzeJr
This is a rich book, which I think will appeal both to IR theorists, and those looking to gain a sense of the debates around US-Iran relations. On the one hand, it contains a rich meta-commentary on contemporary IR, and the theoretical possibilities it contains for dialogue between its various theoretical paradigms. Second, its a very detailed and reasoned analysis of the state of US Iran relations, and the idea that there is a 'crisis' (and what it even means to speak of crisis).
Before we get started, the authors make strong claims in the book in favor of what they term eclectic pluralism, and they are critical of the idea that there is only one truth, or one story to be told, about International relations. That might seem to imply they see all truths in IR as somehow equal or equivalent. Nevertheless, as you'll hear, the book is doesn't hesitate to land some punches. In the chapter on Marxism and World Systems Theory, for example, they write that, from the perceptive of Marxism:
Modern academic Realism is a superstructural tool that legitimizes and naturalizes the exploitative and violent polito-economic order of global capitalism. Modern academic Realism is not outside of history nor is it 'timeless wisdom.' Instead, Realism is caught up in constructing the violent, capitalist World-System that it is hopelessly trying to make sense of.
Thanks for listening. We don't ask for any financial support, in bringing you this show. But if you like what you hear, please leave a kind review on your podcast app. If you have any feedback, you can DM us @occupyirtheory on Twitter and Instagram. Thanks!
Hello, Fully Automated friends! For your coronavirus lockdown listening pleasure, we are today releasing a really special episode. Our guest is Dr. Magnus Paulsen Hansen, who is an Associate Professor at the Department of Social Sciences and Business, at Roskilde University. Magnus researches the role of ideas and evaluation in the legitimation of welfare state transformations. But he is also a bit of a Foucault ninja. And he is joining us today to discuss a question that has vexed me for a long time: was Foucault a neoliberal?
Veteran listeners may recall the last time we discussed this issue, when we had Mark GE Kelly on the show, all the way back in Episode 2! But I wanted to get Magnus on the show to go a little deeper into some of these arguments, as its a debate that doesn't seem to be going away. In 2015, Magnus published an article in the journal Foucault Studies, entitled Foucault's Flirt? Neoliberalism, the Left and the Welfare State; a Commentary on La dernière leçon de Michel Foucault and Critiquer Foucault. For me, it stands as one of the most exhaustively researched and argued rebuttals of the contention, by Daniel Zamora, and other fellow travelers (see also here), that Foucault bears some kind of intellectual responsibility for the rise of neoliberal thought.
Honestly, I've always been a little alarmed by the argument that Foucault was a neoliberal. Its not so much the idea itself that offends me, as the slipshod nature of the way the argument is made. With a strong tendency towards ad hominem argumentation, and little consideration for Foucault's core teachings on power, the argument appears to be quite ideologically driven. Often, it seems to boil down simply to the argument that Foucault was some sort of intellectual magpie, and all too easily distracted by shiny objects. Zamora and his fellow travelers claim that Foucault was "seduced" by the basic model of freedom offered by neoliberal thought, and that he was thus blinded to its more disciplinary tendencies. Given Foucault's prestige and influence among the left, this was an abdication from his intellectual duty, weakening the left just at the moment of Reagan and Thatcher's arrival.
In this interview, we discuss the danger of looking for "hidden" or "unconscious" intentions in an author, and the idea that such intentions might relate to any conclusion about an author's politics. We discuss the "best case" defense of the claim that Foucault was somehow seduced by neoliberal thought, and the way this argument often gets linked in an under-nuanced way to Foucault's critique of the post-war welfare state. We also explore the various ways in which Foucault, while often categorized as a libertarian, with anti-state proclivities, was equally opposed to anarchist theoretics of the state, going even so far as to refer to them as a form of "state phobia" — something that is especially interesting think about today, in light of Agamben's recent interventions on Coronavirus measures as amplifying permanent state of exception (I discussed this at length in the intro to our last episode, with Garnet Kindervater).
In the face of such weak evidence, we should note that Foucault in no way accepted or endorsed the idea that he was himself a neoliberal. To the contrary, as Magnus notes, there is a strong cautionary voice in Foucault's writings on neoliberalism. Indeed, he appears to argue that it foreshadows the dawn of a new and sinister mode of political power; at the moment of neoliberalism's birth, Foucault was warning that neoliberal theory imagines itself installing a "permanent economic tribunal" and becoming a hegemonic "model of social relations and of existence itself." Certainly, this is not to say Foucault's work has no blind spots when it comes to the question of what neoliberal theory would later become. One common objection to Foucault in this sense is his failure to anticipate the disciplinary aspects of contemporary neolibera...
This episode is the second in our Brexit series, and we are joined by Lucian Ashworth, Professor of International Relations at Memorial University of Newfoundland, and author of the influential text 'A History of International Thought' (Routledge, 2014).
Back before Christmas, in Episode 14, we heard Lee Jones offer what was perhaps not exactly a 'Lexit' (or 'left exit') position on Brexit, but nevertheless a progressive position very much in favor of a full Brexit. At the core of Jones's arguments was, I think, the view that the EU is an essentially anti-democratic and unreformable project. The only way to address the problem, he claimed, was to restore British sovereignty. In this sense, Jones was critical not only of the deal Theresa May proposed, last December, but also the position of the Labour Party, with its now infamous six tests — that is, essentially, the idea that whatever deal the UK should pursue, it should be one that results in the "exact same benefits" as as those currently enjoyed by the UK, as a member of the Single Market, but with special additional provisions, including "fair management of migration."
