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The paper discusses the events of 2005–2015, when the international community decided that Iran's nuclear programme can also serve military purposes, and endeavoured to impose a strict control over this programme. The diplomacy of the European Union was exceptionally active in this area, in particular its three strongest members: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Given the protests of Iran and its accelerated work within the programme, there emerged the option of confrontation (including military conflict) or compensation offered to Iran in return for its abandoning nuclear ambitions. Over several years of negotiations, concluded by an agreement in July 2015, the EU was able to exert a strong politico-economic pressure on Iran on the one hand, and offer it advantageous terms of cooperation in the field of nuclear research on the other. ; The paper discusses the events of 2005–2015, when the international community decided that Iran's nuclear programme can also serve military purposes, and endeavoured to impose a strict control over this programme. The diplomacy of the European Union was exceptionally active in this area, in particular its three strongest members: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Given the protests of Iran and its accelerated work within the programme, there emerged the option of confrontation (including military conflict) or compensation offered to Iran in return for its abandoning nuclear ambitions. Over several years of negotiations, concluded by an agreement in July 2015, the EU was able to exert a strong politico-economic pressure on Iran on the one hand, and offer it advantageous terms of cooperation in the field of nuclear research on the other.

Nuclear weaponry is a factor of military deterrence, hence is also a key means of shaping security and maintaining strategic balance. Therefore, despite implementation of the policy of a nuclear non-proliferation, there is no political will towards eliminating it completely and ultimately. The aim of the article is to analyze and assess the impact of nuclear weapons on shaping the international security policy. In the paper, the author assumed that nuclear weapons, in both political and military categories, are an important factor in shaping international relations. Therefore the importance of nuclear weapons in international relations, despite the passage of time, does not change much. Most countries that possess nuclear weapons, modernize and expand their arsenals, seeing in that not only an expression of power but also guarantee to its security. Studying the article should at least bring some reflection on the evolution of nuclear weapons as a mean of shaping contemporary security relationships.

Nuclear weaponry is a factor of military deterrence, hence is also a key means of shaping security and maintaining strategic balance. Therefore, despite implementation of the policy of a nuclear non-proliferation, there is no political will towards eliminating it completely and ultimately. The aim of the article is to analyze and assess the impact of nuclear weapons on shaping the international security policy. In the paper, the author assumed that nuclear weapons, in both political and military categories, are an important factor in shaping international relations. Therefore the importance of nuclear weapons in international relations, despite the passage of time, does not change much. Most countries that possess nuclear weapons, modernize and expand their arsenals, seeing in that not only an expression of power but also guarantee to its security. Studying the article should at least bring some reflection on the evolution of nuclear weapons as a mean of shaping contemporary security relationships. ; Broń jądrowa stanowi czynnik odstraszania militarnego, tym samym jest to środek kształtowania bezpieczeństwa oraz utrzymania równowagi strategicznej. Dlatego też, mimo przeciwdziałania rozprzestrzenianiu się broni jądrowej, nie ma politycznej woli, aby do jej wyeliminowania ostatecznie doprowadzić. Celem artykułu jest analiza i ocena wpływu broni jądrowej na kształtowanie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. W artykule przyjęto, że broń jądrowa zarówno w kategoriach politycznych, jak i militarnych stanowi ważny czynnik kształtowania relacji międzynarodowych, dlatego też znaczenie broni jądrowej w relacjach międzynarodowych niewiele się zmienia mimo upływu czasu. Większość państw, które taką broń posiadają, modernizuje i rozwija swoje arsenały, widząc w tym nie tylko wyraz swojej potęgi lecz także gwarancje suwerenności i bezpieczeństwa. W ocenie autora studiowanie tego materiału powinno przynajmniej przywołać pewną refleksję nad rozwojem broni jądrowej jako środka kształtowania współczesnych relacji bezpieczeństwa.

Artykuł poświęcony jest wydarzeniom lat 2005-2015, kiedy to społeczność międzynarodowa uznała, że rozwijany przez Iran program nuklearny może służyć także celom wojskowym i podjęła starania o poddanie tego programu ścisłej kontroli. Szczególnie aktywna była na tym polu dyplomacja Unii Europejskiej i jej trzech najsilniejszych państw: Francji, Niemiec i Wielkiej Brytanii. Wobec sprzeciwu Iranu i przyspieszania jego prac możliwa była albo droga konfrontacji (również militarnej), albo zrekompensowania Irańczykom rezygnacji z aspiracji nuklearnych. W kilkuletnich negocjacjach, zakończonych porozumieniem w lipcu 2015 r., UE potrafiła z jednej strony wywrzeć silną presję polityczno-gospodarczą na Iran, a z drugiej - zaoferować mu korzystne warunki współpracy w badaniach atomowych. ; The paper discusses the events of 2005-2015, when the international community decided that Iran's nuclear programme can also serve military purposes, and endeavoured to impose a strict control over this programme. The diplomacy of the European Union was exceptionally active in this area, in particular its three strongest members: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Given the protests of Iran and its accelerated work within the programme, there emerged the option of confrontation (including military conflict) or compensation offered to Iran in return for its abandoning nuclear ambitions. Over several years of negotiations, concluded by an agreement in July 2015, the EU was able to exert a strong politico-economic pressure on Iran on the one hand, and offer it advantageous terms of cooperation in the field of nuclear research on the other.

