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På begynnelsen av 2000-tallet ble det norske invasjonsforsvaret nedlagt. Men hvilke årsaker var viktigst for denne beslutningen? Var det økonomiske, institusjonelle eller kulturelle årsaksforhold? I denne artikkelen legges hovedvekten på institusjonelle årsaker, særlig den norske frykten for at NATO skulle bli irrelevant for USA. Dermed var det bare en ting å gjøre: å avvikle invasjonsforsvaret slik at det kunne frigjøres friske penger. For slik kunne et lite allianseavhengig land, i utkanten av Europa, utenfor EU, og med felles grense til Russland, bidra med ekspedisjonære styrker. Ikke minst for å holde liv i et NATO som strevde med å gjøre seg relevante for USA, først på Balkan og senere i Afghanistan. Med kildemateriale fra Washington D.C., Brussel og Oslo mellom 1998 og 2002 tolkes Norges politiske kontekst inn i et institusjonelt perspektiv. Forhold som resiprositet, norsk omdømme og lojalitet i NATO, blir viktig for å forstå invasjonsforsvarets endelikt.
Abstract in English:NATO's Role in Norway's Defence Reforms, 1998–2002At the turn of the new milennium, Norway's anti-invasion defence concept vanished. What was the rationale for this decision? Was it economc, institutional or cultural reasons? The findings in this article emphasise institutional perspectives. Norwegian apprehensions over a possibly irrelevant NATO in the eyes of the United States stirred a fundamental post-Cold War defence reform. To preclude a future marginalisation of NATO, decision-makers in Oslo needed to free scarce resources from a static, territorial defence that had lost its political and military relevance in the High North. By forging a smaller but more professional force, with improved deployability, survivability and usability abroad, Norway could more effectively contribute to allied cohesiveness. Not least through improved risk- and burdensharing in NATO's out-of-area operations on the Balkans and in Afghanistan. By using primary sources from Washington, DC, Brussels and Oslo between 1998 and 2002, the data is interpretated though the lense of liberal institutionalism. Explanatory mechanisms such as Norwegian reciprocity in the High North, US expectations towards dependent allies abroad, and Norway's collective solidarity may explain why the anti-invasion concept died.

Under 2017 och 2018 ökade Kinas direktinvesteringar i Sverige avsevärt till följd av ett antal stora förvärv, mestadels i fordonsindustrin. Samtidigt har den svenska offentliga debatten kring kinesiska investeringar blivit mer kritisk sedan 2017, då investeringarna överlag talades om i positiva ordalag. Under 2018 och 2019 har en rad aktörer inom statliga myndigheter, politiska partier, media och civilsamhället beskrivit Kinas investeringar som ett potentiellt säkerhetshot. Näringslivsrepresentanter är mindre synliga i debatten men även här finns det en tydlig trend av ökad uppmärksamhet på potentiella säkerhetsrisker kopplade till kinesiska investeringar. Den svenska synen på Kina tycks konvergera allt mer med vad EU har kallat för sin nya "mer realistiska" hållning gentemot Peking. Ett antal policyprocesser har inletts, vilket sannolikt kommer leda till att svensk lagstiftning stärks på flera områden för att öka kontrollen av Kinas investeringar och engagemang i Sverige, särskilt i kritisk infrastruktur såsom telekommunikationsnät men även vad gäller företag vars verksamhet anses som säkerhetskänslig i mer generell bemärkelse.
Abstract in EnglishChinese Investments in Sweden: From Fame to Fear?China's direct investment in Sweden surged in 2017 and 2018 due to a number of large acquisitions, mostly in the automotive industry. At the same time, the public debate on Chinese investments has become more critical since 2017, when they were typically seen in a positive light. Throughout 2018 and 2019, a number of actors in government authorities, political parties, the media and civil society have described China's investments as a potential security threat. Although less prominent in the public debate, business representatives have also become increasingly vocal about potential security risks associated with Chinese investment. The Swedish view of China seems to be aligning with what the EU has called its new "more realistic" approach to Beijing. Meanwhile, a number of policy processes have been launched which are likely to lead to the strengthening of existing legal frameworks to scrutinise Chinese investment and activity in Sweden, especially concerning critical infrastructure such as telecommunications networks, but also more generally concerning companies whose activities are regarded as sensitive from a security perspective.