Since we spoke to Jones, there have been a number of important developments, but little by way of clarity as to how the drama will end. On January 15, in the greatest parliamentary defeat of any PM in British history, the British Parliament rejected Theresa May's deal. Since then, following the terms of the so-called Brady amendment, passed on January 29, she returned to Brussels in order to try to negotiate "alternative arrangements." She plans now to present her new deal to Parliament on March 12, just two weeks before the deadline March 29. This is very close to the wire, but May hopes to be able to get the EU to budge on the backstop — something she must do, if she is to persuade Tory Eurosceptics to support her plan.
In this episode, you will hear Ashworth engage with a number of Jones's key points, including the 'WTO rules' issue, the importance of not overstating the power of the Far Right in Europe, and the history of reactionary politics, on the British left. But Ashworth's core arguments stem from his concerns about the future of the Irish border, and the unacknowledged costs of a return to the fantasy of 'the sovereign people' — especially in an era where complex global flows of capital have made it harder and harder for the Left to leverage the state, as it pursues its mission of defending labour and democracy, from the interests of the global financial elite.
Importantly, this episode with Lucian Ashworth was recorded on February 16. Due to technical issues, it wasn't ready for broadcast until today, February 28. This delay does not significantly effect the value of the interview, since our discussion focused mainly on the historical context of Brexit, and abstract questions about globalization, and its complex consequences for our traditional models of politics and economic life.
That said, it is worth mentioning that on Tuesday, February 26, Theresa May announced that, should her deal fail to pass the house, she is going to allow a vote on an extension of Article 50. The pressure is on, however, as we have also begun to see rebellion breaking out, and the creation in Parliament of a new 'Independent Group,' composed of rebels from both Labour and the Conservatives. Corbyn, for his part, announced his support for a second referendum — putting before the people a choice between whether to remain in the EU, or to pursue Labour's alternative vision of a Brexit deal, which includes a permanent customs union.
If you have any questions or comments about the show, you are welcome to reach out to us via Twitter: @occupyirtheory — equally, feel welcome to leave us a positive rating on iTunes, or your favorite podcast software.
Headlines out of Ukraine in recent weeks have been grim. Military officers on the front lines say that the situation in the country's east is approaching "critical." The country is facing a serious manpower and weapons shortage. The Russian offensive is reportedly accelerating. Privately, Biden administration officials are wondering whether — even with the latest tranche of U.S. aid secured — Ukraine will be able to win this war. Listening to Secretary of State Antony Blinken's speech this week in Kyiv, however, none of this reality was apparent. The tone of Blinken's speech was optimistic — he referred to the war as a "strategic failure" for Moscow and a "strategic success" for Kyiv. He maintained that Ukraine would win the war and eventually join NATO as a thriving democracy with an economy rebuilt from seized Russian assets. "All of these measures – Ukraine's increased integration with, and support from, NATO; a growing network of security agreements with individual countries; a booming defense industrial base – all of these will ensure that the moment conditions are met and Allies agree, Ukraine's invitation and accession to the Alliance will be swift and smooth," Blinken said. "These measures will also ensure that if Russia is ever serious about negotiating a truly just and lasting peace with Ukraine, your military prowess will be formidable, your hand strong, your path to Europe and NATO secure."As the journalist Leonid Ragozin noted on X, "None of that is on the cards at the moment as the devastated and depopulated country is struggling to prevent a collapse on the frontline."The rhetoric is indicative of an administration that has been unwilling to adapt its approach or messaging on the war regardless of changing dynamics. The administration has said that continuing to support Ukraine to improve its battlefield situation will provide Kyiv with a stronger hand at any future negotiations, but has made no indication that such talks are forthcoming and has avoided answering crucial questions about the war's endgame. Notably, the speech contained no specific reference to Ukraine's territorial ambitions. Independent journalist Ken Klippenstein reported on leaked talking points from the secretary's trip, which included as a trip objective "highlight[ing] U.S. support for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace" that includes respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity "within its internationally recognized borders," which would include Crimea and the Donbas. Blinken's speech did not mention either of those regions or include "internationally recognized borders." In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— During his visit, Blinken also indicated that Washington was open to Ukraine using U.S. weapons to hit targets inside Russia. "We've not enabled or encouraged strikes outside of Ukraine, but ultimately, Ukraine has to make decisions for itself about how it's going to conduct this war," he said. Until now, the Biden administration has reportedly told Ukraine not to strike inside Russia, which has been a point of tension between Washington and Kyiv.— Russian President Vladimir Putin is traveling to China this week. In advance of his trip, Putin expressed support for China's peace plan. "We are positive in our assessment of China's approach to solving the Ukrainian crisis," Putin said, according to a translation of a Russian transcript on the Kremlin website. "In Beijing, they truly understand its root causes and its global geopolitical meaning." China has tried to portray itself as a peacemaker in the conflict, and has reportedly been urging Western countries to invite Moscow to upcoming peace summits. Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was set to go to Spain and Portugal this week, but he canceled his plans on Wednesday. No official reason was provided, but media reports suggest that he decided to stay in Ukraine amid the Russian attacks in the country.— British foreign secretary David Cameron pitched Donald Trump on pursuing a peace deal if he returns to White House in 2025, as part of an effort to convince the former pressident to support aid for Ukraine, according to The Sunday Times. "Cameron's message was simple: 'What are the best conditions in which you as president can make a deal in January? It's both sides holding their lines and paying a price for that.' Trump is understood to have responded: 'No one has set that out for me in these terms. And I'm glad we had the conversation,'" according to the Sunday Times. The suggestion of such a peace proposal would mark a significant shift in the UK's approach to the war. Since the report was published, officials have tried to squash speculation that the West was planning to force Kyiv to the negotiating table. "There is just no sense at all in which Britain would try to persuade, strong-arm or otherwise, Ukraine into accepting giving up some of their territory. That's a decision entirely for Ukraine," defense secretary Grant Shapps told Times Radio on Tuesday. U.S. State Department news:In a Tuesday press briefing, State Department spokesman Vedant Patel reiterated the key talking points from Blinken's speech."The Secretary is in Kyiv to reaffirm what President Biden has said, which is that we want Ukraine to win, and we're committing – committed to helping Ukraine to do just that," Patel said. "And with the support of the United States, our partners and allies, the Ukrainian people can and will achieve their vision for the future: a free, prosperous, and secure democracy, fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community and fully in control of its own destiny."
