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The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.

On April 25, 2013, UN's Security Council established a 12,600-strong peacekeeping force for Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) is to take over and continue the security and stabilization task that the French-led military operation in cooperation with UN's African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, initiated in January 2013. The aim of this report is to present a number of long- and short-term perspectives for the recently initiated peace- and state-building process in Mali by focusing on the historical, structural and political causes of the crisis in Mali. Understanding these causes and handling their derived conflict potentials provide a minimum of prerequisites for establishing long-term peace. The report is structured according to four intertwined conflict potentials: Mali's fragile state, the status and background of the Tuareg rebellion, the organized crime and the regional cooperation. .

Globale helsespørsmål har mange berøringspunkter med internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, men har blitt viet relativt lite oppmerksomhet i diskusjoner i FNs sikkerhetsråd. Denne artikkelen gir en oversikt over kunnskapsgrunnlaget for sammenhengen mellom helse og internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, og belyser fire hovedgrupper av årsakssammenhenger. For det første kan uhelse føre til væpnet konflikt. For det andre kan helsekriser bidra til å svekke beredskapen mot konflikt. For det tredje kan helseintervensjoner bidra til å stabilisere sårbare samfunn i kjølvannet av konflikt. For det fjerde gjør konflikt det vanskelig å løse helsekriser. Alle disse berører også direkte eller indirekte Norges fire hovedprioriteter som valgt medlem i FNs sikkerhetsråd for perioden 2021–2022. Gjennomgangen av disse fire årsakssammenhengene demonstrerer at globale helsespørsmål på flere områder er klart relevante for global sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Global Health and Security – an Overview of Academic KnowledgeGlobal health issues are relevant to international peace and security in numerous ways but have so far received little attention in the United Nations Security Council. This article provides an overview of the status of academic knowledge about the ways that global health and international peace and security are connected, and it highlights four main causal relationships. First, societies with poor overall health conditions or with great health inequalities between different groups, are more prone to armed conflict. Second, health crises can weaken societies' resilience and capacity to deal with conflict. Third, health interventions may contribute to stabilize vulnerable post-conflict societies in the wake of conflict. And fourth, armed conflict makes it more difficult to solve health crises. All four aspects of the health and security nexus directly or indirectly touch on Norway's four main priorities as an elected member of the UN Security Council in 2021–2022. The presentation of the various causal relations demonstrates that global health issues are clearly relevant for global security.

Tora Sagård, of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), reviews Hva er Internasjonal Politikk (What Is International Relations), by Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira.

Hvordan håndterer Norge sin militæraktivisme og sitt NATO-medlemskap når landet vil presentere seg selv som en fredsnasjon? Problemstillingen ble aktuell i det norske utenriksdepartementets nylige kampanje for å få Norge valgt inn i FNs sikkerhetsråd, hvor ideen om Norge som fredsnasjon stod sentralt. I denne artikkelen bruker vi nasjonsbranding som et analytisk rammeverk for å forstå hvordan Norge bygget opp sin kampanje som fredsnasjon og håndterte det konkurrerende narrativet om sin rolle i krig. Som et sekundærfokus ser vi også på hvordan Norges to konkurrenter, Irland og Canada, fremstilte seg på disse to dimensjonene – som er av særinteresse da Irland ikke er NATO-medlem. For å utforske disse spørsmålene analyserer vi taler og tekster fra det norske diplomatiet og regjeringen vedrørende kampanjen, samt ser på kampanjematerialet til de tre landene. Gitt at de tre landenes profil er påfallende lik, fant vi at alle måtte forsøke å finne en måte å brande seg på som uttrykket ens særtrekk og høynet ens relevans i sammenligning med de to andre landene. I analysen av Norge ser vi at militæraktivisme stadig ble hvisket ut i løpet av den norske kampanjen og at andre tematikker ble brukt i brandingen – som for eksempel likestilling og bidrag til internasjonal utvikling. Dette skulle dermed skulle legitimere ideen om fredsnasjonen Norge, et land som alle andre kan stole på.
Abstract in English:Military Activism Branded as Peace Activism? Norway's Campaign for a Seat on the UN Security CouncilIn seeking to present itself as a peace nation, how has Norway sought to address its military activism and NATO membership? This tension was apparent in Norway's recent campaign for a seat on the UN Security Council, where the idea of the country as a peace nation stood central. Using nation branding as an analytical framework, we ask how Norway built and sustained this peace narrative and managed the competing narrative of its role in controversial armed conflicts. As a secondary focus, we ask how Norway's two competitors, Ireland and Canada, presented themselves on these two axes of peace and military activism. Ireland posed a particular threat as it is not a NATO member. To explore these questions, we analyse speeches and texts from Norwegian officials regarding the campaign and examine the official campaign material from all three countries. Given that the image of all three countries was generally similar, we find that each country sought to find unique ways to brand themselves as well as countering the few specific advantages of the others. In the case of Norway, we find that during the campaign the country's military activism was downplayed and other themes were foregrounded in the branding, such as gender equality and international development cooperation. This would legitimate the idea of Norway as a peace nation, a reliable partner that all states could trust.

