MONETARY UNION REVISITED
In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Volume 24, Issue 1, p. 87-95
ISSN: 1467-9485
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In: Scottish journal of political economy: the journal of the Scottish Economic Society, Volume 24, Issue 1, p. 87-95
ISSN: 1467-9485
In: Current history: a journal of contemporary world affairs, Volume 98, Issue 627, p. 171-175
ISSN: 1944-785X
In: The European Union series
In: The European Union Ser.
Cover -- Contents -- List of Figures, Tables and Boxes -- Abbreviations -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1 History of Economic and Monetary Union -- From the Snake to the EMS -- Launching Monetary Union, 1999-2008 -- Crisis and Aftermath: Reconstructing EMU, 2008-present -- Conclusion -- 2 Monetary Integration -- Evolution EMU 1.0 -- Institutions -- Conclusion -- 3 The European Central Bank -- Institutional Configuration and Legal Mandates -- The ECB's Record -- Conclusion -- 4 Financial Integration and Banking Union -- Evolution -- Institutions -- External Dimension -- Conclusion -- 5 Fiscal Policy Coordination -- Evolution -- Instruments -- Conclusion -- 6 Economic Policy Coordination -- Evolution -- Institutions and Instruments -- Conclusion -- 7 The Euro Outs: A View from the Outside -- Becoming a Euro Insider -- Evolution -- The Euro Outsiders with Opt-outs -- Pre-euro Accession Countries -- Remaining in as an Out -- Conclusion -- 8 EMU and the World -- The Euro as an International Currency -- China and the Euro -- External Representation -- Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.
In: The European Union review, Volume 15, Issue 1-2, p. 21-77
ISSN: 1606-8963
In: International studies perspectives: a journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 4, Issue 3, p. 275-292
ISSN: 1528-3577
World Affairs Online
In: The Manchester School, Volume 72, Issue s1, p. 19-33
ISSN: 1467-9957
In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation—that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk‐sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union, are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.
In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Volume 9, Issue 6, p. 13-16
ISSN: 1468-0270
Is European Monetary Union desirable? Pascal Salin, of the Univeristy of Paris, argues that any system of fixed exchange rates such as the EMS Exchange Rate Mechanism, is likely to prove unsatisfactory.
In: Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik 135
In: Swiss political science review: SPSR = Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft : SZPW = Revue suisse de science politique : RSSP, Volume 3, Issue 2, p. 1-8
ISSN: 1662-6370