For the umpteenth time, the U.S. and Iran have come close to an open war neither side wants. The Israelis strike a building within the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, killing senior officers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Iranians, with unintended irony, protest this violation of diplomatic premises, and almost start a war with Israel by launching hundreds of drones and missiles that the U.S., given ample warning, helps to intercept. The Israelis launch a counterstrike to demonstrate its ability to evade Iran's defenses. That appears to end the exchange until the next round.Sooner or later, if the U.S. and the Islamic Republic are going to avoid such a lose-lose conflict, the two sides will need to stop shouting and start talking. Forty-five years of exchanging empty slogans, accusations, threats, and denunciations have accomplished little beyond furthering a few political careers and feeding a sense of self-righteousness. For successive U.S. administrations, Iran remains a problem that will not go away.To paraphrase Trotsky, "You may have no business with Iran; but Iran has business with you." For Iran, the U.S. remains an obsession. The more Iran's hated rulers denounce it, the more attractive it becomes — as both a role model and a destination — to a savvy population suffering from inflation, unemployment, and the stern, misogynistic dictates of an aging and ossified ruling elite.The Islamic Republic, despite the wishes of many Iranians and their friends, is probably not going away soon. In the first months after the fall of the monarchy, the most-asked question in Tehran was, "When are THEY leaving?" (Inhaa key mirand?). Forty-five years later THEY are still in charge and show no signs of packing their bags.Why should we talk to the Islamic Republic, when it has the appalling history that it does? Why should we talk when its overriding policy principle is, in the words of one Iranian official, "opposition to you"? We need to talk because talking (and listening) to an adversary means serving our national interests by communicating. Talking never means either approval of or affection for the Islamic Republic.Talking to the Islamic Republic is not going to bring down that government, persuade the ruling clerics to step aside, or persuade them to stop repressing its women, musicians, journalists, lawyers, students and academics. Talking is not going to end the ruling clerics' bizarre obsessions with controlling every trivial detail of Iranians' private lives. What talking does is allow each side to present its point of view and to correct the dangerous "mythperceptions" that have prevented the U.S. and Iran from breaking out of a 45-year downward spiral of futility.For what has happened when the two sides have not talked? What has happened, for example, when the Islamic Republic's representatives at meetings refuse face-to-face meetings with their American counterparts? What has happened when one side ignores, or rejects outright, proposals from the other to meet in at setting of mutual respect?Whenever two sides — neighbors, relatives, countries — for whatever reason, cannot talk, each side becomes, to the other, simultaneously sub-human and super-human. "Superhuman" means the other is capable of anything. In this case, a superhuman Iran can build and deliver a nuclear weapon in weeks, manipulate proxies to do its will anywhere, and rebuild the mighty Persian Empires of Greek and Roman times. On the other side, a superhuman United States can guide events in Iran and subvert its young people through a powerful, hidden network of agents – journalists, intellectuals, writers, etc. – ready to obey instructions from Washington.As for being "subhuman," in this view neither side is constrained by any sense of morality or humanity. It will do (and since it is also superhuman, can do) anything. In such a case, the superhuman we fear and the subhuman we despise. When such a powerful and evil adversary threatens us, we feel justified in taking any action against it, because that adversary will stop at nothing and has only one goal: to destroy us by any means possible.At one level, leaders in both Tehran and Washington seek to avoid an Iran-U.S. war. Although Tehran's ruling clerics care little for the lives of ordinary Iranians – who would be the victims of such a war – they do care about staying in power and continuing to enjoy their villas and foreign currency accounts. A war with the U.S. would threaten their good life. In Washington, both Democratic and Republican presidents have known that "another stupid war" in the Middle East is a political loser. In 2016, Trump ran against such wars, and his message was powerful. Although he foolishly abandoned the Iran nuclear deal and made a bizarre threat to blow up "52 historical sites" in Iran, he clearly had no stomach for a war. He summarily fired his national security adviser, a paid shill for the cultists of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), when he pushed the president toward confrontation.Does Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu want to drag the U.S. into a war with Iran? To all appearances he does, not only to rid Israel of a declared enemy, but, more important, to keep himself in power. The Israeli premier has used Iran to manipulate the U.S. and even to intervene directly in American domestic politics. The more extreme the rhetoric and actions from Tehran, the better for Netanyahu. It is said he went into mourning when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — notorious for his curious anti-Israeli rhetoric — left office in 2013. But he can usually depend on the Islamic Republic to help him both by overplaying its weak hand and by raising the volume on its tired slogans.Wars often begin with both sides saying they want peace. But miscalculations, underestimating or overestimating the other side, and third-party actions can push a country down a path it knows is self-destructive. Talking to the Islamic Republic will be hard, but it is worth doing if it can keep both sides off a road to disaster.