Vi har omfattende forskningslitteraturer om hvordan norsk utenrikspolitikk på begynnelsen av 1900-årene kretset om fred, og om fremveksten og institusjonaliseringen av norsk freds- og forsoningsdiplomati fra midten av 1980-årene og til i dag. Vår kunnskap om den mellomliggende perioden og røttene til fredsdiplomatiet er mer mangelfull. Artikkelen sammenfatter det vi vet, og den presenterer en tidligere ukjent case fra 1966–1968, det såkalte Nobel-initiativet, der en gruppe norske borgere gikk sammen om å mobilisere nobelprisvinnere med sikte på å etablere en bakkanal for fredssamtaler mellom USA og Nord-Vietnam. Samfunnsinitiativet fikk helhjertet oppslutning fra den norske stat. Nobel-initiativet er dermed en forløper for det samarbeidet mellom stat og samfunn som skulle prege norsk freds- og forsoningsdiplomati. Gitt at vi også finner løse forelegg for freds- og forsoningsdiplomati i 1920-årene, gjør kunnskapen om Nobel-initiativet det mulig å påstå at vi gjennom det siste hundreåret konsistent finner norsk freds- og foroningsdiplomati i den utstrekning og den form som de internasjonale forholdene tillater.
Abstract in English:The Nobel Initiative from 1966 and the Long Lines in Norwegian Peace and Reconciliation DiplomacyNorway was the first state to institutionalise peace and reconciliation work as part of its overall diplomacy. As it emerged from the mid-1980s onwards, peace and reconciliation diplomacy has had two characteristics: it has been carried out by state and society groups in tandem, and it has targeted reconciling a regime and an internal opposition to that regime. The bulk of the article presents a 1966 initiative by a group of concerned Norwegian citizens to launch a back channel for American and North Vietnamese peace talks by mobilising winners of the Nobel Peace Prize, and demonstrates that this initiative received political, administrative and economic help from the Norwegian state. This makes it a precursor of today's peace and reconciliation initiative. Given the fledgling examples of Norwegian peace and reconciliation work that we find in the margins of the League of Nations during the 1920s, knowledge about the Nobel Initiative of 1966 warrants the claim that, for the past hundred years, Norway has consistently attempted peace and reconciliation work to the extent and in the form allowed by international conditions.

Hvordan Norge håndterer sin militæraktivisme og fredsaktivisme ble aktualisert i kampanjen for et sete i sikkerhetsrådet. Aktivisme forstås her som nasjonens villighet til å ta initiativ på tross av kostnader. I denne replikken svarer vi på Friis sin kommentar som trekker verdien av vårt bidrag i tvil, da han omtaler vår analyse av Norges unnlatelse av å fremme sin militæraktivisme til fordel for «mykere verdier», som «gammelt nytt.» I kampanjen fremmet Norge både militæraktivisme og fredsaktivisme, men i ulikt materiale og forum. Vi hevder dermed at dette som et minimum er gammelt nytt i nye klær. Ved bruk av nasjonsbranding-rammeverket finner vi at Norge ønsket å fremstille seg som en aktør som er villig til å bidra, samtidig med å understreke Norge som en ikke utpreget militæraktør.
Abstract in English"Old News" on Military Activism and Peace Activism in New ClothesHow Norway communicates its military activism and peace activism was actualized in the campaign for a seat on the Security Council. Activism is here understood as the nation's willingness to take initiatives despite the costs. In Friis' comment on our article, he questions the value of our contribution, as he categorises our analysis of Norway's public relations focus on "softer values" over its military activism, as "old news". However, Norway in the campaign emphasized both military activism and peace activism, but in different ways and and different forums. We thus claim that this – as a minimum – is interesting old news in new clothes. By using the nation branding framework in the context of a tightly contested political contest, we find that Norway sought to present itself as an actor that was willing to make significant contributions to security, whilst stressing simultaneously that Norway was a non-military actor.

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

EU har gjort en stor feil ved ikke å drive gjennom EU-medlemskap for Bosnia-Hercegovina. De stadige utsettelsene skyldes flere ting, blant annet nasjonale hensyn i EUs medlemsland og en fastlåst politisk situasjon i Bosnia-Hercegovina, som gjør nødvendige reformer vanskelig. Dette har skapt håpløshet i befolkningen og bidrar til fortsatt politisk ustabilitet. Rask integrering i EU og Nato er den eneste sikre veien til fred og utvikling i Bosnia-Hercegovina – og på Vest-Balkan generelt.
Abstract in English: Europe's Betrayal of Bosnia and Herzegovina
The EU has made a major mistake by not driving through EU membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constant delays are due to several things, including national considerations in EU member states and a deadlocked political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making necessary reforms difficult. This has created hopelessness in the population and contributes to continued political instability. Rapid integration in the EU and Nato is the only safe path to peace and development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the Western Balkans in general.The EU has made a major mistake by not driving through EU membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The constant delays are due to several things, including national considerations in EU member states and a deadlocked political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, making necessary reforms difficult. This has created hopelessness in the population and contributes to continued political instability. Rapid integration in the EU and Nato is the only safe path to peace and development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the Western Balkans in general.

BILATERAL RELATIONS ON THE MEND: Transforming the Mosaic of Opportunities into Policies of Stability and Reconciliation between Afghanistan & PakistanBilateral reconciliation and trust building between Afghanistan and Pakistan require determined individuals who will prioritize identification of workable solutions to regional instability.This report summarizes recommendations on how to approach such solutions. The recommendations emerged during two rounds of track-II dialogue – one in Kabul in May, and one in Islamabad in September, 2017 - between influential individuals from Afghanistan and Pakistan, organized by the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) and the Regional Peace Institute (RPI).In addition to discussing a host of other issues, the two rounds of the conference generated ideas and innovative suggestions on how to deal with peace negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban, the future of Western engagement in Afghanistan, ways to resolve the Afghan refugee crisis and increasing the volume of trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan.The constructive and innovative development of recommendations during both rounds went beyond initial expectations in terms of volume and quality. However, generating innovative policy recommendations, by itself, is insufficient without their effective implementation.This report can be viewed as a mosaic of ideas and opportunities to enter a path of reconciliation and stability. If implemented, these ideas and recommendations can lead to addressing the outstanding issues between Afghanistan & Pakistan.By presenting this mosaic of progress, this report, and the authors behind it aspire to contribute in a meaningful manner to mending the existing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.