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The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.

Denne artikkelens hovedargument er at det i overveldende grad er økonomien som har vært den drivende faktor bak Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen, inkludert da invasjonsforsvar ble forlatt som forsvarskonsept i 2001. De sikkerhetspolitiske endringene har først og fremst vært utnyttet retorisk for å begrunne nedbygging av forsvarsstrukturen, når den økonomiske nødvendigheten ikke lenger lot seg skjule. Kostnader forbundet med økt deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner har kun i svært beskjeden grad bidratt til reduksjonen i forsvarsstrukturen – kostnadene var her alt for lave til å kunne gi noen troverdig årsaksforklaring alene. Årsaken er i stedet at forsvarsbudsjettene etter den kalde krigen ikke kompenserte for den reelle kostnadsutviklingen i sektoren. Det resulterte i et kjøpekrafttap som gradvis tæret på Forsvaret.
Abstract in English:Economy – the Driving Force behind Norwegian Defence Transformation after the Cold WarThe main conclusion of this article is that to an overwhelming degree, economic factors have been the driving force behind the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces following the end of the Cold War, including the discontinuation of anti-invasion defence as a level of ambition in 2001. The changes in international affairs have been used rhetorically to justify the downsizing of the force structure, when the financial necessity could no longer be concealed or ignored. Additional costs caused by participation in international operations overseas have only to a very limited extent contributed to the sweeping reduction of the armed forces, since these costs were far too small to explain the cutbacks. The actual financial reason is that the defence budgets throughout the 1990s and 2000s did not compensate for the growth in real term costs in the defence sector, particularly those pertaining to the acquisition and operation of modern weapon platforms and systems. This resulted in a loss of purchasing power which gradually wore down the force structure.

I 2001 besluttet Stortinget en vesentlig endring i forsvarskonsept og en betydelig reduksjon i forsvarsstrukturen. Forsvarets hovedoppgave skulle ikke lenger være å utgjøre et mobiliseringsbasert invasjonsforsvar. Beslutningen var et brudd med forsvarskonseptet som hadde dominert norsk forsvarsplanlegging under den kalde krigen og i tiåret som fulgte. Hvorfor ble invasjonsforsvaret forlatt, og hva ble Forsvarets nye hovedoppgave? Artikkelen argumenterer for at det finnes tre dominerende og delvis konkurrerende forklaringer på omleggingen av Forsvaret: en sikkerhetspolitisk, en kulturell og en økonomisk. Den første tilnærmingen ser beslutningen som drevet av et ønske om å bidra mer i utenlandsoperasjoner for å bli oppfattet som en «god alliert» i NATO og USA. Den andre forklarer overgangen med en kulturell endring der en ny og mer «internasjonalisert» forsvarspolitisks diskurs vant frem blant norske beslutningstakere. Den tredje ser endringen som et uunngåelig resultat av invasjonsforsvarets manglende økonomiske bærekraft.
Abstract in English:Security Policy, Culture or Defence Economics? Competing Explanations for the Transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold WarIn 2001, the Storting – Norway's parliament – decided on a significant change in Norway's national defence concept and a significant reduction in the defence structure. The Armed Forces' main task should no longer be to constitute a mobilization-based territorial defence force. The decision was a break with the defence concept that had dominated Norwegian defence planning during the Cold War and in the decade that followed. Why was territorial defence abandoned, and what became the Armed Forces' new main task? The article argues that there are three dominant and partly competing explanations for the transformation of the Armed Forces: a security policy explanation, a cultural explanation and an economic explanation. The first approach sees the decision as driven by a desire to contribute more in international operations in order to be perceived as a "good ally" in NATO and the United States. The second explains the transformation with cultural changes among Norwegian decision-makers, through which a new and more "internationalized" defence policy discourse became dominant. The third sees the change as the inevitable result of the financial unsustainability of the old status quo in the Armed Forces.

Artiklen ser nærmere på de forhold, som er blevet beskrevet i analyser af interventionen i Afghanistan, der kan forklare den udvikling, som den amerikanske præsiden, Joe Biden, forsikrede ikke ville finde sted i 2021. Tre forhold står frem i tidligere analyser af årene, der gik, i Afghanistan. For det første, at der var løbende udfordringer med kapacitetsopbygningen. Udfordringer, der ligeledes løbende var blevet påpeget internationalt af analytikere, forskere og i krigens mange evalueringsrapporter og erfaringsopsamlinger. For det andet, at formålet med krigen fra de allieredes side skiftede karakter, som tiden gik. Fra at det fælles formål var lettere at få øje på i starten af krigen, så blev interventionsindsatserne til et formålstæt delta, hvor de involverede lande med skiftende regeringer balancerede hensyn til alliancer, en hjemlig vælgerskare, nationale sikkerhedsinteresser og værdipolitiske rettighedsdagsordner. For det tredje, at Taleban gradvist – og ikke fra den ene dag til den anden – havde opbygget styrke og kontrol, og samtidig havde været involveret i en politisk proces via deres repræsentationskontor i Doha, der var med til at bane vejen for deres overtagelse.
Abstract in English20 Years in Afghanistan: What Do We Know About What We Learned?This article takes a closer look at various analyses of the international intervention in Afghanistan, which point at different reasons for the developments that took take place in August 2021. Developments that the American president Biden shortly before the Taliban takeover assured the world would not take place. Three factors stand out in previous analyses of the years that passed by in Afghanistan. First, that there were ongoing challenges with capacity-building. Challenges that had been pointed out by analysts, researchers and in the many evaluation and lessons-learned reports from the war. Secondly, that the purpose of the war on the part of the allied forces changed character as time went on. The common purpose was easier to see in the beginning of the war, but the intervention efforts turned into a purpose-dense delta, where the countries involved and their successive governments balanced considerations to alliances, domestic support, national security interests and value political agendas. Third, that the Taliban seemingly had gradually – and not overnight – built up strength and control, and at the same time been involved in a political process through their exile office in Doha that helped pave the way for their takeover.