During the Cold War constructing nuclear weapons was extremely expensive, which limited the possibility of having it, only to the world's economic powers. The first owners of the destructive, nuclear technology was: United States and Soviet Union. In the meantime of the US-Soviet nuclear technology race, the role of other countries continued to grow. In this second category race, initially, at the forefront was United Kingdom. This situation changed, when China and France joined the race. In subsequent years, the nuclear club expanded by Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa and the nuclear weapons stockpile continued to grow, exceeding a level of more than 65,000 in 1986. It is said that nuclear potential saved global community from the U.S. and the Soviet Union using it against each other, instead triggering a substitute wars, in third world countries. However, declarative support for various nonproliferation initiatives, as it took place in the years 1945-1991, often do not have the impact on the reduction of the real threats of proliferation and usage of weapons of mass destruction. No doubt the nuclear potential developed by Islamic Republic of Iran, or Kim Jong-un's aspirations that are posing a threat to international security ; Podczas zimnej wojny skonstruowanie broni nuklearnej było bardzo kosztowne, co ograniczało możliwość jej posiadania tylko do potęg gospodarczych. Pierwszymi dysponentami destrukcyjnej technologii jądrowej były Stany Zjednoczone i ZSRR. Pomimo tego, w międzyczasie amerykańsko-radzieckiego wyścigu technologii jądrowej, rola innych krajów wciąż rosła. W tym wyścigu drugiej kategorii, początkowo, na czele stała Wielka Brytania. Sytuacja ta zmieniła się, gdy do wyścigu włączył się Pekin oraz Francja. W kolejnych latach do klub atomowego dołączyły: Izrael, Indie, Pakistan i RPA, a zasoby nuklearne wciąż rosły, by w 1986 roku przekroczyć poziom 65 tys. głowic. Mówi się, że to potencjał jądrowy uchronił jednak przed wzajemnym atakiem USA i Związek Radziecki, wywołując jednak wojny zastępcze, w państwach trzecich

The article is an attempt to make an assessment of arguments for the development of civil nuclear power (non-carbon energy source) in the context of concerns on weakening the non-proliferation regime. The article analyzes dilemmas associated with the spread of civil nuclear power in the world and threats to international security (risk of utilization of dual-use technology for military purposes, trafficking of radioactive materials for the military or terrorists). Therefore, the key condition for the development of civil nuclear power is increasing the effectiveness of the NPT regime, including the acceptance of rigorous checks and inspections from IAEA officials by countries aspiring to join the nuclear program. ; The article is an attempt to make an assessment of arguments for the development of civil nuclear power (non-carbon energy source) in the context of concerns on weakening the non-proliferation regime. The article analyzes dilemmas associated with the spread of civil nuclear power in the world and threats to international security (risk of utilization of dual-use technology for military purposes, trafficking of radioactive materials for the military or terrorists). Therefore, the key condition for the development of civil nuclear power is increasing the effectiveness of the NPT regime, including the acceptance of rigorous checks and inspections from IAEA officials by countries aspiring to join the nuclear program.

The aim of the article is to answer the question: What role does nuclear weapon play in Israeli strategy of deterrence? The main hypothesis of the paper is based on the assumption, that the deterrence potential of the Israeli nuclear arsenal is strictly determined by deliberate ambiguity (so-called amimut). The author also assumes that nuclear deterrence plays a significant role in the general Israeli deterrence strategy. However, due to the changing nature of threats, it is not its core element. The author used the following theoretical research methods: critical analysis and comparative analysis of sources, scientific studies, strategic documents as well as selected speeches of the Israeli authorities. This article can be seen as an attempt to capture the specifics of the Israeli nuclear deterrence strategy and the features that distinguish it from deterrence of other nuclear states.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the "madman theory", a name coined by U.S. President Richard Nixon, in the rhetoric of russian war, especially after the events of 24th February 2022. According to the given theory, the leader cultivates the image of madness in order to lend credibility to his threats to use nuclear weapons and make his enemies think twice before they adopt any decision. With the russian invasion of Ukraine, the theory of the madman has been rediscovered and is again being used to explain the increasingly unpredictable behavior of russian President Vladimir Putin, who on February 27, 2022, ordered his defense minister and chief of general staff to initiate special combat tasks by nuclear deterrence units. This behavior by Putin is reminiscent of what has been described as the madman theory of foreign policy – giving the sense that someone is capable of anything if they cannot bring the war to an end the way they want.

