Search results

The state of res on nation-building in the Maghreb is described. The aim is to discover the structural (ie, SH) foundations of nation-building within a relatively uniform regional context (the 3 former French colonies of the Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria & Tunisia). In order to understand Maghrebian society & its particular history, we must consider the Maghreb against its natural background, the Mediterranean world. 2 widely accepted interpretations of this phenomenon exist: (a) that of the classical orientalists, united at the time when the colonial system was at its zenith; & (b) that of the anti-colonialist Marxist, uniting towards the end of the colonial era. Most representative of the orientalists is E. F. Gautier, who states that the marked disparity in the twin processes of nation-building to the north & south of the Mediterranean occurred from the 11th cent onwards because the Arab nomads had put down the first attempt on the part of settled Berber peasant communities to set up an autochtonous nat'l State based on an alliance between peasantry & townsfolk. The Marxists hold that the evolution of Maghrebian society towards modern nationhood was to a very large extent conditioned by the balance of pol'al forces within the Mediterranean zone. They also resusitated the notion of an Asian form of production. The contribution of French ethnologists & English speaking anthrop'ts is also discussed. It is pointed out that it is in patrilineage that we meet with the basic pol'al unit of all the peasant communities of the Maghreb. It is shown that in all 3 countries, it was the union of forces between the peasants & the Ur elites that made the movement for nat'l liberation irreversible. Independence & the reactivation of the segmentary structures is discussed, & it is demonstrated why on the eve of colonization, the 3 countries were not in the same situation as far as nation-building was concerned. E. Weiman.

Preparation for nation-building requires that responsible political leaders consult both with regional and functional experts, those who know why the society in question descended into conflict and those who know from experience elsewhere how to put such societies back together. Goals must be established which transcend the most immediate and normally negative purposes of the inter vention, e.g. halting conflict, stopping genocide or turning back aggression. These positive goals must be commensurate with the scale of military manpower and economic assistance likely to be committed. The larger the social transformation envisaged, the greater the resistance likely to be encountered. The most common cause for the failure of nation-building endeavours is a mismatch between objectives and commitments. (Survival / SWP)

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) disagrees with his assertion that it is the kind of nation building that impacts the handling of ethnocultural diversity rather than the fact that nation building occurs. After characterizing the nation-state, it is argued that nation building presupposes an international regime of nation-states. After elaborating on the notion of nation building, attention turns to establishing Kymlicka's claim that if ethnocultural justice requires that the one-nation state be superceded by a multination state, ie, minority self-government is necessary, then ethnocultural justice requires that exclusive jurisdiction be superceded by overlapping jurisdiction, ie, governance across nation-state borders. Hungarian nationalism is taken as a case to consider the practical relevance of overcoming the nation-state regime, demonstrating that shifts in the international environment have already affected perceptions of political alternatives. J. Zendejas

A comment on Will Kymlicka's "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe" (2001) disagrees with his assertion that it is the kind of nation building that impacts the handling of ethnocultural diversity rather than the fact that nation building occurs. After characterizing the nation-state, it is argued that nation building presupposes an international regime of nation-states. After elaborating on the notion of nation building, attention turns to establishing Kymlicka's claim that if ethnocultural justice requires that the one-nation state be superceded by a multination state, ie, minority self-government is necessary, then ethnocultural justice requires that exclusive jurisdiction be superceded by overlapping jurisdiction, ie, governance across nation-state borders. Hungarian nationalism is taken as a case to consider the practical relevance of overcoming the nation-state regime, demonstrating that shifts in the international environment have already affected perceptions of political alternatives. J. Zendejas

As the demand for nation-building increases and outpaces the supply of nation-builders, the United Nations should remain the first source of nation-building activities; NATO, as another source of peacekeeping capability, should strengthen its capacity and develop reliable arrangements with the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the United Nations to receive civil assets in support of Alliance-led operations. NATO also needs to generate, train, and equip more troops for peacekeeping operations.

Cover Page -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Preface -- Contributors -- Introduction: Nation-Building and National Development: Some Issues for Political Research -- 1 The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe -- 2 Nation-Building? -- 3 The Interlocking of Nation and Personality Structure -- 4 Nation-Building in America: The Colonial Years -- 5 Nation-Building in Latin America -- 6 Nation-Building and Revolutionary War -- 7 Nation-Building in Africa -- 8 Building the Newest Nations: Short-Run Strategies and Long-Run Problems -- BIBLIOGRAPHY A Selection of Recent Works on Nation-Building, Donald J. Puchala -- Some Recent Works on Nation-Building, 1963-1966 -- Index

AbstractNational identity in Africa is routinely viewed as underdeveloped relative to ethnic identity because most states did not follow classic forms of nation‐building, such as mass schooling with nationalist content. Yet recent survey data show that national identity across the continent is more robust than most scholars predicted. What is driving national identification in Africa? What unifies Africans around common national identity? Existing theories are not well suited to explaining this question, because factors that they see as essential, such as higher levels of development and cultural cohesion, often do not exist. In this article, I suggest a new understanding of the strength of national identity, based on the impact of political events, such as peace, political stability and conduct of elections. Drawing on over 200 original interviews with Ghanaian respondents, I demonstrate how political stability in Ghana, contrasted with political turmoil in neighbouring countries, produces narratives about national identity.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the U.S. so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the U.S. state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the U.S.'s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the 'rational actor' model, according to which the U.S. functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled U.S. nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the U.S. should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US's difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the "rational actor" model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Examines issues surrounding the prospect of nation building, taking Afghanistan as an example of a country well behind the curve when it comes to society-building communitarianism. The primacy of tribes characterizing Afghan community is addressed, asserting that Afghanistan is little more than a geographic distinction void of any nationalist underpinnings. It is suggested that rather than begin the nation-building process with so-called design questions, resources ought to be focused on riding unfolding trends & redirecting them rather than trying to create totally new ones. The tribal forces in Iraq, Pakistan, & Afghanistan are briefly noted & their implications for forming native security forces discussed, focusing on Afghanistan. The need for the US to work with Afghanistan's tribal forces & religious leaders in some manner is stressed. Adapted from the source document.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominantexplanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflictsinside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistanby exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficultiesin the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. Themain objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact ofbureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on theBush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which theUS functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions withinthe foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internaltensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The bookalso contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage innation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US's difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers' understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the 'rational actor' model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts.