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In the decade since its creation in 1999, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has experienced surprisingly large and persistent inflation differentials across member states causing substantial shifts in relative price levels. At the same time, member countries exhibited distinct non-synchronized output fluctuations, giving rise to a pattern of 'rotating slumps' (a term coined by Olivier Blanchard). This paper presents a stylized theoretical model of a monetary union which demonstrates how inflation differentials and relative output movements interact dynamically. A number of implications are derived from the model. In particular, national fiscal policies are shown to have an important role in containing internal macroeconomic disparities in a monetary union. An optimal fiscal policy rule is derived from the model for that purpose.

This paper takes a first step in analysing how a monetary union performs in the presence of labour market asymmetries. Differences in wage flexibility, market power and country sizes are allowed for in a setting with both country-specific and aggregate shocks. The implications of asymmetries for both the overall performance of the monetary union and the country-specific situation are analysed. It is shown that asymmetries are not only critical for country-specific performance but also for the overall performance of the monetary union. A striking finding is that aggregate output volatility is not strictly increasing in nominal rigidities but hump-shaped. Moreover, a disproportionate share of the consequences of wage inflexibility may fall on small countries. In the case of country-specific shocks, a country unambiguously benefits in terms of macroeconomic stability by becoming more flexible, while this is not necessarily the case for aggregate shocks. There may thus be a tension between the degree of flexibility considered optimal at the country level and at the aggregate level within the monetary union.

Journal of International Money and Finance Volume 19, Issue 3, June 2000, Pages 419-432. ; This paper employs systems-based cointegration techniques developed by [Reference to Johansen] and [Reference to Johansen] to determine which European Union countries would form a successful Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), based on long-run behavior of the nominal convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht treaty. The original 12 European Union countries are analyzed together. Nominal exchange rates, real exchange rates, long-term interest rates, and government budget deficits are each analyzed for co-movements among the 12 countries and various subgroups of them. The results suggest that not all of the 12 original countries of the European Union can form a successful EMU over time, unless several countries make significant adjustments.

Hauptbeschreibung: This volume contains the contributions of a conference dealing with the consequences of the European Monetary Union for the macroeconometric modelling of the Euro area, which took place in Essen in 2000. At the end of the conference the participants were convinced that the discussions including a great variety of theoretical, methodical and factual aspects from the producers' as well as the consumers' perspective will not fail to have a certain impact on the future development of macroeconometric modelling in the Euro area. Once more it became clear, however, that an ideal w

We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter the monetary union, this tax-restraining effect of uncertainty is mitigated. The monetary union may hence lead to higher fiscal distortions in some member countries, depending on governments' spending targets and on the change in the degree of uncertainty implied by common monetary policy.

This book studies the dynamics of monetary and fiscal interactions in the Euro Area. The policy makers are the European Central Bank and national governments. The primary target of the ECB is low inflation. And the primary target of a national government is low unemployment. However, there is a short-run trade-off between low inflation and low unemployment. Here the main focus is on sequential policy decisions. Another focus is on simultaneous and independent policy decisions. And a third focus is on policy cooperation. There are demand shocks, supply shocks, and mixed shocks. There are country-specific shocks and common shocks. The key question is: Given a shock, what are the dynamic characteristics of the resulting process?