The historic removal of Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.) from the House Speakership on Wednesday introduced a new roadblock to the prospect of future aid for Ukraine's war effort.Funding for Ukraine emerged as a centerpiece in the negotiations to pass government spending bills and avoid a government shutdown in recent weeks, and McCarthy's maneuvering last weekend was ultimately not enough to save his job. The race for who will take his spot has begun, with Reps. Jim Jordan (R-Ohio) and Steve Scalise (R-La.) already throwing their hats into the ring and others, like Rep. Kevin Hern (R-Okla.) are rumored to be interested as well. One attribute that all share is reluctance to provide more aid to Ukraine, at least in the immediate future. "Looking at the Republican candidates for speaker, I have a tough time seeing any of them bringing Ukraine funding to the floor — even with strings," wrote Punchbowl News' Jake Sherman on the social media platform X. Sherman later added that he "would be surprised if the W.H. gets another Ukraine aid package this year." The reluctance stems from the growing opposition in the GOP caucus to continuing to provide aid for Ukraine. During the Pentagon Appropriations Act amendment process last month, just over half of Republican House members voted against including $300 million in Ukraine aid, and a handful of members maintained that they would not vote for any government spending bills that included money for Ukraine. After much back-and-forth, McCarthy had seemingly acquiesced to the bloc of House Republicans who are skeptical of funding Ukraine. The 45-day Continuing Resolution, which passed with the support of 209 Democrats and 126 Republicans over the weekend, did not contain any further money for Kyiv. But the issue was still a major reason for McCarthy's ouster, with Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.), the leader of the revolt, accusing the former Speaker of working with President Joe Biden behind the scenes to ensure that Ukraine funding would ultimately be brought to the floor. "Members of the Republican party might vote differently on a motion to vacate if they heard what the speaker had to share with us about his secret side deal with Joe Biden on Ukraine. I'll be listening," Gaetz said earlier this week, before introducing the motion to vacate. On Sunday, Biden said that he expected McCarthy to "keep his word and secure the passage of support for Ukraine at this critical moment." McCarthy was eventually removed from his leadership position, with eight Republicans joining forces with every voting Democrat to vacate the speakership. It marked the first time ever that a "motion to vacate" had been successfully employed to remove a House Speaker from power. But if the next Speaker refuses to bring Ukraine aid up to a vote, supporters of sending more aid to Ukraine could have a couple of procedural options that would allow them to supersede the Speaker. One is a petition to discharge, a mechanism by which any House majority can bypass leadership and force floor action on a bill that has been stuck in committee. A petition to discharge would require legislation to first be introduced and be pending in a committee for 30 legislative days. Further, a petition to discharge would require the signatures of a majority of members. Even if all Democrats signed the petition, it would still need six Republicans to reach the necessary 218. There are far more than six Republicans who are in favor of continued aid for Ukraine, but the question is whether there are six who are willing to team up with Democrats and publicly buck their party's leadership. Because petitions to discharge always require members of the majority party to agree with the minority party's legislative priorities, they have rarely been employed successfully.Another option would be a maneuver known as "defeating the previous question." Voting on the previous question is a motion used to end debate on pending legislation and therefore bringing it to an immediate vote.If Democrats — once again with sufficient GOP help — vote to defeat the previous question on a future rule vote, it will leave the rule being voted on open to debate and amendment, which could theoretically be used to add in funding for Ukraine. Both options were floated in the media as ways for Democrats and moderate Republicans to overcome opposition from others in the GOP during the government funding debate. Experts viewed them unlikely to happen, because it would mean that a group of Republicans would essentially declare war on party leadership. At the time, Molly Reynolds of the Brookings Institution wrote on X that any solution that relied on a bloc of Republicans joining forces with Democrats would have to be "implicitly blessed by the GOP leadership."Therefore, bringing future Ukraine-related legislation to the floor over a speaker's public objection would require either rank-and-file Republicans taking a major political risk by going against them, or leadership doing so by privately endorsing the effort.A third possibility, a close observer of the Hill tells RS, is that members who want to continue funding Ukraine strike a deal with the next Speaker, either by pairing it with conservative policy goals like border security concessions, or by trimming down the size of the aid package. In any case, these options are all either unlikely or will take time to progress. The White House and legislators supportive of continued funding for Ukraine have argued that quickly passing another tranche of aid is essential to Kyiv's effort. "We cannot under any circumstances allow America's support for Ukraine to be interrupted," Biden said on Sunday after the stopgap funding measure was passed. "We have time, not much time, and there's an overwhelming sense of urgency," President Joe Biden said Sunday. On Tuesday, eight Senate Democrats sent a letter to House and Senate leadership, saying that "now is not the time to slow our aid to Ukraine.""It is past time for the U.S. Congress to take up and pass legislation guaranteeing Ukraine has the critical resources necessary to continue defending themselves against Putin's illegal war," they wrote. "We urge you to act immediately to advance legislation that will provide critical and sustained security and economic support for Ukraine to the President's desk for his signature."Proponents of expediting the next package argue that the money that Washington has already sent to Kyiv is quickly drying up, though as Responsible Statecraft has reported this week, the reality is more complex. Sen. Mark Warner, (D-Va.) noted on Tuesday that he does not have "100% clarity," on how much of the roughly $62 billion that has been appropriated for military aid remains. Given the events in recent months, the path forward for more Ukraine aid already seemed tricky. With House leadership in turmoil, it now appears to be even more daunting.
