Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Air Force Acronyms -- Foreword -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The Air Force and Strategic Missiles -- 2. Evolution of the Minuteman Force Levels -- 3. Minuteman in Context -- 4. Solid Propellant Comes of Age -- 5. From Polaris Came Minuteman -- 6. Siting and Facility Design -- 7. Construction and Activation -- 8. Motors and Airframe -- 9. Mark 5 and 11 Series Reentry Vehicles -- 10. Guidance and Control -- 11. Targeting Minuteman -- 12. Research and Development Flight Programs -- 13. Operational Flight and Evaluation Programs -- 14. Operational Base Missile Test Programs -- 15. Aspects of Command and Control -- 16. Keeping Pace: Modernization and Upgrades -- 17. Force Reduction -- Epilogue -- Appendix A: Construction, Acceptance, and Activation Summaries -- Appendix B: Flight Test Programs -- Appendix C: Operational Flight Test and Evaluation Programs -- Appendix D: Airborne Launch Control Center Panels -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

When Francis Gary Powers was asked by the presiding judge of the Soviet military tribunal trying him for espionage whether he had not considered the possibility that his U-2 flight might provoke armed conflict, the captured pilot answered, "The people who sent me should think of these things. My job was to carry out orders. I do not think it was my responsibility to make such decisions." This article deals with a similar problem, a predicament which to this day, fortunately, has remained hypothetical, but which may become distressingly real at some time in the future. It concerns the unenviable position of the military subordinate commanded to use nuclear weapons, who may be punished today if he disobeys and prosecuted tomorrow if he obeys. The discussion initially evolves around three issues in international law: (1) the validity of the plea of superior orders as a defense in war crimes trials; (2) the question of the legality of using nuclear weapons; and (3) the present status and future of the law of war. That these problem areas are intimately related should become clear as we proceed.The disregard for humanitarian and moral considerations which has increasingly characterized the conduct of war in the twentieth century, and, more recently, the development of nuclear weapons—the tools of mass extermination par excellence—have led many students of international law to conclude that the laws of war are dead. Grotius' doctrine of the temperamenta belli, requiring belligerents to conduct hostilities with regard for the principles of humanity and chivalry, as well as the many conventions drawn up prior to World War I in order to regulate the use of violence, are said to have become largely obsolete.