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This book includes an analysis of the broad stages in the developmental pattern, of the key variables that must shape it, of their function in moral judgement and of the principles that must lie behind a moral education that has autonomy as its goal.

Unter Rekurs auf die Ergebnisse soziologischer Studien über den Einstellungs- und Wertewechsel der städtischen Jugend Chinas beschreibt der Artikel die Versuche von Staat und Partei, der aus der Konfrontation traditioneller Werte mit den Erfordernissen einer westlich orientierten Modernisierung erwachsenen "moralischen Krise" der chinesischen Gesellschaft mit einer politisch-ideologischen Kampagne zur Verstärkung der "moralischen Erziehung" zu begegnen. (BIOst-Hml)

AbstractIn this paper, we draw attention to several important tensions between Kant's account of moral education and his commitment to transcendental idealism. Our main claim is that, in locating freedom outside of space and time, transcendental idealism makes it difficult for Kant to both provide an explanation of how moral education occurs, but also to confirm that his own account actually works. Having laid out these problems, we then offer a response on Kant's behalf. We argue that, while it might look like Kant has to abandon his commitment to either moral education or transcendental idealism, there is a way in which he can maintain both.

I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach in state sponsored schools. Instead, they should allow reasonable citizens latitude to choose the worldview in which their own children are educated. I begin by defending a particular conception of political liberalism, and its associated requirement of public reason, against the received interpretation. I argue that the values of respect and civic friendship that motivate the public reason requirement do not support the common demand that citizens "bracket" their comprehensive commitments in politics. Rather, citizens should seek to enact policies the justification of which is compatible with the truth of their fellow reasonable citizens' worldviews. Next I argue that no single educational approach can meet this standard of justification. Many believe that state sponsored education in a pluralist, liberal society ought to present multiple worldviews in a neutral way. I argue that this aspiration is unrealizable, and no other educational model will plausibly meet the justificatory demand. Finally, I address two objections to my favored alternative: that it may allow for the inculcation of disrespect, and that it violates children's autonomy. Against the first, I claim that political liberals have no grounds for thinking that reasonable citizens will seek to inculcate disrespect. Finally, I argue that there is no conception of autonomy that can sustain the second.