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: Indonesia has potential in cooperation on the intermission of UN peacekeeping tasks, although the need for UN intermission does not occur frequently (incidentally), but it needs to be prepared in order to anticipate opportunities and challenges in the development of the situation in UN PKOs, as has happened to the Indonesian Armed Forces Engineer Company Taskforce/Garuda Contingent. XXXII-C, through a decision-making mechanism based on the UN Resolution in UN PKOs to carry out the intermission of peacekeeping tasks from Haiti to Central Africa (2014-2015). The Kizi Taskforce TNI/Konga XXXIIC/MINUSTAH or Konga XXXVII-A/MINUSCA, can complete their duties as UN peacekeepers on duty at the UN Mission in MINUSTAH - Haiti and carry out UN Peace Task Intermissions in MINUSCA, in order to prepare missions in the African Republic Center (CAR). On this "rare" opportunity, the UN intermission process can be carried out properly through effective diplomacy and negotiations, so that the TNI/Konga XXXII-C Kizi Taskforce can carry out tasks in two different missions at once. And on this occasion, the researcher tries to explore the data in the form of a research entitled "Implementation of the United Nations Peacekeeping Taskforce; Case Study of Intermission of Satga IEC/Konga XXXII-C from Haiti to Central Africa (2014-2015)", In this study, I tried to explain the mechanism and implementation of the UN peacekeeping mission, accompanied by various challenges and obstacles faced in the area of operation. as well as the steps and efforts taken to overcome them, so that the task of ending the mission of the IEC/Garuda contingent in Haiti and the reopening of the UN mission in the Central African Republic can take place safely and smoothly. The researcher explored this research, considering that this form of intermission assignment rarely occurs, not only in the IEC Taskforce/Garuda Contingent, but also in UN peacekeeping operations.

After the Vienna Congress in 1815, the Allied ministers did not return home, but continued their negotiations in Paris. They deliberated on the measure of reparation payments and arrear payments that France owed to the other European states. The new peace also rested on financial securities. The United Kingdom of the Netherlands assumed a large part in these conferences, since through the mass of private claims it was France's largest creditor. In this article we demonstrate how, as one of the essentials of the new concert diplomacy of 1815, smaller powers such as the Netherlands were allowed to weigh in on the Four Powers' deliberations in Paris. The political conundrums regarding these financial securities and reparationshave not been charted and analysed before. Through previously unstudied sources,such as the minutes of the Paris Ministerial Conference, we discuss the influence a secondary power could exert provided they deployed smart financial experts. Under that condition large political and financial gains could be made.

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2)When the Home Front meets Foreign Parts. The Aftermath of Commissions of Inquiry into derailed Peace MissionsPeace Missions take place in difficult and volatile circumstances. It is therefore hardly surprising that some peace missions become 'derailed'. Christ Klep zooms in on three 'derailed' missions in his book and focuses on the value of Commissions of Inquiry which are subsequently set up as a result of public and political pressure. Do they succeed in revealing the 'how' and the 'why' of such derailments and – above all – identifying those who are responsible? Based on a broad spectrum of questions and extensive source materials, Klep concludes that 'the number of escape routes from the labyrinth of responsibility is practically infinite'; a clear message for all those taking part in international and domestic politics. It is here that the author skillfully and expertly succeeds: exposing the complex entanglement of domestic and foreign policy, even concerning events that sometimes happen away from the capital city.

India and Pakistan both are South Asian nuclear states, having a historical animosity that mainly stems from unresolved Kashmir issue. Both states realized the importance of peace therefore went for the negotiations after every battle. However, neither war nor negotiation could lead to the permanent solution. This article presents a critical analysis of the talks and negotiations held from 1998 to 2004 in order to restore peace and to resolve conflicts between both neighbors. The official documents i.e. declarations, agreements and recommendations of the CBMs have provided quite solid material for analytical discussion. Though a great desire of resolving all issues peacefully, including the issue of water and Kashmir through dialogue on both sides have been explored from this analysis, however the resilient elements prevail and deteriorate the peace process on both sides. The role of media has also been found negative in making public opinion. If the international law is implemented and the people of Kashmir are given their right of self-determination under the UNO resolutions both countries can live in peace and address their other issues

J. Galtung's redefinition of the concept of peace is a classic example of an attempt to reorient a discipline by coining a new term; but it should not be the pleasant connotation of the term 'positive peace', but its usefulness in studying factual violence, which should be decisive in determining the merits of the new definition. Three objections to Galtung's definition are raised: (1) It is quite ineffective to criticize the 'minimal' definition of violence, which is meant to refer to observable phenomena, by counterproposing a theoretical construct. Galtung's definition of violence, which, apart from 'direct' violence, includes also 'structural' violence, needs prior operationalization before it can be used in empirical research. (2) Although Galtung's use of the term 'structural violence' suggests otherwise, any indication of the social units to which the 'actual' & 'potential realizations' in his definition of violence refer, is lacking. Most of Galtung's examples are at the individual level. Social interdependencies (eg, those resulting from the DofL) necessitate the introduction of properties of the SE order in Galtung's terminology & require that he make explicit how 'the best attainable realizations' (as the most likely interpretation of 'potential realizations') can be incorporated in his thinking. (3) In drawing a distinction between 'personal violence' & 'structural violence', Galtung mistakes a distinction between theoretical alternatives in the study of violence (ie, the Clausewitzian approach vs the causal-empirical approach) for a distinction between kinds of violent relationships. In emphasizing that the causes of war should also be searched for in periods of peace, Q. Wright has shown that 'positive peace' cannot be considered as an alternative for 'negative peace'. Nevertheless, Galtung's use of the term has induced serious disagreement among peace researchers about the most desirable research strategy in their discipline. 'Critical' peace researchers (Galtung not included) tend to rely on ideological testimony instead of empirical proof for the causes of violence. Research into those causes, including the relationship between social injustice & violence, is regarded a more fruitful approach. 6 Tables. Modified HA.

Klep, Christ, Somalië, Rwanda, Srebrenica. De nasleep van drie ontspoorde vredesmissies (Dissertatie Utrecht 2008; Amsterdam: Boom, 2008, 385 blz., ISBN 978 90 8506 668 2).ResponseThe validity of my comparative approach (Somalia-Rwanda-Srebrenica) still stands, in my opinion. At the level of political responsibility and the process of coming to terms with events, the similarities are stronger than the differences. My estimation that the Inquiry reports were 'hijacked' by almost all of the stakeholders involved (especially the Canadian, Belgian and Dutch governments) is more of a matter of fact and a political reality than a reproach that ought to have legal implications. Finally, the question of how far the three governments that were involved learned lessons from the three affairs is difficult to answer. Was it not also the wider developments (for example, the switch from the 'blue' missions to the more robust 'green' missions) that compelled the lessons to be drawn out?