The article explains the mechanisms leading to achieving the Russian Federation's dominance in the regional and global security environment. To solve the research problems, a systemic approach was applied and methods of literary analysis and critique, non-participant observation, and uncategorized interviews were used. In the research process, it was established that the dominance of the Russian Federation in the international arena is based on force. The key factors enabling its achievement are displayed by the quantitative and qualitative superiority of the armed forces, expressed by force correlation coefficients, strategic forecasting, and operational prediction as well as the modern forms and methods of using armed forces. The Russian Federation balances the existing international disparities with the use of adaptive strategy, blackmail of conflict escalation with the use of nuclear weapons, modern and technologically advanced operational capabilities, and offensive asymmetric activities.

The author distinguishes threats to international security from challenges faced by the security policy of states and collective international actors but approaches them as a certain continuum. The following phenomena are considered threats and challenges in the second decade of the 21st century: military threats (nuclear weapons and their proliferation, conventional weapons and huge military spending), terrorism, other threats (cybernetic, economic and energy-related, ecological), as well as the migration challenge. A separate major challenge, which the author analyses in detail, is the reconfiguration of the international order that has been taking place for more than a decade now. The author believes that this reconfiguration constitutes a serious challenge to the West, including to its security policy. In order to take up this challenge, benefit from it and prevent the emergence of new threats to international security, the West needs to not only consolidate its security system but also engage in dialogue and cooperation with the emerging competitors and rivals challenging the West's global leadership (the emerging powers from BRICS), as the American political scientist Charles Kupchan proposed in 2010, emphasising that lasting peace can be achieved by turning enemies into friends. It is, however, uncertain what kind of foreign policy will be conducted by the new US President, Donald Trump, elected in November 2016.

Canada took part in creating United Nations Organization and actively participated in many UN specialized organizations. It was also the co-author of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Contributed in negotiations in the matter of the prohibition of continuing the experiences with the nuclear weapon, supported Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Canada acted as a leader of the British Commonwealth, the allied of United States, moderator in the Atlantic Alliance, mediator in solving international conflicts. Canada was involved as the economic power in solving global problems, and also offered help for undeveloped states. Beginning from the end of years 60. the politics of Canadian governments brought to the reduction of defense expenses, and in the result brought some problems with the Canadian identity. The Canada balances among the necessity of the co-operation with United States and the protections of own independence. New defense strategy introduced in 2008, Canada First. Defense Strategy, created possibilities of change in the defense policy. New strategy give possibility of the armed forces strengthening and the strengthening of the international position of the Canada, however these introduced changes are meeting some difficulty after years of negligence s.

The next phase of Russian aggression against Ukraine demonstrated that despite lacking a large military, territorial, population, or raw material potential, Belarus could play a significant role in the project to construct a new regional, continental, and even global security architecture. The purpose of this article is to discuss the problem of repositioning Belarus, which was affected not only by the multidimensional change in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations as a result of the war but also by long-term efforts to elevate Belarusian-EU relations. In this area, the fundamental research question is whether the war in Ukraine, the breach of the so-called Budapest Memorandum and the deepening of the multifaceted Russian-Belarusian integration within the Union State (including the militarisation of Belarus and the allocation of tactical nuclear weapons) will cause the projects for the redefinition of Belarus-EU relations (which are instrumental in reducing the intensity of political turbulence in the region) to disappear from the EU diplomatic agenda for a long time, with a direct negative impact on the future of European security. The article verifies the hypothesis that due to the specificity of the Belarusian authoritarian model, despite the systematically deepening Russian-Belarusian integration and the ever-expanding sanctions policy towards Belarus, (2) due to the shape of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations after 2014 and the periodically satisfactory Belarusian-EU relations, (1) there are still prospects for Belarus to pursue foreign policy diversification and repositioning of the European vector in it.