Nesten to tiår etter den USA-ledete intervensjonen i Afghanistan, på tross av massiv innsats for å bygge en afghansk stat, så kollapset den afghanske regjeringsstrukturen i august 2021, og Taliban gjeninntok hovedstaden Kabul. Hvorfor mislyktes det internasjonale statsbyggingsprosjektet? Kunne ekstern statsbygging ha lykkes om tilnærmingen var en annen? Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i nyere litteratur (David Lake, Melissa Lee, Roland Paris, Timothy Sisk) og gjør en analyse av hvordan dilemmaer i ekstern statsbygging manifesterte seg i Afghanistan henholdsvis på det politiske, militære og økonomiske området. Historisk har stabilitet i Afghanistan hvilt på en balanse mellom en svak sentralmakt og et betydelig rom for tradisjonelle samfunnsstrukturer. USA, som ekstern statsbygger, var opptatt av lojalitet fra en sterk sentralmakt, og underminerte derfor en maktfordeling som kunne gitt større grad av legitimitet. Resultatet ble en stat som var helt avhengig av ekstern støtte, og idet USA inngikk en avtale direkte med den væpnede opposisjonen, Taliban, så går den afghanske staten i oppløsning.
Abstract in EnglishDoomed to Fail? The US and the Afghan State-building Project, 2001–2021Nearly two decades after the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, following a massive effort to build an Afghan state, the country's government structure collapsed in August 2021, and the Taliban took control of the capitol Kabul. Why did international state-building fail? Could external state-building have been successful if the approach had been a different one? This article takes recent contributions to the literature on the dilemmas of external state-building as its point of departure (David Lake, Melissa Lee, Roland Paris, Timothy Sisk), and presents an analysis if how these dilemmas came to the fore in the political, military, and economic domains. Historically, Afghan stability have rested on a balance between a weak central authority, with considerable influence resting with traditional societal actors. The US, as an external state-builder, was concerned with loyalty from a strong central power, and thereby undermined the division of power that could otherwise have gained a higher degree of legitimacy. The result is a state which was fully dependent on external support, and as the US entered a treaty with the armed opposition, the Taliban, the Afghan state apparatus collapses.

Vi har omfattende forskningslitteraturer om hvordan norsk utenrikspolitikk på begynnelsen av 1900-årene kretset om fred, og om fremveksten og institusjonaliseringen av norsk freds- og forsoningsdiplomati fra midten av 1980-årene og til i dag. Vår kunnskap om den mellomliggende perioden og røttene til fredsdiplomatiet er mer mangelfull. Artikkelen sammenfatter det vi vet, og den presenterer en tidligere ukjent case fra 1966–1968, det såkalte Nobel-initiativet, der en gruppe norske borgere gikk sammen om å mobilisere nobelprisvinnere med sikte på å etablere en bakkanal for fredssamtaler mellom USA og Nord-Vietnam. Samfunnsinitiativet fikk helhjertet oppslutning fra den norske stat. Nobel-initiativet er dermed en forløper for det samarbeidet mellom stat og samfunn som skulle prege norsk freds- og forsoningsdiplomati. Gitt at vi også finner løse forelegg for freds- og forsoningsdiplomati i 1920-årene, gjør kunnskapen om Nobel-initiativet det mulig å påstå at vi gjennom det siste hundreåret konsistent finner norsk freds- og foroningsdiplomati i den utstrekning og den form som de internasjonale forholdene tillater.
Abstract in English:The Nobel Initiative from 1966 and the Long Lines in Norwegian Peace and Reconciliation DiplomacyNorway was the first state to institutionalise peace and reconciliation work as part of its overall diplomacy. As it emerged from the mid-1980s onwards, peace and reconciliation diplomacy has had two characteristics: it has been carried out by state and society groups in tandem, and it has targeted reconciling a regime and an internal opposition to that regime. The bulk of the article presents a 1966 initiative by a group of concerned Norwegian citizens to launch a back channel for American and North Vietnamese peace talks by mobilising winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, and demonstrates that this initiative received political, administrative and economic help from the Norwegian state. This makes it a precursor of today's peace and reconciliation initiative. Given the fledgling examples of Norwegian peace and reconciliation work that we find in the margins of the League of Nations during the 1920s, knowledge about the Nobel Initiative of 1966 warrants the claim that, for the past hundred years, Norway has consistently attempted peace and reconciliation work to the extent and in the form allowed by international conditions.

