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Europe's financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro's invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar's privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany's persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community's Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988-89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.

Since the creation of the euro, capital ows among member countries have been large and volatile. Motivated by this fact, I provide a theory connecting the exchange rate regime to nancial integration. The key feature of the model is that monetary policy aects the value of collateral that creditors seize in case of default. Under exible exchange rates, national governments can expropriate foreign investors by depreciating the exchange rate. Anticipating this, investors impose tight limits on international borrowing. In a monetary union this source of exchange rate risk is absent, because national governments do not control monetary policy. Forming a monetary union thus increases nancial integration by boosting borrowing capacity toward foreign investors. This process, however, does not necessarily lead to higher welfare. The reason is that a high degree of nancial integration can generate multiple equilibria, with bad equilibria characterized by inecient capital ights. Capital controls or scal transfers can eliminate bad equilibria, but their implementation requires international cooperation.

The purpose of this article is to provide a political economy rationale that helps explain why some non-central European economies, featuring highly idiosyncratic disturbances and apparently low inflation bias inefficiencies, seem so eager to enter the European Monetary Union (EMU). The main message from the paper is that because these economies normally display a high degree of domestic political uncertainty, the "economic costs" arising from the decision to surrender monetary policy may in fact be less severe than the "political costs" of opting out of EMU and then possibly facing undesired inflation upsurges in the future. ; O objetivo deste artigo é sugerir um argumento de economia política que ajude a explicar porque alguns países periféricos da Europa, que apresentam choques econômicos altamente idiossincráticos, e que conseguiram controlar o problema do viés inflacionário recentemente, apresentam elevado desejo de ingressar na União Monetária Européia. A principal mensagem do artigo é que, devido ao elevado grau de incerteza e polaridade política presentes nestas economias, os "custos econômicos" de se delegar hoje a política monetária a um agente externo, podem se mostrar menores que os "custos políticos" de não adesão caso um governo com preferências inflacionárias mais amenas venha a vencer as eleições futuras.

The Road to Monetary Union analyses in non-technical language the process leading to adoption of a common currency for the European Union. The monetary union process involved different issues at different times and the contemporary global background mattered. The Element explains why monetary union was attempted and failed in the 1970s, and why the process was restarted in 1979, accelerated after 1992 and completed for a core group of EU members in 1999. It analyzes connections between eurozone membership and Greece's sovereign debt crisis. It concludes with analysis of how the eurozone works today and with discussion of its prospects for the 2020s. The approach is primarily economic, while acknowledging the role of politics (timing) and history (path dependence). A theme is to challenge simplistic ideas (e.g. that the euro has failed) with fuller analysis of competing pressures to shape the nature of monetary union.

Monetary Issues: Monetary Unions: Between International Trade and National Sovereignty -- Why a Monetary Union?- Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union: Lessons from Simple Models -- Institutions and Monetary Policy -- Fiscal Issues: Government Deficits, Transfers and Debt -- Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union -- The Policy Mix -- Toward an Ever Closer Union: Structural Adjustments and Reforms -- Fiscal Union -- Banking Union -- The Fate of a Monetary Union -- General Conclusion. .

General introduction -- General introduction -- One: Currency Competition -- I. The theory of currency competition -- II. The history of currency competition -- III. The history of monetary thought on currency competition -- IV. The current debate: The return to gold and the liberalization of banking -- Two: Monetary Union -- to Part Two. Which monetary integration? -- V. The European Monetary System -- VI. Is the adjustable peg a viable option? -- VII. Freely flexible exchange rates or a common currency? -- VIII. Exchange controls for ever? -- IX. Towards a better European Monetary System -- Appendix to Bibliographical Note (Lawrence H. White) -- The authors -- Index of names.

Hopkin, B. ; Reddaway, B.: Heading for breakdown. - S. 239-243. Holtham, G.: The Maastricht conception of EMU is obsolete. - S. 244-248. Palmer, J.: Wanted: A compelling vision. - S. 249-252. Radice, G.: The case for a single currency. - S. 252-256. Wolf, M.: Why European integration cannot be built on EMU. - S. 256-260

DESPITE THE AURA OF CONFIDENCE PERVADING EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS AS THE DEADLINE FOR MEETING THE CONVERGENCE CRITERIA FOR EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION (EMU) APPROACHES, THE LINES FOR A POLITICALLY DIVISIVE BATTLE ARE BECOMING CLEAR. ON ONE SIDE STAND GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL, FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, AND THE VAST MAJORITY OF SENIOR EUROPEAN POLITICIANS, WHO CARE FAR MORE ABOUT ACHIEVING EMU ON TIME THAN ABOUT HOW THEY GET THERE. THEY WORRY THAT IF MONETARY UNION IS DELAYED ONCE, IT COULD BE POSTPONED INDEFINITELY. ON THE OTHER SIDE STANDS THE GERMAN STABILITY COALITION, COMPOSED OF THE BUNDESBANK, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, AND OTHER GERMAN INSTITUTIONS. THE STABILITY COALITION IS WORRIED THAT RUSHING INTO EMU MIGHT COST GERMANY ITS SWAY OVER EUROPEAN ECONOMIC POLICY, WITH CONTROL PASSING TO A BROAD COALITION OF ECONOMICALLY WEAKER SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES LED BY A RESURGENT FRANCE.

Monetary unions of the past had a better chance of success if economic policies of the participating states were in harmony. Example: The Scandinavian Monetary Union in contrast to the Latin Monetary Union. 0 Since harmony of economic policies could not be maintained under political stress (in the First World War), even the Scandinavian Union failed. .1 0 The only cases where monetary unions have survived up toQiow are those of general political, economic, and monetary unification: Switzerland, Italy and Germany. In monetary matters, the centralizing of decisions has been a minimum requirement for the success of a union. 0 No historical monetary union has brought about political unification. It has always been the other way round.

This book explores the scope and limits of macroeconomic policy in a monetary union. The focus is on pure policies, policy mixes, and policy coordination. The leading protagonists are the union central bank, national governments, and national trade unions. Special emphasis is put on wage shocks and wage restraint. This book develops a series of basic, intermediate, and advanced models. The monetary union is an open economy with high capital mobility. The exchange rate between the monetary union and the rest of the world is floating. The world interest rate can be exogenous or endogenous. The union countries may differ in money demand, consumption, imports, openness, or size. A striking feature is the numerical estimation of policy multipliers. A lot of diagrams serve to illustrate the subject in hand

In the decade since its creation in 1999, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has experienced surprisingly large and persistent inflation differentials across member states causing substantial shifts in relative price levels. At the same time, member countries exhibited distinct non-synchronized output fluctuations, giving rise to a pattern of 'rotating slumps' (a term coined by Olivier Blanchard). This paper presents a stylized theoretical model of a monetary union which demonstrates how inflation differentials and relative output movements interact dynamically. A number of implications are derived from the model. In particular, national fiscal policies are shown to have an important role in containing internal macroeconomic disparities in a monetary union. An optimal fiscal policy rule is derived from the model for that purpose.

This paper discusses possible links between monetary arrangements in particular monetary union and economic growth. It is stressed that growth depends ultimately on how the real economy works: there is no monetary magic that can conjure up growth. But monetary policy can contribute to conditions for sustainable growth by securing and maintaining price stability; monetary union might extend this. It might also deepen the single market. The elimination of nominal exchange rate movement among members of the union removes some sources of shock but also some ways of adjusting to shocks. This underlines the importance of other adjustment mechanism especially supply-side flexibility, which is crucial for growth in any event.