On Wednesday, President Joe Biden announced that he would stop sending offensive weapons to Israel "'if they go into Rafah." It is the most notable sign of his administration's shift in its support for Israel's war to date, but questions remain over how and when the president will follow through on his words. Meanwhile, the administration paused a recent shipment of bombs to Israel, but it is not a permanent decision, and the president's claim that "they haven't gone in Rafah yet" — despite the fact that Israel is continually striking the southern Gazan city, have tanks positioned on the periphery, and took control of the the Rafah crossing — suggests that U.S. support may otherwise continue so long as the campaign remains relatively limited.Behind the scenes in the U.S. government, there has been a bit of turmoil.At least four federal employees, including three from the State Department, have publicly resigned, explicitly in protest of the administration's response to the war. This comes amid a number of stories about internal tension in the Biden administration concerning its largely unwavering rhetorical and material support for Benjamin Netanyahu's government as it prosecutes a war that has now killed nearly 35,000 Palestinians. In addition, hundreds of civil servants from various government agencies have signed a series of open letters calling on Biden to push for a ceasefire in Gaza and de-escalation in the wider region. Unfortunately, one federal employee with more than 15 years of service in two government agencies told RS, "the internal messaging to staff mirrors the external messages. And that has been a source of both disappointment and deep frustration." (Sources asked for anonymity in order to discuss internal dynamics.) In other words, the informal 'dissent channel' doesn't seem to be moving the needle, seven months into the war.Critics within the administration are not motivated by their moral qualms alone. There is a growing sense among staff, according to another source, that the long-term alliance with Israel does not serve U.S. interests. Specifically, they are worried that Washington is itself being drawn into a regional war, that its actions are increasing instability in the region, and that "ironclad" support for Israel's conduct in Gaza is undermining any claim that the U.S. is a champion for global human rights and democracy. The dissent also extends beyond the departments that are typically considered responsible for implementing Gaza policy, such as the State Department or USAID. It includes officials in other agencies whose work is tangentially related to the war and still others who are simply outraged by American complicity in the rising death toll and humanitarian crisis. "Having worked in the administration during the Afghan withdrawal and also the Russian invasion of Ukraine, so many efforts were spearheaded and led, and normal procedures were bypassed given the urgent humanitarian situation. Here, however, it has been a totally different ballgame. There are systemic issues with how we issue Palestinian cases," says a homeland security official. "Any kind of initiative to expedite help for Palestinians has been blocked or quelled or slowed down dramatically in a way that I've never seen before." The signs were there in the early days of the war, sources say. "The decision was made from the top very early on," says an official with 25 years of national security experience. "Experts have been shut out from the decision-making process, making it very hard to change that policy."Annelle Sheline, a former staffer in the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, who resigned in protest of the administration's Gaza policy in March, says her experience was similar."There are so many people who know the region really well working at State, who were raising concerns from all kinds of angles: the U.S. national interest angle, the legalistic angle or the human rights angle," Sheline tells RS. "People who spent their whole careers working on these things, and nobody was being listened to. Even relatively senior officials inside State who are very concerned and very opposed were not being listened to." (Sheline was previously a research fellow at the Quincy Institute, which publishes RS.) Federal employees who are disillusioned with the approach to Gaza say they have explored multiple avenues to make their position clear. One federal employee told RS that when staffers raised concerns about unconditionally supporting Israel in the early stages of the war, they realized that doing so through formal channels was ineffective."As the months dragged on, it became evident that the dissent channels that the State Department likes to tout are about placating staff more than actually listening to those with deep regional and policy expertise and making changes," says the 15-year federal employee. The dissidents say only a handful of individuals in the upper echelons of the State Department, at the National Security Council and, and ultimately Biden himself, have decision-making power, and no amount of dissent has made a difference. According to one report, Biden's own staunch pro-Israel position has been solidified over five decades in Washington, and his commitment to the Jewish state is not easily shaken. In the months since October 7, a number of staffers have resorted to quieter and more informal forms of protest — having unsanctioned conversations with journalists; changing social media avatars to express solidarity with Palestinians; or wearing keffiyehs during work meetings — to express their unhappiness or distress within the administration.When RS spoke to these federal employees, they noted the importance of May 8, the day the Biden administration was supposed to produce a report for Congress on Israel's compliance with international humanitarian law. It would have been a clear sign of how far Biden and other top officials are willing to go to back the war effort. That date came and went with no report on Wednesday. There are conflicting reports on whether the report is delayed "indefinitely" or whether it is expected to be delivered soon. As the staffers noted, the Israeli blockade of aid — at the very least — has been so blatant that it would be hard to believe that any official acting in good faith would sign a report asserting the contrary. And this is an argument that many other notable individuals have made publicly."The determination regarding compliance with international law is one of fact and law. The facts and law should not be ignored to achieve a pre-determined policy outcome. Our credibility is on the line," Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), the lawmaker who led the effort to require a report be submitted to Congress, recently said. In late April, more than 90 lawyers signed a letter to the Biden administration calling on it to suspend military aid to Israel. "The law is clear and aligned with the majority of Americans who believe the U.S. should cease arms shipments to Israel until it stops its military operation in Gaza," read the letter. At least 20 of the signatories work in the administration, according to Politico. Politico reported on Tuesday that there has been an uptick in the number of non-public resignations by officials and that more resignations, both public and non-public, will soon follow.Sources tell RS that there have been discussions of larger-scale resignations, though ultimately it remains unclear whether such dramatic steps would make much difference, given how little impact the public dissent has made to date. Many staffers are reluctant to quit their jobs because of family or financial considerations.Sheline, who was the third official to publicly resign over Gaza policy, says that there have been efforts to delegitimize her resignation, as well as those that preceded it. "I think if there were a lot more public resignations, I do think it would be very hard for the administration to pretend that it was just a one-off. So I do hope that there will be more."