Mimo ścisłych związków między technologią i stosunkami międzynarodowymi istnieje niewiele prac w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, które podejmują próbę teoretycznego połączenia obu tych sfer rzeczywistości społecznej. Podstawowym celem artykułu jest historyzacja technologii militarnej w społecznej historii stosunków międzynarodowych. Autor przedstawia proces historycznego wzrostu znaczenia technologii militarnej w funkcjonowaniu społeczeństw i jej destruktywny wpływ na życie społeczne. Przekonuje, że nowe technologie rozwinaje są przez istoty ludzkie, a nie "odkrywane". Dokonane wynalazki odzwierciedlają określone interesy, posiadanie adekwatnych zasobów do ich dokonania i istnienie określonego instytucjonalnego wsparcia. W takim rozumieniu nauka, technologia i innowacje są funkcją ludzkich wyborów, interesów, idei, instytucji i zasobów. ; Despite close connections between technology and international relations, there are few works in international relations studies that would make an attempt to theoretically connect both of these two spheres of social reality.The main aim of the article is a historization of military technology in a social history of international relations. The author presents the process of historical growth of importance of military technology in functioning of societies and its destructive influence on social life. He convinces one that new technologies are developed, not "discovered" by human beings. Inventions reflect specific interests, owning proper resources to develop them and the existence of determined institutional support. In this understanding, science, technology and innovations are functions of human choices, interests, ideas, institutions and resources.In the first part of the article, the author presents relations between science, technology and innovations, as well as main attitudes in international relations studies in the context of comprehending these relations. Problems caused by technological development are also discussed. In the second part of the article, the author presents the meaning of military technology in international relations through its historization. By showing different contexts of "war machines" (horse, chariot, cavalry, cannons, conventional and nuclear weapon, information technology),one can observe the influence of military technology on international relations in the process of uneven and related development of different societies in different times from antiquity to the present day. In particular, the results of transformation of relations between armed forces and scientific institutions after World War II into permanent structures of society and government are shown. On the example of United States of America, the author points negative consequences of forming bureaucratic national security services for many aspects of social life. Finally, referring to James Der Derian's analysis, the author presents transformative influence of information technology on international relations.

The American program BMD has been formally regarded as the greatest –alongside NATO enlargement to the East – challenge to the security of the Russian Federation since the establishment of the state at the end of 1991. However, due to the modernization omissions taken place in the last quarter of a century in Russia (in contrast to the impressive technological leap made in China) – particularly with regard to the economic sphere – in fact it can be a much greater potential challenge for the Russian economy, geopolitics and prestige than for its defense capabilities. Hence, an ambitious attempt of response consisting in pushing through the costly weapons programs can be – paradoxically – the same trap as an attempt to maintain parity in response to the mythical program SDI from the Soviet Union. Sufficient, in terms of the military effectiveness (deterrence effect), and at the same relatively cheapest cost, the answer is to keep Russia's strategic nuclear forces to present a quantitative ceiling. In the long term, decisive for the future position and strength of the country as well as its "attractiveness" and "attraction" in the international sphere will be a significant increase ofthe economic potential, especially in the sphere of high technologies and industries responsible for meeting the wider consumption. This type of strategy has led to the unprecedented development of China. ; Publikacja recenzowana ; Amerykański program BMD jest formalnie postrzegany jako największe – obok rozszerzania NATO na Wschód – wyzwanie dla bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyj-skiej od chwili powstania państwa w końcu 1991 r. Jednak ze względu na mające miejsce w ciągu ostatniego ćwierćwiecza w Rosji zaniechania modernizacyjne (w odróżnieniu od imponującego skoku technologicznego dokonanego w Chinach) – zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do sfery gospodarczej – faktycznie może on stanowić znacznie większe potencjalne wyzwanie dla rosyjskiej ekonomii, geopolityki i prestiżu niż dla jej zdolności obronnych. Stąd próba ambitnej odpowiedzi, polegającej na forsowaniu kosztownych programów zbrojeniowych, może być – paradoksalnie – taką samą pułapką, jak próba utrzymania parytetu w odpowiedzi na mityczny program SDI ze strony ZSRR. Wystarczającą pod względem efektywności militarnej (efektu odstraszania), a przy tym relatywnie najtańszą ekonomicznie odpowiedzią jest utrzymywanie przez Rosję strategicznych sił jądrowych na obecnym pułapie ilościowym. W długofalowej perspektywie de-cydujące dla przyszłej pozycji oraz siły tego państwa, a także jego "atrakcyjności" i "siły przyciągania" w przestrzeni międzynarodowej będzie znaczące podniesienie potencjału gospodarczego, zwłaszcza w sferze wysokich technologii oraz w branżach odpowiedzialnych za zaspokojenie szeroko rozumianej konsumpcji. Tego typu strategia doprowadziła do bezprecedensowego rozwoju Chin.