Det er gått en generasjon siden krigen i Bosnia-Hercegovina var over. Likevel lever landets innbyggere fortsatt i fattigdom og frustrasjon. Det kan virke som et mysterium at Bosnias stabile politiske elite holder seg ved makten i valgperiode etter valgperiode, uten å bli alvorlig utfordret. Dette på tross av at de jevnlig er involvert i korrupsjonsskandaler som tapper staten for ressurser, hindrer en velfungerende administrasjon og ødelegger tilliten mellom borgerne. Hva er det politikerne gir sine velgere, når de ikke kan gi dem fremskritt og velstand? En viktig del av svaret er: ideen om «etnisk rene» stater. Denne ideen betinger fortsatt mye av politikken i Bosnia-Hercegovina så vel som i flere av de andre jugoslaviske etterfølgerstatene. Aktører utenfra utnytter dette for å oppnå egne mål. Spesielt ser det ut som om Republika Srpskas sterke mann, Milorad Dodik, får russisk hjelp i stadige forsøk på å ytterligere sementere etniske skillelinjer i Bosnias statsordning. Men like lite som på 1990-tallet gir ideen om etnisk separasjon svar på hvordan landene i regionen kan oppnå velstand og leve i fred med naboene.
Abstract in English:«Isto sranje, novo pakovanje». 25 Years after Srebrenica: The Idea of Ethnically Pure States Still Influential in Bosnia-Herzegovina
25 years have passed since the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In spite of this, the citizens live in poverty and frustration. It is hard to grasp how Bosnia's enduring political elite can stay in power without being seriously challenged. Even though they regularly figure in corruption scandals that drain the state's resources, hobble the administration and institutions and destroy mutual trust within the population. What, then, do the politicians offer their voters, when they cannot deliver progress and prosperity? A key part of the answer is: the idea of an 'ethnically pure' state. This idea still has a large impact on politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as in the other Yugoslav successor states. External actors are exploiting the idea for their own purposes; in particular it seems the Republika Srpska strongman, Milorad Dodik, is getting Russian help in his continuing endeavour to further cement ethnic divisions in Bosnia. But just like in the 1990s, the idea of ethnic separation fails to offer solutions as to how the region's countries can become prosperous and live in peace with their neighbours.

De siste ti årene har enkelte avgjørelser i norsk barnevern skapt sterke internasjonale reaksjoner. Våren 2016 demonstrerte over 8000 personer i elleve land i forbindelse med en sak som angikk en norsk-rumensk familie. Denne artikkelen undersøker tre saker som har gitt Norge betydelige diplomatiske utfordringer (India 2011, Russland 2014 og Romania 2016). Artikkelen ser på hvorfor sakene utløste så sterke reaksjoner, og redegjør for hvordan norske myndigheter håndterte sakene. Vi beskriver også gjeldende norsk lovverk og prosedyrer på feltet. Et viktig funn i vår undersøkelse er at alle sakene kan knyttes til andre sterke drivkrefter i det aktuelle landet. Det er kombinasjonen av en dramatisk familiehistorie i møte med en større politisk agenda som gjør sakene så kraftfulle og betente i de enkelte landene. I materialet vi legger frem, finner vi også tegn til læring og forbedring i Utenriksdepartementets (UD) håndtering, og også utvikling og forbedring i måten UD har samarbeidet med andre deler av embetsverket på. Samtidig stiller artikkelen spørsmål ved hvorfor et sentralt verktøy i arbeidet med å håndtere denne type saker (ratifiseringen av Haagkonvensjonen), kom på plass så sent.
Abstract in EnglishDiplomatic Controversies Sparked by Decisions of the Norwegian Child Welfare Service: A Preliminary AssessmentDecisions taken by the Norwegian child welfare services have in the past decade, in some cases, created strong international reactions. In the spring of 2016, over 8,000 people in eleven countries demonstrated in connection with a case involving a Norwegian-Romanian family. This article examines three issues that have presented significant diplomatic challenges to Norway (India 2011, Russia 2014 and Romania 2016). The article looks at why the cases triggered such strong reactions and explains how the Norwegian authorities handled these cases. It also outlines the relevant Norwegian legislation and judicial procedures in the field. The paper finds that the three controversial cases assessed linked with other strong driving forces or national political issues in the country in question. In the material we present, there is also evidence of learning and improvement in the way the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs handled these challenges, and there also seems to have been improvement in the way the Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborated with other parts of the civil service. At the same time, the article questions why a key tool in dealing with these types of cases (The 1996 Hague Convention) was ratified so late in Norway.