This week, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky offered his starkest warning yet about the need for new military aid from the United States."It's important to specifically address the Congress," Zelensky said. "If the Congress doesn't help Ukraine, Ukraine will lose the war."Unfortunately for Zelensky, Congress does not appear to be listening. In fact, Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) is now on the verge of losing control of the House due to deep Republican disagreements over Ukraine aid and a host of other issues. If Johnson fails to rein in his colleagues, the House may be unable to pass much of anything for the rest of the year.As Kyiv's ammunition shortage worsens, a Wednesday dispute revealed just how weak of a hold the speaker has on his caucus. Johnson is trying to renew a spying authority before it expires on April 19, but a last-minute intervention from former President Donald Trump led Republicans to kill his bill before it even reached the floor.Ukraine and its allies seem to have internalized the lesson that Johnson is now learning: As the presidential election season gets into gear, the center of gravity in Republican politics has shifted southward. Hence why British Foreign Minister David Cameron's pro-Ukraine charm tour made its first stop in Palm Beach, Florida.Cameron met with Trump Monday at Mar-a-Lago, where he pushed the Republican candidate on aid. "[I]t's in everybody's interest that Ukraine is in a strong position and [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is in a weak position at the end of this year," Cameron said following the meeting. "Whoever is president wants to be able to push forward in a way that is backing success and not trying to overturn failure."The former British prime minister then went to Washington, where he met with congressional leaders, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.). Cameron did not, however, sit down with Johnson. A British source told Politico that there were scheduling issues, though the symbolism is hard to ignore.The Biden administration, for its part, has made some efforts to bridge the gap in hopes that the House will eventually pass a new aid package. The White House authorized a $138 million weapons sale on Tuesday, and it followed up by sending Ukraine thousands of Iranian guns and ammunition that the U.S. had seized en route to Yemen last year. But this pales in comparison to the billions of dollars worth of weapons that Kyiv received each month in the early stages of the war.All of this is further complicated by the fact that corruption in Ukraine has led to price gouging on some items purchased by Ukraine's Defense Ministry. "Corruption has been deeply ingrained in Ukraine's defense sector since Soviet times, with manufacturers routinely bribing officials to purchase equipment at inflated prices," the Wall Street Journal reported. "Changing those practices would be hard enough in peacetime, let alone in the midst of war."This leaves Ukraine in its weakest position since the early weeks of the war. Without new aid, Kyiv risks losing both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, with Moscow holding an apparent advantage in each domain.This wasn't always the case. In late 2022, when Ukrainian forces pushed Russia from the outskirts of Kyiv all the way back to the Donbas, Ukraine had the momentum in every domain. As George Beebe of the Quincy Institute wrote at the time, "Ukraine's successes on the battlefield have provided it with substantial leverage to shape the terms of any settlement.""This success story does not mean that either Russia or Ukraine is yet ready for serious negotiations," Beebe, who previously led Russia analysis at the CIA, argued. "But it offers a window of opportunity for the United States to prepare the diplomatic ground for an eventual settlement of the conflict — a window that may get smaller over time if we do not act now."Beebe's prediction has proved prescient. Russia, now in a much stronger position, has far fewer reasons to grant concessions to Ukraine than it did a year ago. This does not necessarily mean that all is lost. If Congress can pass a new Ukraine aid package, then Kyiv may be able to at least hold onto the stalemate that has prevailed for much of the past year. This would create an opportunity to sue for peace, though likely on less favorable terms than were previously possible.But it does mean that maximalist goals — including the reconquest of Crimea, which Russia has held since 2014 — are that much less realistic now than they were in 2022. Even some mainstream Democrats are coming around to this position, as exemplified by recent comments from Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee."Realistically, Crimea is not coming back to Ukraine, and we can absolutely win this war and absolutely make a difference even in that reality," Smith said in a hearing Wednesday."We do not have to have Crimea to make it 1000% worth it to give Ukraine the money," he argued. "We need a sovereign democratic Ukraine that can survive."In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:— Three drones slammed into a Russian-occupied nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on Sunday, reigniting fears that the war could spark a nuclear accident, according to the BBC. Russia blamed Ukraine for the strikes, while Ukrainian officials argued that the Kremlin may have staged it as a "false flag" attack. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said the attack was the first direct hit on the plant since late 2022 but noted that there are "no indications of damage to critical nuclear safety or security systems."— European states penned a new deal to enhance cooperation on protecting undersea infrastructure in the North Sea, according to Reuters, which noted that attacks on the Nord Stream pipelines in 2022 has focused attention on security issues along Europe's northern coast. Not noted in the Reuters report is the increasingly popular view that Ukraine or pro-Ukrainian forces were behind the attack. The pact — signed by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom — mostly focuses on sharing information about threats to underwater cables and pipelines, with a focus on potential Russian malfeasance.— The European Union tightened restrictions on imports of Ukrainian produce in an effort to stem concerns that European farmers are being undercut by cheap goods from Ukraine, according to Politico. The issue has taken on particular salience in the run-up to the EU elections, with politicians anxious to avoid political costs from drawn-out fights with farmers, who have staged major protests in Poland and France. As Politico notes, the short-term tug of war over Ukrainian imports signals a larger problem: If Ukraine joins the EU, then farmers across the continent risk being put out of business by Kyiv's massive agricultural sector.— In The Hill, Sen. Mike Lee (R-Utah) argued that "peace talks remain the only viable option" to end the war in Ukraine. "No hard power endgame is viable for the U.S. in Ukraine, and the terms for Ukrainians get worse every minute the U.S. enables the continuation of this war," Lee wrote. "Our best hope to stop the bleeding is at the negotiating table. The blank checks must end, and American statecraft must start."U.S. State Department news:In a Monday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller renewed the U.S. call for Russia to withdraw from the Zaporizhzhia power plant following this week's attacks. "Russia is playing a very dangerous game with its military seizure of Ukraine's nuclear power plant, which is the largest in Europe," Miller said. "We continue to call on Russia to withdraw its military and civilian personnel from the plant, to return full control of the plant to the competent Ukrainian authorities, and refrain from taking any actions that could result in a nuclear incident at the plant."