Ukrainekrisen har forstyrret det ellers velfungerende samarbejde i Arktis, og det er blevet vanskeligere at samarbejde om både militære, diplomatiske og økonomiske forhold. Dog er krisens betydning mere begrænset, end man kunne have frygtet. Ruslands vigtige interesse i arktisk olie og gas gør, at Moskva har ført en mindre aggressiv politik i det høje nord. I stedet er det særligt Vesten, der har bragt krisen til polarregionen ved at inddrage regionen i sine sanktionspakker, og det kan betyde, at Rusland skifter kurs i fremtiden. I så fald vil Rusland ikke søge en direkte militær konfrontation, men i stedet udnytte politiske svagheder i den vestlige alliance ved hjælp af provokationer, obstruktion af samarbejde og suverænitetskrænkelser. Rigsfællesskabet bør fortsætte sin samarbejdsorienterede politik i Arktis. Praktisk samarbejde og åbne kommunikationskanaler til Moskva vil gøre det muligt at afspænde situationen og undgå, at misforståelser og enkeltstående episoder fører til en unødig eskalering. Samtidig bør Rigsfællesskabet dog forberede sig på, at Rusland kan skifte kurs i Arktis i det omfang, at disse forberedelser ikke underminerer den samarbejdsorienterede politik. ; The Ukraine crisis has made it more difficult to cooperate over military, diplomatic, and economic matters in the Arctic, but the impact of the crisis is less severe than it could have been. Oil and gas exploration and exploitation in the Arctic is central to Russia's grand strategy and it makes Russia more dependent on the other states in the Arctic, and thus more prone to cooperate in the region. Instead, it is mainly the West that has brought the crisis to the High North by including the region in its sanction packages. It may become rational for Russia to change to a more aggressive course in the Arctic. Russia will not seek a military confrontation in that case, but will instead exploit political weaknesses in the Western alliance through provocations, obstructions of cooperation, and violations of sovereignty. The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, the Faeroe Islands, and Greenland) should continue its cooperation-oriented policy in the Arctic. Practical cooperation and open channels of communication enable Denmark and the Western states to lower tensions and to avoid that a single incident or misunderstanding escalates the situation. The Kingdom of Denmark should concurrently prepare for how to handle a more assertive Russia in the Arctic, insofar as these preparations do not undermine its cooperation-oriented policy in the High North.

Artikkelen ser på den teknologiske og strategiske rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina hva gjelder implementeringen av 5G-nettverk, og spør hva som er med å påvirke hvordan andre stater posisjonerer seg mellom de to supermaktene. Ved å bygge på tre grener av politisk realisme – balance-of-threat-teoriens tanke om at trusseloppfatning driver staters valg av allianser, patron–klient-teoriens tro på at USA kan forvente at deres klientstater innretter seg etter amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, og teorien om at handelsrelasjoner kan brukes som maktverktøy – utleder jeg et sett med hypoteser og potensielt relevante forklaringsvariabler. Som avhengig variabel samler jeg 70 staters holdninger til Kinas omstridte telekommunikasjonsgigant Huaweis rolle i 5G. Bivariat analyse avslører tre hovedmønstre: (1) Stater som er små og maktesløse i forhold til Kina, samt statene i Kinas geografiske region, ser ut til å være mer aksepterende til Huaweis 5G. (2) Stater som ser på USA som sin patron og som er avhengige av Washingtons sikkerhetsgaranti ser ut til å være betydelig mer avvisende til selskapets 5G. (3) Handelsrelasjoner til både USA og Kina ser ut til å ha liten eller ingen effekt på staters holdninger. Av de tre realisme-grenene er det altså patron–klient-teorien som veier tyngst når det gjelder å forklare staters holdninger til Huaweis 5G.
Abstract in English:The US way or the Huawei: An analysis of how small and medium states stand on the Chinese giant's role in 5GThis article examines the technological and strategic rivalry between the US and China on the implementation of 5G networks, asking what influences how other states position themselves between the two superpowers. By building on three branches of political realism – balance-of-threat theory's notion that perception of threat drives states' alliance choices, patron-client theory's belief that the US can expect its client states to adhere to American foreign policy, and the theory that trade relations can be used as power tools – I derive a set of hypotheses and potentially relevant explanatory variables. As dependent variable, I measure 70 states' stances on China's controversial telecom giant Huawei's role in 5G. Bivariate analysis reveals three primary patterns: (1) States who are dwarfed by China's power, as well as states in China's immediate geographic region, appear to be more acceptive of Huawei's 5G. (2) States who see the US as their patron and who rely on Washington's security guarantee appear to be much more rejective of the company's 5G. (3) Trade relations to both the US and China appear to have little or no effect on states' stances. Of the three branches of realism, it is the patron-client theory that offers the most weight in explaining states' stances on Huawei's 5G.

FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen er innlysende riktig. Forpliktelsene går neppe lenger enn Ikkespredningsavtalen, som Norge sluttet seg til allerede i 1970. Avskrekking med atomvåpen forutsetter at de må være klare til bruk for å bli umulige å bruke. Særlig i kriser blir en slik tankegang lett farlig fordi den kan utløse atomkrig ved misforståelser. Likevel er den norske regjeringens motstand mot FNs totalforbud rasjonell fordi hensikten er å forebygge en endring i oppfatning om maktbalanse som kunne undergrave Norges selvstendighet. Spørsmålet blir derfor om risiko for atomkrig kan reduseres uten å øke fare for press, og i verste fall angrep? Artikkelen presenterer egen forskning om hvordan konfrontasjonen i første halvdel av 1980-tallet mellom de to tyske stater førte til risiko for storkrig utløst av gjensidige misforståelser på begge sider av det daværende jernteppet. Teorier om tankeprosesser forklarer misforståelsene som universelle kognitive begrensninger. Forholdene i dag er på vesentlige punkter sammenliknbare med første halvdel av 1980-årene, da det på tross av spenninger likevel var rom for initiativ til felles sikkerhet. Artikkelen konkluderer derfor med at Norge bør slutte seg til FNs totalforbud mot atomvåpen, og sammen med Sverige ta initiativ til en felleseuropeisk dialog med Russland om en europeisk sikkerhetsordning bygd på forestillinger om felles sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Norwegian Support for the UN's Total Ban on Nuclear Weapons?The article argues that while the UN ban on nuclear arms is obviously sensible, the Norwegian Government's objections are still rational. Rejecting the US nuclear arms umbrella undermines deterrence to the degree that is the perception. The article sets out how cognitive processes determine perceptions of deterrence and risks of war. Shifting nuclear strategies are attempts to cope with the contradiction between deterrence and the inherent impossible choice of nuclear war. The Cold War in the first half of the 1980s shows how nuclear arms, though intended as deterrence, in a confrontation may be misperceived as a looming attack. This misperception almost caused nuclear war by inadvertence, as it could again. The fear of attack may prompt a compelling sense of urgency for a preemptive strike. This is the only real risk of large-scale war in Europe. Therefore, the Norwegian Government should join the UN ban on nuclear arms to reduce tensions in Europe. In a joint initiative with Sweden, which has already endorsed the ban, Norway should persuade other European states to enable a political process with Russia towards a European common security without the looming threat of nuclear arms. Military force should not exceed the minimum required to block intimidation, coercion, and low-intensity aggression.