While the Biden administration has secured a deal with Israel and Hamas for a combat "pause," it remains to be seen if this leads to a formal cease fire or only allows for a brief respite before Israel resumes its bid to destroy Hamas. But what is clear is that Hamas's October 7 assault has shaken the assumptions of every player in the Middle East including Iran. Tehran's number one worry is that the assault could invite a regional war for which it was not prepared. Ground zero for such a conflict is the Lebanon-Israel theater. While Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah telegraphed in his November 3 speech that he wants to avoid war with Israel, he also insisted that "when we do receive the order to…take sides with Hamas against the Israelis, you will see the difference." Thus, he warned, "whoever wants to prevent a regional war, and I am talking to the Americans, must quickly halt the aggression in Gaza."If the Biden administration has been listening, so have Iran's leaders. They may yearn for Israel's destruction. But the last thing Tehran wants is for the "axis of resistance" that it has forged to be weakened by a regional conflagration that Iran did not seek. The purpose of Iran's alliances with militant groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen is not Israel's elimination but rather the survival of the regime. Thus, Iran will have to find ways to support a pummeled Hamas as it contends with what could eventually be a wider global effort to rebuild Gaza as part of a new diplomatic initiative on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. To resist, while skirting the potential perils of resistance, is a dilemma that Hamas's "Al-Aksa Storm" has only deepened for Iran, and for Hezbollah.Deterrence and the paradox of "resistance"Lacking a powerful conventional military, Iran has deployed a "forward defense" strategy via alliances with armed non-state groups which have one primary mission: to deter the U.S. or Israel from attacking Iran. Beyond subcontracting Iran's defense to regional actors, this strategy gives Iran plausible deniability even as its allies periodically harass, intimidate or threaten Tehran's foes. This blurring of the lines between defense and offense carries risks, the most obvious of which is the possibility of spiraling escalation between Iran and its enemies. But a second risk is that Iran's regional allies might "go rogue" by taking on Israel or the U.S. in ways that could damage the deterrent architecture provided by the axis of resistance. Such a possibility has been ever-present in the Israel-Lebanon theater but has loomed even larger in the Gaza-Israel arena.For Tehran, Hezbollah's most important role is to deter an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Thus, it has provided Hezbollah with some 100,000 rockets, while Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard has helped transform Hezbollah's army—which includes some 22,000 fighters and an equivalent number of reserves—into a potent fighting force. Even with Israel's "Iron Dome" anti-missile system, by launching multiple rockets, experts argue that Hamas could hit all of Israel's main cities and inflict immense damage on refineries, water desalination plants, and industrial infrastructure. But, because Israel is capable of inflicting similar costs on Lebanon, the ultimate obstacle to a full-fledged Hezbollah-Israel war is the real prospect of "Mutually Assured Catastrophe," or MAC, for both countries. Knowing this, Hezbollah's role in the axis of resistance is to preserve its deterrent capacity (and that of Iran) by avoiding a full-fledged war with Israel.As for Hamas, while it has not received the kind of advanced armaments that Iran has given Hezbollah, it has used Iran's missiles, drones, training and funding to cause pain and draw Israel into costly military incursions -- but without posing an existential threat. Indeed, this situation facilitated Israel's efforts to divide Gaza from the West Bank. While Gaza's people have paid a high price for this modus vivendi, the Israel-Hamas stand-off has benifitted Iran. By giving its regional allies the means to harass Israel, Iran has kept the flame of "resistance" burning, but without risking a regional explosion that might prove costly for Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran's forward defense strategy has depended on walking this tricky path.October 7: Hamas goes quasi-rogue?Hamas' October 7 "Al Aksa Mosque Storm" has complicated Iran's forward defense strategy in two closely related ways:First, it underscored the risk that one or more of its allies might go rogue. After all, the attack hinged on an elaborate artifice of deception that not only surprised Israel but was also kept from both Hezbollah and Iran. Thus, Iran and Hezbollah responded to events as they unfolded while their leaders held that they had no forewarning of the attack. U.S. intelligence sources substantiated such claims, while Hezbollah's decision to move it forces to southern Lebanon following the Hamas attack suggested the improvised nature of its response. When Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian insisted that Hamas "is not receiving orders from us" and is acting in its "own interests," he was probably not prevaricating. Instead, Abdollahian stated unambiguously that "we don't want this war to spread out."Second, Hamas's massacre of 1200 Israeli and foreign nationals and its seizure of at least 240 hostages has galvanized many Israelis behind a "war of destiny" the likes of which the Islamist organization has never witnessed. This, of course, may be exactly what Hamas envisioned. Indeed, at the very most, some of its forces were prepared to move towards the West Bank in the hope that Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem — and in Israel — would rebel en masse. At the very least, Hamas's leaders hoped that their attack would shake up the entire region, even if this meant absorbing a terrible