"10 years after NATO Membership. An Anniversary in the Shadow of a Crisis", indeholder artikler fra politiske aktører, diplomater og forskere, der alle bidrog til til konferencen af samme navn, hvor den 10-året for baltisk medlemskab af NATO var omdrejningspunktet. Udover den danske forsvarsminister, er den estiske og litauiske forsvarsminister og NATO's vicegeneralsekretær blandt bidragyderne. Konferencens formål var at fejre, inddrage og diskutere 10 års forsvarspolitisk NATO-samarbejde i Østersøområdet. Den internationale udvikling i Europa betød at konferencens dagsorden i stedet for kom til at stå i skyggen af krisen i Ukraine, og det anspændte europæiske forhold til Rusland. Dette afspejledes ikke kun på selve konferencen, men har også sat et dybt fodaftryk på publikationen, der dels belyser det forsvarspolitiske samarbejde mellem Danmark og de baltiske stater, dels tegner et billede af hvordan den russiske aggression på Krimhalvøen blev italesat af de repræsenterede landes Forsvarsministre samt fra hovedkvarteret i NATO. Konferencen blev afholdt tidligere i år i København, og var et resultat af et tæt samarbejde mellem Forsvarsakademiet, Forsvarsministeriet og ambassadørerne for Estland, Letland og Litauen i Danmark. ; Since the recognition of their independence in 1921, the three Baltic States Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have enjoyed a special status in Danish foreign policy that has continued into present-day times. Being one of the few countries that never officially recognized the Soviet annexation in 1940, Denmark became an early advocate in relation to Baltic membership of NATO in the wake of the Cold War. Defence cooperation, such as the joint contribution to the missions in the Balkans in the early 1990s, as well as the present air policing mission, first initiated in 2004, has been an important part of the political relationship. A conference celebrating and evaluating the first ten years of NATO membership was quite naturally a high-level event to be placed in Copenhagen. As progress with planning the conference proceeded, the international security community suddenly faced a crisis in Crimea, when separatists, with Russian support, gradually took control of the Crimean Peninsula. In only 24 days, what had initially been demonstrations and protests evolved into a complete Russian annexation, through a very dubious local democratic election, where independence from Ukraine, as well as affi liation to Russia, was declared with 96% of voters in favor of joining Russia. These events naturally had a massive impact on this conference, which resulted in an anniversary in the shadow of a crisis. This turn of events forced a new discussion upon the member states of NATO: What is the main purpose of the Alliance? This question became a focal point for the conference, as well as the articles presented here.

The regional powerhouse, South Africa, has since the introduction of the nonracial democratic dispensation in 1994, played a central and important role in the formation of both the regional and continental security architecture. With the establishment of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992, one of the central areas of collaboration for the community was envisioned to be security, understood within a broadened human security framework. Security was therefore from the outset one of the cornerstones of integration in the SADC. It was believed that the formation of a security community would help dismantle the enmities that had plagued regional relations during the apartheid era. For some parties, institutionalisation of relations pointed to a means of stabilising and disseminating a particular order. Such institutions depict the power relations prevailing at the time of their establishment, which, however, can change over time (Cox 1981:136). The integration ambition surrounding security correlated with the ambitions of South Africa, the new democratic government in the regional powerhouse. South Africa and its overall foreign policy ambitions desired the pursuit of peace, democracy and stability for economic growth and development in the region and within South Africa itself. Since South Africa's acceptance into the SADC in 1994, the organisation has attempted to set up the required institutional framework to enable co-operation on security, both in terms of narrow military co-operation and regarding designated 2 softer security issues, such as migration and cross-border crime. The military cooperation moved forward in the early years after 1994 with the 1996 decision of creating an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC)1 and later the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact (MDP) in 2003, and eventually the creation of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) in 2004, which operationalised the OPDSC (SADC 2004). However, the actual military cooperation, e.g. military exercises, came close to a standstill. Several developments obstructed military co-operation of which the evolving crisis in Zimbabwe and the subsequent withdrawal of donor support to, for instance, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Harare are but two examples. The RPTC constituted the backbone of the co-operation, but political differences between member states illustrated during the Zimbabwean crisis and following the mandate of the interventions in especially the DR Congo and partly Lesotho in 1998 all contributed to regional tensions.2 Despite the crisis, SADC members, and in particular South Africa, declared that the organisation would be able to form a regional stand-by brigade for the use of the African Union (AU) as part of its wider security architecture. On 17 August 2007, the SADC declared its stand-by-force operational at a large parade in Lusaka, Zambia and at the same occasion signed a memorandum of understanding on the SADCBRIG (SADC 2007). According to the timeline provided by the AU, the brigade should be fully operational by June 2010. Former South African deputy foreign minister Aziz Pahad stated after the launch that this was an important step, but that now there was much to be done securing joint levels and types of training, interoperability, etc. (Pahad 2007). The question that continues to linger is to what extent this brigade is operational and for what purpose. Is this new regional military formation in its present form just a paper tiger, or is it "real progress" and an example of "successful" regional cooperation and integration? This article scrutinises the security co-operation and integration in SADC and asks whether an apparent lack of common values between SADC member states are blocking the security integration process, the creation of a security community, and thereby the establishment of an effective stand-by brigade, the so-called SADCBRIG. The article furthermore attempts to scrutinise the role played by South Africa in establishing the SADCBRIG.