military blow and sacrificing thousands of civilian lives. But the prospect of a wider war that could burn its own regional assets was not something that Iran or Hezbollah sought.Dilemmas for Iran and HezbollahThe potential for a wider war has created a dilemma for Iran and Hezbollah. Neither can afford to let up on the pressure along the Lebanese border and in other arenas such as Syria, lest they be seen as failing to support Hamas. But, as the pace of deadly tit-for-tat attacks has escalated, the danger for Israel and Lebanon has increased. Quite apart from the lethal prospect of MAC is the possibility that Israel could refocus its military might on Lebanon and thus deliver a severe blow to Hezbollah. But if, as one expert has noted, it is unlikely that "Iranians want to sacrifice Hezbollah on the altar of Hamas," Tehran cannot risk signaling that it is ready to sacrifice Hamas on the altar of the axis of resistance. Iran's leaders face a conundrum for which there is no simple solution.Still, given their long-term interests, Iran's leaders must find a way forward that ensures that their regional allies can survive and project deterrence. For this purpose, they are resorting to their familiar carrot-and-stick approach. The stick is being wielded by Tehran's allies in Yemen and especially Iraq. Apart from demonstrating solidarity with Palestinians, the recent missile attacks on U.S. forces in Syria are meant to send the signal that U.S. forces will suffer a cost if Washington doesn't push for a formal cease-fire. The U.S. has retaliated after each assault in the hope that it can deter Iran's allies from escalating, but the potential for a widening confrontation between U.S. and pro-Iranian forces could increase dramatically if Israel resumes its assault in Gaza. As for the carrot, based on his early November talks with Qatar and Hamas, Foreign Minister Amir-Abdollahian set out the outlines of a deal, including a prisoner exchange between Hamas and Israel, an immediate halt to attacks, and the provision of humanitarian aid to Gaza. But, he added, "It is the American side that must decide whether it wants to escalate the war."This, of course, was the very question that the Biden White House had to address. Now that it has backed a truce, the White House might welcome an international efforts to press for a wider cease-fire. Not surprisingly, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted that military operations will continue. But with the recent release of hostages, the pressure in Israel and abroad to expand the truce will increase, thus lessening the chances of a U.S.-Iran military confrontation that Washington and Tehran both want to avoid.Iran wants no war and no peaceWhatever the outcome of the Gaza conflict, two things are clear. First, Iran's leaders must rethink how to ensure that its allies do not use the umbrella of "deterrence" to pursue goals that could harm the axis of resistance. This will not be easy because the foot soldiers of Hamas and Hezbollah have long expected that the ultimate purpose of resistance is to crush Israel rather than to protect Iran's rulers. As one Hezbollah fighter put it, my "main fear is to die without liberating Palestine – but we can see it getting closer." Such hopes will be delt a further blow if a diplomatic process –backed by Iran-- opens up.Second, while the Gaza war has exposed the failures of the Biden administration's Middle East policy, the international community might still look to Washington to build on the November 24 truce in the hope that it can provide the basis for a wider effort to rebuild Gaza and, as Biden himself has proposed, to refocus U.S. policy on the issue of Palestinian statehood. In fact, the White House might try to recast the "Abraham Accords" in a manner designed to tackle, rather than circumvent, the Palestinian issue. Such an effort could have the support of European states and the blessings of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, including Qatar, which has emerged as a vital Gulf Arab ally of the United States.With U.S. elections looming on the horizon and a Middle East seizing with anger over Israel's devastation of Gaza, the window of opportunity for such an initiative will be very short. It is possible that Iran might activate the axis of resistance to sabotage any wider diplomatic process, especially if, as is likely, it excludes Hamas. But any bid by Iran to act as a spoiler could also again expose the fault lines in the axis of resistance. Indeed, having pushed for a cease-fire, Tehran must tread carefully. After all, Russia and especially China — which are effectively associate members of the axis of resistance — will probably back rather than undercut a broader diplomatic process.Such a possibility has prompted a debate in Iran regarding the costs and benefits of working with Russia and China, particularly given Beijing's role in securing a renewal of Saudi-Iranian relations earlier this year. One analyst has argued that "we operate within the framework of China and Russia's interests, without little to gain for ourselves." However exaggerated, this warning speaks to the contending interests that are at play in a widening axis of states and non-state groups, some of which will not automatically toe Tehran's line of no peace and no war.This article has been abridged from a previous version published by the Arab Center Washington DC.Dear RS readers: It has been an extraordinary year and our editing team has been working overtime to make sure that we are covering the current conflicts with quality, fresh analysis that doesn't cleave to the mainstream orthodoxy or take official Washington and the commentariat at face value. Our staff reporters, experts, and outside writers offer top-notch, independent work, daily. Please consider making a tax-exempt, year-end contribution to Responsible Statecraft so that we can continue this quality coverage — which you will find nowhere else — into 2024. Happy Holidays!
